Karnataka High Court
Kailash Roofing Solutions Pvt Ltd vs Steel Hypermart India Pvt Ltd on 17 November, 2025
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COMAP No.86/2024
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
COMMERCIAL APPEAL NO.86/2024
BETWEEN:
1. KAILASH ROOFING SOLUTIONS PVT LTD
A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER
THE COMPANIES ACT 1 OF 1956
HAVING ITS OFFICE AND PLACE OF
BUSINESS AT PLOT NO.69/B, 69/C
PARTS OF SURVEY NO.18 AND 19
Digitally signed VASANTHANARASAPURA INDUSTRIAL AREA
by RUPA V NAGENAHALLI, KORA HOBLI
Location: High TUMKURU TALUK AND DISTRICT
Court Of REP. BY ITS DIRECTOR
Karnataka MR. UMED SINGH.
2. MR. UMED SINGH
S/O JAGANATH SINGH
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
DIRECTOR OF KAILASH ROOFING
SOLUTIONS PVT LTD
PLOT NO.69/B, 69/C
PARTS OF SURVEY NO.18 AND 19
VASANTHANARASAPURA INDUSTRIAL AREA
NAGENAHALLI, KORA HOBLI
TUMKURU TALUK AND DISTRICT.
R/AT NO.148, 1ST MAIN ROAD
1ST CROSS, S V G NAGAR,
MOODALAPALYA
BANGALORE-560072.
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COMAP No.86/2024
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3. MR. KISHORE SINGH
S/O JAGANATH SINGH
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
DIRECTOR OF KAILASH ROOFING
SOLUTIONS PVT LTD
PLOT NO.69/B, 69/C
PARTS OF SURVEY NO.18 AND 19
VASANTHANARASAPURA INDUSTRIAL AREA
NAGENAHALLI, KORA HOBLI
TUMKURU TALUK AND DISTRICT.
R/AT NO.148, 1ST MAIN ROAD
5TH CROSS, MOODALAPALYA
BANGALORE-560072.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. D. ASWATHAPPA, ADV., FOR
SRI. M. SUBRAMANI, ADV.,)
AND:
1. STEEL HYPERMART INDIA PVT LTD
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE
COMPANIES ACT 1 OF 1956 HAVING ITS
REGISTERED OFFICE AT
MANNAJ, NO.2/1A, GROUND FLOOR
NANJAPPA ROAD, SHANTHINAGAR
BENGALURU-560027
REP. BY ITS DIRECTOR
MAHENDRA KUMAR SINGHI.
2. THE ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER
STATE BANK OF INDIA
BANGALORE CITY BRANCH
NO.22, J C ROAD
BANGALORE-560002.
3. INDIA BULLS HOUSING FINANCE LTD
NO.87/6, RICHMOND ROAD
RICHMOND TOWN
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COMAP No.86/2024
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OPP. ELANZA HOTEL
BANGALORE-560025.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. LAKSHAY AGARWAL, ADV., FOR
SRI. ROSHAN JACOB, ADV., FOR R1
R2 & R3 SERVICE OF NOTICE IS D/W V.C.O. DTD:15.07.2024)
---
THIS COMAP/COMMERCIAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 13 (1A) OF THE COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT R/W
ORDER 41 RULE 1 AND 2 OF CPC, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 10.01.2022 PASSED BY THE COURT
OF LXXXII ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
BANGALORE (CCH-83) ALLOWED I.A.NO. 2 UNDER ORDER-
XIII-A OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE IS ALLOWED IN COM.O.S.
NO. 26084/2017 FILED BY THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT AND
DECREED THE SUIT OF RESPONDENT NO.1 BY ALLOWING THE
APPEAL & ETC.
THIS COMAP HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
12.11.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT, THIS DAY VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL J., DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
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COMAP No.86/2024
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CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
This appeal is filed by the appellants-defendant Nos.1
to 3 under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') read with Order
XLI Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as 'the CPC'), challenging the
judgment and decree dated 10.01.2022 passed in
Com.O.S.No.26084/2017 by the LXXXII Additional City
Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Trial Court').
