Karnataka High Court
M/S Jsw Steel Ltd vs Government Of Karnataka on 2 May, 2025
Author: Suraj Govindaraj
Bench: Suraj Govindaraj
-1-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH R
DATED THIS THE 2ND DAY OF MAY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
WRIT PETITION NO. 106038 OF 2023 (L-RES)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO. 101114 OF 2022 (S-DIS)
WRIT PETITION NO. 101905 OF 2022 (L-RES)
WRIT PETITION NO. 101908 OF 2022 (L-RES)
WRIT PETITION NO. 101909 OF 2022 (L-RES)
WRIT PETITION NO. 101911 OF 2022 (L-RES)
WRIT PETITION NO. 101912 OF 2022 (L-RES)
WRIT PETITION NO. 101915 OF 2022 (L-RES)
WRIT PETITION NO. 101920 OF 2022 (L-RES)
IN WP NO.106038 OF 2022
Digitally signed
by SHWETHA BETWEEN
RAGHAVENDRA
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA JSW ENERGY LTD.,
VIJAYANAGAR WORKS
P.O.VIDYANAGAR-583275,
TORANAGALLU, SANDUR TALUK,
BALLARY DISTRICT, KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY
SENIOR MANAGER(LEGAL)
w...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. PRASHANT F. GOUDAR,
Ms. SHEETAL V. KILLEKAR, ADVOCATES)
-2-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
AND:
1. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR,
VIKAS SOUDHA, VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560001.
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
2. K. SRINIVAS RAO S/O. K. RAMANNA
981/D, 14TH MAIN, JUDICIAL LAYOUT,
ALLASANDRA, BENGALURU-560065
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI V.S. KALASURMATH, AGA FOR R1,
SRI. SHIVAPRASAD SHANTANGOUDAR, AND
SRI. ABHISHEK PATIL, ADVOCATES FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI OR ANY APPROPRIATE ORDER QUASHING THE ORDER
OF REFERENCE DATED 05.06.2023, PRODUCED VIDE ANNEXURE-
"H", IN ¸ÀASÁå:PÁE/198/Lrf/2023 PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1
AND ETC.
IN WP NO.101114 OF 2022,
BETWEEN
JSW STEEL LTD.,
P.O. VIDYANAGAR-583275
(TORANAGALLU), BALLARI,
(KARNATAKA) INDIA,
R/BY GENERAL MANAGER,
CORPORATE RELATIONS.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. B.C. PRABHAKAR &
SRI. MALLIKARJUNSWAMY B. HIREMATH, ADVOCATES)
AND
-3-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
1. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR,
VIKAS SOUDHA, VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560001.
BY ITS UNDER SECRETARY.
2. HARI M. S/O. SRI. ANANDA M.
BEHIND TIPPUSULTAN HOSTEL,
FORT, BALLARI-583102.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI V.S. KALASURMATH, AGA FOR R1,
SRI. RAVI HEGDE AND
SRI. VINAYKUMAR BHAT, ADVOCATES FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY APPROPRIATE ORDER
QUASHING THE ORDER OF REFERENCE DATED 07.01.2022 IN NO.
KAA.E/383/IDG/2021(ANNEXURE-T) PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1;
QUASH THE NOTICE DATED 21.01.2022 ISSUED BY THE PRINCIPAL
DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BELLARY IN APPL.
10(1)(C)/4/2022, (ANNEXURE-U) AND ETC.
IN WP NO.101905 OF 2022,
BETWEEN
M/S. JSW STEEL LTD.,
P.O. VIDYANAGAR-583275
(TORANAGALLU), BALLARI,
(KARNATAKA) INDIA,
R/BY GENERAL MANAGER,
CORPORATE RELATIONS.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. B.C. PRABHAKAR &
-4-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
SRI. MALLIKARJUNSWAMY B. HIREMATH, ADVOCATES)
AND
1. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR,
VIKAS SOUDHA, VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560001.
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
2. K. BASAVARAJ,
S/O. VENKATESH K.,
AGE: 29 YEARS, OCC: JR. ENGINEER,
ANJINEYA TEMPLE,
WARD NO.01, BAGEVADI,
SIRUGUPPA TALUK,
BELLARY-583121.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI V.S. KALASURMATH, AGA FOR R1,
SRI. RAVI HEGDE AND
SRI. VINAYKUMAR BHAT, ADVOCATES FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI OR ANY APPROPRIATE ORDER QUASHING THE ORDER
OF REFERENCE DATED 07.01.2022 IN NO.KAA E/392/IDG/2021
PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 (ANNEXURE-F) PASSED BY
RESPONDENT NO.1 ; QUASH THE NOTICE DATED 21.01.2022
ISSUED BY THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
BELLARY IN APPL.10(1)(C)/7/2022 (ANNEXURE-G)
IN WP NO.101908 OF 2022,
BETWEEN
M/S. JSW STEEL LTD.,
P.O. VIDYANAGAR-583275
(TORANAGALLU), BALLARI,
(KARNATAKA) INDIA,
R/BY GENERAL MANAGER,
-5-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
CORPORATE RELATIONS.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. B.C. PRABHAKAR &
SRI. MALLIKARJUNSWAMY B. HIREMATH, ADVOCATES)
AND
1. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR,
VIKAS SOUDHA, VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560001.
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
2. N. DEVARAJA
AGE: 49 YEARS, OCC: ASSISTANT MANAGER,
WARD NO.25, NEAR ESWARA TEMPLE,
ESWARANAGARA, HOSPET TALUK,
BELLARY DISTRICT - 583 201.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI V.S. KALASURMATH, AGA FOR R1,
SRI. RAVI HEGDE AND
SRI. VINAYKUMAR BHAT, ADVOCATES FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY APPROPRIATE ORDER
QUASHING THE ORDER OF REFERENCE DATED:7.1.2022 IN NO.KAA
E/393/IDG/2021 (ANNEXURE-F) PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1;
QUASH THE NOTICE DATED 21.01.2022 ISSUED BY THE PRINCIPAL
DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BELLARY, IN
APPL.10(1)(C)/13/2022, (ANNEXURE-G) AND ETC.
IN WP NO.101909 OF 2022,
BETWEEN
M/S. JSW STEEL LTD.,
P.O. VIDYANAGAR-583275
(TORANAGALLU), BALLARI,
-6-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
(KARNATAKA) INDIA,
R/BY SENIOR MANAGER (LEGAL)
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. B.C. PRABHAKAR &
SRI. MALLIKARJUNSWAMY B. HIREMATH, ADVOCATES)
AND
1. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR,
VIKAS SOUDHA, VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560001.
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
2. B. VASANTHA MADHAVA
S/O. SRI. RAHAVENDRA ACHAR,
AGE: 53 YEARS, OCC: DEPUTY MANAGER,
8TH CROSS RIGHT, KAPPAGAL ROAD END,
BELLARI-583103.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI V.S. KALASURMATH, AGA FOR R1,
SRI. RAVI HEGDE AND
SRI. VINAYKUMAR BHAT, ADVOCATES FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI OR ANY APPROPRIATE ORDER QUASHING THE ORDER
OF REFERENCE DATED 7.1.2022 IN NO.KAA E/382/IDG/2021
(ANNEXURE-R) PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1; QUASH THE NOTICE
DATED 21.01.2022 ISSUED BY THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, BELLARY, IN APPL.NO.10(1)(C)/5/2022
(ANNEXURE-S) AND ETC.
IN WP NO. 101911 OF 2022,
BETWEEN
M/S. JSW STEEL LTD.,
P.O. VIDYANAGAR-583275
-7-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
(TORANAGALLU), BALLARI,
(KARNATAKA) INDIA,
R/BY SENIOR MANAGER (LEGAL)
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. B.C. PRABHAKAR &
SRI. MALLIKARJUNSWAMY B. HIREMATH, ADVOCATES)
AND
1. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR,
VIKAS SOUDHA, VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560001.
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
2. NOOR AHMED,
AGE: 48 YEARS, OCC: DEPUTY MANAGER,
EX-SERVICEMEN COLONY,
BY PASS ROAD, DOOR NO.78/1,
COWL BAZAAR, BELLARY-583101.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI V.S. KALASURMATH, AGA FOR R1,
SRI. RAVI HEGDE AND
SRI. VINAYKUMAR BHAT, ADVOCATES FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE
ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY APPROPRIATE ORDER
QUASHING THE ORDER OF REFERENCE DATED 7.1.2022 IN NO.KAA
E/386/IDG/2021 (ANNEXURE-Q) PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1;
QUASH THE NOTICE DATED 21.01.2022 ISSUED BY THE PRINCIPAL
DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BELLARY, IN APPL.
10(1)(C)/1/2022,(ANNEXURE-R).
