Karnataka High Court

Mr. D Mohammed Javed vs The State Of Karnataka on 25 November, 2025

Author: M.Nagaprasanna

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

Reserved on : 18.11.2025
Pronounced on : 25.11.2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH

DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
R
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

CRIMINAL PETITION No. 100611/2025

BETWEEN:

1. MR. D.MOHAMMED JAVED
S/O D.HUSSAIN SAB
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS
PETTY HOTEL BUSINESS
R/O HOUSE NO.85 (PRESENT)
OLD D. NO.18, WARD NO.18,
BEHIND MAYURA HOTEL
COURT ROAD, BALLARI.

2. MR. RAFIQ AHAMED
S/O LATE MEHABOOB SAB
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
CARRYING ON PETTY BUSINESS
R/O H.NO.21, WARD NO.18
BEHIND MAYURA HOTEL
COURT ROAD, BALLARI.

3. MR. HUSSAIN SAB D.,
S/O D.HUSSAIN SAB
AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS,
PETTY HOTEL BUSINESS
R/O HOUSE NO.85 (PRESENT)
OLD D. NO.18, WARD NO.18
2

BEHIND MAYURA HOTEL
COURT ROAD, BALLARI.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI MOHAMMED ABRAR S., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH BRUCEPET POLICE STATION
BALLARI DISTRICT
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD - 580 008.

2. M.RAMDASAREDDY
S/O LATE MOLAGAVALLI LAKSHMIKANTHA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS
R/O DOOR NO.2, K.C. ROAD
BALLARI CITY, BALLARI TALUK
BALLARI DISTRICT - 583 101.
... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI T.HANUMAREDDY, AGA FOR R1;
SRI S.S.YADRAMI, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/W.,
SRI GIRISH V.BHAT, ADVOCATE FOR R2)

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., (528 OF B.N.S.S) PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED
COMPLAINT IN PC NO. 364/2019 GIVEN BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2
AND IMPUGNED FIRST INFORMATION REPORT DATED 12.03.2020
IN CRIME NO. 38/2020 REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1
BRUCEPET PS BALLARI AND IMPUGNED CHARGE SHEET IN CC NO.
747/2020 AND ALL ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS PENDING ON THE FILE
OF I ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC BALLARI FOR THE OFFENCES
P/U/SEC. 420, 465, 468 AND 471 R/W 34 OF IPC AS AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS/ACCUSED NO.1 TO 3.
3

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 18.11.2025, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

Petitioners - accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 are at the doors of this

Court calling in question proceedings in C.C.No.747/2020 registered

for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 465, 468 and 471

read with 34 of the IPC.

2. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows:

The petitioners are the residents of Ballari and are said to be

living in the place for 60 to 70 years and are in the possession of all

the necessary documents. It is their contention that they have

been paying the Municipal taxes of the respective properties, which

comes within the precincts of the City Corporation, Ballari. The

second respondent is the complainant. A suit comes to be

instituted by the second respondent and others in O.S.No.177/2019

seeking declaration and possession of the suit schedule properties

mentioned therein, against the defendants, who are the petitioners
4

herein, who are in possession of the properties, which are said to

have been included in the schedule. The suit is instituted in the

year 2019. Immediately thereafter, the second respondent sets the

criminal law into motion, not by registering a complaint before the

jurisdictional police, but by invoking Section 200 of the Cr.P.C.

before the learned Magistrate. It is then a private complaint comes

to be registered in P.C.R.No.364/2019. The learned Magistrate

refers the matter for investigation under Sub-section (3) of Section

156 of the Cr.P.C., for investigation into the matter, by an order

dated 04.03.2020. The jurisdictional police on the directions of the

learned Magistrate register a crime in Crime No.38/2020 for the

offences punishable as afore-quoted. A writ petition comes to be

filed challenging the registration of the crime. During the pendency

of the said petition, the police conduct investigation and file their

charge sheet. On the charge sheet so filed by the police, the case

is registered before the concerned Court in C.C.No.747/2020. It is

this, that has driven the petitioners to this Court in the subject

petition.
5

3. Heard Sri Mohammed Abrar S., learned counsel for the

petitioners, Sri T. Hanumareddy, learned Additional Government

Advocate for respondent No.1 and Sri S.S.Yadrami, learned senior

counsel for Sri Girish V. Bhat, learned counsel for respondent No.2.

4. Sri Mohammed Abrar S., learned counsel for the petitioners

taking this Court through the documents appended to the petition

or even the complaint before the learned Magistrate would submit

that it is verbatim similar to what is registered before the Civil

Court. It is the averment in the plaint before the civil Court that

the petitioners are in possession of the suit scheduled properties,

who have not vacated from the said properties, even after they are

purchased by the complainant. Therefore, the complainant sought

declaration and possession by filing the suit. The matter is purely

civil in nature as the petitioners and their ancestors have been

residing in the said properties for 60 to 70 years. The second

respondent by setting the criminal law into motion is wanting to get

eviction of these petitioners faster than the civil proceedings from

the schedule properties. Therefore, he would submit that the
6

impugned criminal proceedings are an abuse of the process of the

law.

5. Per contra, Sri S.S.Yadrami, learned senior counsel for

respondent No.2 - complainant would submit that the police after

investigation have filed an elaborate charge sheet. Findings in the

charge sheet are that the petitioners have forged the documents

and are in possession of the suit scheduled properties for the last

50 years and therefore, the matter requires investigation at the

hands of the jurisdictional police. The learned senior counsel

submits that in the light of the prima facie findings, the petitioners

should face the trial and come out clean in a full blown trial. He

seeks for dismissal of the petition.

6. Learned Additional Government Advocate would also toe

the lines of the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent

by seeking disposal of the petition, on the score that the

jurisdictional police after investigation have filed the charge sheet

and the petitioners must face the trial.
7

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions

made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have

perused the material on record.

8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The second

respondent - complainant is said to be the purchaser of the

property abutting the place, where the petitioners are residing in

Ballari. Initially, he institutes a civil suit in O.S.No.177/2019. It

becomes necessary to notice the contents of the plaint in the civil

suit, which reads as follows:

"PLAINT FILED ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS UNDER
ORDER VII RULE 1 R/W SECTION 26 OF THE CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE

The plaintiffs above named humbly submit as follows:

1) The plaintiffs are the original owners of the suit
schedule properties and they have given Power of Attorney to
their Power of Attorney Holder M.Nandish S/o. Ravindra Babu,
to lookafter, to develop and to improve the properties
mentioned in the power of attorney. The power of attorney is
also authorized and given the power to represent, to appear
before any authorities and also before the courts, it is also
authorized the power of attorney holder, to file appropriate
proceedings on behalf of the plaintiffs. Original General Power of
Attorney is herewith filed along with the plaint for the kind
perusal of this Hon'ble court.

2) It is germane to submit that, the grand father of the
plaintiffs No.2 to 4 namely Late. Molagavalli Lakshmireddy son
of Late. Patil Dasireddy had purchased landed properties bearing
8

Sy. No.952 admeasuring 3.93 acres and Sy. No.951/B
admeasuring 0.72 acres situated in Ballari City, through Court
Sale and got registered vide document No.2719/1939 dated
25-09-1939, registered before the Joint Sub-Registrar at Ballari
Town. Since then the said properties were in possession and
enjoyment purchaser i.e., M.Lakshmireddy, therefore he had
absolute right, title and interest over the said properties. It is
pertinent to submit that, sincde the properties situated within
the limits of Ballari City, the said properties converted into T.S.
number and its corresponding T.S. number is 7/2, thereafter it
is sub-divided into 7/2A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H. It is pertinent to
submit that, the said properties situated at Heart of the city i.e.,
near to the old Central Bus Stand, Ballari and nearer to the
court. The said properties are located in Prime area of Ballari
which is also called as Central Library area. It is further
pertinent to submit that, a small bypass road which leading
from double road to court, passing through these properties.

3) It is further pertinent to submit that, after demise of
said M.Lakshmireddy, his only son namely M.Lakshmikantha
Reddy had inherited the said properties purchased under the
1939 registered sale deed. It is further submit that, during the
life time of said Lakshmikantha Reddy, he and his sons i.e.,
plaintiffs 2 to 4 had divided their entire joint family properties
including the above said T.S.No.7/2 property by, metes, and
bounds on 01-01-1976 among themselves and said Partition
was recognized under Section 171 of Income Tax Act, as per the
orders of the Income Tax Officer dated 23-07-1977. It is further
germane to submit that, the said Lakshmikanthareddy and his
sons i.e., plaintiffs 2 to 4, in order to have a registered
document in respect of the said partition of their joint family
properties they got registered the Memorandum of Partition
dated 29-12-2008 víde document No.5990/2008-09. In the said
Memorandum of Partition father of the plaintiff No.2 to 4 took
the properties mentioned in Schedule 1 of the said deed as his
share of 1/5th i.e., 20% share out of the property called as
Mayura Complex, during the life time of Lakshmikanthareddy his
share of property was enjoyed by him as absolute property and
died intestate.

4) It is further germane to submit that, after death of
Lakshmikanthareddy, his wife, who is plaintiff No.1 and his
sons, who are plaintiffs 2 to 4 have succeeded the estate of the
9

deceased Lakshmikanthareddy including the above T.S. No.7/2
as per the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, the plaintiffs are
absolute owners and have been in possession and enjoyment of
the T.S. No.7/2 as full ownership over the said properties, the
said properties stand in the name of the plaintiffs jointly in all
the relevant records i.e., Municipal Records, Survey records and
other records.