2. The respondent No.1-plaintiff filed a suit for
recovery of a sum of Rs.2,72,58,080/- against the
respondents with an interest at the rate of 24% p.a. from
the date of suit till realization of the amount with costs. In
the said suit, the defendant Nos.1 to 3 failed to file a
written statement refuting any claim made by the plaintiff.
The Trial Court, on consideration of the case, in view of
the absence of the written statement and also on an
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application filed by the plaintiff under Order XIII-A,
proceeded to pass a summary judgment allowing the suit
and directing the appellants-defendant Nos.1 to 3 to
jointly and severally pay a sum of Rs.2,72,58,080/- with
the interest at the rate of 24% p.a. from date of suit till
realization. Being aggrieved, the present appeal is filed
along with an application in I.A.No.1/2024 under Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay
of 721 days in filing the appeal.
3. Sri.D.Aswathappa, learned counsel appearing
for Sri.M.Subramani, learned counsel for the appellants
submits that the appellants have filed an affidavit
accompanying the application for condonation of delay and
also additional affidavits explaining the cause for the
delay. It is submitted that the impugned judgment is
passed on 10.01.2022 and only after receipt of the
execution notice, the appellants entered appearance in the
execution proceedings and filed vakalath on 16.12.2023
and thereafter, filed an appeal. It is further submitted
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that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had excluded the period
of limitation during the Covid-19 pandemic from
15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 and hence, the said period is
required to be excluded while computing the period of
limitation. It is also submitted that the appellant No.2
underwent surgery and he was admitted to the hospital on
12.08.2022 and discharged on 13.08.2022. Similarly, the
appellant No.3 had undergone medical treatment on
different dates and also underwent surgery which has
been explained in the affidavits filed by both the
appellants. Hence, the delay is required to be condoned
by considering the cause shown in the affidavits. It is
contended that the appellants have deposited the principal
amount before the Trial Court and the matter is required
to be remanded back to the Trial Court as the Trial Court,
without considering the scope of Order XIII-A Rule 3 of the
CPC, has proceeded to accept the plaint version and
decreed the suit, which is impermissible. In support of his
contentions, he placed reliance on the decision of the
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Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C.N.RAMAPPA
GOWDA Vs. C.C.CHANDRE GOWDA (DEAD) BY LRS
AND ANOTHER1 and the decision of Delhi High Court in
the case of BRIGHT ENTERPRISES PRIVATE LIMITED
AND ANR. Vs. M.J. BIZCRAFT LLP AND ANR.2. He
further contended that one opportunity is required to be
given to the appellants to place their defense before the
Trial Court as they have a good case on merits.
Therefore, he seeks to condone the delay and consider the
appeal on merits.
4. Per contra, Sri.Lakshay Agarwal appearing for
Sri.Roshan Jacob, learned counsel for the respondent No.1
supports the impugned order of the Trial Court and
submits that the appellants have filed vakalath before the
Trial Court but they failed to file a written statement and
hence, the matter was dragged on for many years and
considering the material available on record, by a well
reasoned order, the Trial Court decreed the suit, which
(2012) 5 SCC 265
(2017) SCC Online Delhi 6394
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does not call for any interference. It is submitted that the
Court should not condone the delay in the commercial
suits in a mechanical manner unless there is sufficient
cause. It is further submitted that the statement of
objections filed by the respondent No.1-plaintiff contains
various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court with
regard to consideration of application for condonation of
delay. He seeks to consider those judgments and reject
the application filed by the appellants for condonation of
delay and consequently, reject the appeal.
5. We have heard the arguments of the learned
counsel appearing for the appellants, the learned counsel
appearing for the respondent No.1, perused the material
available on record and have given our anxious
consideration to the submissions advanced, judgments
relied and the material on record.