IN WP NO. 101912 OF 2022,
BETWEEN
M/S. JSW STEEL LTD.,
P.O. VIDYANAGAR-583275
(TORANAGALLU), BALLARI,
-8-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
(KARNATAKA) INDIA,
R/BY SENIOR MANAGER (LEGAL)
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. B.C. PRABHAKAR &
SRI. MALLIKARJUNSWAMY B. HIREMATH, ADVOCATES)
AND
1. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR,
VIKAS SOUDHA, VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560001.
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
2. A.G. JOSHI,
AGE: 56 YEARS, OCC: MANAGAER,
MMTC COLONY,
OPP. TO MMTC PARK,
S.N.PET, 3RD CROSS,
BELLARY, BELLARY DISTRICT-583101.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI V.S. KALASURMATH, AGA FOR R1,
SRI. RAVI HEGDE AND
SRI. VINAYKUMAR BHAT, ADVOCATES FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE
ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY APPROPRIATE ORDER
QUASHING THE ORDER OF REFERENCE DATED 07.01.2022 IN NO.
KAA E/381/IDG/2021 PASSED BY (ANNEXURE-Q) PASSED BY
RESPONDNET NO.1 PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1;
QUASH THE NOTICE DATED 21.01.2022 ISSUED BY THE PRINCIPAL
DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BELLARY, IN APPL.
10(1)(C)/6/2022(ANNEXURE-R).
IN WP NO. 101915 OF 2022
BETWEEN
M/S. JSW STEEL LTD.,
P.O. VIDYANAGAR-583275
-9-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
(TORANAGALLU), BALLARI,
(KARNATAKA) INDIA,
R/BY SENIOR MANAGER (LEGAL)
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. B.C. PRABHAKAR &
SRI. MALLIKARJUNSWAMY B. HIREMATH, ADVOCATES)
AND
1. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR,
VIKAS SOUDHA, VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560001.
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
2. SUDARSHAN S. PAI,
C/O. SATISH B. PAI,
NEAR POLICE QUARTERS,
KUMTA, UTTARA KANNADA-583104.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI V.S. KALASURMATH, AGA FOR R1,
SRI. RAVI HEGDE AND
SRI. VINAYKUMAR BHAT, ADVOCATES FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY APPROPRIATE ORDER
QUASHING THE ORDER OF REFERENCE DATED 07.01.2022 IN NO.
KAA E/390/IDG/2021 (ANNEXURE-Q) PASSED BY RESPONDENT
NO.1; QUASH THE NOTICE DATED 21.01.2022 ISSUED BY THE
PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE BELLARY IN APPL.
10(1)(C)/9/2022(ANNEXURE-R).
IN WP NO. 101920 OF 2022
BETWEEN
M/S. JSW STEEL LTD.,
P.O. VIDYANAGAR-583275
- 10 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
(TORANAGALLU), BALLARI,
(KARNATAKA) INDIA,
R/BY SENIOR MANAGER (LEGAL)
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. B.C. PRABHAKAR &
SRI. MALLIKARJUNSWAMY B. HIREMATH, ADVOCATES)
AND
1. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR,
VIKAS SOUDHA, VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BENGALURU-560001.
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
2. RAGHUNATH P.S. GHORPADE,
C/O. M. ERANNA,
PLOT NO.C-12,
PATEL NAGAR, 4TH CROSS,
BELLARY.
..RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI V.S. KALASURMATH, AGA FOR R1,
SRI. RAVI HEGDE AND
SRI. VINAYKUMAR BHAT, ADVOCATES FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY APPROPRIATE ORDER
QUASHING THE ORDER OF REFERENCE DATED 7.1.2022 IN NO.KAA
E/385/IDG/2021 (ANNEXURE-R) PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1;
QUASH THE NOTICE DATED 21.01.2022 ISSUED BY THE PRINCIPAL
DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BELLARY, IN
APPL.10(1)(C)/2/2022,(ANNEXURE-S).
THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 12.02.2025, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
- 11 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
CAV ORDER
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
1. The Petitioner-employer in WP No.106038/2023 is
before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:
i. Issue a Writ of certiorari or any appropriate
order quashing the order of reference dated
05.06.2023 produced vide Annexure-"H", in
Sankhya.Kaae/198/ IDG/2023 passed by
Respondent No.1.
ii. Grant any other relief/s as may be deemed fit
and proper by this Hon'ble Court, in the
interest of justice and equity.
2. The Petitioner-employer in WP No.101114/2022 is
before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:
i. Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any appropriate
order quashing the Order of Reference dated
07.01.2022 in No. Kaa.e/383/
idg/2021(Annexure-T) passed by Respondent
No.1;
ii. Quash the notice dated 21.01.2022 issued by
the Principal District and Sessions Judge,
Bellary in Appl. 10(1)(c)/4/2022, (Annexure-
U).
iii. Grant any other relief/s as maybe deemed fit
and proper by this Hon'ble court, in the
interest of justice and equity.
- 12 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
3. The Petitioner-employer in WP No.101905/2022 is
before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:
i. Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any appropriate
order quashing the Order of Reference dated
07.01.2022 in No.Kaa e/392/IDG/2021 passed
by Respondent no.1 (Annexure-F) passed by
Respondent No.1;
ii. Quash the Notice dated 21.01.2022 issued by
the Principal District and Sessions Judge,
Bellary in appl.10(1)(c)/7/2022(Annexure-G).
iii. Grant any other relief/s as maybe deemed fit
and proper by this Hon'ble court, in the
interest of justice and equity.
4. The Petitioner-employer in WP No.101908/2022 is
before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:
1. Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any appropriate order
quashing the order of reference dated:7.1.2022
in No.kaa e/393/idg/2021 (Annexure-F) passed
by Respondent No.1;
2. Quash the Notice dated 21.01.2022 issued by the
Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bellary, in
Appl.10(1)(c)/13/2022, (Annexure-G).
3. Grant any other relief/s as maybe deemed fit and
proper by this Hon'ble court, in the interest of
justice and equity.
5. The Petitioner-employer in WP No.101909/2022 is
before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:
- 13 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
1. Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any appropriate
Order quashing the Order of Reference dated
7.1.2022 in No.Kaa e/382/IDG/2021
(Annexure-R) passed by Respondent No.1;
2. Quash the Notice dated 21.01.2022 issued by
the Principal District and Sessions Judge,
Bellary, in Appl.No.10(1)(c)/5/2022 (Annexure-
S).
3. Grant any other relief/s as maybe deemed fit
and proper by this Hon'ble court, in the interest
of justice and equity.
6. The Petitioner-employer in WP No.101911/2022 is
before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:
i. Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any appropriate
order quashing the Order of Reference dated
7.1.2022 in No.Kaa e/386/IDG/2021
(Annexure-Q) passed by Respondent no.1;
ii. Quash the Notice dated 21.01.2022 issued by
the Principal District and Sessions Judge,
Bellary, in Appl. 10(1)(c)/1/2022,(Annexure-
R).
iii. Grant any other relief/s as may be deemed fit
and proper by this Hon'ble court, in the
interest of justice and equity.
7. The Petitioner-employer in WP No.101912/2022 is
before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:
- 14 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
i. Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any appropriate
Order quashing the Order of Reference dated
07.01.2022 in No. Kaa e/381/IDG/2021
passed by (Annexure-Q) passed by
Respondent No.1 passed by Respondent no.1;
ii. Quash the Notice dated 21.01.2022 issued by
the Principal District and Sessions Judge,
Bellary, in Appl. 10(1)(c)/6/2022(Annexure-R).
iii. Grant any other relief/s as may be deemed fit
and proper by this Hon'ble court, in the
interest of justice and equity.
8. The Petitioner-employer in WP No.101915/2022 is
before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:
i. Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any appropriate
order quashing the Order of Reference dated
07.01.2022 in No. Kaa e/390/IDG/2021
(Annexure-Q) passed by Respondent No.1;
ii. Quash the Notice dated 21.01.2022 issued by
the Principal District and Sessions Judge
Bellary in Appl. 10(1)(c)/9/2022(Annexure-R).
iii. Grant any other relief/s as may be deemed fit
and proper by this Hon'ble court, in the
interest of justice and equity.
9. The Petitioner-employer in WP No.101920/2022 is
before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:
i. Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any appropriate
order quashing the Order of Reference dated
7.1.2022 in No.Kaa e/385/IDG/2021
(Annexure-R) passed by Respondent No.1;
- 15 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
ii. Quash the Notice dated 21.01.2022 issued by
the Principal District and Sessions Judge,
Bellary, in Appl.10(1)(c)/2/2022, (Annexure-
S).
iii. Grant any other relief/s as may be deemed fit
and proper by this Hon'ble court, in the
interest of justice and equity.
10. Essentially, the Petitioner is aggrieved by the order of
reference made by the Government of Karnataka in
each of the above matters and it is in that
background that the aforesaid reliefs are sought for.