5) It is pertinent to submit that, the sub-division numbers
of T.S. No.7/2G admeasuring 4385 sq. feet and T.S. No.7/2H
admeasuring 7383 sq. feet, in all both the T.S. numbers
admeasuring 11768 sq. feet. It is further pertinent to submit
that, both sub-division numbers are abutting each other. It is
further relevant to submit that, at the time of purchasing in the
year 1939 the total property called as Amer Building. It is
further pertinent to submit that, at the time of construction of
Mayura Hotel and other annexure buildings, the plaintiffs have
constructed / put up some sheds / Huts in T.S. No.7/2G and H
for the purpose of labours as well as some RCC rooms for
godown purpose in the above two sub-division numbers. It is
further pertinent to submit that, during the time of construction
of Mayura Hotel Complex and other buildings, the labours used
to stay in the sheds and Hats, after completion of construction
the sheds, Huts and two rooms were kept idle in the above
stated sub-division T.S. numbers,

6) It is further germane to submit that, the plaintiffs
originally hail from Molagavalli village in Alur Taluq, Kurnool
District, Andhra Pradesh and also they owned properties in
Andhra Pradesh also. Therefore the plaintiffs are not
permanently residing at Ballari and they used to go to their
native place to maintain and develop their properties. By taking
undue advantage of the plaintiffs absence from the City and also
by taking advantage of non visiting of the T.S. No.7/2, some 8
to 10 families including the defendants had unauthorisedly
occupied and started staying in the above stated sheds and
rooms, without knowledge and permission of the plaintiffs. The
said 8 to 10 families were residing in the said sheds and Huts
illegally and without any iota of right, title and interest over the
said sheds / Huts and Rooms. It is further pertinent to submit
that, recently the plaintiffs have noticed the illegal occupancy of
the said families, the plaintiffs have warned those families to
vacate from the sheds / huts and rooms. It is submitted that in
10

the mean while the plaintiffs due to their advanced age and old
age ailments, they is better to execute power of attorney to
lookafter, to develop and to deal in all other aspects with regard
to the T.S.No.7/2G and 7/2H. Accordingly the plaintiffs have
executed the Power of Attorney in favour of power of attorney
on 29-05-2019 in favour of Sri. M.Nandish son of M.Ravindra
Babu. After executing the said power of attorney, the power of
attorney holder had negotiated with the illegal occupants and
convinced some of them and made them to vacate on their own.
The power of attorney holder dealt the vacated families with
humanitarian grounds by giving financial assistance to have
their accommodations. The defendants families have not
vacated from their respective properties, the said properties are
now the subject matter of the suit and hereinafter referred them
as suit schedule properties.

7) It is pertinent to submit that, the suit schedule
properties are situated towards the extreme Eastern side of the
T.S. No.7/2G, which are fully described in the schedule column.
The defendants without having any iota of right, title and
interest over the schedule property have illegally occupied and
illegally staying in suit schedule properties. It is further
pertinent to submit that, the defendants forcibly and illegally
continued their possession in the suit schedule properties. The
defendants have no any sort of rights to remain in the suit
schedule properties as the suit schedule properties are absolute
properties of the plaintiffs and which are part and parcel of T.S.
No.7/2G which is a part and parcel of the properties purchased
under 1939 Registered sale deed by original purchaser namely
M.Lakshmikanthareddy.

8) It is further relevant to submit that, after vacating the
other families, the power of attorney holder dismantle the sheds
/ huts in T.S. No.7/2H and also partly in T.S. No.7/2G and now
only one sheds and an R.C.C. Building and an open space are
left in the Eastern side of T.S. No.7/2G, i.e., suit schedule
properties, wherein the defendants 1 and 2 are staying and the
defendant No.3 is claiming illegal rights on that open space. It is
further relevant to submit that, the plaintiffs have recently
learnt that the defendants have fabricated and concocted some
documents to lay false claim over the sheds and structures in
which they are residing in suit schedule T.S. numbers. It is
further pertinent to submit that, after gaining the knowledge of
11

fabrication of the documents, the plaintiffs have obtained the
relevant documents under the R.T.I. and came to know that the
defendants have concocted some documents and also created
the fictitious sub-division numbers on papers in collusion with
the concerned authorities. It is further pertinent to submit that,
the defendant No.2 without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, have
made some alterations to the old store room and residing in
that. The defendants have been residing in their respective
schedule properties, without having right, title and interest over
the said properties. It is further pertinent to submit that, the
defendants stay is absolutely illegal and unauthorized. It is
further pertinent to submit that, the defendant No.2's father has
allegedly executed a Registered Gift Deed with regard to the
schedule-B property vide document No.16292/2016-17 dated
25-03-2017, the said alleged Gift Deed executed by the second
defendant's father in his favour is absolutely void document and
it is not binding on the plaintiffs' title. It is further pertinent tp
submit that, the defendant No.3's father namely Mehaboob Sab
had executed a registered WILL with regard to the schedule-C
property in favour of third defendant vide document
No.00213/2018-19 dated 18-12-2018, the said alleged WILL is
void document and it is not binding in the title of the plaintiffs.
It is further pertinent to submit that, due to the above alleged
registered deeds a cloud is casted upon the title of the plaintiffs
over the suit schedule properties, therefore, the plaintiffs are
seeking title with regard to the suit schedule properties only.

9) Therefore, in view of the above facts and
circumstances the plaintiffs are constrained to approach this
Hon'ble court to seek the intervention of the Hon'ble court into
the matter by granting decree for declaration and consequential
reliefs of possession and permanent injunction. It is further
pertinent to submit that, the plaintiffs left with no other
efficacious remedy except to file this suit for declaration and
consequential reliefs to safeguard their rights and interest in the
suit schedule property.

10) The plaintiffs are herewith filing the General Power of
Attorney executed by the plaintiffs in favour of their power of
attorney dated 29-06-2019, certified copy of the sale deed
dated 05-09-1939 vide document No.2719/1939, the Xerox
copy of the partition deed, Encumbrance Certificate, Mutation
order pertaining to the T.S. No.7/2G and 7/2H in favour of the
12

plaintiffs, Form No.3 for the year 2010-11 of both T.S.
Numbers, latest Form No.3 of both T.S. Numbers, survey sketch
and extract of both T.S. numbers, an Endorsement dated
06-07-2019 issued by CMC, Ballari, Tax paid returns and
receipts under Self Assessment scheme from 2010-11 to current
year, Guideline price list issued by Sub-Register office, Ballari,
for the kind perusal of this hon'ble court. It is relevant to submit
that as far as the original title deed i.e., 1939 document is
concerned, the original is not in the custody of the plaintiffs as it
was misplaced and therefore the plaintiffs are relying on the
secondary evidence by producing the certified copy of the title
deed. The plaintiffs are herewith producing the alleged gift deed
dated 04-02-2017 executed in between the defendant No.1 and
his father, the Amended document dated 25-03-2017 is also
herewith produced for the kind perusal of this Hon'ble court. The
plaintiffs further produced the copy of WILL executed by the
third defendant's father in his favour dated 08-12-2018, for kind
perusal of the Hon'ble court.

11) The cause of action arose on 25/27th March, 1939
when the grand father had purchased the land bearing
Sy.No.952 and 951/B, wherein the suit schedule property is part
and parcel of the said property, again 29-12-2008 when the
plaintiffs have got divided the entire joint family properties by
way of registered partition deed, on all other dates when the
plaintiffs got the mutations in their respective names, again on
29-05-2019 when the plaintiffs have executed the power of
attorney in favour of their power of attorney holder Sri.
M.Nandish on all other subsequent dates when the power of
attorney holder negotiated with the defendants and finally on
28-06-2019 when the power of attorney holder issued a legal
notice through his counsel to the defendants to ask them to
vacate from the T.S. No.7/2G, the said cause of action continues
and arose at Ballari, which is within the jurisdiction of this
Hon'ble court. It is pertinent to submit that, the of the plaintiffs,
therefore the plaintiffs are added all the three defendants in this
suit with regard to the common reliefs .

12) The suit of the plaintiffs is valued for the purpose of
court fee and jurisdiction as follows:

i) As far as Schedule-A property, approximate total
measurements are 720 sq. feet, the present market price as per
13

the Sub-Registrar Office is of Rs.1,300/- per sq. feet. Therefore
the total value of this schedule property is Rs.9,36,000/-.

ii) As far as Schedule-B property, the approximate total
measurements are 720 sq. feet, the present market price as per
the Sub-Registrar Office is of Rs.1,300/- per sq. feet. Therefore
the total value of this schedule property is Rs.9,36,000/-.

iii) As far as Schedule-C property, approximate total
measurements are 1000 sq. feet, the present market price as
per the Sub-Registrar Office is of Rs.1,300/- per sq. feet.
Therefore the total value of this schedule property is
Rs.13,00,000/-.

iv) Therefore, the total suit subject matter value is for the
purpose of court fee and jurisdiction is valued Rs.31,72,000/-,
there upon the court fee of Rs. 1,52,285 is herewith paid under
Section 24(b) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation
Act.

v) As far as the cancellation of the alleged deeds are
concerned, no court fee is required to pay as the relief is
ancilliary relief to the main relief.

13) Therefore it is prayed that the Hon'ble court be
pleased to decree the suit in favour of the plaintiffs as against
the defendants.

a) to declare that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of
the suit A, B and C Schedule properties, which are part and
parcel of T.S.No.7/2G:

b) order to handover the possession of the suit schedule
properties;

c) Award costs of the suit: and

d) Grant such other relief/s as this Hon;ble court may
deems fit and proper under the circumstances of the case, in
the interest of justice.

