Smt Soumya W/O. Late Suresh Rao vs Smt Ratnakumari W/O. S. Baburao
2025 Latest Caselaw 10617 Kant

Karnataka High Court

Smt Soumya W/O. Late Suresh Rao vs Smt Ratnakumari W/O. S. Baburao on 25 November, 2025

Author: M.Nagaprasanna

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

                                                  1



                      Reserved on : 17.10.2025
                      Pronounced on :25.11.2025

                        IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH

                               DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025

                                                BEFORE
                                                                                 R
                               THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

                               WRIT PETITION No.104795 OF 2025 (GM - RES)


                      BETWEEN:

                      SMT. SOUMYA W/O. LATE SURESH RAO
                      (AS LATE SRINIVASRAO
                      IN THE IMPUGNED ORDER)
                      AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
                      R/O. HOUSE NO.2, WARD NO.23
                      NEAR SARVODAYA SCHOOL,
                      SIDDARTHNAGAR, BALLARI - 583 104.
                                                                    ... PETITIONER

                      (BY SRI SRINIVAS NAIK, ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed by
RAKESH S              AND:
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench,
                      1.   SMT. RATNAKUMARI
Dharwad                    W/O. S. BABURAO
                           AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
                           R/O. HOUSE NO.2, WARD NO.23,
                           NEAR SARVODAYA SCHOOL,
                           SIDDARTHNAGAR, BALLARI - 583 104.

                      2.   SMT. ARUNA W/O. NAGESHWAR RAO
                           AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
                                 2



     R/O. HOUSE NO.2, WARD NO.23,
     NEAR SARVODAYA SCHOOL,
     SIDDARTHNAGAR, BALLARI - 583 104.

3.   THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AND
     AUTHORITY FOR SENIOR
     CITIZENS TRIBUNAL
     BALLARI - 583 104.
                                           ... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI V.S.KALASURMATH, AGA FOR R3;

SMT.GAYATRI S.R., ADVOCATE FOR R1 AND R2)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO I) ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 17.06.2025 PASSED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT BEARING NO.KAM.SENIORCITIZEN:06:2024-2025, VIDE ANNEXURE-C, INSOFAR AS PETITIONER IS CONCERNED IN THE ENDS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 17.10.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

The petitioner is before this Court calling in question an order

dated 17.06.2025, passed by the Assistant Commissioner and

Authority for Senior Citizens Tribunal, Ballari, under the provisions

of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act,

2007 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), whereby, the Assistant

Commissioner directs the petitioner to vacate the house, which is in

possession of the petitioner and her children and hand it over the

same to the first respondent - senior citizen.

2. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows:

The petitioner and the second respondent are both daughters

in-law of the first respondent. The son of the first respondent -

husband of the petitioner dies and the petitioner and her children

and the first respondent are said to be residing at house No.2, Ward

No.23, Siddarthnagar, Ballari. After the death of the son of the first

respondent, the relationship between the petitioner and the first

respondent was not cordial and therefore, the first respondent is

said have filed an application under the provisions of the Act, before

the Assistant Commissioner seeking eviction of the petitioner and

her children from the aforesaid house and also sought cancellation

of another gift deed executed in favour of the second respondent in

respect of a different house. The application before the Assistant

Commissioner was submitted on 15.04.2025 and a report was

sought from the competent authority. In terms of the report, the

impugned order comes to be passed directing vacation of the

premises, which is in the possession of the petitioner and her

children, within 30 days from the date of the impugned order and

directed to hand over the vacant possession to the first respondent.

It is this order that has driven the petitioner to this Court in the

subject petition.

3. Heard Sri Srinivas Naik, learned counsel for the petitioner,

Smt. Gayathri S.R., learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and

Sri V.S.Kalasurmath, learned Additional Government Pleader for

respondent No.3.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would project

that the Assistant Commissioner does not have the jurisdiction to

pass an eviction order while entertaining a petition filed by a senior

citizen under Section 23 of the Act. He would submit that the order

impugned be set aside and the petitioner and her children be

permitted to continue to stay in the said premises.

5. Per contra, Smt. Gayathri S.R., learned counsel for

respondent Nos.1 and 2 would submit that the husband of the

petitioner and son of the first respondent died 8 years ago; after

the death of the husband of the petitioner, the petitioner and her

children were residing in Andhra Pradesh. The learned counsel has

produced memo along with certain documents to buttress her

submissions that the present petitioner is not staying anywhere in

the aforesaid premises. She would contend that after the death of

the petitioner's husband, the relationship between the first

respondent and petitioner turned irretrievably sour and therefore,

the first respondent approached the legal cell, who in turn

submitted an petition before the Assistant Commissioner by

registering a complaint. The learned counsel would submit that the

Assistant Commissioner in certain circumstances is conferred with

the power to pass eviction orders under the Act. She would seek

dismissal of the petition.

6. Learned Additional Government Advocate would defend the

action of the Assistant Commissioner and seek dismissal of the

petition, toeing the lines of the learned counsel for the first and

second respondents.

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions

made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have

perused the material on record.

