Karnataka High Court
Sri.R.Ramachandra vs State Of Karnataka on 21 November, 2025
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CRL.RP No. 1149 of 2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.1149 OF 2016
BETWEEN:
SRI R. RAMACHANDRA
S/O. LATE RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
RESIDENT OF NEAR KUPPUSHETTY BAVI
MALUR TOWN.
NOW RESIDING AT
INDIRANAGAR, MASTHI CIRCLE, MALUR TOWN
KOLAR DISTRICT-563 131.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI M.R. NANJUNDA GOWDA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY MALUR POLICE STATION
MALUR TOWN, KOLAR DISTRICT
REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT BUILDING
BENGALURU-560 001.
...RESPONDENT
Digitally signed by
MOUNESHWARAPPA
(BY SMT. SOWMYA R., H.C.G.P.)
NAGARATHNA
Location: High Court
of Karnataka
***
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 397 READ WITH SECTION 401 OF THE CR.P.C. PRAYING TO
SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND ORDER ON
SENTENCE DATED 16-6-2014 PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL CIVIL
JUDGE AND JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS, MALUR, IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO.107 OF 2013 AND JUDGMENT DATED 24-8-2016
PASSED BY THE II ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE, KOLAR, IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.45 OF 2014.
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 31-10-2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS
DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
CAV ORDER
Heard Sri M.R. Nanjunda Gowda, learned counsel for
the petitioner-accused, and Smt. Sowmya R., learned High
Court Government Pleader for the respondent-State.
2. The petitioner-accused has filed this revision
petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.') to
set aside the judgment of conviction and order on
sentence dated 16-06-2014 passed by the Principal Civil
Judge and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Malur, in
Criminal Case No.107 of 2013 and confirmed by the II
Additional Sessions Judge, Kolar, in Criminal Appeal No.45
of 2014 dated 24-8-2016.
3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are
referred to as per their rankings before the trial Court. The
petitioner is the accused and the respondent is the
complainant-State.
4. The brief facts of the prosecution case are that,
on 31-12-2012 around 1.00 p.m., at Malur-Hosur Main
Road, near divider situated in front of Taluk Office, Malur,
the accused, being the driver of autorickshaw, bearing
registration No.KA-03/4164, drove the same in a rash and
negligent manner and dashed to the motorcycle, bearing
Registration No.KA-08 Q-8753, which was coming from
opposite direction. Thus, the first informant-Narasimha
Murthy and pillion rider-Shankarappa sustained severe
injuries, and Shankarappa succumbed to the injuries.
Hence, PW1 lodged a complaint. This led to registration of
F.I.R. and the Investigating Officer investigated the matter
and filed the charge-sheet against the accused for the
offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'IPC').
5. After receipt of the charge-sheet, the trial Court
took cognizance of the offences and recorded plea of the
accused. In order to prove its case, the prosecution in all
examined eight witnesses as PW1 to PW8 and got marked
twelve documents as per Exs.P1 to P12. Based on oral
and documentary evidence on record, the trial Court
convicted the accused for the offences punishable under
Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC. Aggrieved by the
judgment of conviction and order on sentence, the
accused preferred an appeal in Criminal Appeal No.45 of
2014 before the First Appellate Court and the First
Appellate Court confirmed the judgment passed by the
trial Court. Hence, this revision petition.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner-accused has
contended that the impugned judgment passed by the trial
Court as well as the First Appellate Court are contrary to
law, facts and evidence. However, the trial Court has
come to a wrong conclusion and convicted the accused;
the trial Court convicted the accused on surmises and
conjunctures without appreciating the true and material
facts that have been placed before it; some of the
witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution are not
eyewitnesses to the alleged incident and they have turned
hostile to the case of the prosecution, however, the Courts
below have failed to take note of this fact. Hence, he
prays for extending the benefit of doubt in favour of the
accused; there is no direct evidence produced by the
prosecution and it has failed to prove that the accused
committed the alleged offences; there are many
contradictions, inconsistencies and variations in the
evidence of one witness to another, there is no
corroboration in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses,
however, the trial Court and the First Appellate Court have
not taken note of these contradictions in the evidence; the
prosecution has failed to produce the report regarding the
vehicle tyre marks on the road, where the accident took
place and the concerned photographs of the accident spot;
the accused is a poor man doing coolie work for his living.
