The State Of Karnataka vs H B Munivenkatappa
2025 Latest Caselaw 10390 Kant

no tank bed in Sy.No.54, or old Sy.No.15 which is the

land in question. There being such clear finding rendered

by the lower appellate court, the State and its authorities

should not be permitted to re-open the issue once again.

Learned counsel submits that respondent No.1 and its

family members should be permitted to enjoy the fruits of

the long litigation, having succeeded throughout before

the courts of law.

10. Learned counsel Sri.S.Kalyan Basavaraj has

made submission on behalf of respondent No.8, seeking

to espouse public cause. The learned counsel has

supported the arguments of the learned AAG, while

contending that a public property in the nature of a water

tank should not be permitted to be usurped by the

contesting respondents.

11. Heard Sri.Kiran V.Ron, learned AAG for

Sri.K.P.Yoganna, learned AGA, Sri.P.N.Manmohan,

learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 6, Sri.S.Kalyan

Basavaraj and K.Prajwal, learned counsels for respondent

No.8 and perused the petition papers.

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12. It would be relevant to notice that a Division

Bench of this court made great efforts to secure the

original records, having raised three important issues, as

noticed hereinabove. It has been the contention of the

petitioner-State and its authorities that the land in

question forms the part of "Kere Angala" or tank bed and

therefore, the Land Tribunal could not have conferred

occupancy rights or could not have re-granted the lands

to Sri.H.B.Munivenkatappa. It was also contended that no

such order was passed by the Land Tribunal in favour of

Sri.H.B.Munivenkatappa. A question mark was put on the

document, i.e., the order passed by the Land Tribunal.

The Division Bench noticed the earlier orders passed in

W.P.No.7908/1979, where the certified copy of the order

of the Land Tribunal was verified. It was noticed that the

learned Government Pleader, after verifying the records

of the Land Tribunal in case No.LRF.5063/79-80,

admitted that such an order was indeed passed by the

Land Tribunal. This court noticed the fact that similar

contention was raised and considered by the Land

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Tribunal as to whether the land in question forms part of

tank bed. It was noticed that the order of the Land

Tribunal which was marked as exhibit-S shows that as

some portion of the land was acquired for the purpose of

sinking bore-wells and construction of road, the

Government had acquiesced to the position that the land

in question was no more a tank bed. The Division Bench

found from the records that 20 guntas of land in the

same survey number were acquired by the State

Government in the year 1931 and the second acquisition

of 30 guntas by the State Government was in 1955. It

was therefore, held that the acquisition of the land was

prior to the vesting on 01.02.1959, under the Statute.

13. But the Division Bench also noticed that the

contentions of the Government that one Smt.Ramakka

w/o Shikari Muniyappa and Sri.T.Venkatappa s/o Thimma

Reddy had filed applications for grant of occupancy rights

in the same survey number and the Special Deputy

Commissioner for Abolition rejected the applications on

the ground that the lands form part of the tank bed and it

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cannot be re-granted. Similar application filed by Captain

Thyagarajan Pillai was also rejected by the Special

Deputy Commissioner. Therefore, it was doubtful as to

whether Sri.H.B.Munivenkatappa had subsequently filed

application in Form No.7 under Section 48-A(1) of the

Karnataka Land Reforms Amendment Act. It is for this

reason that the Division Bench allowed RSA

No.2166/2006 filed by the State of Karnataka, while

condoning the delay 9 years 7 months in preferring the

regular appeal. The matter was remanded to the lower

appellate court to hear and dispose of the appeal on

merits, in accordance with law and in the light of the

observations made by the Division Bench. The Division

Bench held that as the State had already preferred a

regular appeal challenging the order passed in

O.S.No.394/1993, a writ petition challenging the very

same order is not maintainable. However, since the State

and its authorities contended that there was no such

order at all, the said question also was to be gone into by

the lower appellate court.