8. The afore-narrated facts are all a matter of record. Since

the entire issue brought before this Court springs from a complaint

/ application submitted before the Assistant Commissioner and the

reasons for filing such a petition, read as follows:

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16. ¸À鼃 PÀ¼ÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ©zÀÝ £À£ßÀ UÀAqÀ£À£ÄÀ ß §¼ÁîjAiÀÄ N¦r D¸ÀàvÉæAiÀÄ°è zÁR°¹ aQvÉì PÉÆr¹zÀ£ÄÀ . CzÀPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀzÀ zÁR¯ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß F ªÀÄ£À«AiÉÆA¢UÉ ®UÀwÛ¹gÀÄvÉÛãÉ.

17. £Á£ÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £À£ßÀ UÀAqÀ D¸ÀàvæÉAiÀÄ°è EzÁÝUÀ £À£ßÀ JgÀqÀ£ÃÉ ¸ÉÆ¸É ²æêÀÄw ¸ËªÀÄå F »AzÉ C°èAiÀĪÀgÀUÉ £Á£ÀÄ ªÁ¹¸ÀÄwÛzÀÝ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°èzÝÀ £À£Àß J¯Áè ¸ÁªÀiÁ£ÀÄUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß ºÉÆgÀPÌÉ ©¸ÁQ vÀ£Àß ¸ÁªÀiÁ£ÀÄUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß vÀAzÀÄ £Á£ÀÄ PÀnÖ¹zÀ PÀlÖqÀzÀ £É® ªÀĺÀrAiÀÄ°è zËdð£ÀåªÁV AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà ¥ÀǪÁð£ÀĪÀÄw E®èzÉ zÀÆjPÉÆArgÀÄvÁÛ¼É.

18. D¸ÀàvÉæ¬ÄAzÀ §AzÀ £Á£ÀÄ £À£ßÀ ¸ÁªÀiÁ£ÀÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ©Ã¢UÉ ZÉ°ègÀĪÀÅzÀ£ÀÄß PÀAqÀÄ CªÀÅUÀ¼À£ßÉ ®è MAzÀÄ ¸ÀtÚ UÉÆqˤ£ÀAvÀºÀ gÀÆ«Ä£À°è ºÁQ ²Ãn£À ºÀAa£À ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è C£ÁgÉÆÃUÀå¸ÀÜ£ÁzÀ £À£ßÀ UÀAqÀ£À£ÀÄß ElÄÖPÆÉ AqÀÄ £ÀªÄÀ ä PÉÆ£ÉAiÀÄ ¢£ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÀ¼ÉAiÀÄ®Ä ªÀÄÄAzÁVzÉÝêÉ. F zÀĹÜwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ªÀÄ£É ªÀÄAiÀiÁðzÉUÁV ¸À»¹PÉÆArzÉÝêÉ.

19. £À£Àß D¹ÛAiÀÄ°è £À£ßÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è £Á£ÀÄ E®è¢zÁÝUÀ £À£ÀUÉ w½¸ÀzÉ £À£ßÀ ¥ÀǪÀð C£ÀĪÀÄw ¥ÀqÉAiÀÄzÉ zËdð£ÀåªÁV £À£ßÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÉƼÀPÉÌ CPÀæªÄÀ , CwPÀæªÀÄ ¥ÀæªÉñÀ ªÀiÁrzÀ £À£ßÀ JgÀqÀ£ÃÉ ¸ÉÆ¸É ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DPÉAiÀÄ vÀAzÉ PÉÆ°è ¸ÀħæªÀÄtåA, vÁ¬Ä PÉÆ°è PÀ¸ÆÀ ÛgÀªÄÀ ä ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DPÉAiÀÄ vÀªÄÀ ä PÉÆ°è ªÀÄÄgÀ½gÀªÀgÄÀ zËdð£ÀåªÁV CPÀæªÄÀ ªÁV £À£Àß ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è ªÁ¹¸ÀĪÀÅzÀ®èzÉ ¥Àæw¢£À £À£ßÀ £ÀÄß MA¢®è MAzÀÄ PÁgÀtPÉÌ D¹ÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÉÆrÛAiÀiÁ ¸Á¬ÄwÃAiÀÄ JAzÀÄ ¢£À¤vÀå £À£ßÀ £ÀÄß £À£Àß UÀAqÀ£À£ÀÄß avÀæ»A¸É AiÉÆA¢UÉ ºÉzÀj¸ÀÄwÛzÁÝgÉ.

20. £À£À߸ÉƸÉ, ¸ÉƸÉAiÀÄ vÀAzÉ vÁ¬Ä ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¸ÉƸÉAiÀÄ vÀªÀÄä ¥Àæw¤vÀå CªÀgÀÄ £À£ÀߣÀÄß ªÀiÁ£À¹PÀ »A¸ÉUÉ UÀÄj ªÀiÁqÀÄvÁÛ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £À£ßÀ £ÀÄß zÉÊ»PÀªÁV ºÉÆqɧqÉ ªÀiÁqÀÄvÁÛ ¤£ÀߣÀÄß PÉêÀ® LzÉà ¤«ÄµÀzÀ°è ¸Á¬Ä¹©qÀÄvÉÛÃ£É ºÀĵÁgï JAzÀÄ ºÉüÀÄvÁÛ ¥Àæw¤vÀå £À£ÀUÉ £ÀgÀPÀ ¸ÀzÀȱÀªÁzÀ zÀĹÜw PÀ°à¸ÄÀ wÛzÁÝgÉ.