6. The point that arises for consideration is:
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"Whether the appellants have shown
'sufficient cause' to condone the delay of
721 days in filing the appeal?"
7. The answer to the above point is in the negative
for the following reasons:
(a) Before considering the cause shown by the
appellants seeking for condonation of delay of 721 days, it
would be useful to refer to the decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court on the subject. In the case of JHARKAND
URJA UTPADAN NIGAM LTD. AND ANOTHER VS. BHARAT
HEAVY ELECTRICALS LIMITED3 at paragraphs 20 and 21
held as under:
"20. The High Court, thereafter, proceeded to
answer the aforesaid question as under:
"19. In order to answer this question, we
cannot lose sight of the whole purpose of
enactment of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 i.e., to provide for speedy disposal of
high value commercial dispute.
20. No doubt there was a similar provision
in Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988
framed under the Consumer Protection Act,
1986 which was considered by the Supreme
2025 SCC OnLine SC 910
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Court in the case of Housing Board,
Haryana (1 supra).
The said provision in the Haryana
Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 also
provided for communication of the order of the
District forum to the parties free of charge in
order to avoid the delay as well as to save the
parties from the burden of expenses that may
he incurred for obtaining the certified copy.
The Supreme Court held that the scheme of
the Consumer Protection Act was to provide
for better protection of the interest of the
consumers as a measure for economical and
speedy remedy for the settlement of the
dispute and the matters connected therewith
and therefore, the said rule should be
understood in a manner so that it would
protect the interest of the parties before the
District forum by making it obligatory on the
District forum to provide a copy of the order
duly signed and dated by the members of the
Bench; and the period of limitation prescribed
with regard to filing of an appeal under
Section 15 of the said Act therefore, has to be
computed as commencing from the date of
communication of the order in the manner laid
down in the rules.
It was in that context that it was Held that
mere pronouncement of an order in the open
Conn would not be enough, but under the
scheme of the rules copy of the said judgment
has to be communicated to the parties
affected by the said order so that the parties
adversely affected therefrom may have a fair
and reasonable opportunity of knowing the
text, reasons and contents thereof so as to
formulate grounds of attack before the
appellate or before the higher forums. In
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absence of such communication of signed and
dated order, it was held that the parties
adversely affected by it will have no means of
knowing the contents of the order so to
challenge the same and get it set aside by the
appellate authority or by the higher forums.
21. Normally petitioners before the District
forums under the Consumer Protection Act,
1986 are individuals and not corporate entities
like the appellant/instrumentality of the State.
So, there is justification for taking the view as
regards petitioners in District forums that the
provisions in the Haryana Consumer Protection
Rules, 1988 which mandated communication
of the order of the said forums to the parties
free of charge was to save the parties from the
burden of expenses that may be incurred for
obtaining the certified copy.
22. We are afraid that the logic behind the
provision contained in Haryana Consumer
Protection Rules, 1988 framed under the
Consumer Protection Act. 1986 cannot be
applied to the litigants before the Commercial
Court. For Commercial entities and in
particular litigants like the applicants herein
who are the State Government Undertakings,
the expenses of obtaining a certified copy of a
judgment of the Commercial Court would be
very small compared to the stakes involves in
the litigation.
23. Therefore, they cannot be put on the
same footing as a petitioner before the District
Consumer forum; and the logic of counting the
period of limitation from the date of
communication of the order of consumer
forum, cannot be applied to a Commercial
dispute to which Commercial entities are
parties.
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24. In our opinion. Order XX Rule 1 CPC as
amended and made applicable to the
Commercial Courts is to be treated as only
directory and not mandatory. So
notwithstanding the provision contained in the
amended Order XX Rule 1 CPC (mandating
issuance of copies to the parties to the dispute
through electronic mail or otherwise), if such
copies are not issued within a reasonable time,
the parties to the dispute have to apply for the
same, and after obtaining it, prefer an appeal
within the time prescribed in Section 13(1-
A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
25. This is because the speedy resolution of
high value commercial dispute cannot be lost
sight of. Such an interpretation would be in
tune with the scheme and object of the
Commercial Couns Act, 2015 and any
interpretation of the nature advanced by the
counsel for the applicants would defeat the
whole purpose of the object of the Commercial
Courts Act. 2015 to provide for speedy
disposal of high value commercial disputes.