Sd/- sd/-
Advocate for the Plaintiffs Plaintiffs"
14

It is the admission of the complainant in the plaint itself that

8 to 10 families are residing in sheds and huts illegally without any

right. It is these petitioners who are residing. Thus, the petitioners

are residing in the area for long time. Therefore, a declaration and

possession is sought at the hands of the concerned Court by the

second respondent. The notice is issued, but no injunction is

granted. On the score that no injunction is granted, the

complainant sets the criminal law into motion by registering a

private complaint before the learned Magistrate.

9. The petitioners - defendants before the civil Court

submitted their written statement in O.S.No.177/2019. It read as

follows:

"45. The suit of the plaintiffs is not maintainable as the plaintiffs
do not have any iota of title, right or any document to
prove and claim that they are the owners of suit schedule
properties more particularly the plaint C schedule property.

46. The suit filed by the plaintiffs is liable to be rejected as the
suit is not filed by the persons claiming to have the right
over the suit schedule properties and the alleged power of
attorney holder is not having any right, legally to file the
suit and he is not a competent and capable person to file
the suit on behalf the plaintiffs and therefore the very locus
standi of the plaintiffs to file the suit through the power of
attorney holder is challenged and at the outset the
defendant no.3 prays the Hon'ble court to frame a
15

preliminary issue and reject the suit as not maintainable as
the power of attorney which is alleged to be filed by the
plaintiffs is not a legal document and therefore the suit of
the plaintiffs has to be rejected in limine.

47. The suit of the plaintiffs is not maintainable as all the
alleged family members of late. Lakshmikanth Reddy to
whom the plaintiffs alleged to belong and claim to be the
legal heirs all the family members of late, Lakshmikantha
reddy have not filed the suit nor all of them have given /
executed the power of attorney in favour of M. Nandish s/o.
M. Ravindra Babu to file the suit and therefore the suit filed
by part and only projected members is not maintainable as
the suit is filed for declaration of title and possession and in
view of all the family members not being party to the suit
as plaintiffs the suit is liable to be rejected for non joinder
of all proper and necessary parties and therefore the
defendant no.3 prays the Hon'ble court to frame an issue
and reject the suit in this regard.

48. At the outset the defendant no.3 submits that the plaintiffs
are alleged to be claiming to be owners more particularly
they claim title through court sale dt: 25-09-1939 which is
alleged to be purchased by late. M. Lakshmikanth Reddy
who is the alleged grand-father of plaintiffs no.2 to 4 and
the property alleged to be purchased is the landed property
bearing Sy no.952 measuring 03-93 acres and land bearing
Sy No.951/B measures: 0-72 acres but the plaintiffs has,
utterly failed to allege that by way of legal and authentic
document that the above said lands have been converted
into Town Sy. No. 7/2 and therefore the VERY IDENTITY OF
PROPERTY ALLEGED TO BELONG TO THE PLAINTIFFS
THROUGH THEIR PLEADINGS DO NOT REVEAL AND
CONFIRM AND TALLY THAT THE PROPERTIES ARE
CONVERTED INTO T.S. NO.7/2 WITH THE
SUB-DIVISIONS 7/2A, B, C, D, E, F, G & H,

49. AND THERFORE THE IDENTITY OF THE SUIT SHCEDULE
PROPERTY IS NOT THE PROPERTY ALLEGED TO BE
PURCHASED BY THEIR GRAND FATHER AND THEREFORE
THE SUIT OF PLAINTIFFS HAS TO BE REJECTED IN LIMINE
AS THERE IS NO MATCHING/CORROBORATING WITH THE
16

PROPERTIES AND THEREFORE THE SUIT OF PLAINTIFFS IS
TO BE REJECTED AND UNDER ORDER-VII, RULE-1 OF CPC.

50. The defendant no.3 further submits that not only the
identity of property tallies with the sale deed alleged to be
belonging to their grand-father with suit schedule
properties but also the plaintiffs have failed to make a note
of the measurements of the plaint schedule properties and
therefore the plaintiffs are not entitled to the claim of
declaration and possession and further. the plaint C
schedule property does not belong to the plaintiffs at all
and they are not entitled to the relief over the said
property.

51. The defendant no.3 submits that the entire plaint A, B & C
schedule properties are not the properties of the plaintiffs
as they were the Govt. properties and the plaint B and C
schedule property and other properties adjacent to
properties are granted properties by the Tahsildar Ballari by
way of Hakku patras to the residents.

52. The defendant no.3 submits that the plaint C schedule
property originally belongs to his joint family members as
his father namely Mehaboob Sab and his brother Dadavali
and other family members who were jointly living together
in the plaint C schedule property since nearly 70-80 years.
The defendant no.3 and his family members belong to very
poor and downtrodden community. After the demise of the
father of defendant no.3 his uncle Dadavali, the defendant
no.3 and other family members are all residing in plaint C
schedule property which is a hut. After the demise of
Mehaboob sab his brother Dadavali took care of the entire
family of his brother Mehaboob sab. During the life time of
Dadavali he had submitted an application to the Tahsildar
Ballari that the plaint C schedule property being the Govt.,
property, Dadavali and his brother Mehaboob sab and
family members residing since 70-80years more so during
their parents time seeking for the grant of patta of the
plaint c schedule property.

53. In view of the application submitted by the uncle of
defendant no.3 Dadavali the Tahsildar Ballari has granted
17

the Hakku patra on 01-07-2002 in favour of Dadavali with
regard to plaint C schedule property which is situate in TS
No.7/2, measuring 30 x 40ft., having boundaries East -
Chandrashekar property West property of Hussainsab
(plaint B schedule property) Ediga hostel, South Road. The
defendant no.3 submits that the grant of Hakku patra by
Tahslidar Ballari was made in favour of Dadavali as per the
law, rules and regulations and in view of the possession
and enjoyment of the father of defendant no.3, his uncle
Dadavali and all family members and at no point of time
the plaint C schedule property belong to the plaintiffs nor
they were ever in physical possession and enjoyment of the
property.

54. The defendant no.3 submits during the life time of his
father, his uncle Dadavali the taxes to plaint C schedule
property was paid by them since a long time and they have
been paying water taxes and also the electricity charges to
the authorities since a long which vouches for their lawful
possession as owners.

55. The defendant no.3 submits that his uncle Dadavali was a
bachelor and he stayed and resided with the defendant
no.3 and family members and he was taken care of till his
death by defendant no.3 & family members during his life
time. Dadavali had great love and affection towards
defendant no.3 being his nephew who was taking care of
him till his death and therefore out of love and affection
late. Dadavalli uncle of defendant no.3 executed a
registered Will on 18-12-2018 in favour of defendant no.3
with regard to plaint C schedule property and after the
death of Dadavali the defendant no.3 became the absolute
owner of plaint C schedule property as a beneficiary and
legatee and he became the absolute owner and continued
to pay the taxes to the property.

56. The defendant no.3 submits that the fact of the plaint C
schedule property being assigned, granted by the Tahsildar
to Dadavali and the entire family of defendant no.3 residing
in the property since nearly 70-80 years is known to the
plaintiffs and also call the adjacent persons beside the
plaint C schedule.
18

57. The plaintiffs who are not the owners are never in
possession of the property at any point of time and as the
defendant no.3 and his family members are in physical and
lawful possession in plaint C schedule property since 70-80
years the plaintiffs are ousted from possession and they
have no legal right to claim ownership or possession over
the property. The Plaintiffs have failed to show the
measurements of the Plaint Schedule properties, and the
extent and boundaries not being correct reveals the
Plaintiffs are not the owners of the Plaint schedule
properties at all.

58. The suit of the plaintiffs is LIABLE TO BE REJECTED IN
LIMINE AS THE PLAINTIFFS AS NOT STATED AND PLEADED
IN THE PLAINT THE EXACT DATE, PERIOD, YEAR ON
WHICH THE THEY CAME TO KNOW WHEN THE
DEFENDANTS, OR DEFENDANT NO 3 OCCUPIED THE
PLAINT C SCHEDULE PROPERTY NOR WHEN THEY
DEMENADED THE DEFENDANT NO.3 AND FAMILY MEMBERS
TO VACATE, ON THE BASIS OF VAGUE PLEADINGS AND NO
CAUSE OF ACTION SUIT HAS TO BE REJECTED FOR WANT
OF CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER ORDER VII RULE 1 OF CPC
AND THE HON'BLE COURT HAS TO FRAME A PRELIMINARY
ISSUE AND DISMISS THE SUIT.

59. The Defendant No 3 has come to know that Plaintiffs are all
highly rich, having immense properties, highly having
political support and influence and having men and muscle
at their behest, and their alleged power of attorney is
notoriously famous for using illegal, high handed means to
vacate and threaten poor and innocent persons to grab
their properties, and seeing the defendant no 3 and his
family members being poor, and Plaint C Schedule Property
being very valuable, and to knock off the property by hook
or crook and having tries illegal means, having failed have
filed this false suit against defendant No 3 which is not
maintainable and has to be dismissed.

60. Therefore considering the above facts and law the suit of
the plaintiffs is totally devoid of truth, merit and legality
and the defendant no.3 and his family members who are
the owners and in possession and enjoyment of the plaint C
schedule property who are all very poor will suffer great
19

hardship as except plaint C schedule property they do not
have any other properties and they will be put to great
hardship loss and injury and the defendant no 3 prays the
Hon'ble court to dismiss the suit of the plaintiffs as they
have file the suit only to grab the property seeing the
defendant no.3 being poor helpless, and therefore to
dismiss the suit with exemplary costs, of Rs.5 lakhs, which
would meet the ends of justice and equity."