21. £À£Àß JgÀqÀ£Éà ¸ÉÆ¸É ªÀÄvÀÄÛ CªÀgÀ vÀAzÉ vÁ¬Ä ªÀÄvÀÄÛ vÀªÀÄä gÀªÀgÀÄUÀ¼ÄÀ UÀÄA¥ÀÅ UÀÄA¥ÀÅUÀ¼ÁV d£ÀgÀ£ÄÀ ß PÀgÉzÄÀ PÉÆAqÀÄ §AzÀÄ ¤Ã£ÀÄ D¹ÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ºÀAa ©qÀÄ E®è CAzÀgÉ ¤£ÀߣÀÄß ¸Á¬Ä¹ ©qÀÄvÉÛÃªÉ JAzÀÄ ºÉzÀj¸ÀÄvÁÛ fêÀ ¨ÉzÀjPÉUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß PÉÆqÀÄwÛzÁÝgÉ. £ÀªÀÄUÉ DAzsÀæ¥ÀæzÃÉ ±ÀzÀ gÁdPÁgÀtÂUÀ¼ÀÄ, ªÀÄvÀÄÛ EzÉà §¼ÁîjAiÀÄ°è ºÉ¸ÀgÁAvÀ ¥À槮 §¯ÁqÀågÀ ¨ÉA§®«zÉ ¤£ÀߣÀÄß PÉêÀ® LzÀÄ ¤«ÄµÀzÀ°è ¸Á¬Ä¹©qÀÄvÉÛêÉ. D¹ÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ºÀAZÀĪÀÅzÁUÀ° CxÀªÁ £ÀªÄÀ UÉ 60 ®PÀë zÀÄqÀÄØ PÉÆqÀĪÀÅzÁUÀ° ªÀiÁqÀ¨ÃÉ PÀÄ. E®èªÁzÀgÉ ¤£ÀߣÀÄß Cw²ÃWÀæzÀ¯ÃèÉ ¸Á¬Ä¹ ©qÀÄvÉÛêÉ. ¤£Àß UÀAqÀ£À PÁ®£ÀÄß ªÀÄvÉÆÛAzÀÄ ªÀÄÄjAiÀÄÄvÉÃÛ ªÉ. ¤£Àß zÉÆqÀØ ªÀÄUÀ£À£ÄÀ ß §eÁgÀ°è NqÁr¹ ºÉÆqÉAiÀÄÄvÉÛêÉAzɯÁè ¨ÉzÀjPÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÁPÀÄwÛzÁÝgÉ.

22. £À£Àß JgÀqÀ£Éà ¸ÉÆ¸É ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DPÉAiÀÄ ¸ÀA§A¢üPÀgÄÀ »ÃUɯÁè vÉÆAzÀgÉ PÉÆqÀÄwÛgÀ®Ä AiÀiÁªÀ ¥ÀgÀªÁ¤UÉAiÀÄÆ E®èzÉ PÀÄAiÀÄÄQÛ¬ÄAzÀ ²æà DAd£ÉÃAiÀÄ gÀªÀgÄÀ £ÀªÄÀ ä PÀlÖqÀzÀ ªÉÄïÁâªÀuÉAiÀÄ°è MAzÀ£ÃÉ

ªÀĺÀrAiÀÄ°è pPÁuÉ ºÀÆrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.CªÀgÄÀ ¸ÀºÀ £À£Àß ªÀÄ£É PÉÆAqÀÄPÉƼÀÄîªÀÅzÁV ºÉýzÀ CªÀgÄÀ £Á£ÀÄ ¤ªÀÄUÉ PÉÆnÖgÀĪÀ E¥ÀàvÄÀ Û ªÀÄÆgÀÄ ®PÀëzÀ°è 5 ®PÀë gÀÆ¥Á¬ÄUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß CqÁé£ïì DV ¥ÀjUÀt¸ÄÀ vÁÛ E£ÀÄß½zÀ ¸ÀĪÀiÁgÀÄ 18 ®PÀë UÀ½UÉ §rØ ºÁQPÉÆqÀ¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ wgÀÄV ©¢ÝgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.

23. £À£Àß ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß Rjâ¸ÀĪÀ ªÀiÁvÀ£ÀÄß §zÀ¯Á¬Ä¹ PÀè§Î¼ÀÄ £ÀqɸÀĪÀªÀjUÉ ºÀvÀÄÛ ¸Á«gÀ ¨ÁrUÉ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 10 ®PÀë CqÁé£ïì ¥ÀqÉzÀÄ CªÀjUÉ ºÀ¸ÁÛAvÀgÀ ªÀiÁqÀĪÀÅzÁV ¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁPÀÄwÛzÁÝ£É. ¤ªÁ¸À ¸ÀܼÀUÀ¼À°è PÀè¨ï £ÀqɸÀĪÀÅzÁV ¥ÀzÉà ¥ÀzÉà ¨sÀAiÀÄ¥Àr¸ÀÄwÛzÁÝ£É.