26. Therefore, we reject the contention of
the counsel for the applicants that the period
of limitation for filing the appeal to the
Commercial Appellate Division of the High
Court would not commence unless the
judgment of the Commercial Court in the
Commercial suit was communicated by the
said Commercial Court to the parties.
27. We shall next consider whether the
delay of 301 days in filing this Commercial
Appeal can be condone in exercise of power
conferred on this Court under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963.
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28. The extent of applicability of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to cases
falling under the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 fell for consideration of the Supreme
Court in Government of Maharashtra (2
supra).
29. The Supreme Court in Para 19 of it's
judgment in Government of Maharashtra (2
supra) discussed the statement of objects and
reasons behind enacting of the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 and held that period of
limitation must always to some extent be
arbitrary and may result in some hardship, but
this is no reason as to why they should not be
strictly followed.
In para 32, it held that the condonation of
delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 has to be seen in the context of the
object of speedy resolution of the dispute.
In para 58, the Supreme Court held that
given the object sought to be achieved under
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 i.e., the
speedy resolution of the disputes, expression
"sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 is not elastic enough to cover long
delays beyond the period provided by the
appeal provision itself; and that the expression
"sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea
for the ill of pressing negligent and stale
claims.
In other words, the Supreme Court
indicated that in exercise of power under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 a delay
beyond the period of 60 days from the date on
which the appeal could have been filed can be
condoned (i.e., below 120 days from the date
of pronouncement of the judgment) by
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invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
but where there is negligence, inaction or lack
of bona fides, such power ought not to be
exercised.
It went further in para 59 by observing that
merely because the Government is involved, a
different yardstick for condonation of delay
cannot be laid down. (This rule would thus
apply equally to instrumentalities of
Government like the applicants herein).
It held in para 62 that merely because
sufficient cause has been made out in the facts
of a given case, there is no right in the
applicants or the appellants to have the delay
condoned.
It concluded in para 63 as under:
"63. Given the aforesaid and the
object of speedy disposal sought to be
achieved both under the Arbitration An
and the Commercial Courts Act, for
appeals pled under section 37 of the
Arbitration Act that are governed by
Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation
Act or Section 13(l-A) of the
Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond
90 days, 30 days or 60 days.
respectively, is to be condoned by way
of exception and not by way of rule. In
a fit case in which a party has otherwise
acted bona fide and not in a negligent
manner, a short delay beyond such
period can, in the discretion of the
court, he condoned, always bearing in
mind that the other side of the picture
is that the opposite party may have
acquired both in equity and justice,
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what may now be lost by the first
party's inaction, negligence or laches."
(emphasis supplied)
30. Thus, the Supreme Court
in Government of Maharashtra (2 supra)
permitted condonation of delay beyond 60
days in a case falling under the Commercial
Courts Act only by way of exception and not
by way of rule. If the applicants for
condonation of delay had not acted bona fide
and had acted in a negligent manner as in the
instant case, the delay is not liable to be
condoned.
31. In the instant case, the delay in filing
the appeal is 301 days - way beyond 60 days
+ 60 days = 120 days permitted by the
judgment of the Supreme Court to be
condoned in exercise of power under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Therefore, such inordinate delay caused by
negligence of the applicants is not liable to be
condoned.
(emphasis supplied)
32. We may also point out that the
applicants were represented before the
Commercial Court, Ranchi by counsel and the
judgment was obviously pronounced in the
presence of the counsel.
Though the order was pronounced on
09.10.2023 it appears that the application for
issuance of certified copy was made on
30.08.2024, it was made ready on
07.09.2024, and the appeal was filed on
04.10.2024.