Since the present issue triggers on account of the complaint, I

deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. It reads as follows:

"1) The complainant is Senior Citizen, peace loving and
law abiding citizen and residing in the above said address as a
permanent resident of Ballari. The complainant has coming from
good reputated family and the complainant and his family
owned several properties in and around Ballari.

2) It is germane to submit that, the grand father of the
complainant namely Late. Molagavalli Lakshmireddy son of Late.
Patil Dasireddy had purchased landed properties bearing Sy.
No.952 admeasuring 3.93 acres and Sy. No.951/B admeasuring
0.72 acres situated in Ballari City, through Court Sale and got
registered vide document No.2719/1939 dated 25-09-1939,
registered before the Joint Sub-Registrar at Ballari Town. Since
then the said properties were in possession and enjoyment of
the purchaser i.e., M.Lakshmireddy, therefore he had absolute
right, title and interest over the said properties. It is pertinent to
submit that, since the properties situated within the limits of
Ballari City, the said properties converted into T.S. number and
its corresponding T.S. number is 7/2, thereafter it is sub-divided
into 7/2A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H. It is pertinent to submit that,
the said properties situated at Heart of the city i.e., near to the
old Central Bus Stand, Ballari and nearer to the court. The said
properties are located in Prime area of Ballari which is also
called as Central Library area. It is further pertinent to submit
that, a small bypass road which leading from double road to
court, passing through these properties.
20

3) It is further pertinent to submit that, after demise of
the said M.Lakshmireddy, his only son ADCM Lakshmikantha
Reddy ie., complainant's father had inherited the said properties
purchased under the 1939 registered sale deed. It is further
submit that, during the life time of said Lakshmikantha Reddy,
he and his sons i.e., complainant and his brothers had divided
their entire joint family properties including the above said T.S.
No.7/2 property by metes and bounds on 01-01-1976 among
themselves, and said partition was recognized under Section
171 of Income Tax Act, as per the orders of the Income Tax
Officer dated 23-07-1977. It is further germane to submit that,
the said Lakshmikanthareddy and his sons i.e., complainant and
his brothers, in order to have a registered document in respect
of the said partition of their joint family properties they got
registered the Memorandum of Partition dated 29-12-2008 vide
document No.5990/2008-09. In the said Memorandum of
Partition complainant's father took the properties bearing T.S.
No.7/2 i.e., called as Mayura Complex and Amar Building.

4) It is further germane to submit that, after death of
complainant's father Lakshmikanthareddy, his mother and
brothers have succeeded the T.S. No.7/2 as per the Hindu
Succession Act. Therefore, the complainant and his mother and
brothers are absolute owners and have been in possession and
enjoyment of the T.S. No.7/2 as full ownership over the said
properties, the said properties stand in the name of the
complainant, his mother and brothers jointly in all the relevant
records i.e., Municipal Records, Survey records and other
records.

5) It is pertinent to submit that, the sub-division numbers
of T.S. No.7/2G admeasuring 4385 sq. feet and T.S. No.7/2H
admeasuring 7383 sq. feet, in all both the T.S. numbers
admeasuring 11768 sq. feet. It is further pertinent to submit
that, both sub-division numbers are abutting each other. It is
further relevant to submit that, at the time of purchasing in the
year 1939 the total property called as Amar Building. It is
further pertinent to submit that, at the time of construction of
Mayura Hotel and other annexure buildings, the complainant,
his mother and brothers have put up and constructed / put up
some sheds / Huts in T.S. No.7/2G and H for the purpose of
labours as well as some RCC rooms for Godown purpose in the
above two sub-division numbers. It is further pertinent to
21

submit that, during the time of construction of Mayura Hotel
Complex and other buildings, the labours used to stay in the
sheds and Huts, after completion of construction the sheds,
Huts and two rooms were kept idle in the above stated sub-
division T.S. numbers.

6) It is pertinent to submit that, the accused and some
other persons have trespassed into the Huts and Sheds which
were situated in T.S. No.7/2G and H. It is further pertinent to
submit that, the complainant on number of occasions requested
and warned the trespassers to vacate the premises, despite his
repeated demands and requests, the trespassers did not vacate
the premises. It is further pertinent to submit that, the
complainant and his family being law abiding citizens, they were
unable to get vacate the trespassers. Therefore the complainant
and his family have constrained to enter into the sale agreement
with one Mullangi Nandeesh son of Mullangi Ravindra Babu by
executing sale agreement in his favour, on the same day the
complainant and his family members have also executed a
General Power of Attorney in his favour.

7) It is further pertinent to submit that, after execution of
the sale agreement and power of attorney, the power of
attorney holder of the complainant has pursued the trespassers
and succeeded in getting vacated all the trespassers except the
accused. It is further pertinent to submit that, the accused
inclined to vacate the premises, therefore the GPA Holder of the
complainant has approached the jurisdictional Gandhinagar
Police by lodging oral complaint with regard to the trespass. On
the basis of said oral information the jurisdictional police have
called the accused and asked them about their stay in the
premises. It is pertinent to submit that, in response to the police
call the accused have produced some documents, the GPA
Holder of the complainant shocked to see that the said
documents are forged and fabricated documents. Thereafter the
GPA Holder of the complainant has obtained all relevant
documents from the authorities and verified with the documents
produced by the accused, thereby the GPA Holder of the
complainant confirmed himself that the documents produced by
the accused before the Gandhinagar Police station are forged
and fabricated documents. Immediately thereafter the GPA
Holder of the complainant informed to the complainant with
regard to the forged and fabricated documents.
22

8) It is further pertinent to submit that, the GPA Holder
has also immediately written the letters to the survey
department and Municipal Corporation with regard to the
forgery and fabrication of documents. It is further pertinent to
submit that, as per the records and report given by the ADLR,
Ballari, the T.S. No.7/2G, did not sub-divided into any sub-
divisions, still it is standing as a consolidated number as 7/2G
admeasuring 4385 sq. feet. It is further pertinent to submit
that, Municipal Corporation has also received the said
information. It is further pertinent to submit that, the accused
have made / fabricated that the T.S. No.7/2G as divided into
three sub-divisions i.e., 7/2G/1, 7/2G/2 and 7/2G/3. In-fact the
T.S. No.7/2G has not at all sub-divided. In this regard the
complainant is herewith producing the consolidated survey
sketch and extract to substantiate the said fact.

9) It is further pertinent to submit that, on the basis of
the fabricated and forged documents, willfully and knowingly
well that the said survey sub-division numbers are fictitious,
have produced before the corporation and got mutation on their
names. It is further pertinent to submit that, on the basis of
fictitious, forged and fabricated documents, the accused have
got mutation in T.S. No.7/2G and also obtained fictitious Form
No.-III from Municipal Corporation, Ballari. The accused have
fraudulently and dishonestly have made false documents and
produced them before the Municipal Corporation to get fictitious
and false Khatha and Form No.-III. It is further pertinent to
submit that, the accused have fraudulently and dishonestly
made the false documents and knowingly they are false
documents, produced them before the City Corporation, Ballari,
obtained the false Khathas and Form No.-III with intention to
cheat the complainant and his family members.

10) It is further pertinent to submit that, the GPA Holder
of the complainant has written the letters to the Corporation to
seek the cancellation of the fictitious Khatha and to cancel the
Form No.-III which was issued on the basis of false and fictitious
survey records. On the said letters the Corporation has issued
two show cause notices to the accused stating that why can't
cancel the Khatha and Form No.-III issued in favour of the
accused. It is also pertinent to submit that, the complainant and
his brothers have already filed civil suit in O.S. No.177/2019 on
23

the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ballari, for declaration
of their title and seeking the cancellation of alleged Gift Deed
executed by the father of the accused No.1 in his favour and
alleged WILL deed executed by the father of the accused No.2 in
his favour. The said suit is pertaining to the civil remedy.

11) It is further pertinent to submit that, the GPA Holder
of the complainant namely M.Nandeesh has also written a letter
to the Superintendent of Police, Ballari complaining about the
trespass, making of false documents, forging and fabrication of
documents and fraudulently and dishonestly obtaining Khatha
and Form No.-III, through a Registered Post Letter dated
05-09-2019. The said letter received by the Office of the
Superintendent of Police, Ballari. It is further pertinent to submit
that, despite the said letter the Hon'ble authority is not at all
taken any action against the accused.

12) Therefore, in view of the above facts and
circumstances, the complainant has left no other efficacious
remedy except by filing this private complaint against the
accused for the offences punishable u/s 420, 465, 468, and 471
of IPC. The Hon'ble court has ample powers to entertain the
complaint and to take the cognizance against the accused for
the above said offences. The complainant has already exhausted
the remedies available to him by giving complaint to the
jurisdictional police and also Superintendent of Police, Ballari.
Therefore, as a last resort the complainant is filing this private
complaint before this Hon'ble court.

13) Therefore it is prayed that the Hon'ble court be
pleased to take the cognizance against the accused and punish
them as per the law, in the above case, in the interest of
justice.

Sd/-
Advocate for the Complainant Complainant

VERIFICATION

I, the above named complainant do hereby declare that
what is stated in the above paras is true and correct to the best
of my knowledge, information and belief.
24

Verified and signed at Bellary on this day of November,
2019.

Complainant."

If the contents of the plaint and the prayer sought in this

petition are noticed, it is verbatim similar.

10. The learned Magistrate refers the matter for investigation

under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., completely ignoring the fact

whether the complainant has complied with the provisions of Sub-

sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. before directing

the jurisdictional police to register a complaint. A private complaint,

in law, should necessarily accompany an affidavit, sworn to by the

complainant to its contents. Therefore, there is twin lacunae, when

the complaint was referred to investigation to which the learned

Magistrate ought to have taken note of.

