Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 10472 Kant
Judgement Date : 20 November, 2025
-1-
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
RSA No. 159 of 2010
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR
MAGADUM
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 159 OF 2010
(DEC/INJ-)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI. RUDRAPPA
S/O SRI. BADAGI THIPPAIAH,
AGE: 65 YEARS,
2. SRI. RANGAPPA
S/O SRI. BADAGI THIPPAIAH,
AGE: 63 YEARS,
BOTH ARE R/O BARHAMPURA VILLAGE
AIMANGALA HOBLI, HIRIYUR TALUK,
CHITHRADURGA DIST-577501.
Digitally signed by
NIJAMUDDIN
JAMKHANDI
...APPELLANTS
Location: HIGH
COURT OF (BY SRI. R. B. SADASHIVAPPA, A/W
KARNATAKA
SRI. G. B. NANDISH GOWDA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SMT. HANUMAKKA
W/O SRI ERANNA,
AGE: 48 YEARS,
2. SMT. CHITTAMMA
W/O SRI. THAMANNA,
AGE: 46 YEARS,
BOTH ARE R/O YELAGHATTA
-2-
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
RSA No. 159 of 2010
HC-KAR
GOLLARAHATTI,
CHELLAKERE TALUK,
CHITHRADURGA DIST-577501.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. BALAKRISHNA SHASTRY, ADVOCATE)
THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 100 OF CPC, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 07.12.2009 PASSED BY THE
ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE, FAST TRACK COURT,
CHITHRADURGA IN R.A.16/2006 CONFIRMING THE JUDGMENT
AND DECREE DATED 28.02.2006 PASSED BY THE I ADDL.
CIVIL JUDGE (SR. DN) CHITHRADURGA IN O.S.132/1995 AND
CONSEQUENTLY DISMISS THE SUIT IN O.S.132/1995 FILED BY
THE RESPONDENTS.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM)
The captioned second appeal is filed by defendants
assailing the concurrent judgments of the Courts below
wherein plaintiffs suit is decreed declaring plaintiffs as
absolute owners of the suit schedule properties and
consequently, the defendants are directed to deliver
possession of the suit schedule properties to the plaintiffs
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
within a period of three months from today.
2. For the sake of brevity, the parties are
referred to as per their rank before the Trial Court.
3. The plaintiffs instituted the present suit
contending that the suit schedule properties were
originally owned by one Puttamma. Upon her death, the
properties devolved upon her daughter Kariyamma,
who is the mother of plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 and the wife
of plaintiff No.1. It is the case of the plaintiffs that
Kariyamma died about 17 years prior to the institution
of the suit. After her demise, plaintiff No.1 married the
second wife, Eramma. The plaintiffs alleged that
Eramma developed a hostile attitude towards plaintiff
Nos.2 and 3, who were minors at the relevant point of
time. Consequently, plaintiff No.1 entrusted the care
and custody of plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 to one Sannakka,
wife of Baggajja of Yalagatta Gollarahatty, Challakere
Taluk, who is the maternal aunt of plaintiff Nos.2 and 3.
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
The plaintiffs further stated that being illiterate, they
did not take steps to get their names mutated in the
revenue records after the death of Kariyamma.
Nonetheless, plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 asserted that they,
along with plaintiff No.1, continued in exclusive
possession of the suit lands.
4. The suit was filed alleging that in July 1995,
when the defendants attempted to get their names
mutated in the revenue records, the plaintiffs
discovered that the defendants were claiming ownership
based on a registered sale deed dated 17.09.1986.
Plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 specifically contended that they
had never executed any such sale deed in favour of the
defendants and alleged that the document was
fabricated by the defendants in collusion with the
attesting witnesses and the scribe. They therefore
sought a declaration that the sale deed is null and void,
along with consequential relief of possession. The
plaintiffs further contended that they were minors on
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
the date of the purported sale and hence legally
incapable of executing any such conveyance.