If the Commercial Court had not
communicated the copy of its judgment to the
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applicants within the reasonable time, it was
incumbent on the part of the counsel for the
applicants or the employees in the Legal
Department of the applicants to apply for
issuance of certified copy from the Commercial
Court, but they have failed in their duty to
apply for it when they did not receive it within
a reasonable time.
Their negligence resulted in the inordinate
delay of 301 days in filing this appeal.
33. The applicants cannot blame the
respondent for not communicating to them
about the disposal of the appeal and for not
making any demand of payment in terms of
the decree of the Commercial Court.
34. They also cannot take advantage of the
negligence of the counsel engaged by them in
not informing the applicants about the
judgment of the Commercial Court. This is
because the applicants have a Legal
Department and employees engaged by the
applicants in that department have a duty to
monitor what is happening in the cases to
which the applicants are parties, keep track of
the progress of the said cases and the
decisions therein, and ensure that applications
for issuance of certified copy are made to the
concerned court so that the appeals, if
required, can be preferred within the period of
limitation prescribed by law."
21. We are in complete agreement with the line
of reasoning assigned by the High Court."
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(b) In the case BORSE BROTHERS ENGINEERS AND
CONTRACTORS PRIVATE LIMITED4 at paragraphs 58 to
63, it has been held as under:
"58. Given the object sought to be achieved
under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of
disputes, the expression "sufficient cause" is not
elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the
period provided by the appeal provision itself.
Besides, the expression "sufficient cause" is not
itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing
negligent and stale claims. This Court,
in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14
SCC 81] , has held : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for
which the defendant could not be blamed
for his absence. The meaning of the word
"sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough",
inasmuch as may be necessary to answer
the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
"sufficient" embraces no more than that
which provides a platitude, which when the
act done suffices to accomplish the purpose
intended in the facts and circumstances
existing in a case, duly examined from the
viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a
cautious man. In this context, "sufficient
cause" means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there
was a want of bona fide on its part in view
(2021) 6 SCC 460
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of the facts and circumstances of a case or
it cannot be alleged that the party has "not
acted diligently" or "remained inactive".
However, the facts and circumstances of
each case must afford sufficient ground to
enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the
court exercises discretion, it has to be
exercised judiciously. The applicant must
satisfy the court that he was prevented by
any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his
case, and unless a satisfactory explanation
is furnished, the court should not allow the
application for condonation of delay. The
court has to examine whether the mistake
is bona fide or was merely a device to cover
an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land &
Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath
Banerjee [Manindra Land & Building
Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC
1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [Mata
Din v. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770]
, Parimal v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena,
(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1]
and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal
Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [Maniben Devraj
Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai,
(2012)5 SCC 157:(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra
Kumar [Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar,
AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the
difference between a "good cause" and a
"sufficient cause" and observed that every
"sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice
versa. However, if any difference exists it
can only be that the requirement of good
cause is complied with on a lesser degree of
proof than that of "sufficient cause".
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11. The expression "sufficient cause"
should be given a liberal interpretation to
ensure that substantial justice is done, but
only [Ed. : The matter between two
asterisks has been emphasised in
original.] so long as negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the
party concerned [Ed. : The matter between
two asterisks has been emphasised in
original.] , whether or not sufficient cause
has been furnished, can be decided on the
facts of a particular case and no straitjacket
formula is possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [Madanlal v. Sh
yamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195]
.)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that
law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied with
all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.
The court has no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds. 'A
result flowing from a statutory provision is
never an evil. A court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its
operation.' The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice
but to enforce it giving full effect to the
same. The legal maxim dura lex sed
lex which means "the law is hard but it is
the law", stands attracted in such a
situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to
be considered while interpreting a statute.
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13. The statute of limitation is founded
on public policy, its aim being to secure
peace in the community, to suppress fraud
and perjury, to quicken diligence and to
prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts
of the past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time
become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws
of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266:
'605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The
courts have expressed at least three
differing reasons supporting the existence
of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that
long dormant claims have more of cruelty
than justice in them, (2) that a defendant
might have lost the evidence to disprove a
stale claim, and (3) that persons with good
causes of actions should pursue them with
reasonable diligence.'