11. Jurisprudence is replete on this issue by the plethora of

judgments rendered by the Apex Court and this Court. The Apex

Court in the case of in the case of PRIYANKA SRIVASTAVA v.

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH1 has held as follows:

".... .... ....

1
(2015) 6 SCC 287
25

29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under
Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of
law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of
Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot
invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really
grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke
the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert
litigations takes this route to harass their fellow citizens, efforts
are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.

30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in
this country where Section 156(3) CrPC applications are
to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the
applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of
the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the
learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the
truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations.
This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible.
We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications
are being filed in a routine manner without taking any
responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons.
That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming
when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders
under a statutory provision which can be challenged
under the framework of the said Act or under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take
undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is
determined to settle the scores.

Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have
already stated that the veracity of the same can also be
verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to
the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to
say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere,
matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial
offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and
the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in
initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita
Kumari [(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] are
being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also
be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR."

(Emphasis supplied)

The said elucidation has been reiterated by the Apex Court in

the case of BABU VENKATESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA2 in the

following paragraphs:

".... .... ....

11. It was submitted that, the Magistrate was required to
apply his mind before passing an order under Section
156(3)CrPC. It was further submitted that, unless an application
under Section 156(3)CrPC was supported by an affidavit duly
sworn by the complainant, the learned Magistrate could not
have passed an order under the said provision.
... ... ...
20. It could thus be seen that, though this Court has
cautioned that, power to quash criminal proceedings should be
exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in
the rarest of rare cases, it has specified certain category of
cases wherein such power can be exercised for quashing
proceedings.

2
2022 SCC OnLine SC 200
27

21. We find that in the present case, though civil suits
have been filed with regard to the same transactions and
though they are contested by Respondent 2 by filing written
statement, he has chosen to file complaint under Section
156(3)CrPC after a period of one-and-a-half years from the date
of filing of written statement with an ulterior motive of harassing
the appellants. We find that, the present case fits in the
category of No. 7, as mentioned in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 426] .
... ... ...
23. After analysing the law as to how the power under
Section 156(3)CrPC has to be exercised, this Court in Priyanka
Srivastava v. State of U.P. [Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P.,
(2015) 6 SCC 287 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294 : (2015) 4 SCC
(Cri) 153] has observed thus : (SCC p. 306, paras 30-31)

"30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in
this country where Section 156(3)CrPC applications are to
be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant
who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the
Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned
Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also
can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can
make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to
say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a
routine manner without taking any responsibility
whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it
becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to
pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory
provision which can be challenged under the framework of
the said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a
criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the
scores.

affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution
in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually
invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3).
That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the
same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard
being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are
compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to
fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes,
commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption
cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches
in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita
Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 :
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the
learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in
lodging of the FIR."

24. This Court has clearly held that, a stage has come
where applications under Section 156(3)CrPC are to be
supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the complainant who
seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

25. This Court further held that, in an appropriate case,
the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth
and also verify the veracity of the allegations. The Court has
noted that, applications under Section 156(3)CrPC are filed in a
routine manner without taking any responsibility only to harass
certain persons.

26. This Court has further held that, prior to the
filing of a petition under Section 156(3)CrPC, there have
to be applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3)CrPC.
This Court emphasises the necessity to file an affidavit so
that the persons making the application should be
conscious and not make false affidavit. With such a
requirement, the persons would be deterred from
causally invoking authority of the Magistrate, under
Section 156(3)CrPC. Inasmuch as if the affidavit is found
to be false, the person would be liable for prosecution in
accordance with law.

27. In the present case, we find that the learned
Magistrate while passing the order under Section
156(3)CrPC, has totally failed to consider the law laid
down by this Court.
29

28. From the perusal of the complaint it can be seen
that, the complainant Respondent 2 himself has made
averments with regard to the filing of the original suit. In
any case, when the complaint was not supported by an
affidavit, the Magistrate ought not to have entertained
the application under Section 156(3)CrPC. The High Court
has also failed to take into consideration the legal
position as has been enunciated by this Court in Priyanka
Srivastava v. State of U.P. [Priyanka Srivastava v. State
of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294 :
(2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153] , and has dismissed the petitions
by merely observing that serious allegations are made in
the complaint."
(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court, in its later judgment, in the case of RANJIT

SINGH BATH v. UNION TERRITORY CHANDIGARH3 has held as

follows:

".... .... ....

5. We have carefully perused the decision of this
Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava reported in
(2015) 6 SCC 287. This Court has noted that there was
misuse of the provisions of sub Section (3) of Section
156. In paragraphs 30 and 31, this Court held thus:

3
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1479
30

being filed in a routine manner without taking any
responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain
persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and
alarming when one tries to pick up people who are
passing orders under a statutory provision which can
be challenged under the framework of the said Act or
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it
cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal
court as if somebody is determined to settle the
scores.

31. We have already indicated that there has to
be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and
154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3).
Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the
application and necessary documents to that effect
shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that
an application under Section 156(3) be supported by
an affidavit is so that the person making the
application should be conscious and also endeavour
to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because
once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable
for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter
him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate
under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already
stated that the veracity of the same can also be
verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had
to the nature of allegations of the case. We are
compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining
to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes,
commercial offences, medical negligence cases,
corruption cases and the cases where there is
abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal
prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are
being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would
also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR."
(underlines supplied)

6. Section 154 of the CrPC reads thus:

"154. Information in cognizable cases.

(1) Every information relating to the commission of
a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge
of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or
under his direction, and be read over to the informant;
and every such information, whether given in writing or
31

reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the
person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be
entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form
as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf:

[Provided that if the information is given by the
woman against whom an offence under section 326A,
section 326B, section 354, section 354A, section 354B,
section 354C, section 354D, section 376, section 376A,
section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376E or
section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is
alleged to have been committed or attempted, then such
information shall be recorded, by a woman police officer
or any woman officer:

Provided further that-

(a) in the event that the person against whom an
offence under section 354, section 354A, section
354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 376,
2[section 376A, section 376AB, section 376B,
section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA,
section 376DB], section 376E or section 509 of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to
have been committed or attempted, is
temporarily or permanently mentally or physically
disabled, then such information shall be recorded
by a police officer, at the residence of the person
seeking to report such offence or at a convenient
place of such person's choice, in the presence of
an interpreter or a special educator, as the case
may be;

(b) the recording of such information shall be video
graphed;

(c) the police officer shall get the statement of the
person recorded by a Judicial Magistrate under
clause (a) of sub-section (5A) of section 164 as
soon as possible.];

(2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-
section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the
informant.

(3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of
an officer in charge of a police station to record the
32

information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the
substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the
Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that
such information discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an
investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to
him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer
shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police
station in relation to that offence.

7. The requirement of sub-Section (1) of Section 154
is that information regarding commission of a cognizable
offence has to be furnished to an officer Incharge of a Police
Station. In this case, obviously, the said compliance was not
made. It is stated that the Inspector General of Police
forwarded a complaint to the Economic Offences Wing. Sub-
Section (3) of Section 154 comes into picture only when
after a complaint is submitted to the Officer Incharge of
Police Station or information is provided to the Officer
Incharge of Police Station regarding commission of a
cognizable offence, the Officer Incharge refuses or neglects
to register First Information Report.

8. Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of
the CrPC are the two remedies available for setting
the criminal law in motion. Therefore, this Court held
that before a complainant chooses to adopt a remedy
under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, he must exhaust
his remedies under sub-Sections (1) and (3) of
Section 154 of the CrPC and he must make those
averments in the complaint and produce the
documents in support. However, in this case, the
second respondent did not exhaust the remedies. In
this view of the matter, we find that both the learned
Magistrate and the High Court have completely ignored the
binding decision of this Court in the case of Priyanka
Srivastava."

(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court in RANJIT SINGH BATH's case holds that

there should be an averment in the private complaint regarding
33

compliance of Section 154(1) and (3) of the Cr.P.C., and an

affidavit to that effect should be filed. The Apex Court holds that

filing an affidavit along with private complaint is imperative; not

only an affidavit, the averments and the documentation with regard

to the complaint under Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of

the Cr.P.C. is obligatory. The non-compliance with the said

provision as held by the Apex Court would vitiate the complaint

itself. This Court following the afore-quoted judgments of the Apex

Court has taken similar view as that of the Apex Court in the latest

judgment in the case of RAMIAH SAMBANDAM @

R.SAMBANDAM Vs. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA4, and quashed

the proceedings therein. As the issue in this regard is well settled,

the complaint filed before the learned Magistrate requires to be

obliterated as it is in violation of law.