24. F J¯Áè DUÀĺÉÆÃUÀÄUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß ¸ÀÆPÀëäªÁV ¥Àj²Ã°¹zÀgÉ £À£ßÀ JgÀqÀ£Éà ¸ÉÆ¸É ²æêÀÄw ¸ËªÀÄå ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀÄ£É Rjâ¸ÀĪÀÅzÁV §A¢zÀÝ ¸ÀzÀj DAd£ÉÃAiÀÄ gÀªÀgÄÀ ¥ÀgÀ¸àÀ gÀ M¼À M¥ÀàAzÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀAvÉ PÁtÄwÛzÀÄÝ E§âgÆ À ¸ÉÃj £À£ÀUÉ ¨ÉÃgÉ zÁj E®èzÀAvÉ ªÀiÁr CªÀj§âgÀÄ ºÉýzÀ RjâUÉ £Á£ÀÄ £À£ßÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ªÀiÁgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £À£Àß ¸ÉƸÉUÉ CzÀgÀ°è CzsÀð ¨sÁUÀ PÉÆqÀĪÀ CAvÀºÀ ¢Ã£À ¥Àj¹ÜwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥Àæw¤vÀå ¥Àæw UÀAmÉUÉ ¸ÀȶָÄÀ wÛzÁÝgÉ. £À£Àß ¸ÉÆ¸É ²æêÀÄw ¸ËªÀÄå gÀªÀgÄÀ £À£ßÀ ¸Áé CfðvÀ D¹ÛAiÀÄ°è ¨sÁUÀ PÉüÀĪÀ ºÀQÌ®è¢zÀÝgÀÆ zËdð£Àå £ÀqɸÄÀ wÛzÁÝgÉ.

25. ¯ÁAiÀÄgï £ÉÆÃn¸ï ¢£ÁAPÀ 10.03.2025gÀ C£ÀÄß £À£ßÀ ¸ÉÆ¸É ²æêÀÄw ¸ËªÀÄågÀªÀgÀÄ £À£ÀUÉ PÀ¼ÄÀ »¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. D °ÃUÀ¯ï £ÉÆÃn¸Àß°è E®è¸À®èzÀ ¸ÀļÀÄîUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß ºÉüÀÄvÁÛ £À£ßÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É qÉƪÉĹÖPï (ªÁAiÀįɣïì), UÀȺÀ »A¸É PÁAiÉÄÝ C£ÀéAiÀÄ PÁ£ÀƤ£À PÀæªÄÀ dgÀÄV¸ÀĪÀÅzÁV ¨ÉzÀj¸ÀÄvÁÛ vÀPëÀ tªÉà CªÀjUÉ £Á£ÀÄ £À£ßÀ ¸Áé CfðvÀ D¹ÛAiÀÄ°è ¨sÁUÀªÀ£ÄÀ ß PÉÆqÀ¨ÃÉ PÉAzÀÄ E®èªÁzÀ°è £À£Àß «gÀÄzÀÞ PÁ£ÀƤ£À PÀæªÀÄ PÉÊUÉƼÀÄîªÅÀ zÁV ºÉzÀj¸ÀĪÀAvÀºÀ °ÃUÀ¯ï £ÉÆÃn¸ï PÉÆnÖgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.

26. £À£Àß ¸Àé DfðvÀ D¹ÛUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß zËdð£Àå¢AzÀ ¥Áæt¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁPÀÄvÁÛ CªÁZÀå ±À§ÝUÀ½AzÀ ¨ÉÊzÁqÀÄwÛgÄÀ ªÀÅzÀjAzÀ ºÁUÀÆ 77 ªÀµÀðzÀ »jAiÀÄ£ÁUÀjPÀ£ÁzÀ £À£ßÀ UÀAqÀ£À C£ÁgÉÆÃUÀå ¥Àj¹ÜwAiÀÄ°è 73 ªÀµÀðzÀ £À£ÀUÉ K£ÀÄ ªÀiÁqÀ¨ÃÉ PÉÆà w½AiÀÄzÀAvÁVzÉ.

27. £À£Àß ¸ÉÆ¸É »ÃUÉ ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛgÀ®Ä DAd£ÉÃAiÀÄÄ®Ä gÀªÀgÀÄ £À£Àß ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß Rjâ¸ÀĪÀ §zÀ®Ä £À£ßÀ ¸ÉƸÉUÉ £ÉÃgÀªÁV ¨ÉA§°¸ÀÄvÁÛ £À£ÀߣÀÄß ªÀiÁ£À¹PÀªÁV ºÉzÀj¸ÀĪÀAvÀºÀ jÃwAiÀÄ°è £À£ßÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀ¨ è ï ªÀiÁqÀĪÀÅzÁV ¨sÀAiÀÄ¥Àr¸ÀĪÀ DAd£ÉÃAiÀÄÄ®Ä gÀªÀgÀ jÃw ¤ÃwUÀ½AzÀ®Æ £Á£ÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £À£ßÀ UÀAqÀ ¨sÀAiÀÄ©üÃvÀgÁVzÉÝêÉ.

28. C®èzÉà £À£Àß MAzÀ£ÃÉ ¸ÉƸɬÄAzÀ vÀ£ßÀ ºÉýPÉAiÀÄAvÉ £À£Àß D¹ÜAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ªÁ¥À¸ï ¥ÀqÉAiÀĨÉÃPÁVzÉ.