An unlimited limitation would lead to a
sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and
therefore, limitation prevents disturbance
or deprivation of what may have been
acquired in equity and justice by long
enjoyment or what may have been lost by a
party's own inaction, negligence or laches.
(See Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff
Assn. [Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI
Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh [Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705]
and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project [Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon
Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 :
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka [P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC
(Cri) 830] this Court held that judicially
engrafting principles of limitation amounts
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to legislating and would fly in the face of
law laid down by the Constitution Bench
in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
93] .
15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a case
has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the
court as to what was the "sufficient cause"
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. In case a party
is found to be negligent, or for want of bona
fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have
not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature."
(emphasis supplied)
59. Likewise, merely because the Government is
involved, a different yardstick for condonation of
delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously
stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
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Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
["Postmaster General"], as follows : (SCC pp. 573-
74, paras 27-29)
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with the
issues involved including the prescribed period of
limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a
special leave petition in this Court. They cannot
claim that they have a separate period of limitation
when the Department was possessed with
competent persons familiar with court proceedings.
In the absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the
delay is to be condoned mechanically merely
because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted
to advance substantial justice, we are of the view
that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various
earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies being
used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all
the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable
and acceptable explanation for the delay and there
was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the
usual explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable degree of
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procedural red tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to
ensure that they perform their duties with diligence
and commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an anticipated
benefit for the government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and should
not be swirled for the benefit of a few."
60. The decision in Postmaster
General [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
has been followed in the following subsequent
judgments of this Court:
(i) State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan
Mathur [State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan Mathur,
(2014) 1 SCC 592] at paras 8-8.2;
(ii) State of U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav [State of
U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422] at
paras 2-3;
(iii) State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of
T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721]
at paras 11-13; and
(iv) State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of
M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1
SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1
SCC (L&S) 84] at paras 3-4.
61. In a recent judgment, namely, State of
M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade [State of
M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade, (2020) 10 SCC 667 :
(2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 111 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 120 :
(2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 87] , this Court referred
to Postmaster General [Postmaster
General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC
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563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri)
580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] , and held as
follows : (SCC pp. 668-69, paras 1-5)
"1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do
the same thing again and again and the conduct
seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition
has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an
occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed
filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh
in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of
M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1
SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1
SCC (L&S) 84] in terms of our order dated 15-10-
2020.
2. We have penned down a detailed order in that
case and we see no purpose in repeating the same
reasoning again except to record what are stated to
be the facts on which the delay is sought to be
condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the
Government Advocate was approached in respect of
the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram
Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine MP
1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of
the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020.
Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17
months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be
filed or not. What greater certificate of
incompetence would there be for the Legal
Department!
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief
Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look
into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department
as it appears that the Department is unable to file
appeals within any reasonable period of time much
less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as
already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no
more admissible in view of the judgment
in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
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Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
4. We have also expressed our concern that
these kinds of the cases are only "certificate cases"
to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the
Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The
object is to save the skin of officers who may be in
default. We have also recorded the irony of the
situation where no action is taken against the
officers who sit on these files and do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual
manner in which the application has been worded,
the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose
costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be
deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation
Project Committee. The amount be deposited within
four weeks. The amount be recovered from the
officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and
sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the
said amount be also filed in this Court within the
said period of time. We have put to Deputy
Advocate General to caution that for any successive
matters of this kind the costs will keep on going
up."