12. Driving back to the case at hand, what is the complaint

about? The matter which is purely civil in nature, the police on a

reference made under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., by the learned

4
2025 SCC OnLine Kar 19043
34

Magistrate conducts investigation and file a charge sheet. The

summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in Column No.17 is as

follows:

"17. PÉÃ¹£À ¸ÀAQë¥ÀÛ, ¸ÁgÁA±À

§Ææ¸À¥ÉÃmÉ ¥ÉÆÃ°¸À oÁuÉ UÀÄ£Éß £ÀA.38/2020, PÀ®A 419, 420, 465, 468, 471 gÉ/« 34
L¦¹

§¼Áîj §Ææ¸À¥ÉÃmÉÉ oÁuÉAiÀÄ ¸ÀgÀºÀ¢Ý£À°è §gÀÄªÀ §¼Áîj ¨sÀÆ zÁR¯ÉUÀ¼À ¸ÀºÁAiÀÄPÀ
¤zÉÃð±ÀPÀgÀ PÀbÉÃj¬ÄAzÀ ¥ÀqÉAiÀÄ¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄªÀ £ÀPÁ±ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß F zÉÆÃµÁgÉÆÃ¥Àt ¥ÀvÀæzÀ PÁ®A
£ÀA:12 gÀ°è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹zÀ DgÉÆÃ¦-1 jAzÀ 4 gÀªÀgÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ ¸ÁQë-1 gÀªÀgÀ n.J¸ï. £ÀA:7/2f,
«¹ÛÃtð 4385 ZÀ.CrUÀ½gÀÄªÀ eÁUÀªÀ£ÀÄß PÀ§½¸ÀÄªÀ GzÉÝÃ±À¢AzÀ DgÉÆÃ¦-1 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 3
gÀªÀgÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ ¸ÁQë-1 gÀªÀgÀ n.J¸ï £ÀA:7/2f, «¹ÛÃtð 4385 ZÀ.CrUÀ½gÀÄªÀ eÁUÀPÉÌ n.J¸ï
£ÀA:7/2f2. ¤ªÉÃ±À£À £ÀA§gÀÄ 12954/08, ªÀÄ£É £ÀA:85, «¹ÛÃtð 800 ZÀ. CrUÀ¼ÀÄ CAvÀ
ªÀÄvÀÄÛ n.J¸ï £ÀA:7/2f, «¹ÛÃtð 4385 ZÀ.CrUÀ½gÀÄªÀ eÁUÀªÀ£ÀÄß 7/2/f1, 7/2/f2, 7/2/f3
CAvÀ £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹zÀ ¸ÀªÉÃð£ÀPÁ±ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¸ÀÈ¶Ö¹PÉÆAqÀÄ §¼Áîj ªÀÄºÁ£ÀUÀgÀ ¥Á°PÉ¬ÄAzÀ
£ÀªÀÄÆ£É-3 £ÉÃzÀÝ£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ DgÉÆÃ¦-3 FvÀ£ÄÀ §¼Áîj »jAiÀÄ
G¥À£ÉÆAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ°è DgÉÆÃ¦-1 gÀªÀjUÉ zÁ£À ¥ÀvÀæ ªÀiÁr¹zÀÄÝ, DgÉÆÃ¦-1
FvÀ£ÀÄ £ÀAvÀgÀ ¸ÀzÀj D¹ÛAiÀÄ°è£À CzsÀð ¨sÁUÀªÀ£ÀÄß ¸ÁQë-7 & 8 ªÀiÁgÁl ªÀiÁr ¸ÁQë-1
gÀªÀjUÉ ªÉÆÃ¸À ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ F zÉÆÃµÁgÉÆÃ¥Àt ¥ÀvÀæzÀ PÁ®A £ÀA:12 gÀ°è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹zÀ
DgÉÆÃ¦-2 & 4 gÀªÀgÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ ¸ÁQë-1 gÀªÀgÀ n.J¸ï £ÀA:7/2f, «¹ÛÃtð 4385 ZÀ.CrUÀ½gÀÄªÀ
eÁUÀPÉÌ C¸É¸ÀäAmï £ÀA:22019/©, PÀlÖqÀ £ÀA:116/1, 1200 ZÀ.CrUÀ¼ÀÄ CAzÀ §¼Áîj ªÀÄºÁ£ÀUÀgÀ
¥Á°PÉ¬ÄAzÀ £ÀªÀÄÆ£É-3 £ÉÃzÀÝ£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ¸ÁQë-1 gÀªÀjUÉ ªÉÆÃ¸À ªÀAZÀ£É ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ
JAzÀÄ PÉÃ¹£À vÀ¤SÁ PÁ®PÉÌ ¸ÁQëzÁgÀgÀ ºÉÃ½PÉUÀ½AzÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ½AzÀ
¸Á©ÃvÁVgÀÄvÀÛªÉ.

DzÀjAzÀ DgÉÆÃ¦- 1 jAzÀ 4 gÀªÀgÀÄUÀ¼À «gÀÄzÀÞ ªÉÄÃ®ÌAqÀ PÀ®A UÀ¼ÀrAiÀÄ°è F
zÉÆÃµÁgÉÆÃ¥Àt ¥ÀvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß vÀAiÀiÁj¹ ªÀiÁ£Àå £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄPÉÌ ¤ªÉÃ¢¹PÉÆ¼Àî¯ÁVzÉ."

A perusal of the complaint or the summary of the charge

sheet would clearly indicate that a purely civil dispute is dressed

with a colour of crime. The offences alleged are the ones

punishable under Section 420 of the IPC for cheating and Sections
35

465 to 471 of the IPC for forgery. Section 420 of the IPC reads as

follows:

"420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of
property.--Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces
the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to
make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable
security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is
capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to
fine."

Section 420 of the IPC has its ingredients in Section 415 of

the IPC. Section 415 of the IPC reads as follows:

"415. Cheating.--Whoever, by deceiving any person,
fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to
deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any
person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the
person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would
not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or
omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that
person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat".

Explanation.--A dishonest concealment of facts is a
deception within the meaning of this section.

Illustrations

(a) A, by falsely pretending to be in the Civil Service,
intentionally deceives Z, and thus dishonestly induces Z to
let him have on credit goods for which he does not mean to
pay. A cheats.

(b) A, by putting a counterfeit mark on an article,
intentionally deceives Z into a belief that this article was
made by a certain celebrated manufacturer, and thus
36

dishonestly induces Z to buy and pay for the article. A
cheats.

(c) A, by exhibiting to Z a false sample of an article,
intentionally deceives Z into believing that the article
corresponds with the sample, and thereby dishonestly
induces Z to buy and pay for the article. A cheats.

(d) A, by tendering in payment for an article a bill on a
house with which A keeps no money, and by which A expects
that the bill will be dishonoured, intentionally deceives Z, and
thereby dishonestly induces Z to deliver the article, intending
not to pay for it. A cheats.

(e) A, by pledging as diamonds articles which he
knows are not diamonds, intentionally deceives Z, and
thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend money. A cheats.

(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A
means to repay any money that Z may lend to him and
thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend him money, A not
intending to repay it. A cheats.

(g) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A
means to deliver to Z a certain quantity of indigo plant which
he does not intend to deliver, and thereby dishonestly
induces Z to advance money upon the faith of such delivery,
A cheats; but if A, at the time of obtaining the money,
intends to deliver the indigo plant, and afterwards breaks his
contract and does not deliver it, he does not cheat, but is
liable only to a civil action for breach of contract.

(h) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A has
performed A's part of a contract made with Z, which he has
not performed, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to pay
money. A cheats.

(i) A sells and conveys an estate to B. A, knowing that
in consequence of such sale he has no right to the property,
sells or mortgages the same to Z, without disclosing the fact
of the previous sale and conveyance to B, and receives the
purchase or mortgage money from Z. A cheats."
37

Section 415 of the IPC mandates that accused must have

lured the complainant into a transaction with a dishonest intention

right from inception. Where is the question of these petitioners

luring the complainant in the case at hand, it is un-understandable.

They do not have any contract between the two or contact between

the two. Therefore, the offence under Section 420 of the IPC is

loosely laid.

13. The remainder of the offences is Sections 465 to 471 of

the IPC, which deals with forgery and forged documents. The

petitioners - accused, even according to the plaint averments or

the complaint, are said be staying in the said properties for ages on

the strength of the documents that they have. It is for the

complainant who is a subsequent purchaser, who has approached

the Civil Court seeking declaration and possession, to prove his

case. Having approached the Civil Court with a verbatim similar

relief, second respondent - complainant sets the criminal law into

motion for a faster remedy to arm-twist these petitioners, only on

the fact that the second respondent - complainant has purchased
38

the property. It is sans countenance that the criminal law

machinery cannot be misused by the complainant or the like to get

eviction orders faster than the Civil Court can do.

14. Jurisprudence is again replete with quashment of

proceedings on civil remedy being dressed with a colour of crime.

14.1. In identical circumstances, the Apex Court in the case of

VIJAY KUMAR GHAI v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL5 has held as

follows:

"27. Section 405 IPC defines "criminal breach
of trust" which reads as under:

"405. Criminal breach of trust.--Whoever, being in
any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion
over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his
own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that
property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the
mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal
contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the
discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so
to do, commits "criminal breach of trust"."

The essential ingredients of the offence of criminal
breach of trust are:

(1) The accused must be entrusted with the property or with
dominion over it,

(2) The person so entrusted must use that property, or;

(3) The accused must dishonestly use or dispose of that
property or wilfully suffer any other person to do so in
violation,

5
(2022) 7 SCC 124
39

(a) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to
be discharged, or;

(b) of any legal contract made touching the discharge of such trust.

28. "Entrustment" of property under Section
405 of the Penal Code, 1860 is pivotal to constitute
an offence under this. The words used are, "in any
manner entrusted with property". So, it extends to
entrustments of all kinds whether to clerks,
servants, business partners or other persons,
provided they are holding a position of "trust". A
person who dishonestly misappropriates property
entrusted to them contrary to the terms of an
obligation imposed is liable for a criminal breach of
trust and is punished under Section 406 of the
Penal Code.

29. The definition in the section does not
restrict the property to movables or immovables
alone. This Court in R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi
Admn. [R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Admn., (1963) 1 SCR
253 : AIR 1962 SC 1821] held that the word
"property" is used in the Code in a much wider
sense than the expression "movable property".
There is no good reason to restrict the meaning of
the word "property" to movable property only when
it is used without any qualification in Section 405.