29. PÁgÀt £À£Àß ¸Àé DfðvÀ D¹ÛUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß PÀ§½¸ÀĪÀÅzÀPÁÌV £À£Àß JgÀqÀ£ÃÉ ¸ÉÆ¸É zËdð£Àå¢AzÀ ¥Áæt¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁPÀÄvÁÛ CªÁZÀå ±À§ÝUÀ½AzÀ ¨ÉÊzÁqÀÄwÛgÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ ºÁUÀÆ 77 ªÀµÀðzÀ »jAiÀÄ£ÁUÀjPÀ£ÁzÀ £À£Àß UÀAqÀ£À C£ÁgÉÆÃUÀå ¥Àj¹ÜwAiÀÄ°è CªÀjUÉ ºÁUÀÆ 73 ªÀµÀðzÀ £À£ÀUÉ £À£Àß ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß Rjâ¸ÀĪÀ §zÀ®Ä £À£ßÀ ¸ÉƸÉUÉ £ÉÃgÀªÁV ¨ÉA§°¸ÀÄvÁÛ £À£ßÀ £ÀÄß ªÀiÁ£À¹PÀªÁV ºÉzÀj¸ÀĪÀAvÀºÀ jÃwAiÀÄ°è £À£ßÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀè¨ï ªÀiÁqÀĪÀÅzÁV ¨sÀAiÀÄ¥Àr¸ÀĪÀ Dd£ÉÃAiÀÄÄ®Ä gÀªÀgÀ jÃw ¤ÃwUÀ½UÉ PÀrªÁt ºÁPÀ¨ÃÉ PÉAzÀÄ C®èzÃÉ £À£Àß MAzÀ£ÃÉ ¸ÉƸɬÄAzÀ vÀ£ßÀ ºÀ½PÉAiÀÄAvÉAiÉÄà £À£ßÀ D¹ÜAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ªÁ¥À¸ï PÉÆr¸À¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ JgÀqÀ£ÃÉ ¸ÉÆ¸É ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DPÉAiÀÄ vÀAzÉ PÉÆ°è ¸ÀħæªÀÄtåA, vÁ¬Ä PÉÆ°è PÀ¸Æ À ÛgÀªÄÀ ä ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DPÉAiÀÄ vÀªÀÄä PÉÆ°è ªÀÄÄgÀ½gÀªÀgÀÄ zËdð£ÀåªÁV CPÀæªÄÀ ªÁV £À£ßÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è ªÁ¹¸ÀĪÀÅzÀ®èzÉ ¥Àæw¢£À £À£ßÀ £ÀÄß MA¢®è MAzÀÄ PÁgÀtPÉÌ D¹ÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÉÆrÛAiÀiÁ ¸Á¬ÄwÃAiÀÄ JAzÀÄ ¢£À¤vÀå £À£ÀߣÀÄß £À£ßÀ UÀAqÀ£À£ÀÄß avÀæ»A¸É AiÉÆA¢UÉ ºÉzÀj¸ÀÄwÛzÁÝgÁzÀ PÁgÀt CªÀgÉ®ègÀ «gÀÄzÀÞ ¸ÀÆPÀÛ jÃwAiÀÄ «ZÁgÀuÉ £Àqɹ £À£ßÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £À£ßÀ UÀAqÀ£À D¹Û gÀPÀëuÉ, ªÀiÁ£À¹PÀ ±ÁAw ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¥Áæt gÀPëÀ uÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÉÆr¸À¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ vÀªÀÄä°è «£ÀAw¸ÀÄwÛzÝÉ Ã£É ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £ÀªÄÀ ä ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£À£ÄÀ ß ¸ËªÀÄå ªÀÄvÀÛªÀgÀ C£À¢üPÀÈvÀ d£ÀjAzÀ ªÀÄÄPÀÛUÆÉ ½¸À®Ä ªÀÄ£À«, £ÀªÀÄä D¹ÛUÀ½UÁV zËdð£ÀåªÁV PÀÄAiÀÄÄQÛ¬ÄAzÀ ¥Áæt¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁPÀĪÀÅzÀ£ÄÀ ß vÁªÀÅUÀ¼ÄÀ vÀqÉAiÀĨÉÃPÁVzÉ."

(Emphasis added)

The first respondent narrates as to why she had to approach

the Assistant Commissioner venting out her grievances. The reason

is that, the first respondent and her husband were kept in the

outhouse, while the petitioner and her children took the possession

of the aforesaid house after the death of the husband of the

petitioner and had not permitted the senior citizens to enter the

house. The Assistant Commissioner considering the report and the

prayer of the first respondent, passes the impugned order on

17.06.2025. It reads as follows:

"¤uÁðAiÀÄPÀ CA±ÀUÀ¼ÄÀ :

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                                                                  (Emphasis added)

The issue now would be whether the Assistant Commissioner

can pass an order of eviction, while considering a petition by a

senior citizen. There are welter of precedents on both sides, a few

holding that eviction orders cannot be passed and few, eviction

orders could be passed. Therefore, it is the legal jugglery that

requires consideration in the case at hand.

9. Before embarking upon the issue, noticing the law as laid

down by the Apex Court or other High Courts under certain

provisions of the Act is necessary. Section 23 of the Act reads as

follows:

"23. Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances. --

(1) Where any senior citizen who, after the commencement of this Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal.

(2) Where any senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee if the transferee has notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against the transferee for consideration and without notice of right.

(3) If, any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the rights under sub-sections (1) and (2), action may be taken on his behalf by any of the organisation referred to in Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 5."