7. The testimony of PWs.1, 3 and 4 do not indicate
any allegation of rash and negligent driving on the part of
the accused. Hence, the prosecution failed to prove the
ingredients of 279 of the IPC. Further, there is delay in
examination of eyewitnesses to the incident and place of
the accident is also not proved. In Ex.P11-spot sketch,
neither the Investigating Officer nor the person, who
prepared sketch has located PWs.1, 3 and 4. Thus, PWs.3
and 4 appears to be planted eyewitnesses. The
Investigating Officer could have recorded the statements
of eyewitnesses at the earliest point of time. In this case,
the best available evidence was the driver of the bus, who
has not examined. Hence, on all these grounds, he prays
to allow the revision petition.
8. Learned High Court Government Pleader for the
respondent-State has contended that since the trial Court
as well as the First Appellate Court have given concurrent
findings, interference by this Court to set aside the
judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed
against the accused would not arise. She contended that
the accident and the death of Shankarappa in the accident
are not disputed, the manner of accident and identity of
the accused are also not disputed. Hence, she prays to
dismiss the revision petition.
9. In view of the submissions made by both parties,
the following points arise for Court consideration:
Whether the revision petitioner has made
out sufficient grounds to interfere in the
concurrent findings passed by trial Court as
well as First Appellate Court?
10. Admittedly, the revision Courts power allows a
Superior Court to review the legality, correctness and
propriety of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court
proceedings and orders to prevent injustice or abuse of
process. It is an extraordinary power used sparingly and is
not a substitute for an appeal. The Court cannot re-
evaluate evidence to come to a different conclusion unless
there is a gross error, perversity, or arbitrariness in the
original decision. In the light of the above, it is just and
necessary to analyse the scope of Section 397 of the
Cr.P.C.
11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Munna
Devi v. State of Rajasthan and Another1 while
discussing the scope of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C., at
paragraph No.3 held as under:
"3. xxx xxx xxx. The revision power under the
Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised
in a routine and casual manner. While
exercising such powers the High Court has no
authority to appreciate the evidence in the
manner as the trial and the appellate courts are
required to do. Revisional powers could be
exercised only when it is shown that there is a
legal bar against the continuance of the criminal
proceedings or the framing of charge or the
facts as stated in the first information report
even if they are taken at the face value and
accepted in their entirety do not constitute the
offence for which the accused has been
charged."
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Tamil Nadu v R. Soundirarasu and Others2 at
paragraph No.79 held as under:
"79. Thus, the revisional power cannot be
exercised in a casual or mechanical manner. It
can only be exercised to correct manifest error
of law or procedure which would occasion
injustice, if it is not corrected. The revisional
power cannot be equated with the appellate
power. A Revisional Court cannot undertake
meticulous examination of the material on
(2001) 9 SCC 631
(2023) 6 SCC 768
record as it is undertaken by the trial court or
the appellate court. This power can only be
exercised if there is any legal bar to the
continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as
stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true
on their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence for which
the accused has been charged. It is conferred to
check grave error of law or procedure."
13. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar3 at
paragraph No.16 held as under:
"16. xxx xxx xxx. Now it is well settled that
revisional jurisdiction can be exercised sparingly
and only in exceptional cases. A Revisional
Court cannot convert itself into a regular court
of appeal."
14. In the light of the above principles, it is
necessary to examine the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses. PWs.1, 3 and 4 are the eyewitnesses to the
incident. Initially, they supported the case of the
prosecution. They have further stated that, the accused,
being the driver of autorickshaw, came from Malur Bus
stop towards Taluk Office, caused the accident to the
motorcycle which was parked by the side of the divider,
(2008) 9 SCC 475
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which shows that the driver of autorickshaw was
negligent. They also stated that PW1 and the deceased
Shankarappa were proceeding towards Malur Bus Stop
from Taluk Office on the motorcycle. PW1 was riding the
motorcycle and the deceased Shankarappa was the pillion
rider. A bus was coming from Masthi, at that time, the
driver of autorickshaw caused the accident. Hence, PW1
and the deceased Shankarappa sustained severe injuries.
Thus, they have clearly stated that the accident occurred
due to rash and negligent driving of the accused. In the
cross-examination of PWs.1, 3 and 4, nothing has been
elicited to discredit their testimonies.
15. PW2-Murali, son of the deceased, is not an
eyewitness and he came to the spot soon after the
accident.
16. PWs.5-Manjunath and 6-Lakshminarayana are
the mahazar witnesses to Ex.P2 and owners of
autorickshaw. They have not supported the case of the
prosecution.