5. Upon service of summons, defendant Nos.1
and 2, the alleged purchasers, entered appearance and
contested the suit. In their written statement, the
defendants denied the plaint averments in toto. They
contended that plaintiff Nos.2 and 3, being the
daughters of Kariyamma, inherited the properties
exclusively and that plaintiff No.1, being only the
husband of the deceased, is not a Class-I heir and
therefore did not succeed to the suit properties. They
further asserted that plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 voluntarily
executed the registered sale deed in their favour and
thus, after an unexplained delay of nine years, the
plaintiffs were not entitled to challenge a validly
executed transaction. On these premises, the
defendants claimed absolute title and lawful possession
and sought dismissal of the suit.
6. Both parties adduced oral and documentary
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
evidence in support of their respective claims. To prove
that plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 were minors on the date of
the alleged sale, the plaintiffs examined a Radiologist as
PW.3. The defendants, on the other hand, sought to
rebut the claim of minority and also counter the
allegation of forgery by obtaining the opinion of a
finger-print expert with respect to the signatures found
on the sale deed dated 17.09.1986, marked as Ex.D-
17.
7. The trial Court, while noting that the finger-
print expert's opinion indicated that the signatures on
Ex.D-17 tallied with those of plaintiff Nos.2 and 3,
nevertheless placed substantial reliance on the evidence
of PW.3 and the age certificate issued by him marked
as Ex.P-11. On this basis, the trial Court concluded that
plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 were indeed minors on the date of
the transaction and therefore incapable of executing the
sale deed. The Court held the sale deed dated
17.09.1986 to be a concocted and void document,
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
answering Issue No.1 in the affirmative. The trial Court
further held that the defendants failed to establish that
the plaintiffs had received consideration of Rs.5,000/-
under the alleged sale. Additional Issue No.1 was also
answered in the affirmative, with the Court recording a
finding that the defendants forcibly dispossessed the
plaintiffs on 21.02.2001. Consequently, the suit was
decreed, declaring the plaintiffs as absolute owners and
directing restoration of possession.
8. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the
trial Court, the defendants preferred an appeal before
the First Appellate Court.
9. The Appellate Court, upon reappreciation of
the evidence, concurred with the findings of the trial
Court. It upheld the conclusion that plaintiff Nos.2 and 3
were minors as on 17.09.1986 based on the age
certificate Ex.P-11 and the testimony of PW.3. The
Appellate Court reiterated that a minor is incompetent
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
to enter into a contract and therefore incapable of
alienating immovable property. It accordingly held that
the sale deed did not confer any title upon defendant
Nos.1 and 2 and dismissed the appeal.
10. It is these concurrent findings of the Courts
below that are under challenge at the instance of the
defendants in the present second appeal.
11. This Court, vide order dated 20.09.2010,
admitted the appeal on the following substantial
question of law:
"Whether the evidence on record was
sufficient to hold that the respondents herein
were minors as on the date of the execution
of the sale deed dated 17.09.1986, which
was disputed?"
12. This Court has recalled the judgment earlier
rendered on merits, upon noticing that, despite the
respondent having duly engaged counsel, the registry
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
had inadvertently failed to reflect the name of the
respondent's advocate in the cause-list. Consequently,
the respondent was not issued notice and was deprived
of an effective opportunity of hearing. In order to rectify
this procedural lapse and to uphold the principles of
natural justice, this Court found it necessary to recall
the judgment.
13. Pursuant to the recall, the matter was taken
up for fresh consideration and was heard at length. The
learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs advanced
detailed submissions and strenuously contended that
the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts
below are well-reasoned and do not call for interference
by this Court in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. It
was therefore urged that the appeal deserves to be
dismissed.
14. Heard learned counsel for defendant Nos.1
and 2 and counsel for plaintiffs.
- 10 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
15. The plaintiffs' case, as pleaded, proceeds on
a narrow but determinative premise: that plaintiff Nos.2
and 3 were minors on 17.09.1986 and therefore lacked
the legal capacity to alienate the suit lands by executing
the registered sale deed dated 17.09.1986 (Ex.D-17).