(Emphasis supplied)

Section 23 of the Act permits entertainment of a petition by

senior citizen. Section 23 of the Act has borne interpretation by the

Apex Court in the case of S. VANITHA VS. DEPUTY

COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT AND

OTHERS1, wherein, the Apex Court considers this issue as to

whether the Assistant Commissioner exercising power under the Act

has authority to order eviction of the transferee from the property

and if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the maintenance and

protection of the senior citizen. The Apex Court holds as follows:

"22. Sub-section (1) of Section 23 covers a situation where property has been transferred after the enactment of the legislation by a senior citizen (by gift or otherwise) subject to the condition that the transferee must provide the basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor. In other words, sub-section (1) deals with a situation where the transfer of the property is accompanied by a specific condition to provide for the maintenance and needs of a senior citizen. In such an event, if the transferee fails to provide the maintenance and physical needs, the transfer of the property is deemed to have been vitiated by fraud, coercion or under undue influence. Sub-section (1), in other words, creates a deeming fiction of the law where the transfer of the property is subject to a condition and the condition of providing for maintenance and the basic needs of a senior citizen is not fulfilled by the person upon whom the obligation is imposed. Then, at the option of the transferor, the transfer can be declared as void by the Tribunal.

23. On the other hand, sub-section (2) of Section 23 envisages a situation where a senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate. Where such a right exists, the right of maintenance can be enforced where the estate or a portion of it, is transferred against a transferor who

(2021) 15 SCC 730

has notice of the right; or if the transfer is gratuitous. The right however cannot be enforced against a transferee for consideration and without notice of the right. Now, sub-section (1) of Section 23 envisages a situation where the transfer of property is by the senior citizen. This is evident from the language of sub-section (1), namely, "where any senior citizen who, after the commencement of this Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property...". On the other hand, sub-section (2) of Section 23 does not confine itself to a transfer by a senior citizen, unlike sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) uses the expression "such estate or part thereof is transferred". Where a senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of the estate and any part of it is transferred, sub-section (2) permits the enforcement of the right to receive maintenance out of the estate against a transferee with notice or against a gratuitous transferee. Sub-section (2), in other words, may cover a situation where the transfer of the estate (in which a senior citizen has a right to maintenance) is by a third party, in which event, the provision provides the right to enforce the claim of maintenance against such transferee (other than those transferees for consideration or without notice of the pre-existing right). Arguably, the language of sub-

section (2) is broad enough to also cover a situation where the transfer is by the senior citizen, in which event the transferee with notice of the right; or a gratuitous transferee, can be made subject to the enforcement of the right against the transferred estate.

24. Another distinction between sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 23 must also be noticed. Under sub-section (1), where a transfer has been made by a senior citizen subject to the condition that the transferee will provide for basic amenities or physical needs of the transferor and if there is a failure of the transferee to fulfil the condition, two consequences follow : (i) the transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence; and (ii) the transfer shall, at the option of the transferor, be declared to be void by the Tribunal. The deeming consequence which is provided for in sub- section (1) is not incorporated in sub-section (2). Sub- section (2), in contradistinction, stipulates that the right to receive maintenance can be enforced against a

gratuitous transferee or a transferee with notice of the pre-existing right of a citizen to receive maintenance out of an estate notwithstanding who is the transferee of the estate. In keeping with the salutary public purpose underlying the enactment of the legislation, the expression "transfer" would include not only the absolute transfer of property but also transfer of a right or interest in the property. This would also be in consonance with the provisions of Section 2(f) which defines the expression "property" to include "rights or interests in such property". The expression "transfer" not having been defined specifically by the legislation, it must receive an interpretation which would advance the beneficent object and purpose of its provisions. Sub- section (2) of Section 23 speaks of the enforcement of the "right to receive maintenance" which is more comprehensive in its nature, than merely enforcing an order for maintenance passed under Section 9 of the Act.

25. The substance of sub-section (2) of Section 23, as submitted by the second and third respondents, is that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to pass an order directing the eviction of the appellant who is their daughter-in-law. According to the submission, the power to order eviction is implicit in the provision guaranteeing a "right to receive maintenance out of an estate" and the enforcement of that right. In supporting the submission, they have referred to the view which has been taken by several High Courts, indicating that the Tribunal may order the eviction of a child or a relative from the property of a senior citizen, where there has been a breach of the obligation to maintain the senior citizen. The Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 may have the authority to order an eviction, if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the maintenance and protection of the senior citizen or parent. Eviction, in other words would be an incident of the enforcement of the right to maintenance and protection. However, this remedy can be granted only after adverting to the competing claims in the dispute."

(Emphasis supplied)

The afore-quoted judgment is further followed by the Apex

Court, in the case of RAJESWAR PRASAD ROY VS. THE STATE

OF BIHAR AND OTHERS2, wherein, considering an identical

circumstance of interplay between the rights of the wife under

Domestic Violation Act and the rights of the Senior Citizen under

the Act, it is held as follows:

".... ...... .....

9. We have heard the counsels for both sides and perused the record. After due consideration of facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that, both the Maintenance Tribunal and Single Judge of the High Court were right in passing the order of eviction against Respondent Nos. 8 and 9. It is well established from the Plot Possession Report issued on 28.01.1982 by Bihar State Housing Board that the subject property is Appellant's self-acquired property and not an ancestral property. Respondent Nos. 8 and 9 have continuously claimed before all judicial forums that they have legitimate claim over the subject property for it is an ancestral property. They are at liberty to pursue their claim through appropriate legal remedy however we hereby affirm the factual finding of the Maintenance Tribunal. Both, the Single judge and the Division Bench of the High court have concurred with Tribunal's finding on facts. Further, we must note that behaviour of Respondent Nos. 8 and 9 towards the Appellant is getting worse day by day as evidenced from multiple proceedings including criminal complaints lodged by them against the Appellant.