11. FACTS IN WP NO.106038/2023
11.1. Respondent No.2 is stated to be a 'Graduate
Engineer Trainee' appointed with the Petitioner
on 08.05.2003. Thereafter, he was appointed
as Junior Manager-Operation on 17.08.2004,
who is stated to have tendered his resignation
for personal reasons on 06.08.2020, which
came to be accepted by the Petitioner employer
on 30.09.2020.
- 16 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
11.2. The Petitioner claims that Respondent No.2 had
also made necessary applications for payment
of gratuity, which was so paid by a cheque on
21.09.2020. It is further claimed that
Respondent No.2 had applied for clearing PF
accumulation by filing necessary application.
Respondent No.2 had also filed a self-
declaration with regard to his non-employment
and claiming pension under the EPF Pension
Scheme, 1995.
11.3. Respondent No.2 accepted all the deductions to
be correct and further had undertaken that if
any of the information is found to be false, the
amount would be returned in full along with
interest. Hence, amount of Rs.19,47,368/- was
paid to Respondent No.2 on 28.12.2020. It is
after more than 19 months of accepting the
resignation and settling of all service benefits
that Respondent No.2 filed a petition before the
- 17 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kalaburagi,
alleging that his resignation had been obtained
by force.
11.4. The Petitioner-employer had submitted his reply
raising objection with regard to the jurisdiction
and maintainability of the proceedings before
the Deputy Labour Commissioner and
Conciliation Officer alleging that Respondent
No.2 was working in a managerial cadre and
was not a 'workman' within the meaning of
Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act
(hereinafter referred to as the 'ID Act' for
brevity).
11.5. Respondent No.1-Government of Karnataka, by
its order of reference dated 05.06.2023,
referred the matter to the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellari, for adjudication on the
following points of dispute:
a) Whether Shri. Srinivasa Rao who was
working with the Management of M/s. JSW
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
Energy Limited., Bellary, as Manager would
prove that he was a "workman" within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947.
b) If proved, whether the Applicant would
prove that the Management of M/s. JSW
Energy Ltd., has obtained his resignation
forcefully and relieved him from service with
effect from 30.09.2020 without paying any
compensation.
c) If not, to what relief the Applicant is
entitled to?
11.6. In pursuance of which, the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellari, registered the dispute as
Application No. 10(1)(c)/2/2023 and issued
notice to the Petitioner on 19.06.2023. It is
challenging the same, the Petitioner is before
this Court.
12. FACTS IN WP NO.101114/2022
12.1. Respondent No.2 is stated to be appointed as a
Junior Engineer (BOF-Operations) S3 Grade
with the Petitioner on 26.07.1999. Thereafter,
he was promoted to Assistant Manager vide
promotion order dated 29.04.2014 and is
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WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
stated to have tendered his resignation for
personal reasons on 28.07.2020, which came to
be accepted by the Petitioner-employer on
31.07.2020.
12.2. The Petitioner claims that Respondent No.2 had
also made necessary applications for payment
of gratuity, which was so paid by a cheque on
27.10.2020. It is further claimed that
Respondent No.2 had applied for clearing PF
accumulation by filing a necessary application.
Respondent No.2 had also filed a self-
declaration with regard to his non-employment
and claiming pension under the EPF Pension
Scheme, 1995.
12.3. Respondent No.2 accepted all the deductions to
be correct and further had undertaken that if
any of the information is found to be false, the
amount would be returned in full along with
interest. Hence, the amount of Rs.19,02,524/-
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WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
was paid to Respondent No.2 on 15.11.2020. It
is after more than 9 months of accepting the
resignation and settling of all service benefits
that Respondent No.2 filed petition before the
Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kalaburagi,
alleging that his resignation had been obtained
by force.
12.4. The Petitioner-employer had submitted his reply
raising objection with regard to the jurisdiction
and maintainability of the proceedings before
the Deputy Labour Commissioner and
Conciliation Officer alleging that Respondent
No.2 was working in a managerial cadre and
was not a 'workman' within the meaning of
Section 2(s) of the ID Act.
12.5. Respondent No.1-Government of Karnataka, by
its order of reference dated 07.01.2022,
referred the matter to the Principal District and
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
Session Judge, Bellary, for adjudication on the
following points of dispute:
a) Whether Shri. Hari M. who was working
with the Management of M/s. JSW Energy
Limited., Bellary, as Assistant Manager would
prove that he was a "workman" within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
b) If proved, whether the Applicant would
prove that the Management of M/s. JSW
Energy Ltd., has obtained his resignation
forcefully and relieved him from service with
effect from 01.08.2020 without paying any
compensation.
c) If not, to what relief the Applicant is
entitled to?
12.6. In pursuance of this, the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellari, registered the dispute as
Application No. 10(1)(c)/4/2022 and issued a
summons to the Petitioner's manager to appear
on 21.03.2022. It is challenging the order dated
07.01.2022 and the notice dated 21.03.2022,
the Petitioner is before this Court.
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
13. FACTS IN WP NO.101905/2022
13.1. Respondent No.2 is stated to be appointed as a
Diploma Engineering Trainee with the Petitioner
on 12.05.2018. Clause 3(iv) of the appointment
order states that either of the parties may
terminate the employment by giving one
month's notice or salary in lieu thereof.
Respondent No.2, accepting the same, reported
for duty 14.05.2018.
13.2. The Petitioner claims that Respondent No.2 was
continuously irregular in his duties and had last
attended work on 21.04.2020 and stopped
coming to work thereafter despite repeated
reminders from the Petitioner. As a last chance,
Respondent No. 2 vide letter 16.07.2020 was
informed that failing to report for duty on or
before 23.07.2020 would result in presuming
abandonment of his services to the company,
and his further employment would thus stand
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
terminated. Respondent No.2 did not report to
work on the said date, and as per the terms
and conditions of the appointment order, the
Petitioner terminated him from service via
memo dated 14.08.2020 without attaching any
stigma so as to safeguard his future.
13.3. Respondent No.2 filed a petition before the
Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kalaburagi,
challenging his termination from service and a
notice dated 01.03.2021 was issued for a
meeting on 06.03.2021.
13.4. The Petitioner-employer had submitted his
reply raising objections with regard to the
jurisdiction and maintainability of the
proceedings before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner and Conciliation Officer, alleging
that Respondent No.2 was working in a
managerial cadre and was not a 'workman'
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID
Act.
13.5. Respondent No.1-Government of Karnataka, by
its order of reference dated 07.01.2022,
referred the matter to the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellary, for adjudication on the
following points of dispute:
a) Whether Shri. K. Basavaraj who was
working with the Management of M/s. JSW
Steel Limited., Bellary, as Jr. Engineer would
prove that he was a "workman" within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947.
b) If proved, whether Management of M/s.
JSW Steel Ltd., would prove that the
termination of his services from August 2020
is justified.
c) If not, to what relief the Applicant is
entitled to?
13.6. In pursuance of this, the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellari, registered the dispute as
Application No. 10(1)(c)/7/2022 and issued a
summons to the Petitioner's manager to appear
on 21.03.2022. It is challenging the order dated
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
07.01.2022 and notice dated 21.03.2022, the
Petitioner is before this Court.
14. FACTS IN WP NO.101908/2022
14.1. Respondent No.2 is stated to be appointed as
an Engineer - LO6 Garde with the Petitioner on
05.03.2012. Clause 11 of the appointment
order states that if Respondent No.2 remains
absent from duty without due permission for a
period exceeding 10 days, he would lose his
lien on employment.
14.2. The Petitioner claims that RespondentNo.2 was
continuously irregular in his duties and had last
attended work on 05.06.2020 and stopped
coming to work thereafter despite repeated
reminders from the Petitioner. As a last chance,
Respondent No. 2 vide letter 20.07.2020 was
informed that failing to report for duty on or
before 27.07.2020 would result in presuming
abandonment of his services to the company
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
and his further employment would thus stand
terminated. Respondent No.2 did not report to
work on the said date, and as per the terms
and conditions of the appointment order, the
Petitioner terminated him from service vide
memo dated 14.08.2020 without attaching any
stigma so as to safeguard his future.
14.3. Respondent No.2 filed a petition before the
Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kalaburagi,
challenging his termination from service and a
notice dated 01.03.2021 was issued for a
meeting on 06.03.2021.
14.4. The Petitioner-employer had submitted his
reply raising objections with regard to the
jurisdiction and maintainability of the
proceedings before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner and Conciliation Officer alleging
that Respondent No.2 was working in a
managerial cadre and was not a 'workman'
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID
Act.
14.5. Respondent No.1-Government of Karnataka by
its order of reference dated 07.01.2022,
referred the matter to the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellary, for adjudication on the
following points of dispute:
a) Whether Shri. N. Devaraju who was
working with the Management of M/s. JSW
Steel Limited., Bellary, as Jr. Engineer would
prove that he was a "workman" within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947.
b) If proved, whether Management of M/s.