30. In Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v. CBI [Sudhir
Shantilal Mehta v. CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1: (2009) 3 SCC
(Cri) 646] it was observed that the act of criminal breach
of trust would, inter alia mean using or disposing of the
property by a person who is entrusted with or has
otherwise dominion thereover. Such an act must not only
be done dishonestly but also in violation of any direction
of law or any contract express or implied relating to
carrying out the trust.

31. Section 415 IPC defines "cheating" which reads
as under:
40

"415. Cheating.--Whoever, by deceiving any person,
fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to
deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any
person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the
person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he
would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act
or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to
that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to
"cheat"."

The essential ingredients of the offence of
cheating are:

1. Deception of any person

2. (a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that
person--

(i) to deliver any property to any person; or

(ii) to consent that any person shall retain any
property; or

(b) intentionally inducing that person to do or
omit to do anything which he would not do or
omit if he were no so deceived, and which act
or omission causes or is likely to cause
damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property.

32. A fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an
essential ingredient of the offence. A person who
dishonestly induces another person to deliver any
property is liable for the offence of cheating.

33. Section 420 IPC defines "cheating and
dishonestly inducing delivery of property" which reads
as under:

"420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing
delivery of property.--Whoever cheats and thereby
dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any
property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the
whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which
is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being
converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
41

34. Section 420 IPC is a serious form of
cheating that includes inducement (to lead or
move someone to happen) in terms of delivery of
property as well as valuable securities. This
section is also applicable to matters where the
destruction of the property is caused by the way
of cheating or inducement. Punishment for
cheating is provided under this section which
may extend to 7 years and also makes the
person liable to fine.

35. To establish the offence of cheating in
inducing the delivery of property, the following
ingredients need to be proved:

(i) The representation made by the person was
false.

(ii) The accused had prior knowledge that the
representation he made was false.

(iii) The accused made false representation with
dishonest intention in order to deceive the
person to whom it was made.

(iv) The act where the accused induced the
person to deliver the property or to perform
or to abstain from any act which the person
would have not done or had otherwise
committed.

36. As observed and held by this Court in R.K.
Vijayasarathy v. SudhaSeetharam [R.K. Vijayasarathy
v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 16 SCC 739 : (2020) 2
SCC (Cri) 454] , the ingredients to constitute an
offence under Section 420 are as follows:

(i) a person must commit the offence of cheating under
Section 415; and

(ii) the person cheated must be dishonestly induced to:

(a) deliver property to any person; or
42

b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or
anything signed or sealed and capable of being
converted into valuable security. Thus, cheating
is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute
an offence under Section 420 IPC.

37. The following observation made by this
Court in Uma Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar [Uma
Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC
336 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 49] with almost similar facts
and circumstances may be relevant to note at this
stage : (SCC pp. 338-39, paras 6-7)
"6. Now the question to be examined by us is
as to whether on the facts disclosed in the petition of
the complaint any criminal offence whatsoever is
made out much less offences under Sections
420/120-BIPC. The only allegation in the complaint
petition against the accused persons is that they
assured the complainant that when they receive the
insurance claim amounting to Rs 4,20,000, they
would pay a sum of Rs 2,60,000 to the complainant
out of that but the same has never been paid. ... It
was pointed out on behalf of the complainant that
the accused fraudulently persuaded the complainant
to agree so that the accused persons may take steps
for moving the consumer forum in relation to the
claim of Rs 4,20,000. It is well settled that every
breach of contract would not give rise to an offence
of cheating and only in those cases breach of
contract would amount to cheating where there was
any deception played at the very inception. If the
intention to cheat has developed later on, the same
cannot amount to cheating. In the present case, it
has nowhere been stated that at the very inception
that there was intention on behalf of the accused
persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for
an offence under Section 420IPC.
7. In our view petition of complaint does not
disclose any criminal offence at all much less any
offence either under Section 420 or Section 120-
BIPC and the present case is a case of purely civil
dispute between the parties for which remedy lies
before a civil court by filing a properly constituted
suit. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing
the police investigation to continue would amount to
43

an abuse of the process of court and to prevent the
same it was just and expedient for the High Court to
quash the same by exercising the powers under
Section 482CrPC which it has erroneously refused."
38. There can be no doubt that a mere
breach of contract is not in itself a criminal
offence and gives rise to the civil liability of
damages. However, as held by this Court
in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of
Bihar [Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of
Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] ,
the distinction between mere breach of contract
and cheating, which is criminal offence, is a fine
one. While breach of contract cannot give rise to
criminal prosecution for cheating, fraudulent or
dishonest intention is the basis of the offence of
cheating. In the case at hand, complaint filed by
Respondent 2 does not disclose dishonest or
fraudulent intention of the appellants."

(Emphasis supplied)

14.2. The Apex Court in the case of LALIT CHATURVEDI v.

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH6 has held as follows:

"5. This Court, in a number of judgments, has
pointed out the clear distinction between a civil wrong
in the form of breach of contract, non-payment of
money or disregard to and violation of the contractual
terms; and a criminal offence under
Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC. Repeated judgments
of this Court, however, are somehow overlooked, and
are not being applied and enforced. We will be referring
to these judgments. The impugned judgment dismisses the
application filed by the appellants under Section 482 of
the Cr. P.C. on the ground of delay/laches and also the

6
2024 SCC OnLine SC 171
44

factum that the chargesheet had been filed on 12.12.2019.
This ground and reason is also not valid."

(Emphasis supplied)

14.3. Again, the Apex Court in the case of NARESH KUMAR

v. STATE OF KARNATAKA7 has held as follows:

".... .... ....

8. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties
relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by
one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal
offence in every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit
Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing
with the distinction between the offence of cheating and a
mere breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa
Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, has
held that every breach of contract would not give rise
to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be
shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest
intention at the time of making the promise.

9. In the case at hand, the dispute between the
parties was not only essentially of a civil nature but in this
case the dispute itself stood settled later as we have already
discussed above. We see no criminal element here and
consequently the case here is nothing but an abuse of
the process. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside
the order of the High Court dated 02.12.2020. The criminal
proceedings arising out of FIR No. 113 of 2017 will hereby
stand quashed."
(Emphasis supplied)

7
2024 SCC OnLine SC 268
45

14.4. Later, the Apex Court in the case of

S.N.VIJAYALAKSHMI vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA8 has held as

follows:

".... .... ....

42. Coming to the second question i.e., whether civil
and criminal proceedings both can be maintained on the very
same set of allegations qua the same person(s), the
answer stricto sensu, is that there is no bar to simultaneous
civil and criminal proceedings. If the element of criminality is
there, a civil case can co-exist with a criminal case on the
same facts. The fact that a civil remedy has already been
availed of by a complainant, ipso facto, is not sufficient
ground to quash an FIR, as pointed out, inter alia, in P
Swaroopa Rani v. M Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC
765 and Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi
Admn.), (2009) 5 SCC 528. The obvious caveat being that
the allegations, even if having a civil flavour to them,
must prima facie disclose an overwhelming element of
criminality. In the absence of the element of criminality, if
both civil and criminal cases are allowed to continue, it will
definitely amount to abuse of the process of the Court, which
the Courts have always tried to prevent by putting a stop to
any such criminal proceeding, where civil proceedings have
already been instituted with regard to the same issue, and
the element of criminality is absent. If such element is
absent, the prosecution in question would have to be
quashed. In this connection, Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673 can be referred to:

'12. ... Whether a complaint discloses a criminal
offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged
therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal
offence are present or not has to be judged by the High
Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also
have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see
whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is

8
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1575
46

given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a
civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has
happened in this case, the High Court should not
hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent
abuse of process of the court.'

(emphasis supplied)

43. In Usha Chakraborty v. State of West
Bengal, (2023) 15 SCC 135, while quashing the FIR therein
and further proceedings based thereon, it was observed
'...the factual position thus would reveal that the genesis as
also the purpose of criminal proceedings are nothing but the
aforesaid incident and further that the dispute involved is
essentially of civil nature'."
(Emphasis supplied)

14.5. The Apex Court in its latest judgment rendered in the

case of ANUKUL SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH,9 has

held as follows:

"... ... ...
11.5. Thus, the cumulative principles that emerge
are: while the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is
extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, it is the
duty of the High Court to intervene where continuation of
criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of
process of law, or where the dispute is purely of a civil
nature and criminal colour has been artificially given to it.
Conversely, where disputed questions of fact arise requiring
adjudication, the matter must ordinarily proceed to trial.

12. The specific case of the appellant is that his father
purchased land comprised in Khasra Nos. 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22
situated at Village Sherpur Mafi, District Moradabad, from one
Akil Hussain. This land was used for the purposes of Qurbani.
According to the appellant, in order to usurp the said property,

9
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060
47

the Shaher Imam of Bilari, in collusion with the district
administration and under pressure exerted upon the local police,
ensured that a series of false criminal cases were foisted against
him. As many as eight FIRs were lodged against the
appellant, including the present one, all of which, in
substance, arise out of a civil dispute relating to
ownership and possession of the property. Initiation of
the present criminal proceedings, therefore, amounts to a
clear abuse of the process of law, squarely falling within
the illustrative categories delineated in Bhajan Lal,
particularly where the dispute is manifestly civil in nature
and the prosecution is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive.

13. The record reveals that within a short span, as many
as eight FIRs were registered against the appellant. The
gravamen of the allegations in the present FIR is that
Respondent No. 2/complainant approached the appellant for a
loan of Rs. 2,00,000/-, but was allegedly advanced only Rs.
1,40,000/-. It is further alleged that, in connection with the said
transaction, an agreement to sell dated 09.11.1998 was
executed in respect of a plot owned by the complainant, and
that the appellant procured three cheques from Respondent No.
2, which, upon presentation, were dishonoured for insufficiency
of funds. Even if accepted in entirety, these allegations disclose,
at best, a civil dispute and do not prima facie constitute the
essential ingredients of the criminal offences alleged.