10. As far as the authority of Tribunal under the Act to order eviction is concerned, this court in S Vanitha v Deputy Commissioner Bengaluru Urban Disincr & Ors reported in (2021) 15 SCC 730', specifically held that the

SLP.(CIVIL)NOS.7675 OF 2024, DISPOSED ON 30.01.2025

Tribunal under the Act has the authority to order eviction to ensure the maintenance and protection of the senior citizens. This case involved a similar challenge to the order of eviction by daughter-in law. The relevant paragraph (Para 25) from the case is extracted below:

"25. The substance of sub-section (2) of Section 23, as submitted by the second and third respondents, is that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to pass an order directing the eviction of the appellant who is their daughter-in-law. According to the submission, the power to order eviction is implicit in the provision guaranteeing a "right to receive maintenance out of an estate" and the enforcement of that right. In supporting the submission, they have referred to the view which has been taken by several High Courts, indicating that the Tribunal may order the eviction of a child or a relative from the property of a senior citizen, where there has been a breach of the obligation to maintain the senior citizen. The Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 may have the authority to order an eviction, if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the maintenance and protection of the senior citizen or parent. Eviction, in other words would be an incident of the enforcement of the right to maintenance and protection. However, this remedy can be granted only after adverting to the competing claims in the dispute. It is necessary to recapitulate that the situation in the present case is that the eviction was sought of the daughter in-law i.e., the appellant. The land, where the house has been constructed, was originally purchased by the son of the applicants who are seeking eviction of their daughter-in-law. The son had purchased the property a few months before his marriage to the appellant. He had subsequently transferred the property by a registered sale deed to his father and the fact that it was for the same consideration after the lapse of several years is of significance. The father, in turn, executed a gift deed in favour of his spouse. The appellant has asserted that she had been living in the house, as her matrimonial residence, until the application was filed. Her spouse has (according to

her) deserted her and their minor daughter and left them in the lurch. The electricity to the premises was disconnected for non-payment of dues. Their daughter has sought admission to an engineering degree course however her father, fourth respondent has not provided any financial support. The transfers which took place cannot be viewed in isolation from the context of the ongoing matrimonial dispute which has taken place. The issue is whether the appellant as the daughter-in-law and the minor daughter could have been ousted in the above manner."

11. Furthermore, the counsels for Appellant have rightly pointed out Rule 21 (2) (i) of the Bihar Senior Citizens Rules, 2012 which specifically provides that it is the duty of the District Magistrate to ensure that the life and property of the senior citizens are protected and they are able to live with security and dignity. The present Appellant is 75 year old. It shall be a defeat of the purpose of the Act if Appellant is not granted the benefit of eviction against his son and daughter-in-law who have not only encroached his self-acquired property but also threatened him of false criminal complaints, abusing and creating hurdles in running of the Rest House and thereby causing mental and physical harassments to old parents.

12. The Appeal is accordingly allowed. The Impugned order of the Division Bench dated 03.01.2024 is set aside and that of the Maintenance Tribunal dated 16.04.2022 is restored. Further, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we grant time till 31st May, 2025 to respondents (8 and 9) to vacate the premises in question and hand over vacant and peaceful possession to the appellant."

(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court in the case URMILA DIXIT V. SUNIL

SHARAN DIXIT3, has held as follows:

"20. In Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi [Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi, (2024) 14 SCC 225 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1684] , this Court refused to grant the benefit of Section 23 in the absence of an averment that the transfer in question was subject to a condition for maintenance of the parents. It was observed : (SCC para 15)

"15. When a senior citizen parts with his or her property by executing a gift or a release or otherwise in favour of his or her near and dear ones, a condition of looking after the senior citizen is not necessarily attached to it. On the contrary, very often, such transfers are made out of love and affection without any expectation in return. Therefore, when it is alleged that the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 23 are attached to a transfer, existence of such conditions must be established before the Tribunal."

(emphasis supplied)

21. Furthermore, in Sudesh [Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi, (2024) 14 SCC 225 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1684] for attracting the application of Section 23(1), the following essentials were expounded:

(a) The transfer must have been made subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor; and

(b) The transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs to the transferor.

22. Adverting to the facts at hand, we find that there are two documents on record. One, a promissory note dated 7-9-

(2025) 2 SCC 787

2019 which records that the promisor (respondent) shall serve the appellant and her husband till the end of their life, and in the absence of him fulfilling such obligation, the subsequent deed can be taken back by the appellant. Second, the gift deed dated 7-9-2019 also records a similar condition i.e. the donee maintains the donor, and the former makes all necessary provisions for the peaceful life of the appellant donor. Both these documents were signed simultaneously.

23. The appellant has submitted before us that such an undertaking stands grossly unfulfilled, and in her petition under Section 23, it has been averred that there is a breakdown of peaceful relations inter se the parties. In such a situation, the two conditions mentioned in Sudesh [Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi, (2024) 14 SCC 225 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1684] must be appropriately interpreted to further the beneficial nature of the legislation and not strictly which would render otiose the intent of the legislature. Therefore, the Single Judge of the High Court and the tribunals below had rightly held the gift deed to be cancelled since the conditions for the well-being of the senior citizens were not complied with. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench, because it takes a strict view of a beneficial legislation.