JSW Steel Ltd., would prove that the
termination of his services from 18th August
2020 is justified.
c) If not, to what relief the Applicant is
entitled to?
14.6. In pursuance of this, the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellari, registered the dispute as
Application No. 10(1)(c)/13/2022 and issued a
summons to the Petitioner's manager to appear
on 21.03.2022. It is challenging the order dated
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WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
07.01.2022 and notice dated 21.03.2022, the
Petitioner is before this Court.
15. FACTS IN WP NO.101909/2022
15.1. Respondent No.2 is stated to be appointed as
Assistant (Horticulture) - S2 Grade with the
Petitioner on 26.07.1996. Thereafter, he was
promoted as Deputy Manager vide promotion
order dated 31.10.2018 and is stated to have
tendered his resignation/early retirement for
personal reasons on 23.07.2020, which came to
be accepted by the Petitioner-employer on
30.09.2020.
15.2. The Petitioner claims that Respondent No.2 had
also made necessary applications for payment
of gratuity, which was so paid by a cheque on
26.10.2020. It is further claimed that
Respondent No.2 had applied for clearing PF
accumulation by filing necessary application.
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
Respondent No.2 had also filed a self-
declaration with regard to his non-employment
and claiming pension under the EPF Pension
Scheme, 1995.
15.3. Respondent No.2 accepted all the deductions to
be correct and further had undertaken that if
any of the information is found to be false, the
amount would be returned in full along with
interest. Hence, amount of Rs.25,33,344/- was
paid to Respondent No.2 on 18.11.2020. It is
after more than 9 months of accepting the
resignation and settling of all service benefits
that Respondent No.2 filed a petition before the
Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kalaburagi,
alleging that his resignation had been obtained
by force.
15.4. The Petitioner-employer had submitted his
reply raising objection with regard to the
jurisdiction and maintainability of the
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
proceedings before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner and Conciliation Officer alleging
that Respondent No.2 was working in a
managerial cadre and was not a 'workman'
within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID
Act.
15.5. Respondent No.1-Government of Karnataka, by
its order of reference dated 07.01.2022,
referred the matter to the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellary, for adjudication on the
following points of dispute:
a) Whether Shri. B. Vasantha Madhav who was
working with the Management of M/s. JSW Steel
Limited., Bellary, as Deputy Manager would
prove that he was a "workman" within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
b) If proved, whether the Applicant would prove
that the Management of M/s. JSW Steel Ltd.,
has obtained his resignation forcefully and
relieved him from service with effect from
01.08.2020 without paying any compensation.
c) If not, to what relief the Applicant is entitled
to?
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
15.6. In pursuance of which, the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellari registered the dispute as
Application No. 10(1)(c)/5/2022 and issued
summons to the Petitioner's manager to appear
on 21.03.2022. It is challenging the order dated
07.01.2022 and the notice dated 21.01.2022,
the Petitioner is before this Court.
16. FACTS IN WP NO.101911/2022
16.1. Respondent No.2 is stated to be appointed as a
Junior Engineer - S3 Grade with the Petitioner
on 27.05.1999. Thereafter, he was promoted as
Deputy Manager - Operations vide promotion
order dated 29.04.2013 and is stated to have
tendered his resignation for personal reasons
on 22.09.2020, which came to be accepted by
the Petitioner-employer on 22.09.2020.
16.2. The Petitioner claims that Respondent No.2 had
also made necessary applications for payment
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
of gratuity, which was so paid by a cheque on
27.10.2020. It is further claimed that
Respondent No.2 had applied for clearing PF
accumulation by filing a necessary application.
Respondent No.2 had also filed a self-
declaration with regard to his non-employment
and claiming pension under the EPF Pension
Scheme, 1995.
16.3. Respondent No.2 accepted all the deductions to
be correct and further had undertaken that if
any of the information is found to be false, the
amount would be returned in full along with
interest. Hence, amount of Rs.11,89,061/- was
paid to Respondent No.2 on 17.11.2020. It is
after more than 9 months of accepting the
resignation and settling of all service benefits
that Respondent No.2 filed a petition before the
Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kalaburagi,
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
alleging that his resignation had been obtained
by force.
16.4. The Petitioner-employer had submitted his reply
raising objection with regard to the jurisdiction
and maintainability of the proceedings before
the Deputy Labour Commissioner and
Conciliation Officer alleging that Respondent
No.2 was working in a managerial cadre and
was not a 'workman' within the meaning of
Section 2(s) of the ID Act .
16.5. Respondent No.1-Government of Karnataka, by
its order of reference dated 07.01.2022,
referred the matter to the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellary, for adjudication on the
following points of dispute:
a) Whether Shri. Noor Ahmed who was working
with the Management of M/s. JSW Steel
Limited., Bellary, as Deputy Manager would
prove that he was a "workman" within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
b) If proved, whether the Applicant would prove
that the Management of M/s. JSW Steel Ltd.,
has obtained his resignation forcefully and
relieved him from service with effect from
30.09.2020 without paying any compensation.
c) If not, to what relief the Applicant is entitled
to?
16.6. In pursuance of which, the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellari registered the dispute as
Application No. 10(1)(c)/01/2022 and issued a
summons to the Petitioner's manager to appear
on 21.03.2022. It is challenging the order dated
07.01.2022 and the notice dated 21.03.2022,
the Petitioner is before this Court.
17. FACTS IN WP NO.101912/2022
17.1. Respondent No.2 is stated to be appointed as
Trainee - Steno Assistant with the Petitioner on
05.01.1995. Thereafter, he was promoted as
Assistant Manager vide promotion order dated
22.05.2012, and is stated to have tendered his
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WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
resignation for personal reasons on 31.07.2020,
which came to be accepted by the Petitioner-
employer on 01.08.2020.
17.2. The Petitioner claims that Respondent No.2 had
also made necessary applications for payment
of gratuity, which was so paid by a cheque on
26.10.2020. It is further claimed that
Respondent No.2 had applied for clearing PF
accumulation by filing a necessary application.
Respondent No.2 had also filed a self-
declaration with regard to his non-employment
and claiming pension under the EPF Pension
Scheme, 1995.
17.3. Respondent No.2 accepted all the deductions to
be correct and further had undertaken that if
any of the information is found to be false, the
amount would be returned in full along with
interest. Hence, amount of Rs.16,01,296/- was
paid to Respondent No.2 on 15.11.2020. It is
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
after more than 9 months of accepting the
resignation and settling of all service benefits
that Respondent No.2 filed a petition before the
Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kalaburagi,
alleging that his resignation had been obtained
by force.
17.4. The Petitioner-employer had submitted his reply
raising objection with regard to the jurisdiction
and maintainability of the proceedings before
the Deputy Labour Commissioner and
Conciliation Officer alleging that Respondent
No.2 was working in a managerial cadre and
was not a 'workman' within the meaning of
Section 2(s) of the ID Act .
17.5. Respondent No.1-Government of Karnataka, by
its order of reference dated 07.01.2022,
referred the matter to the Principal District and
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WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
Session Judge, Bellary, for adjudication on the
following points of dispute:
a) Whether Shri. A.G. Joshi who was working
with the Management of M/s. JSW Steel
Limited., Bellary, as Assistant Manager would
prove that he was a "workman" within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
b) If proved, whether the Applicant would prove
that the Management of M/s. JSW Steel Ltd.,
has obtained his resignation forcefully and
relieved him from service with effect from
01.08.2020 without paying any compensation.
c) If not, to what relief the Applicant is entitled
to?
17.6. In pursuance of this, the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellari, registered the dispute as
Application No. 10(1)(c)/6/2022 and issued a
summons to the Petitioner's manager to appear
on 21.03.2022. It is challenging the order dated
07.01.2022 and the notice dated 21.03.2022,
the Petitioner is before this Court.
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
18. FACTS IN WP NO.101915/2022
18.1. Respondent No.2 is stated to be appointed as a
Diploma Engineer Trainee - L3T Grade with the
Petitioner on 19.04.2007. Thereafter, he was
promoted as Assistant Manager vide promotion
order dated 30.11.2019 and is stated to have
tendered his resignation for personal reasons
on 23.07.2020, which came to be accepted by
the Petitioner-employer on 04.09.2020.
18.2. The Petitioner claims that Respondent No.2 had
also made necessary applications for payment
of gratuity, which was so paid by a cheque on
26.10.2020. It is further claimed that
Respondent No.2 had applied for clearing PF
accumulation by filing necessary application.
Respondent No.2 had also filed a self-
declaration with regard to his non-employment
and claiming pension under the EPF Pension
Scheme, 1995.