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17. PW7-Gopi is another witness to spot mahazar-
Ex.P2.
18. PW8-Shivaswamy, Investigating Officer, who
investigated the matter and filed the charge-sheet.
19. In this case, there is no dispute with regard to
accident by the accused, there is no dispute with regard to
death of Shankarappa in the accident, there is no dispute
regarding the involvement of autorickshaw in the accident,
there is no dispute as to place of accident, and there is no
dispute that the accident occurred due to mechanical
defects of the autorikshaw. PWs.1, 3 and 4 are the
eyewitnesses to the incident and they have supported the
case of the prosecution.
20. On perusal of the material available on record,
the trial Court relying upon the evidence of PWs.1, 3 and 4
and based on the contents of Ex.P2-spot mahazar, Ex.P6-
inquest mahazar, Ex.P7-Post-Mortem Examination Report,
Ex.P8-IMV Report and Ex.P11-sketch convicted the
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accused for the offences punishable under Sections 279
and 304A of the IPC.
21. As rightly pointed out by the learned High Court
Government Pleader that this being a revision petition
against the concurrent findings of the trial Court and the
First Appellate Court, the scope of interference on the
factual aspects is very limited.
22. The evidence on record shows that the accused
did not dispute the occurrence of accident, he did not
dispute the death of the deceased and his identity before
the trial Court. It was his defence that PW1 rode the
motorcycle in a rash and negligent manner and dashed
against the autorikshaw. Hence, he is not responsible for
cause of the death of the deceased.
23. The trial Court as well as the First Appellate
Court have rightly held that Ex.P8-IMV Report, Ex.P2-spot
mahazar and Ex.P11-sketch do not support the defence
theory. The cumulative effect of entire evidence on record
leads to the conclusion that the accident was the outcome
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of the rash and negligent driving on the part of the
accused. PWs.1, 3 and 4 clearly stated about the rash and
negligent driving on the part of the accused. Both the
Courts below held that if the accused drove his
autorikshaw cautiously, there could not have been any
accident. Therefore, both the Courts below held that the
accused was guilty of the offences.
24. Now, the only question that arises for
consideration before this Court is whether the sentence
imposed was tenable.
25. Learned counsel for the petitioner-accused
submits that the accused has no criminal antecedents or
had any intention to cause the accident. He is the sole
bread earner in the family and hence, he prays to apply
the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
26. On perusal of the judgment passed by the trial
Court, the maximum sentence imposed is one year for the
offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC and the
sentence imposed is two years for the offence punishable
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under Section 304A of the IPC. The First Appellate Court
modified the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the
trial Court and sentenced the accused to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of three months for the offence
punishable under Section 279 of the IPC and simple
imprisonment for a period of six months for the offence
punishable under Section 304A of the IPC.
27. While dealing with the question, whether it is
desirable to impose minimal or negligible sentence in a
case of offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of GURU
BASAVARAJ @ BENNE SETTAPPA v. STATE OF
KARNATAKA reported in 2012 (8) SCC 734 at
paragraph Nos.22, 23, 28, 30 and 33, held as under:
"22. In Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, this Court
expressed thus:
"13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road
accidents in India and the devastating
consequences visiting the victims and their
families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature
of the offence under Section 304A IPC as
attracting the benevolent provisions of
Section 4 of the PO Act. While considering the
quantum of sentence to be imposed for the
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offence of causing death by rash or negligent
driving of automobiles, one of the prime
considerations should be deterrence."
23. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to
highlight what is expected of a professional
driver:
"13. ... A professional driver pedals the
accelerator of the automobile almost
throughout his working hours. He must
constantly inform himself that he cannot
afford to have a single moment of laxity
or inattentiveness when his leg is on the
pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He
cannot and should not take a chance
thinking that a rash driving need not
necessarily cause any accident; or even if
any accident occurs it need not
necessarily result in the death of any
human being; or even if such death
ensues he might not be convicted of the
offence; and lastly, that even if he is
convicted he would be dealt with leniently
by the court. He must always keep in his
mind the fear psyche that if he is
convicted of the offence for causing death
of a human being due to his callous
driving of vehicle he cannot escape from
jail sentence. This is the role which the
courts can play, particularly at the level
of trial courts, for lessening the high rate
of motor accidents due to callous driving
of automobiles."
xxx xxx xxx
28. In Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of
Maharashtra, it has been laid down that sentencing
is an important task in relation to criminal justice
dispensation system.