24. Before parting with the case at hand, we must clarify the observations made vide the impugned order [Sunil Sharan Dixit v. Urmila Dixit, 2022 SCC OnLine MP 3776] qua the competency of the Tribunal to hand over possession of the property. In S. Vanitha [S. Vanitha v. Commr., (2021) 15 SCC 730] , this Court observed that Tribunals under the Act may order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizen. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunals constituted under the Act, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23, cannot order possession to be transferred. This would defeat the purpose and object of the Act, which is to provide speedy, simple and inexpensive remedies for the elderly.

25. Another observation of the High Court that must be clarified, is Section 23 being a stand-alone provision of the Act. In our considered view, the relief available to senior citizens under Section 23 is intrinsically linked with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, that elderly citizens of our country, in some cases, are not being looked after. It is directly in furtherance of the objectives of the Act and empowers senior citizens to secure their rights promptly when they transfer a property subject to the condition of being maintained by the transferee."

(Emphasis supplied)

The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed

reliance upon a subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in the

case of SAMTOLA DEVI V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH4, to

contend that the Assistant Commissioner has no jurisdiction to

order eviction. In the said judgment itself, the Apex Court has

held that orders of eviction could be passed looking to the

welfare of the senior citizens. The Apex Court has held as

follows:

".... .... ....

30. The Senior Citizens Act vide Chapter-II provides for maintenance of parents and senior citizens. It inter alia provides a senior citizen or a parent who is unable to maintain himself from his own earning or the property owned by him shall be entitled to make an application against his parent or grand

2025 SCC OnLine SC 669

parent or against one or more of his children (not a minor) or where the senior citizen is issueless against specified relatives to fulfil his needs to enable him to lead a normal life. The Tribunal constituted under the Act on such an application may provide for the monthly allowance for the maintenance and expenses and in the event they fail to comply with the order, the Tribunal may for breach of the order issue a warrant for levying fines and may sentence such person to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment is made whichever is earlier.

31. The provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, nowhere specifically provides for drawing proceedings for eviction of persons from any premises owned or belonging to such a senior person. It is only on account of the observations made by this Court in S. Vanitha v. Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District5 that the Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act may also order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizens. The Tribunal thus had acquired jurisdiction to pass orders of eviction while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act which otherwise provide for treating the sale of the property to be void if it is against the interest of the senior citizen.

32. The aforesaid decision was followed by this Court in Urmila Dixit (supra). However, even in the aforesaid case the court has only held that in a given case, the Tribunal ''may order'' eviction but it is not necessary and mandatory to pass an order of eviction in every case. The Appellate Tribunal has not recorded any reason necessitating the eviction of Krishna Kumar or that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is expedient to order eviction so as to ensure the protection of the senior citizen."

(Emphasis supplied)

In the afore-quoted judgment, the Apex Court again followed

the judgments in the cases of S. VANITHA supra and URMILA

DIXIT supra.

10. The Apex Court in the judgments quoted supra has

emphatically observed that the Act does not in express terms

contemplate a general power to initiate eviction against an

occupant of the premises owned, by or belonging to a senior

citizen. It is only in a compelling circumstances, qua the facts

obtaining in every case, where the protection, dignity and welfare

of a senior citizen so demands, that the Tribunal by justifiably pass

an eviction order. The judgments in the cases of SAMTOLA DEVI

supra, further builds upon the principles laid down in the case of

URMILA DIXIT supra, reaffirming that eviction cannot be sought

as a matter of routine or ordered for the asking. The jurisdiction is

extraordinary to be invoked where rights of the elderly are to be

protected.

11. At this juncture it becomes apposite to refer to the

judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh rendered in the case

of ANIL vs. SUBHADRA5, which succinctly expounds upon the

rights of the senior citizens, the Court holds as follows:

".... .... ....

10. Thus, the primary contention of the petitioners that under the Act, 2007 an order of eviction cannot be passed by the Tribunal has specifically been negatived in the aforesaid decision by holding that what is granted thereunder is the 'right of residence' meaning thereby that eviction as understood under the common law is not ordered. It is only for the purpose of securing the right of residence of the Parent or Senior Citizen, as the case may be, that the person in unauthorized possession is directed to be evicted for securing such right. Moreover, the definition of 'maintenance' under Section 2(b) of the Act specifically includes within it provision for 'residence'. If for providing maintenance in the form of residence under Section 4/5 of the Act, 2007 the Tribunal directs for dispossession or eviction of a person in possession thereof without any authority it cannot be said that it acts beyond jurisdiction in any manner."

(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh rightly recognises

that ensuring a senior citizen secured dwelling may in necessary

circumstances, require the removal to obstruct such security. I am

in respectful agreement with the observations and the law as laid

down by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.

2023 SCC OnLine MP 6893

12. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the

present case, the Court finds no perversity or infirmity in the order

passed by the Assistant Commissioner. The senior citizen in the

case at hand has been housed in the outhouse, depriving the senior

citizen of dignified access to her own home, as the house is in the

possession of the petitioner, who does not reside in the said

premises. The petitioner having shifted residence to Andhra

Pradesh after her husband's demise cannot insist on retaining the

premises on the basis of frayed relationship with the senior citizen.

13. In the light of the afore-quoted judgments of the Apex

Court and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, given the unique

factual matrix obtaining in the case at hand, this Court finds no

merit in the challenge mounted, therefore, the writ petition fails and

accordingly, dismissed.

Sd/-

(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE

nvj CT:MJ