Karnataka High Court
Lakshmamma vs Lakshmamma on 26 November, 2025
Author: H.P.Sandesh
Bench: H.P.Sandesh
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NC: 2025:KHC:49215
RSA No. 1539 of 2024
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 26TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 1539 OF 2024 (PAR)
BETWEEN:
1. LAKSHMAMMA
W/O LATE BETTEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
2. RAMEGOWDA,
S/O LATE PAPEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
3. SUDHA.
W/O RAMEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
ALL ARE R/AT HARAVU VILLAGE,
Digitally signed CHINAKUARALI HOBLI,
by DEVIKA M
Location: HIGH PANDAVAPURA TALUK.
COURT OF MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 427.
KARNATAKA
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. MANJEGOWDA D.S., ADVOCATE)
AND:
LAKSHMAMMA W/O. PUTTASWAMY,
D/O. PAPEGOWDA
R/OF SRINIVASA AGRAHARA VILLAGE
K. SHETTAHALLI HOBLI, SRIRANGAPATNA TALUK
SINCE DEAD BY LRS.
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RSA No. 1539 of 2024
HC-KAR
1. SMT. MANJULA.
W/O PUTTASWAMY,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF MANDYADA KOPPALU VILLAGE,
HARAKERE HOBLI,
SRIRANGAPATNA TALUK.
MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 415.
2. REKHA,
W/O RAVIKUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.3015,
GOKULAM 1ST STAGE,
GOKULAM MAIN ROAD,
V.V.MOHALLA,
MYSURU - 570 001.
3. P. AJAY,
S/O LATE PUTTASWAMY,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF SRINIVASA AGRAHARA VILLAGE,
K.SHETTAHALLI HOBLI,
SRIRANGAPATNA TALUK,
MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 807.
...RESPONDENTS
THIS RSA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF CPC
AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT AND DECREE DATED 12.08.2024
PASSED IN RA NO. 5029/2020 ON THE FILE OF THE III
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE AT, MANDYA
(SITTING AT SRIRANGAPATNA) ALLOWING THE APPEAL AND
SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
14.01.2020 PASSED IN OS.NO.23/2012 ON THE FILE OF THE
SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, PANDAVAPURA.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
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RSA No. 1539 of 2024
HC-KAR
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
ORAL JUDGMENT
This second appeal is filed against the concurrent
findings of the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate
Court.
2. This matter is listed for admission.
3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants in
length.
4. The factual matrix of case of plaintiff before the
Trial Court is that the suit schedule properties are the
ancestral and joint family properties of the plaintiff and the
defendants. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 contended that Item
No. 1 of the property is the self-acquired property of
Papegowda and Item No.2 property is the self-acquired
property of defendant No.2. They further contended that
during the lifetime of Papegowda, he himself effected a
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partition in respect of Item No.1 of the property and
allotted the same to his two sons in equal shares.
5. The Trial Court, after considering the pleadings
of the parties, framed the issues and allowed the parties to
lead evidence. The plaintiff, in order to prove her case,
examined herself as PW-1 and got marked documents as
Exs.P1 to P5. On the other hand, the defendants examined
3 witnesses as DW-1 to DW-3 and got marked documents
as Exs.D1 to D9.
6. Upon considering both the oral and
documentary evidence, it is not in dispute that the
property belongs to the father of Papegowda. The only
contention raised is that a partition had taken place during
the lifetime of the father as per Ex.D2. However, Ex.D2 is
not a registered document, and no material is placed on
record to establish that the parties acted upon the said
document. Except relying upon Exs.D8 and D9, the tax
paid receipts, the death certificate (Ex.D5), and certain
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bank receipts(Exs.D3 and 4), no supporting evidence has
been produced.
7. The Trial Court, therefore, comes to the
conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/9th share. While
arriving at this conclusion, the Trial Court observed that
there are no materials to believe the version of the
defendants. Defendant Nos.3 and 4 have produced the
oral evidence of one of the attesting witnesses as DW-3,
whose evidence supported their case; however, except
eliciting that the guardian was defendant No.3, nothing
substantial was brought out in his cross-examination.
Hence, the Trial Court allowed the notional partition and
accordingly granted 1/9th share to the plaintiff.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree,
the appellants filed an appeal in R.A. No.5029/2020. The
Appellate Court, after considering the grounds urged in the
appeal, formulated the point as to whether the Trial Court
was justified in granting 1/9th share over suit schedule
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properties and whether the judgment and decree calls for
interference. Upon reassessing the entire material on
record, the Appellate Court came to the conclusion that
though Exhibit D2 was relied upon, it is an unregistered
document and has not been acted upon. It is further held
that the suit schedule properties continued to remain as
joint family properties in the hands of the children of
Papegowda. By considering Section 6A and Section 8 of
the Hindu Succession Act, the Appellate Court held that
the plaintiff is entitled to 1/3rd share and accordingly,
modified the judgment of the Trial Court, which had
granted only a notional share.
9. Being aggrieved by the findings of the Trial
Court as well as the Appellate Court, the appellants have
urged that the First Appellate Court committed an error in
granting 1/3rd share to the plaintiff. It is their contention
that there was a partition between the two brothers on
15.06.1991, and the RTC entries clearly disclose such a
division. It is further contended that the First Appellate
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Court had committed an error in granting an equal 1/3rd
share instead of a notional share of 1/9th, on the ground
that there was no registered partition between the father
and his sons, which finding is unsustainable. The
appellants also submit that the Appellate Court committed
an error in relying upon the judgment in Vineetha
Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma case. Hence, this Court
ought to admit the appeal and frame substantial questions
of law.
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the
appellants as well as the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents, and on perusal of the pleadings, it is
specifically pleaded in the plaint that the suit schedule
properties are the joint family properties of the plaintiff
and the defendants. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 contended
that Item No.1 is the self-acquired property of Papegowda
and Item No.2 is the self-acquired property of defendant
No.2. However, defendant No.2 has not produced any
document to substantiate that Item No.2 is his exclusive
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property. It is also not in dispute that the properties were
acquired by Papegowda. Admittedly, Papegowda did not
execute any testamentary document disposing of his
properties and when such being the case, he died
intestate, leaving behind the plaintiff and the defendants
as his legal heirs.
11. Though the defendants rely upon Ex.D2, is
inadmissible document and the same is unregistered
document. Apart from that, no material has been placed
on record to show that the parties have acted upon the
said document. The Appellate Court has rightly comes to
the conclusion that Ex.D2 cannot be relied upon,
particularly when the plaintiff is not a party to the said
document. When such being the case, the plaintiff, being
the legal heirs of Papegowda are entitled to 1/3rd
share.When such material was taken note of by the Trial
Court as well as the Appellate Court, it is clear that the
plaintiff is entitled to a share. The only error committed by
the Trial Court was in holding that she is entitled only to a
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notional share, which has been rightly rectified by the First
Appellate Court by holding that she is entitled to an equal
share and not merely 1/9th share. By relying upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vineetha Sharma
(supra), the Appellate Court rightly comes to the
conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/3rd share and
not a notional share. Hence, I do not find any ground to
admit the appeal or to frame any substantial question of
law, and it is not a case for invoking Section 100 of the
CPC.
12. In view of the discussions made above, I pass
the following:
ORDER
The Regular Second Appeal is dismissed.
Sd/-
(H.P.SANDESH)
JUDGE