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
18.3. Respondent No.2 accepted all the deductions to
be correct and further had undertaken that if
any of the information is found to be false, the
amount would be returned in full along with
interest. Hence, the amount of Rs.04,41,311/-
was paid to Respondent No.2 on 15.11.2020. It
is after more than 9 months of accepting the
resignation and settling of all service benefits
that Respondent No.2 filed petition before the
Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kalaburagi
alleging that his resignation had been obtained
by force.
18.4. The Petitioner-employer had submitted his
reply raising objection with regard to the
jurisdiction and maintainability of the
proceedings before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner and Conciliation Officer alleging
that Respondent No.2 was working in a
managerial cadre and was not a 'workman'
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WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID
Act .
18.5. Respondent No.1-Government of Karnataka, by
its order of reference dated 07.01.2022,
referred the matter to the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellary, for adjudication on the
following points of dispute:
a) Whether Shri. Sudarshan S Pai who was
working with the Management of M/s. JSW Steel
Limited., Bellary, as Assistant Manager would
prove that he was a "workman" within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
b) If proved, whether the Applicant would prove
that the Management of M/s. JSW Steel Ltd.,
has obtained his resignation forcefully and
relieved him from service with effect from
04.09.2020 without paying any compensation.
c) If not, to what relief the Applicant is entitled
to?
18.6. In pursuance of this, the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellari registered the dispute as
Application No. 10(1)(c)/9/2022 and issued a
summons to the Petitioner's manager to appear
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WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
on 21.03.2022. It is challenging the order dated
07.01.2022 and the notice dated 21.03.2022,
the Petitioner is before this Court.
19. FACTS IN WP NO.101920/2022
19.1. Respondent No.2 is stated to be appointed as a
'Trainee - S2 Grade' with the Petitioner on
27.04.1998. Thereafter, he was promoted as
Junior Manager vide promotion order dated
12.02.2011 and is stated to have tendered his
resignation for personal reasons on 29.07.2020,
which came to be accepted by the Petitioner-
employer on 31.07.2020.
19.2. The Petitioner claims that Respondent No.2 had
also made necessary applications for payment
of gratuity, which was so paid by an Insurance
Company Voucher on 17.11.2020. It is further
claimed that Respondent No.2 had applied for
clearing PF accumulation by filing a necessary
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WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
application. Respondent No.2 had also filed a
self-declaration with regard to his non-
employment and claiming pension under the
EPF Pension Scheme, 1995.
19.3. Respondent No.2 accepted all the deductions to
be correct and further had undertaken that if
any of the information is found to be false, the
amount would be returned in full along with
interest. Hence, amount of Rs.15,44,923/- was
paid to Respondent No.2 on 27.11.2020. It is
after more than 9 months of accepting the
resignation and settling of all service benefits
that Respondent No.2 filed a petition before the
Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kalaburagi,
alleging that his resignation had been obtained
by force.
19.4. The Petitioner-employer had submitted his
reply raising objection with regard to the
jurisdiction and maintainability of the
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
proceedings before the Deputy Labour
Commissioner and Conciliation Officer alleging
that Respondent No.2 was working in a
managerial cadre and was not a 'workman'
within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID
Act .
19.5. Respondent No.1-Government of Karnataka, by
its order of reference dated 07.01.2022,
referred the matter to the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellary, for adjudication on the
following points of dispute:
a) Whether Shri. Raghunath P.S. Ghorpade who
was working with the Management of M/s. JSW
Steel Limited., Bellary, as Junior Engineer would
prove that he was a "workman" within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
b) If proved, whether the Applicant would prove
that the Management of M/s. JSW Steel Ltd.,
has obtained his resignation forcefully and
relieved him from service with effect from
09.09.2020 without paying any compensation.
c) If not, to what relief the Applicant is entitled
to?
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C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
19.6. In pursuance of this, the Principal District and
Session Judge, Bellari, registered the dispute as
Application No. 10(1)(c)/2/2022 and issued a
summons to the Petitioner's manager to appear
on 21.03.2022. It is challenging the order dated
07.01.2022 and the notice dated 21.03.2022,
the Petitioner is before this Court.
20. Sri. K.S. Subramanya, learned counsel appearing for
the Petitioner would submit that:
20.1. The submission of Sri. K.S. Subramanya,
learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner is
that without a prima-facie opinion being
expressed and a conclusion arrived at as to
whether there is an industrial dispute in
existence or is apprehended, no such reference
could be made.
20.2. Respondent No.2 in all the above matters
having tendered a resignation, which was
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WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
accepted by the employer, the workman having
filed all the necessary applications for disbursal
of the amount and benefits, the amounts
having been received by Respondent No.2,
there being no reason for refund of money
received let alone a refund of the monies. The
question of Respondent No.2 in each of the
above matters, claiming that there is an
industrial dispute, would not arise.
20.3. On a resignation being submitted and accepted
by the employer, the relationship between the
employer and the employee ceases to exist,
and on such a resignation, the question of any
industrial dispute having arisen or apprehended
to arise would not arise.
20.4. The resignation having been tendered in the
usual course of business, an application having
been filed to that effect, amounts having been
disbursed, any questions of a dispute being
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WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
raised on voluntary acts of the parties would
thus not arise.
20.5. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of
this Court in the case of Management of
Charak Bhandar v. Presiding Officer1, more
particularly Para No.6 of the said judgment and
operative portion, which are reproduced
hereunder for easy reference.
6. In support of the second contention,
before the Labour Court, the Petitioner had
relied on the judgment of this Court in The
Association of the Physically
Handicapped v. The State of Mysore [ W.P.
4222 of 1974 Dated 3-3-1975.] . In the said
case the first point referred for adjudication
was, whether the Association of the
Physically Handicapped was an industry or
not. The validity of the said order was
questioned before this Court on the ground
that unless the Government formed an
opinion that the said association was an
industry without which there could be no
industrial dispute, the Government had no
competence under Section 10(1) of the Act
to make a reference, as formation of an
opinion that an industrial dispute existed,
was a condition precedent to make a
reference in exercise of the power under
Section 10(1) of the Act. The said contention
was accepted by this Court and it was held
that even though the Government
notification began by saying that in its
1 ILR 1985 KAR 248
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AND 6 OTHERS
opinion an industrial dispute existed, the first
point of reference itself contradicted the said
statement, for the question as to whether
the Association was an industry or not, was
not at all decided by the Government and
was left to be decided by the Labour Court.
The ratio of the said judgment fully applies to
the present case also, but nevertheless the
Labour Court lightly brushed aside the
judgment of this Court and held that the first
point was rightly referred by the Government
stating that the first point referred in that
case was whether the Association of the
Physically Handicapped was an industry,
whereas the question referred in this case
was whether Respondents 2 and 3 were
workmen. The existence of an 'industry' and
workmen' both are essential to bring into an
existence an industrial dispute. If the State
Government cannot refer the question as to
whether a particular establishment was an
industry for industrial adjudication, equally
the Government cannot also refer the
question as to whether the persons
concerned were workmen or not. It may be
that in a given case if substantial number of
workmen or a Trade Union raises an
industrial dispute, concerning the dismissal
from service of one or more employees of an
industry and the employer raises an
objection that dismissed employees were not
'workmen' the Government could refer the
question as to whether the dismissed
employees were workmen, for in such a case
notwithstanding the fact that the dismissed
employees are not workmen, the dispute still
would be between the employer and the
Trade Union or substantial number of
workmen. But that is not the position here.
The dispute was raised by two individuals, in
view of Section 2-A and the Government
could refer the dispute, if only it was of the
view that they were workmen. Therefore, on
this ground alone the impugned order of
reference is liable to be set aside.
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WP No. 106038 of 2023
C/W WP No. 101114 of 2022
WP No. 101905 of 2022
AND 6 OTHERS
ORDER
The Writ Petitions are allowed. The
impugned order dated 2-7-1977 is set aside.
The State Government shall make a fresh
reference if it considered that Respondents 2
and 3 are workmen a defined under Section
2(a) of the Act and that it is the appropriate
Government to make the reference, but it
shall do so only after giving opportunity to
the Petitioner.
20.6. By relying upon the decision in Charak
Bhandar's case (supra), he submits that the
existence of an 'industry' and 'workman' are
essential aspects to bring into existence an
industrial dispute. The Appropriate Government
cannot refer the question as to whether a
particular establishment was an industry for
industrial adjudication, similarly following suit,
the Appropriate Government also cannot refer
the question as to whether the persons
concerned were workmen or not.