14. It is significant to note that prior to registration of the
present FIR, the appellant had already initiated proceedings
against Respondent No. 2, namely a complaint under Section
138 of the N.I. Act (Complaint No. 2402840/2005) before the
N.I. Court, Moradabad, as well as FIR No. 120/2002, in which,
the complainant himself was arrested. The present FIR was
lodged nearly three months after the filing of the Section 138
complaint and seven months after FIR No. 120/2002. The plea
that the FIR is a retaliatory counterblast to the proceedings
legitimately initiated by the appellant, therefore, carries
substantial weight.

15. The mala fide nature of the complaint is further
fortified by the fact that, by judgment dated 15.01.2025, the
trial Court convicted Respondent No. 2 under Section 138 of the
48

N.I. Act, sentencing him to one month's imprisonment and
imposing a fine of Rs. 90,000/-. This conviction lends strong
support to the appellant's case that the initiation of the present
FIR was a retaliatory measure, maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive to neutralise the lawful action taken by him.

16. Despite this background, the police proceeded to file
a charge sheet dated 16.04.2003 against the appellant for
offences under sections 420, 467, and 468 IPC. Even if the
allegations are assumed to be true, they unmistakably arise out
of a commercial/contractual transaction relating to loan and
repayment, which has been given a criminal colour. The case
thus falls squarely within categories (1) and (7) of Bhajan Lal,
namely, where the allegations do not disclose the commission of
an offence, and where the proceedings are maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive. Continuation of such prosecution would
amount to an abuse of process of law and consequently,
warrant quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions,
deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into
criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC
India Ltd., it was held that criminal law cannot be used as
a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual
matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of
process. The following paragraphs from the decision are
apposite:
"9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:

(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations
made in the complaint, even if they are taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety, do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
the case alleged against the accused. For this
purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a
whole, but without examining the merits of the
allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a
meticulous analysis of the material nor an
assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the
allegations in the complaint, is warranted while
examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.

(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a
clear abuse of the process of the court, as when
49

the criminal proceeding is found to have been
initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking
vengeance or to cause harm, or where the
allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.

(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to
stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power
should be used sparingly and with abundant
caution.

(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim
reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence
alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid
in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few
ingredients have not been stated in detail, the
proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of
the complaint is warranted only where the
complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which
are absolutely necessary for making out the
offence.

(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a
civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c)
a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A
commercial transaction or a contractual dispute,
apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking
remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal
offence. As the nature and scope of a civil
proceedings are different from a criminal
proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint
relates to a commercial transaction or breach of
contract, for which a civil remedy is available or
has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash
the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the
allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal
offence or not.

10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take
notice of a growing tendency in business circles to
convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This
is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that
civil law remedies are time consuming and do not
adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors.
Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes
also, leading to irretrievable break down of
marriages/families. There is also an impression that
if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal
50

prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent
settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and
claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by
applying pressure though criminal prosecution should
be deprecated and discouraged."

18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal, it was emphasized that criminal prosecution
must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment or
private vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam,
this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in
respect of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to
harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation,
constitute an abuse of process.

19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @
Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, this Court
disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as
a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money
recovery cannot be enforced through criminal
prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The
Court cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in such
matters but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The
following paragraphs are relevant in this context:
"9. What we have been able to understand is that there
is an oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent
No. 4 might have parted with some money in accordance
with the oral agreement and it may be that the appellant -
herein owes a particular amount to be paid to the
Respondent No. 4. However, the question is whether prima
facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been
committed by the appellant.

10. How many times the High Courts are to be
reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating,
there has to be something more than prima facie on
record to indicate that the intention of the accused
was to cheat the complainant right from the
inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not disclose
any element of criminality.

11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent
pronouncement of this Court in the case of "Delhi Race Club
(1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh", (2024) 10 SCC
51

690. In the said decision, the entire law as to what
constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust
respectively has been exhaustively explained. It appears
that this very decision was relied upon by the learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High Court.
However, instead of looking into the matter on its own
merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to
go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs.
25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent.
We fail to understand why the High Court should undertake
such exercise. The High Court may either allow the petition
saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition
saying that no case for quashing is made out. Why should
the High Court make an attempt to help the complainant to
recover the amount due and payable by the accused. It is
for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be
to look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money
or in any other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act,
1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016.

12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that
the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature.

13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing
for the Respondent No. 4 whether his client has filed any
civil suit or has initiated any other proceedings for recovery
of the money. It appears that no civil suit has been filed for
recovery of money till this date. Money cannot be
recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute between the
parties by filing a First Information Report and seeking the
help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process of
law.

14. We could have said many things but we refrain from
observing anything further. If the Respondent No. 4 has to
recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek
any other appropriate remedy available to him in law. He
cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal
proceedings.

15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the
High Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court
first directed the appellant to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- to the
Respondent No. 4 and thereafter directed him to appear
before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose
of settlement. That's not what is expected of a High Court
to do in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of
52

the Constitution or a miscellaneous application filed under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 for
quashing of FIR or any other criminal proceedings. What is
expected of the High Court is to look into the averments
and the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the other
material on record, if any. The High Court seems to have
forgotten the well-settled principles as enunciated in the
decision of this Court in the "State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal", 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335"

20. Applying the above principles to the facts of the
present case, it is manifest that the dispute - concerning
repayment of loan money and the alleged coercion in execution
of documents - is purely civil in character. The essential
ingredients of cheating or forgery are not prima facie made out.
The institution of multiple FIRs in quick succession, particularly
after the appellant had already initiated lawful proceedings,
reinforces the inference of mala fides.

21. The High Court, in refusing to quash the proceedings,
misdirected itself in law by failing to apply the ratio laid down
in Bhajan Lal, and the subsequent authorities referred to
above, which uniformly hold that the machinery of criminal law
cannot be permitted to be misused for settling civil disputes or
to wreak vengeance.

22. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated
22.10.2019 of the High Court is set aside. FIR No. 47 of 2003
dated 05.02.2003 and the consequential charge sheet dated
16.04.2003, pending before the trial Court, are hereby quashed.
This judgment, however, shall not preclude the parties from
pursuing civil remedies as may be available to them in
accordance with law."
(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgments has clearly

held that prosecution should not be permitted on the allegations of

breach of contract for the purpose of recovery of money.
53

15. In the light of the afore-quoted judgments, the

registration of the crime is rendered unsustainable. While it is

correct that in a given case, on a given set of facts, both civil and

criminal laws could be set into motion, as there could be common

ingredients, which has a flavour of civil law, and which has a rigour

of criminal law. The issue now would be, whether this Court in

exercise of its jurisdiction can entertain the petition under Section

482 of the Cr.P.C., and obliterate the crime. This again is no longer

res integra. The Apex Court holds that in a petition under Section

482 of the Cr.P.C., this Court is permitted to exercise its jurisdiction

by reading the complaint between the lines, as abuse of the process

of law has become rampant. The Apex Court in the case of

MAHMOOD ALI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH10 has held as

follows:

".... .... ....

13. At this stage, we would like to observe
something important. Whenever an accused comes
before the Court invoking either the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the
criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the
ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous
or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for

10
2023 SCC OnLine SC 950
54

wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the
Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a
little more closely. We say so because once the
complainant decides to proceed against the accused
with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal
vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the
FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the
necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure
that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are
such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not
be just enough for the Court to look into the
averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary
ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are
disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious
proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many
other attending circumstances emerging from the
record of the case over and above the averments and,
if need be, with due care and circumspection try to
read in between the lines. The Court while exercising
its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or
Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself
only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take
into account the overall circumstances leading to the
initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation.
Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs
have been registered over a period of time. It is in the
background of such circumstances the registration of
multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting
the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or
personal grudge as alleged.

14. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga
Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of this Court
elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can
assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction
between consideration of materials that were tendered as
evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such
material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the
FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court
held:--

"5. ...Authority of the court exists for advancement
of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that
authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to
55

prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of
the court to allow any action which would result in injustice
and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers
court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds
that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings would
otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is
disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the
question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be
quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials
to assess what the complainant has alleged and
whether any offence is made out even if the
allegations are accepted in toto.

6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC
866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some
categories of cases where inherent power can and should
be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p. 869, para
6)

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of
sanction;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the
charge.

7. In dealing with the last category, it is
important to bear in mind the distinction between a
case where there is no legal evidence or where there
is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the
accusations made, and a case where there is legal
evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not
support the accusations. When exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High
Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry
whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it
accusation would not be sustained. That is the
function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt
should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless
harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in
exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and
circumstances into consideration before issuing process,
lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private
complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person
needlessly. At the same time the section is not an
56

instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a
prosecution and bring about its sudden death....."

(Emphasis supplied)

15. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad is hereby set aside. The criminal
proceedings arising from FIR No. 127 of 2022 dated
04.06.2022 registered at Police Station Mirzapur,
Saharanpur, State of U.P. are hereby quashed."

(Emphasis supplied)

In the light of the facts obtaining in the case at hand as

narrated hereinabove and the judgments rendered by the Apex

Court quoted supra, if further proceedings are permitted to

continue against the petitioners, it would undoubtedly become an

abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice.

16. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

ORDER

a. The writ petition is allowed.

b. The proceedings in P.C.R.No.364/2019 qua the petitioners,

stand quashed.

SD/-