62. Also, it must be remembered that merely
because sufficient cause has been made out in the
facts of a given case, there is no right in the
appellant to have delay condoned. This was
felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields
Ltd. [Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR
762 : AIR 1962 SC 361] as follows : (SCR p. 771 :
AIR p. 365, para 12)
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that
even after sufficient cause has been shown a party
is not entitled to the condonation of delay in
question as a matter of right. The proof of a
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sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in
the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not
proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be dismissed
on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown
then the Court has to enquire whether in its
discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect
of the matter naturally introduces the consideration
of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that
diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for
consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while
exercising the discretionary power after sufficient
cause is shown would naturally be limited only to
such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It
cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was
sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this
connection we may point out that considerations of
bona fides or due diligence are always material and
relevant when the Court is dealing with applications
made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In
dealing with such applications the Court is called
upon to consider the effect of the combined
provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our
opinion, considerations which have been expressly
made material and relevant by the provisions of
Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the
same manner be invoked in dealing with
applications which fall to be decided only under
Section 5 without reference to Section 14."
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy
disposal sought to be achieved both under the
Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for
appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act
that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the
Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial
Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60
days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of
exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in
which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and
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not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond
such period can, in the discretion of the court, be
condoned, always bearing in mind that the other
side of the picture is that the opposite party may
have acquired both in equity and justice, what may
now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence
or laches."
(c) The Hon'ble Supreme Court, considering the
object of the Act, has held that the object of the Act is
speedy resolution of disputes, expression "sufficient cause"
in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not elastic
enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided
by the appeal provision itself, and that the expression
"sufficient cause" is not in itself a loose panacea for the ill
of pressing negligent and strayed claims. In commercial
matters, the condonation of delay should not be in a
routine manner and it should be an exception on showing
sufficient cause. In a fit case, in which a party otherwise
acted bonafide and not in a negligent manner, a short
delay beyond such period can in the discretion of the Court
be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of
the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired
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both equity and justice what may now be lost by the first
party's inaction, negligence, or laches.
(d) Keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred supra, we
need to consider whether the explanation / cause shown
by the appellants in the affidavit filed along with the
application seeking condonation of delay and later two
affidavits filed by the appellant Nos.2 and 3 are sufficient
to condone the delay of 721 days.
(e) The impugned judgment of the Trial Court is
dated 10.01.2022 and admittedly, the appeal is filed on
01.03.2024. The appeal is accompanied with an
application seeking for condonation of delay. The said
application is accompanied with an affidavit with one
Umed Singh-the appellant No.2 in the appeal. Paragraph
2 of the affidavit indicates that the Trial Court had
conducted an enquiry during the Covid pandemic and
there was no access to the general public. Further, it is
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deposed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has excluded the
period of limitation during the Covid pandemic from
15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 and the defendant Nos.1 to 3
were not aware about the passing of the impugned order
by the Trial Court during the pandemic and only when the
Execution Court issued notice to the appellants, they came
to know about the passing of the judgment and they
applied for the certified copy. In the meantime, the
appellant Nos.2 and 3 underwent open heart surgery and
medical records to that effect are produced. It is to be
noticed that the period of limitation excluded by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court referred surpa would not help the
appellants as the impugned judgment is passed on
10.01.2022 and if the said period is excluded, the
appellants may get the benefit of 39 days. It is also
noticed that the appellants have entered appearance
before the Trial Court through the counsel and filed
vakalath on 03.04.2019. On 28.05.2019, the appellants'
counsel filed an interlocutory application seeking direction
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to the respondent No.1-plaintiff to furnish copies of the
documents. The order sheet indicates that the respondent
No.1-plaintiff served the documents to the appellants-
defendant Nos.1 to 3 and based on such memo filed by
the respondent No.1, the application was disposed of and
the matter was adjourned and the Trial Court recorded
that the defendant Nos.1 to 3 and 5 have not filed written
statement. The affidavit accompanying the application
indicates that the appellants came to know about the
judgment only in the execution which cannot be believed
as the appellants appeared before the Trial Court, filed
vakalath, filed an application to furnish documents which
were furnished and thereafter, they failed to file written
statement. A further statement is made by the deponent
in the affidavit that the appellant No.2 underwent open
heart surgery and medical records are produced. A
perusal of the medical records indicate that PTCR regular
was conducted on 12.08.2022 and the appellant No.2 was
discharged on the next day i.e. on 13.08.2022. The
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deponent has falsely deposed that he underwent open
heart surgery.