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14. The lower appellate court, after re-considering

the matter on remand conclusively decided that the

records furnished by the Government regarding the

application filed by Smt.Ramakka and Sri.Venkatappa

were bogus. It was noticed that the applications are said

to have been filed on 26.01.1960, being 'Republic Day',

was a holiday and therefore, there was no occasion for

the Special Deputy Commissioner or Special Tahasildar

(Inams) to reject such applications. On the other hand,

the original revenue records, more particularly, Ex.A19-

RTC reveals that 11 acres 20 guntas in Sy.No.54 were

re-granted in favour of Sri.H.B.Munivenkatappa in case

No.LRF.5063/79-80 and the RTC bears the signatures of

three concerned officials. It was also found that in the

original records, the word 'Sarakari Kere' were

clandestinely inserted, recently in an ink pen. Such acts

were done to deprive Sri.H.B.Munivenkatappa of his

legitimate claims.

15. The lower appellate court has also found on

perusal of exhibits R1 to R18, that the encumbrance

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certificates reveal the fact that sale deeds have been

executed in respect of the land in question commencing

from the year 1927. Sri.Thimmaiah purchased the lands

in question on 10.11.1927; Sri.Armugam Pillai

Thyagarajan purchased the lands on 07.11.1947.

Revenue entries have been made in favour of the

purchasers. These facts reveal that at no point of time

the revenue authorities or the State raised any question

on the sale transactions and maintenance of the revenue

records in favour of the purchasers, on the ground that

the land is part of a tank bed. Further, the lower

appellate court has found from the records that in

Sy.No.54 survey sketches are available from the year

1958 and it was never recorded as water tank. On the

other hand, sale transactions are found on various pieces

in Sy.No.54, in the year 1918, 1947, 1960. The Land

Tribunal has therefore recorded the fact that the survey

records do not record the existence of water tank or tank

bed commencing from the year 1920.

16. In that view of the matter, since the very

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same issues were raised and considered by the civil

court, more particularly, the lower appellate court,

confirmed by a Division Bench of this court in subsequent

RSA No.142/2009 dated 24.11.2016 and further affirmed

by the Apex Court in SLP(Civil)No.D11308/2018 dated

13.04.2018, this court should uphold the contentions of

the learned counsel for respondent No.1 that this writ

petition is hit by the principles of res judicata.

17. The learned counsel for respondent No.1 is

right in seeking support of the recent judgment of the

Apex Court in SULTHAN SAID IBRAHIM VS PRAKASAN AND

OTHERS 2025 INSC 764, where it was held that "the

original court as well as any higher court must in any

future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous

decision was correct. The principles of res judicata applies

also as between two stages in the same litigation to this

extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher

court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one

way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter

again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings".

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18. Similarly, on the question of delay and laches,

the learned counsel for respondent No.1 is also right in

pointing out to MRINMOY MAITY VS CHHANDA KOLEY AND

OTHERS reported in 2024 SCC ONLINE SC 551, where it

was held as follows:

"11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B and others, (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect:

"56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.

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57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969] ). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84]).

58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose."

19. In the considered opinion of this court, there

was no need for the lower appellate court to have

granted such liberty to the petitioner-State and its

authorities to question the order of the Land Tribunal

passed in the year 1980. The decision of the lower

appellate court was rendered on 17.12.2008. Even

otherwise, there is a delay of nearly 20 years in filing this

writ petition, raising a challenge to the order of the Land

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Tribunal dated 27.12.1980, from the date of the

judgment of the lower appellate court. Moreover, the

State and its authorities have taken a chance in

preferring Regular Second Appeal before this court and

by filing Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court. If

this writ petition is entertained, it would amount to

affording a second chance to the petitioner-State and its

authorities to re-agitate the same issue. As reiterated

again and again, the law of limitation is applicable to the

State like any other person and no exception can be

carved out for the State.

20. For the reasons stated above, this court is of

the considered opinion that this writ petition filed by the

State of Karnataka, assailing order dated 27.12.1980

passed by the Land Tribunal, Bangalore South Taluk in

case No.LRF.5063/79-80, cannot be entertained.

The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

Sd/-

(R.DEVDAS) JUDGE MBS CT:VH