20.7. He refers to a decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of National Engineering
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AND 6 OTHERS
Industries Ltd v. State of Rajasthan and
Ors2, more particularly para nos. 19, 25 and 30
thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for
easy reference:
19. The High Court came to the conclusion
that the settlement arrived at in conciliation
proceedings was binding on the workmen
and one of the clauses of the settlement kept
the service conditions intact and another
clause did not permit raising of any demand
throwing an additional financial burden on
IOCL, it was not permissible to modify the
certified Standing Order by an amendment
as that would alter the service conditions and
increase the financial burden on the
Management. The High Court, therefore,
quashed the orders amending the Standing
Orders. Aggrieved, the Union approached
this Court. This Court analysed the provisions
of Sections 2(p), 18(1) and 18(3) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and it also
refers to the provisions of the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
and held as under: (SCC pp. 11-12, para 8)
"It may be seen on a plain reading of sub-
sections (1) and (3) of Section 18 that
settlements are divided into two categories,
namely, (i) those arrived at outside the
conciliation proceedings and (ii) those arrived
at in the course of conciliation proceedings. A
settlement which belongs to the first
category has limited application in that it
merely binds the parties to the agreement
but the settlement belonging to the second
category has extended application since it is
2 AIR 2000 SC 469
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AND 6 OTHERS
binding on all parties to the industrial
dispute, to all others who were summoned to
appear in the conciliation proceedings and to
all persons employed in the establishment or
part of the establishment, as the case may
be, to which the dispute related on the date
of the dispute and to all others who joined
the establishment thereafter. Therefore, a
settlement arrived at in the course of
conciliation proceedings with a recognised
majority union will be binding on all workmen
of the establishment, even those who belong
to the minority union which had objected to
the same. To that extent it departs from the
ordinary law of contract. The object
obviously is to uphold the sanctity of
settlements reached with the active
assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to
discourage an individual employee or a
minority union from scuttling the settlement.
There is an underlying assumption that a
settlement reached with the help of the
Conciliation Officer must be fair and
reasonable and can, therefore, safely be
made binding not only on the workmen
belonging to the union signing the settlement
but also on others. That is why a settlement
arrived at in the course of conciliation
proceedings is put on par with an award
made by an adjudicatory authority."
This Court upheld the judgment of the High
Court.
25. It will be thus seen that the High Court
has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition
when there is an allegation that there is no
industrial dispute and none apprehended
which could be the subject-matter of
reference for adjudication to the Industrial
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Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it
is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial
Tribunal, which could be examined by the
High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the
existence of the Industrial Tribunal
(sic dispute) which would clothe the
appropriate Government with power to make
the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to
adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute
in existence or apprehended the appropriate
Government lacks power to make any
reference. A settlement of dispute between
the parties themselves is to be preferred,
where it could be arrived at, to industrial
adjudication, as the settlement is likely to
lead to more lasting peace than an award.
Settlement is arrived at by the free will of
the parties and is a pointer to there being
goodwill between them. When there is a
dispute that the settlement is not bona fide
in nature or that it has been arrived at on
account of fraud, misrepresentation or
concealment of facts or even corruption and
other inducements it could be the subject-
matter of yet another industrial dispute
which an appropriate Government may refer
for adjudication after examining the
allegations as there is an underlying
assumption that the settlement reached with
the help of the Conciliation Officer must be
fair and reasonable. A settlement which is
sought to be impugned has to be scanned
and scrutinised. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of
Section 18 divide settlements into two
categories, namely, (1) those arrived at
outside the conciliation proceedings, and (2)
those arrived at in the course of conciliation
proceedings. A settlement which belongs to
the first category has a limited application in
that it merely binds the parties to the
agreement but the settlement belonging to
the second category has an extended
application since it is binding on all the
parties to the industrial disputes, to all
others who were summoned to appear in the
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AND 6 OTHERS
conciliation proceedings and to all persons
employed in the establishment or part of the
establishment, as the case may be, to which
the dispute related on the date of the dispute
and to all others who joined the
establishment thereafter. A settlement
arrived at in the course of conciliation
proceedings with a recognised majority union
will be binding on all workmen of the
establishment, even those who belong to the
minority union which had objected to the
same. The recognised union having the
majority of members is expected to protect
the legitimate interest of the labour and
enter into a settlement in the best interest of
the labour. This is with the object to uphold
the sanctity of settlement reached with the
active assistance of the Conciliation Officer
and to discourage an individual employee or
a minority union from scuttling the
settlement. When a settlement is arrived at
during the conciliation proceedings it is
binding on the members of the Workers'
Union as laid down by Section 18(3)(d) of
the Act. It would ipso facto bind all the
existing workmen who are all parties to the
industrial dispute and who may not be
members of unions that are signatories to
such settlement under Section 12(3) of the
Act. The Act is based on the principle of
collective bargaining for resolving industrial
disputes and for maintaining industrial
peace. "This principle of industrial democracy
is the bedrock of the Act," as pointed out in
the case of P. Virudhachalam v. Lotus
Mills [(1998) 1 SCC 650 : 1998 SCC (L&S)
342] . In all these negotiations based on
collective bargaining the individual workman
necessarily recedes to the background.
Settlements will encompass all the disputes
existing at the time of the settlement except
those specifically left out.
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30. When notice was issued on the special
leave petition proceedings on the reference
were stayed. Earlier also during the
pendency of the writ petition before the High
Court, which led to the impugned judgment,
proceedings had been stayed. There has not
been any progress before the Industrial
Tribunal and all these years have passed.
During the course of hearing we have been
told that there have been even two more
settlements and also that the President of
the Workers' Union is now himself the
President of the Labour Union. Even
otherwise it would be futile to allow the
reference to continue after the lapse of all
these years. This is apart from the fact that
in our view reference in itself was bad as the
tripartite settlement did bind the members of
the Workers' Union as well.
20.8. By referring to the decision in the case of
National Engineering Industries Ltd, he
submits that when a settlement is arrived at in
conciliation proceedings, the same is binding on
the workman, which is not permissible to be
modified. An application for resignation having
been made and the same having been accepted
by the employer, there cannot be a dispute
raised in relation to such voluntary resignation.
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20.9. It is in that background that he submits that
the Industrial Tribunal being a creation of a
statute, gets jurisdiction on the basis of a
reference made by the Appropriate
Government. The Appropriate Government
cannot refer the matter where there is a
settlement already arrived at, for adjudication
by the Industrial Tribunal.
20.10. He relies upon the decision in the case of ANZ
Grindlays Bank Ltd v. Union of India (UOI)
and Ors3, more particularly para no. 13
thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
"Mr Bhat, learned Counsel for the second
Respondent, has submitted that this Court
should not interfere with the order of the
Central Government making a reference
under Section 10 of the Act, as the appellant
can ventilate its grievances before the
Industrial Tribunal itself and if the decision of
the Tribunal goes against the appellant, the
same may be challenged in accordance with
law. According to learned counsel the writ
petition is premature as the appellant has
got a remedy before the Tribunal to show
3 AIR 2006 SC 296
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AND 6 OTHERS
that the reference is either bad in law or is
uncalled for. We are unable to accept the
submission made. It is true that normally a
writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution should not be entertained
against an order of the appropriate
Government making a reference under
Section 10 of the Act, as the parties would
get opportunity to lead evidence before the
Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal and to
show that the claim made is either
unfounded or there was no occasion for
making a reference. However, this is not a
case where the infirmity in the reference can
be shown only after evidence has been
adduced. In the present case the futility of
the reference made by the Central
Government can be demonstrated from a
bare reading of the terms of the reference
and the admitted facts. In such
circumstances, the validity of the reference
made by the Central Government can be
examined in proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution as no evidence is required to
be considered for examining the issue
raised."
20.11. By referring to the decision in ANZ Grindlays
Bank Ltd's case (supra), he submits that
though normally the writ Court exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, would not entertain a challenge to an
order of the appropriate Government making a
reference under Section 10 of the ID Act. In the
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AND 6 OTHERS
event of it being shown that such reference is
either unfounded and or there was no occasion
for making a reference, and there will be futility
in making a reference
established/demonstrated from a bare reading
of the terms of reference and the admitted
facts, the writ Court is required to examine the
same under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
20.12. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Secretary, Indian Tea
Association vs. Ajit Kumar Barat and Ors4,,
more particularly para no. 8 thereof, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
8. We extract below the order of the State
Government, which is a speaking one:
"I am directed to say that in terms of the
Hon'ble High Court's order dated 24-11-1997
in Writ Petition No. 22878 (W) of 1997 in the
case of Ajit Kumar Barat v. State of W.B. [
WP No. 22878 (W) of 1997 order dated 24-
4 AIR 2000 SC 915
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AND 6 OTHERS
11-1997 (HC)] Government has examined
the matter in detail.
After examination, it reveals that you were
first appointed as Assistant Secretary in
Indian Tea Association and subsequently
promoted to the post of Joint Secretary.
Besides the basic pay you are given child
allowance, house rent subsidy, furnishing
allowance, house maintenance allowance,
transport subsidy, reimbursement of fuel and
electricity charges, entertainment expenses,
reimbursement of servant's wages, monthly
club subscription, leave travel allowance and
reimbursement of hospitality expenses. Your
duties also included power of sanction of
expenses on behalf of Indian Tea
Association.