(f) The appellant No.2 has filed another affidavit
dated 14.10.2025 which indicates that the appellants have
a strong case on merits. He was admitted in the Apollo
hospital, Bangalore on 12.08.2022 and discharged on
13.08.2022. In his affidavit, he admits that he underwent
diagnostic coronary angiography. The present statement
of the appellant No.2, on oath, falsifies the earlier
statement on oath with regard to the open heart surgery
which clearly demonstrates that the appellants have
falsely deposed before this Court in the affidavit filed along
with the application seeking for condonation of delay. The
affidavit dated 14.10.2025 speaks about prolonged illness,
recovery time and also about Covid pandemic period which
does not inspire the confidence of the Court to condone
the delay of 721 days. The appellant No.2 also deposed
that he has deposited Rs.2,50,25,000/- in the execution
proceedings. They are the matter of facts which would not
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help the appellants seeking for condonation of enormous
delay.
(g) The appellant No.3 also for the first time filed
an affidavit on 14.10.2025 in support of the application
seeking condonation of delay. It is to be noticed that the
application seeking for condonation of delay is
accompanied with the affidavit of the appellant No.2. The
appeal is accompanied with other applications and the
affidavits to such applications were also sworn by the
appellant No.2. The affidavit of the appellant No.3
indicates his medical history. However, it is noticed that
on 02.12.2019, the said appellant underwent PTCA
treatment at Ramaiah Narayan Heart Centre, Bengaluru,
and again on 30.03.2022 and 01.04.2022, he was
admitted for right shoulder orthoscopic rotator cuff repair.
The other treatments referred in paragraph 6 of the
affidavit are only regular follow up and consultation. If
those averments are considered and the documents are
perused, it cannot be said that the appellant No.3 was
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unable to move for 721 days to file the appeal. The
explanation offered by the appellant No.3 with regard to
deposit of the amount and pandemic are replica of that of
the averments made in the affidavit of the appellant No.2.
A perusal of the entire averments of the affidavit of the
appellant No.3 and the documents, indicates that it is an
attempt to overcome the enormous delay. However, that
cannot be construed as a sufficient cause or a genuine
cause to condone the delay of 721 days in the matters of
this nature. We have also noticed that the appellants who
were the defendants filed vakalath, participated in the
proceedings for some time and thereafter, failed to file
written statement and based on the material available on
record, the Trial Court proceeded to pass the impugned
judgment and decree. We are of the considered view that
the appellants who were not diligent in prosecuting the
proceedings before the Trial Court, now cannot come and
contend that the Trial Court has failed to consider the
ambit and scope of Order XIII-A Rule 3 of the CPC and the
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judgment relied on by the appellants with regard to the
scope of the proceedings before the Trial Court cannot be
gone into while considering the application for condonation
of enormous delay of 721 days. There is no dispute with
regard to the preposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court referred by the appellants with regard to
the scope and ambit of Order XIII-A and also how the
application under Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC is required
to be considered. The case on hand is only with regard to
the consideration of the delay in filing an appeal and as to
whether the appellants have shown the sufficient cause to
condone the delay. In our considered view, the cause
shown in 3 affidavits referred supra does not show the
sufficient cause to condone the delay of 721 days.
(h) The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that
the condonation of delay in commercial cases is the
discretion of the Court which is required to be exercised
sparingly for a short delay and that too as an exception.
On considering the cause shown by the appellants in the
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affidavit filed along with the application as well as the
additional affidavits, we find that they do not show
sufficient cause to condone the enormous delay of 721
days. Hence, we are of the considered view that the
application in I.A.No.1/2024 filed seeking for condonation
of delay is devoid of merits and accordingly, the same is
rejected.
Consequently, the appeal stands rejected.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
RV