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"84. ... One of the prime objectives of the
criminal law is imposition of appropriate,
adequate, just and proportionate sentence
commensurate with the nature and gravity
of crime and the manner in which the
crime is done. There is no straitjacket
formula for sentencing an accused on proof
of crime. The courts have evolved certain
principles: The twin objective of the
sentencing policy is deterrence and
correction. What sentence would meet the
ends of justice depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case and the court
must keep in mind the gravity of the crime,
motive for the crime, nature of the offence
and all other attendant circumstances."
It has been further opined that
"85. The principle of proportionality in
sentencing a crime-doer is well entrenched
in criminal jurisprudence. As a matter of
law, the proportion between crime and
punishment bears the most relevant
influence in the determination of
sentencing the crime-doer. The court has
to take into consideration all aspects
including the social interest and
[conscience] of the society for award of
appropriate sentence."
xxx xxx xxx
30. From the aforesaid authorities, it is luminous
that this Court has expressed its concern on
imposition of adequate sentence in respect of
commission of offences regard being had to the
nature of the offence and demand of the conscience
of the society. That apart, the concern has been to
impose adequate sentence for the offence
punishable under Section 304-A of IPC. It is worthy
to note that in certain circumstances, the mitigating
factors have been taken into consideration but the
said aspect is dependent on the facts of each case.
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As the trend of authorities would show, the
proficiency in professional driving is emphasized
upon and deviation therefrom that results in rash
and negligent driving and causes accident has been
condemned. In a motor accident, when a number of
people sustain injuries and a death occurs, it creates
a stir in the society; sense of fear prevails all
around. The negligence of one shatters the
tranquility of the collective. When such an accident
occurs, it has the effect potentiality of making
victims in many a layer and creating a concavity in
the social fabric. The agony and anguish of the
affected persons, both direct and vicarious, can
have nightmarish effect. It has its impact on the
society and the impact is felt more when accidents
take place quite often because of rash driving by
drunken, negligent or, for that matter, adventurous
drivers who have, in a way, no concern for others.
Be it noted, grant of compensation under the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is in a
different sphere altogether. Grant of compensation
under Section 357(3) with a direction that the same
should be paid to the person who has suffered any
loss or injury by reason of the act for which the
accused has been sentenced has a different contour
and the same is not to be regarded as a substitute
in all circumstances for adequate sentence.
xxx xxx xxx
33. There can hardly be any cavil that there has to
be a proportion between the crime and the
punishment. It is the duty of the court to see that
appropriate sentence is imposed regard being had to
the commission of the crime and its impact on the
social order. The cry of the collective for justice
which includes adequate punishment cannot be
lightly ignored. In Siriya v. State of M.P., it has been
held as follows:-
"13.`7. ... Protection of society and stamping
out criminal proclivity must be the object of
law which must be achieved by imposing
appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a
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corner-stone of the edifice of "order" should
meet the challenges confronting the society.
Friedman in his "Law in Changing Society"
stated that, "State of criminal law continues
to be - as it should be - a decisive reflection
of social consciousness of society".
Therefore, in operating the sentencing
system, law should adopt the corrective
machinery or the deterrence based on
factual matrix. By deft modulation
sentencing process be stern where it should
be, and tempered with mercy where it
warrants to be."
28. On perusal of the material available on record,
in the instant case, the factum of rash and negligent
driving has been established.
29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
STATE OF PUNJAB v. SAURABH BAKSHI reported in
2015 (5) SCC 182 has imposed maximum imprisonment
of six months for the offence punishable under Section
304A of the IPC.
30. In view of the ratio laid down in the cases of
GURU BASAVARAJ @ BENNE SETTAPPA and SAURABH
BAKSHI, referred to supra, at least, the minimum
imprisonment of six months is required to be imposed for
the offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC.
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31. Having regard to the fact that the accused was
aged 47 years at the time of accident and he has faced the
proceedings since 2013 and also the fact that, he has no
criminal antecedents, considering the factual and legal
aspects of the matter, the First Appellate Court has held
that the petitioner-accused is guilty of the offences alleged
against him and convicted him for a period of six months
for the offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC.
Therefore, the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence passed by the trial Court, which was confirmed
by the First Appellate Court do not require any
interference at the hands of this Court. Hence, the revision
petition is liable to be dismissed, and accordingly, it is
dismissed.
Sd/-
(VENKATESH NAIK T)
JUDGE
KVK