So your pay and perquisites and the status
enjoyed by you in the organisation and also
the power of sanction of expenses suggest
that you were a part of the management.
Hence you cannot be treated as a workman
within the purview of the Industrial Disputes
Act.
Government, therefore, regrets its inability
to refer your dispute to any Industrial
Tribunal/Court under Section 12(5) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947."
20.13. By relying on the Secretary, Indian Tea
Association's case (supra), he submits that in
terms of Section 2-A of the ID Act for an
industrial dispute to exist, it would include a
dispute between the workmen and the
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AND 6 OTHERS
management, the Government before making
the reference must arrive at a satisfaction
about the existence of the industrial dispute. If
such subjective satisfaction is not made out in
the reference order, the order of reference is
required to be quashed.
20.14. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Rahman Industries Pvt.
Ltd vs. State of U.P. and Ors5, more
particularly para no. 5 thereof, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
"The jurisdiction of the Government under
the scheme of the Act to satisfy itself as to
the existence of the dispute has been the
subject-matter of a catena of judgments of
this Court, some of which have been referred
to in SAIL v. Union of India [SAIL v. Union of
India, (2006) 12 SCC 233 : (2007) 1 SCC
(L&S) 630] , wherein it has been held at para
18, which reads as follows: (SCC p. 241)
"18. Before adverting to the questions raised
before us, we may at this juncture notice the
contention of Mr V.N. Raghupathy that
whereas in the reference only 26 workmen
were made parties, more than 600 workmen
were made parties in the writ petition and,
thus, only because before the appropriate
5 AIR 2016 SC 551
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Government a demand was raised by some
of the workmen contending that they were
workmen of the contractors, an industrial
dispute could be raised that the contract was
a sham one and in truth and substance the
workmen were employed by the
management."
20.15. By relying upon the judgment in Rahman
Industries Pvt. Ltd's case (supra) he submits
that it is for the Government to satisfy itself as
to the existence of a dispute. Even a writ Court
cannot direct by mandamus a reference of a
matter to the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court.
Even if such an order is passed by a writ Court,
the subjective satisfaction of the existence of
an industrial dispute is to be arrived at by the
appropriate Government before such Tribunals.
20.16. On the basis of all the above, he submits that
the State has acted in a mechanical fashion.
Merely because a dispute was raised by the
employee, the appropriate Government has
referred the matter for adjudication by framing
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the above points of reference. There is no
satisfaction as to whether there is an industrial
dispute in existence or not. In the absence of
the same, the reference made by the
appropriate Government is bad in law, requiring
this Court to interfere and quash such
reference.
20.17. The submission of Sri. K.S. Subramanya,
learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner is
that before a reference could be made by the
appropriate Government, the appropriate
Government ought to have come to a
conclusion and or at least a prima-facie opinion
as to whether the persons concerned is/are
'workman' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of
the ID Act i.e., to say without the appropriate
Government having come to a prima-facie
opinion that the person is a workman, no
reference could be made. On that basis, he
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submits that without such a decision invoking
the jurisdiction of the appropriate Government
for reference as to whether the person is a
workman is bad in law.
20.18. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of A.
Sundarambal v. Government of Goa,
Daman and Diu and Ors6, more particularly
para no. 8 thereof, which is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
8. In order to be a workman, a person should
be one who satisfies the following conditions:
(i) he should be a person employed in an
industry for hire or reward; (ii) he should be
engaged in skilled or unskilled manual,
supervisory, technical or clerical work; and (iii)
he should not be a person falling under any of
the four clauses, i.e. (i) to (iv) mentioned in
the definition of "workman" in Section 2(s) of
the Act. The definition also provides that a
workman employed in an industry to do any
skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory,
technical or clerical work for hire or reward
includes any such person who has been
dismissed, discharged or retrenched in
connection with, or as a consequence of, an
industrial dispute, or whose dismissal,
discharge or retrenchment has led to that
dispute.
6 AIR 1988 SC 1700
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20.19. By relying on A. Sundarambal's case (supra),
he submits that to be a workman, the above
requirements are to be satisfied. Without such
satisfaction, a person cannot be said to be a
workman.
20.20. He relies upon the decision of Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Steel Authority of India
Ltd. V. Union of India (UOI) and Ors7, more
particularly para nos. 35, 36 and 37 thereof,
which are reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
35. It is, thus, evident that by taking recourse
to an amendment made in the pleading, the
party cannot be permitted to go beyond his
admission. The principle would be applied in
an industrial adjudication having regard to the
nature of the reference made by the
appropriate Government as also in view of the
fact that an industrial adjudicator derives his
jurisdiction from the reference only.
36. There is another aspect of the matter
which should also not be lost sight of. For the
purpose of exercising jurisdiction under
Section 10 of the 1970 Act, the appropriate
Government is required to apply its mind. Its
7 AIR 2006 SC 3229
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AND 6 OTHERS
order may be an administrative one but the
same would not be beyond the pale of judicial
review. It must, therefore, apply its mind
before making a reference on the basis of the
materials placed before it by the workmen
and/or management, as the case may be.
While doing so, it may be inappropriate for the
same authority on the basis of the materials
that a notification under Section 10(1)(d) of
the 1947 Act be issued, although it stands
judicially determined that the workmen were
employed by the contractor. The State
exercises administrative power both in relation
to abolition of contract labour in terms of
Section 10 of the 1970 Act as also in relation
to making a reference for industrial
adjudication to a Labour Court or a Tribunal
under Section 10(1)(d) of the 1947 Act. While
issuing a notification under the 1970 Act, the
State would have to proceed on the basis that
the principal employer had appointed
contractors and such appointments are valid in
law, but while referring a dispute for industrial
adjudication, validity of appointment of the
contractor would itself be an issue as the State
must prima facie satisfy itself that there exists
a dispute as to whether the workmen are in
fact not employed by the contractor but by the
management. We are, therefore, with respect,
unable to agree with the opinion of the High
Court.
37. We would, however, hasten to add that
this judgment shall not come in the way of the
appropriate Government to apply its mind for
the purpose of issuance of a notification under
Section 10 of the 1970 Act.
20.21. Relying on Steel Authority of India Ltd.'s
case (supra), he submits that before making a
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reference, the government would have to come
to a conclusion that the person seeking a
reference is a workman.
20.22. He refers to the decision of the Hon'ble Kerala
High Court in the case of Everestee v. District
Labour Officer8, more particularly para no. 9
thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
9. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it
is beneficial to extract Section 2(s) of the
Industrial Disputes Act:
"(s) "Workman" means any person (including an
apprentice) employed in any industry to do any
manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational,
clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward,
whether the terms of employment be express or
implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding
under this Act in relation to an industrial
dispute, includes any such person who has been
dismissed, discharged or retrenched in
connection with, or as a consequence of, that
dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or
retrenchment had led to that dispute, but does
not include any such person;
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45
of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950),
or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957; or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as
an officer or other employee of a prison; or
8 ILR 1999 (3) Kerala 142
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(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or
administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory
capacity draws wages exceeding one thousand
six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises,
either by the nature of the duties attached to
the office or by reason of the powers vested in
him, functions mainly of a managerial nature."
The definition of 'Workman' in Section 2(s) in
connection with persons employed in an
industry falls in three parts. The first part of the
definition gives the statutory meaning of
workman. The second part is designed to
include something more in what the term
primarily denotes. By this part of the definition,
persons who have been dismissed, discharged
or retrenched in connection with an industrial
dispute; or whose dismissal, discharge or
retrenchment has led to an industrial dispute.
This part specifically excludes the categories of
the persons specified in Clauses (i) to (iv)
of Section 2(s). The third part connotes that
even if a person satisfied the requirements of
any of the first two parts, if he falls in any of the
four categories in the third part, he shall be
excluded from the definition of 'workman'. In
our opinion, the appellant, having voluntarily
tendered his resignation pursuant to a scheme
for voluntary retirement, the resignation having
been accepted by the management and all the
benefits arising out of such resignation has been
paid by the management and received by the
appellant, he cannot be treated as a 'workman'
coming under Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act. As already noticed, the definition
only includes persons who are presently
employed, or who have been dismissed,
discharged or retrenched from the service of the
employer. In fact, dismissal, discharge or
retrenchment is an act of the employer, whereas
terminating the contract of service by way of
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resignation By the workman is his own act. We
are, therefore, of the opinion that the claim of
the appellant is misconceived and beyond the
scope of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes
Act. A perusal of the petition submitted by the
appellant before the Labour Officer and also the
Original Petition filed before this Court reveals
that the appellant had accepted the benefits
offered to him in pursuance of the Voluntary
Retirement Package announced by the
management and on being satisfied about the
calculation and the quantum thereof, chose to
tender his resignation and thereafter, on diverse
dates, received benefits confirming each time
that the management had fully and finally
settled the accounts, thereby severing the
employer-employee relationship once and for
all. Counsel for the appellant, however,
submitted that the benefits due to the appellant
was not properly quantified and paid, and
therefore, he would be entitled to maintain a
petition before the Labour Officer. As already
discussed and decided, the only remedy
available to the appellant is to approach the
management and not to make a petition before
the Labour Officer, who has no jurisdiction to
decide the matter. Counsel for the appellant also
referred to the payments made to some others
who were also workmen in the skilled category.