The gist of the plaintiffs' claim is that Ex.D-17 is a
fabricated document and that the purported alienation
could not have been effected by persons who were, at
the relevant time, legally incompetent to contract. To
establish minority, the plaintiffs place primary reliance
upon the age certificate exhibited as Ex.P-11 and upon
the testimony of PW.3, who gave evidence as a
Radiologist. On close scrutiny of Ex.P-11, however, it is
apparent that the certificate does not record the date
on which plaintiff No.2 (or plaintiff No.3) was examined
by PW.3 nor does it indicate the method or particulars
of the examination by which the age was ascertained.
These lacunae in Ex.P-11 necessarily engage the
Court's attention because the evidentiary weight of a
- 11 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
medical age-certificate depends heavily upon (a) the
identity of the person examined, (b) the date and
circumstances of examination, and (c) the factual basis
on which the medical opinion as to age is founded. The
credibility and probative value of PW.3's testimony must
therefore be tested against his cross-examination, for it
is in the cross-examination that the Court can examine
whether the certificate was prepared
contemporaneously, whether proper records were kept,
and whether the methodology employed was capable of
yielding a reliable conclusion as to age. The relevant
portion of PW.3's cross-examination which goes
directly to these crucial points is accordingly relied upon
by the parties and will be considered by this Court in
determining the evidentiary worth of Ex.P-11.
"¤.¦.11 gÀ°è ºÀ£ÀĪÀÄPÀ̼À UÀAqÀ£À ºÉ¸g À ÁUÀ°Ã DPÉAiÀÄ Hj£À ºÉ¸g À ÁUÀ°Ã §gÉ¢®è J£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤d. ¸Ànð¦üPÃÉ mï PÉÆlÖ vÁjÃRÄ §gÉ¢®è J£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤d. £À£Àß ¥Àª æ ÀiÁt ¥Àvz Àæ ° À è AiÀiÁªÁåªÀ ªÀÄÆ¼ÉU¼À À PÀ-ë QgÀt vÉUz É É ªÀÄvÀÄÛ AiÀiÁªÀ DzsÁgÀzÀ ªÉÄðAzÀ £À£Àß C©ü¥ÁæAiÀÄ ªÀåPÀÛ ¥Àr¹zÉ JA§ §UÉÎ §gÉ¢®è J£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤d. C®èzÉ J¦¥Éʹ¸ï PÀÆrPÉÆAqÀ §UÉÎAiÀÄÆ ¥Àª æ iÀ Át ¥Àvz æÀ ° À è §gÉ¢®è. ¤.¦. 11 gÀ°è 'C¨ÉÆÃmï' ªÀÄvÀÄÛ '21' §gÉzÀ ¸Àܼz À ° À è 'NªÀgï
- 12 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
gÉÊnAUï' DVzÉ J£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤d. ¸ÀASÉ 21 gÀ°è 2 JA§ ¸ÀASÉåAiÀÄ£ÀÄß 'NªÀgï gÉÊnAUï' DVzÉ J£ÀߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤d. £Á£ÀÄ ¥ÀjÃQëùzÁUÀ ºÀ£ÄÀ ªÀÄPÀ̽UÉ PÀ¤µÀÖ ¥ÀPÀë 21 ªÀµð À DVvÀÄ.Û D ªÀÄÆ¼É PÀÆrPÉÆAqÀÄ JµÀÄÖ ªÀµð À DVzÉ JAzÀÄ ºÉüÀ®Ä ¸ÁzÀå«®è. ZÀªÀÄðzÀ ºÉÆgÀV£À ZÀºg À É ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¨É¼ª À t À UÂ É EªÀÅUÀ¼À DzsÁgÀzÀ ªÉÄðAzÀ ªÀAiÀĸÀ£ ì ÀÄß CAzÁf£À ªÉÄÃ¯É ºÉüÀ§ºÀÄzÉ ºÉÆgÀvÀÄ ¤RgÀªÁV ¸ÁzÀå«®è. ºÀ£ÀĪÀÄPÀ̼À ªÀiÁvÀÄ PÉý ¸ÀļÀÄî ¸ÁQë ºÉüÀÄwÛzÝÉ Ã£É J£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤dªÀ®.è CzÉà vÁjÃT£ÀAzÀÄ vÀªÀÄät£ Ú À ºÉAqÀw avÀª Û ÄÀ ä JA§ÄªÀª¼ À £ À ÀÄß ¥ÀjÃQëù ªÀAiÀĹì£À §UÉÎ ¥Àª æ ÀiÁt ¥ÀvÀæ PÉÆlÖ §UÉÎ £ÀªÀÄä gÀf¸ÀÖg£ À è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¸À¯ÁVzÉ J£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤d. CzÀÄ ¥ÀÄl 216 gÀ°z À ° è ÀÄÝ CzÉà ¥ÀÄlzÀ°è PɼU À q À U É É ºÀ£ÀĪÀÄPÀ̼À ¥Àª æ ÀiÁt ¥ÀvÀæ PÉÆlÖ §UÉÎ §gÉAiÀįÁVzÉ. avÀª Û ÄÀ ä FPÉ CAzÁdÄ (C¨ÉÆ) 21 ªÀµð À CAvÀ §gÉAiÀįÁVzÀÄÝ ¤d. DzÀgÉ ºÀ£ÀĪÀÄPÀ̼À ªÀAiÀĸÀÄì (C¨ÉÆ) 21 ªÀµð À CAvÀ §gÉAiÀįÁVzÉ. 'C¨ÉÆ' 21 ªÀµðÀ CAvÀ §gÉAiÀįÁVzÉ. avÀª Û ÀÄä¼À ªÀAiÀĹì£À ¥Àªæ ÀiÁt ¥ÀvÀæ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄPÉÌ ¨ÉÃPÀÄ CAvÀ ¥ÀqAÉ iÀįÁVzÉ. ªÁ¢AiÀÄ ªÀiÁvÀÄ PÉý ¸ÀļÀÄî ¥Àª æ iÀ Át ¥ÀvæÀ PÉÆnÖzÉÝÃ£É J£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤dªÀ®.è ºÀ£ÀĪÀÄPÀ̼À ªÀAiÀĸÀÄì 21 jAzÀ 24 gÀªg À U É É EgÀ§ºÀÄzÀÄ. CzÀQÌAvÀ ºÉZÀÄÑ EgÀ§ºÀÄzÀÄ J£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¤dªÀ®.è "
16. Upon a meticulous examination of the cross-
examination of PW.3, this Court finds that both the
Courts below have failed to properly appreciate the
slender and unreliable evidence adduced by plaintiff
Nos.2 and 3 to demonstrate that they were minors at
the time of execution of the sale deed in favour of
defendant Nos.1 and 2. PW.3, the Radiologist, has
candidly admitted in his cross-examination that Ex.P-
11, the age certificate relied upon by the plaintiffs, does
not bear the date of examination. He has further
- 13 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
admitted that the certificate does not disclose which
specific bones were examined for the purpose of
determining the age of plaintiff No.2. More significantly,
he has also admitted, in unequivocal terms, that the
expression "about 21 years" appearing in Ex.P-11 is an
overwriting. He has further conceded that he is not in a
position to state when the bones of plaintiff No.2 had
united.
17. These admissions strike at the very root of
the credibility of Ex.P-11. When the evidence of PW.3 is
assessed in its entirety, it becomes evident that the
plaintiffs have failed to place any reliable or cogent
material to prove that they were minors on the date of
the purported alienation. Consequently, this Court is of
the considered view that the concurrent findings of both
the Courts below, holding that plaintiff Nos.2 and 3
were minors as on the date of execution of the sale
deed, suffer from serious perversity and are vitiated by
non-consideration of material admissions elicited in
- 14 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
cross-examination. The findings, therefore, cannot be
sustained.
18. It is well settled that while a Radiologist is
generally competent to estimate age by conducting a
bone ossification test, an assessment based on the
degree of fusion of bones through radiographic
examination, such tests have reliable probative value
primarily when conducted before an individual attains
the age of 18 years. After the age of 18, the elongation
of bones is substantially complete and ossification
approaches its final stage. At that point, variations
caused by individual biological characteristics, nutrition,
hereditary factors, and environmental influences render
the test significantly less reliable. Thus, although the
ossification test may offer a relevant indication, it
cannot be treated as a conclusive or determinative
piece of evidence for establishing age once the
individual has crossed adolescence.
- 15 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
19. In this factual matrix, this Court is not
inclined to place reliance on the oral testimony of PW.3
or on the age certificate Ex.P-11 issued by him. If the
ossification test conducted after the age of 18 cannot be
regarded as fully reliable, the evidentiary value of Ex.P-
11 must necessarily be examined within the limited
framework accorded to expert opinions under Section
45 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is well established that
expert opinion is merely advisory in nature and cannot,
on its own, form the sole basis for determining a crucial
fact unless supported by independent and credible
evidence. In this regard, reference may be made to the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramdeo
Chauhan v. State of Assam (2000) 7 SCC 455,
wherein the Apex Court has clearly laid down the
parameters governing reliance on medical opinion for
age determination.
"The statement of the doctor is no more than opinion, the Court has to base its conclusions upon all the facts and
- 16 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
circumstances disclosed on examining of the physical features of the person whose age is in question. In this vast country with varied latitudes, heights, environment, vegetation and nutrition, the height and weight cannot be expected to be uniform."
20. In Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra,
(2006)1 SCC 283, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
categorically clarified that an ossification test conducted
by a medical officer falls within the ambit of expert
opinion and is intended merely to assist the Court. Such
expert opinion is advisory in nature and does not bind
the Court. Applying this principle to the present case, it
becomes evident that the age certificate issued by PW.3
cannot be treated as reliable evidence, particularly
because the certificate fails to disclose the date on
which plaintiff No.2 was examined. In the absence of
such a foundational detail, Ex.P-11 cannot be accorded
conclusive value for determining the age of plaintiff
No.2.
- 17 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
21. Indian Courts, including the Hon'ble Apex
Court, have in Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh,
(2009) 6 SCC 681 and Jyoti Prakash Rai v. State of
Bihar, (2008) 15 SCC 223, consistently observed that
an ossification test never yields an exact age of the
person examined. Radiological assessment leaves a
margin of error of nearly two years on either side of the
assessed age. Thus, the method is inherently
approximate and incapable of furnishing precise age
determination.
22. In a country like India, where documentary
proof of age may often be unavailable owing to a
variety of social and economic circumstances, Courts
may be compelled to consider medical evidence.
However, where the medical certificate itself does not
indicate the date of examination and where significant
deficiencies in the evidence of the expert stand exposed
in cross-examination, the Courts below ought to have
exercised greater caution before accepting such
- 18 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
evidence. In the present case, the concurrent findings
of both Courts that plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 were minors on
the date of alienation are patently erroneous, having
been rendered without due scrutiny of the infirmities in
PW.3's testimony. These findings suffer from grave
perversity and cannot be sustained.
23. Another vital aspect completely overlooked
by both Courts is the inadequacy of oral evidence
adduced by the plaintiffs. PW.1, whose deposition was
relied upon, has fallen short of establishing the
allegations in the plaint regarding minority of plaintiff
Nos.2 and 3. Plaintiff No.1--the father has not
prosecuted the suit, nor has he stepped into the witness
box to affirm the pleadings. More significantly, plaintiff
Nos.2 and 3, who have alleged serious acts of forgery
and fabrication against the defendants, have abstained
from entering the witness box to substantiate such
grave charges. Instead, they have prosecuted the suit
through a GPA holder, who is admittedly incompetent to
- 19 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
depose regarding matters within the personal
knowledge of plaintiff Nos.2 and 3. The GPA holder is
not a party to the sale deed dated 17.09.1986 (Ex.D-
17) and therefore cannot speak to the circumstances
surrounding its execution. These omissions strike at the
core of the plaintiffs' case. Both Courts ought to have
taken note of these glaring deficiencies and drawn an
adverse inference under Illustration (g) to Section 114
of the Evidence Act.
24. The next important question that arises is
whether the Courts below were justified in granting a
declaration of ownership in favour of the plaintiffs
despite the plaintiffs not seeking cancellation of the
registered sale deed dated 17.09.1986. Where plaintiffs
allege that a sale deed is forged, fabricated, or
executed without lawful authority, they are required to
specifically seek cancellation of the said document. In
the present case, the plaintiffs have furnished only
slender and unreliable evidence to claim that they were
- 20 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
minors. On the other hand, the finger-print expert's
opinion, which has been placed on record by the
defendants, clearly indicates that the disputed
signatures on Ex.D-17 match the specimen signatures
of plaintiff Nos.2 and 3. Once such evidence exists, the
plaintiffs, who are allegedly parties to the document,
were required in law to seek the relief of cancellation of
the sale deed. Without such a prayer, the title flowing
from the registered document remains intact.
25. It is well settled that while a Court may
declare an instrument void even without a specific
prayer for cancellation, such a course is permissible
only when the document is inherently void ab initio.
However, where the document is merely voidable at the
instance of a party particularly where allegations of
forgery or incapacity are raised,the party aggrieved
must necessarily seek a prayer for cancellation. The
nature of the relief sought also has a direct bearing on
the question of limitation. In the present case, the
- 21 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
evidence indicates that plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 were
signatories to the sale deed, and hence, any challenge
to the document required an explicit plea for
cancellation. Both Courts failed to appreciate this legal
distinction and erred in granting a mere declaration of
title without addressing the validity of the registered
sale deed.
26. Although it is well established that Courts, in
appropriate cases, may grant a declaration of invalidity
even in the absence of a prayer for cancellation, the
present case does not fall within such a category. Given
that the finger-print expert's report supports the
defendants and that the plaintiffs have failed to bring
even minimally acceptable evidence to establish
minority at the time of execution, the suit as framed
seeking only declaration and possession was not
maintainable. The plaintiffs were bound to challenge
Ex.D-17 directly, and failure to do so is fatal to their
case.
- 22 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
27. In view of the foregoing discussion, the
substantial question of law framed by this Court must
be answered in the 'negative' and against the
plaintiffs. The material on record is wholly insufficient to
establish that plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 were minors as on
17.09.1986. On the contrary, the documentary and
expert evidence produced by the defendants supports
the execution of the sale deed. Plaintiff Nos.2 and 3
have not participated in the proceedings by entering the
witness box; therefore, an adverse inference under
Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act necessarily arises
against them. Consequently, the concurrent findings of
the Courts below are unsustainable in law. Having
answered the substantial question of law against the
plaintiffs, this Court holds that the suit instituted by
plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 is liable to be dismissed.
- 23 -
NC: 2025:KHC:48252
HC-KAR
28. For the foregoing reasons, the following
order is passed:
ORDER
(i) The second appeal is hereby allowed;
(ii) The judgment and decree dated 07.12.2009
passed in R.A.No.16/2006 by the learned Addl.
Sessions Judge, Fast Tract Court, Chitradurga,
confirming the judgment and decree dated
28.02.2006 passed in O.S.No.132/1995 by the
learned I Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.),
Chitradurga, are set aside. Consequently, the
suit stands dismissed;
(iii) All pending interlocutory applications, if any,
stand disposed of as having become infructuous.
Sd/-
(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE NJ
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!