If there is any anomaly in regard to the
payments made to the appellant and the other
workmen, it is for the appellant to bring the
same to the notice of the management by way
of a fresh representation. If such a
representation is filed within one month from
today, the management is directed to consider
the same and pass appropriate orders in
accordance with law within one month from the
date of receipt of the representation. Learned
counsel for the management submitted that
though the matter is concluded between parties
the management is willing to consider the
representation, if any made by the appellant, as
per the directions now issued by this Court.
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AND 6 OTHERS
20.23. By relying on Everestee's case, he submits
that once a workman has tendered his
resignation in pursuance of a scheme for
voluntary retirement and such resignation has
been accepted by the management. Such a
person cannot be treated as a workman under
Section 2(s) of the ID Act.
20.24. In the present case, he submits that most of
the persons have tendered their resignation
voluntarily and have also received the
concerned benefits by submitting the necessary
applications. Having received those monies, not
refunded the monies, the acceptance of their
resignation being complete, they cannot now be
treated as workmen post their
retirement/resignation, which puts to rest the
clear severance of an employer-employee
relationship.
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AND 6 OTHERS
20.25. In two of the cases where the persons claim
that they had resigned in pursuance of an early
retirement scheme, there is no such scheme
that was propounded by the employer. Hence,
the mere usage of the term - 'early retirement',
would not automatically convert it into a
voluntary retirement scheme. Early retirement
was a claim made by those persons who
resigned from their respective posts/positions
and as such it would not widen the scope of a
resignation to a voluntary retirement scheme.
This being the case, the contentions of those
persons having retired cannot be accepted.
20.26. He relies upon the decision of this Court in the
case of The Karnataka Lingayat Education,
Society and Ors. v. Siddappa G. Namba and
Ors9, more particularly Para nos. 11 and 22
9 ILR 2017 Kar 5139
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AND 6 OTHERS
thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for
easy reference:
11. Section 2(s) of the Act is also quoted below:
"2(s) Workman.-- "workman" means any person
(including an apprentice) employed in any
industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled,
technical, operational, clerical or supervisory
work for hire or reward, whether the terms of
employment be express or implied, and for the
purposes of any proceeding under this Act in
relation to an industrial dispute, includes any
such person who has been dismissed,
discharged or retrenched in connection with, or
as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose
dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to
that dispute, but does not include any such
person--
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45
of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950),
or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as
an officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or
administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory
capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand
six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises,
either by the nature of the duties attached to
the office or by reason of the powers vested in
him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.
22. Had it been so brought to the notice of the
Labour Court, perhaps the things would have
been different. Be that as it may. Irrespective of
the same, even the question of interpretation
and applicability of Rule 5 for determining the
claim of the Respondents could not have been
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AND 6 OTHERS
gone into by the Labour Court while deciding the
application under Section 33C(2) of the Act. The
retired or ex-employees could not at all invoke
Section 33C(2) of the Act, as they were outside
the scope of definition of "workman" as defined
under Section 2(s) of the Act, which envisages
only workman who is working in presentia with
the Employer-Industry."
20.27. By relying on Siddappa G. Namba's case
(supra), he submits that a retired
employee/workman is not a workman under
Section 2(s) of the ID Act, and therefore, no
reference could be made in respect thereto.
20.28. He relies upon the decision of this Court in the
case of Gadigayya and Ors. v. K.L.E. Society
and Ors10, more particularly para no. 11
thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
11. In the instant case, the appellants claimed
difference of Dearness Allowance, Encashment
of Earned Leave, etc. from the Respondent-KLE
Society, whereas the Respondent-KLE Society
has specifically denied and it further stated that
it had no liability to pay that difference on par
with the Government employees. When such
being the case, the application under Section
33C(2) of the Act is not maintainable. The
10 2018 (III) CLR 755
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AND 6 OTHERS
application under Section 33C(2) of the Act is
maintainable, only when there is a determined
amount and when such amount is denied by
the employer. Further, the appellants are not
workmen within the definition of "workman"
under Section 2(s) of the Act. The appellants
had retired from the service of the Respondent-
KLE Society on attaining the age of
superannuation on 31.08.2000 and 30.04.2002
respectively. Subsequently, in the year 2005,
the applications under Section 33C(2) of the
Act were filed before the Labour Court. The
definition of "Workman" under Section 2(s) of
the Act would not include a retired
employee/workman. Therefore, on this ground
also, the application filed by the appellants
herein was not maintainable before the Labour
Court.
20.29. By relying on Gadigayya's case (supra), he
submits that the definition and scope of a
workman under Section 2(s) of the ID Act,
would not include a retired employee/workman.
20.30. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Shriram Manohar Bande
vs. Uktranti Mandal and Others11, more
particularly para nos. 22 and 23 thereof, which
are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
11 2024 SCC OnLine SC 647
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AND 6 OTHERS
"22. This Court in North Zone Cultural
Centre v. Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar, (2003)
5 SCC 455 has held that resignation would be
effective on its acceptance, even if the
acceptance is not communicated as long as
rules or guidelines governing the resignation do
not mandate such acceptance of resignation is
to be communicated. In the North Zone (supra)
case, the employee who was a temporary
Accountant tendered his resignation from the
post held by him on 18.11.1988. With effect
from the said date, the resignation was
accepted by the Director on the very same day
with the endorsement "Accepted, hand over
charge". The employee vide Telegram on
21.11.1988 withdrew his resignation stating
that the same was obtained by pressure. He
was communicated vide letter dated
18.11.1988 regarding acceptance of his
resignation. The High Court allowed the writ
petition on two grounds; (i) the acceptance of
resignation was not communicated till the
withdrawal and (ii) the employee was permitted
to attend the duty even after acceptance of
resignation. Setting aside the judgment of the
High Court, this Court held that non-
communication of the acceptance does not
make the resignation inoperative provided,
there is, in fact, an acceptance before the
withdrawal. It is also held that it is not open to
the public servant to withdraw his resignation
after it is accepted by the appropriate
authority.
23. As noticed by us above, Section 7 of the
MEPS Act and Rule 40 of the Rules does not
impose any guidelines for acceptance of the
resignation upon the management. Hence, the
position of law laid down by this Court in North
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AND 6 OTHERS
Zone (supra) squarely applies to the facts of
the present case. Therefore, the contention
raised by the appellant about withdrawal of
resignation before communication of its
acceptance does not hold water."
20.31. By referring to Shriram Manohar Bande's
case, he submits that resignation would be
effective on its acceptance. Any withdrawal of
the resignation post the acceptance, would not
enure to the benefit of the employee/workman.
In the present case, the withdrawal of the
resignation has happened subsequently.
20.32. He submits that a resignation once submitted
would be effective upon its acceptance. In the
present case, the resignation having been
accepted, the persons not having worked
thereafter, it is only after 14 months that a
reference was sought for raising a dispute.
Thus, once resignation is accepted any scope of
withdrawal thereof would not arise.
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AND 6 OTHERS
20.33. He relies upon the Judgment of a Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in the case of Triveni
Turbine Limited vs. Government of
Karnataka and Ors12, more particularly Para
Nos.21, 22 and 23 thereof, which are
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
21. The Apex Court in the case of Ramesh
Chandra Sankla and others vs. Vikram
Cement and others9 has held at paragraph
Nos.89 and 91 as under:
"89. From the above cases, it clearly transpires
that powers under Articles 226 and 227 are
discretionary and equitable and are required to
be exercised in the larger interest of justice.
While granting relief in favour of the applicant,
the Court must take into account balancing
interests and equities. It can mould relief
considering the facts of the case. It can pass an
appropriate order which justice may demand
and equities may project. As observed by this
Court in Shiv Shankar Dal Mills v. State of
Haryana, Courts of equity should go much
further both to give and refuse relief in
furtherance of public interest. Granting or
withholding of relief may properly be dependent
upon considerations of justice, equity and good
conscience.
xxx
12 2024(1) LLN 772 (Kar)
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AND 6 OTHERS
91. Even otherwise, according to the workmen,
they were compelled to accept the amount and
they received such amount under coercion and
duress. In our considered opinion, they cannot
retain the benefit if they want to prosecute
Claim Petitions instituted by them with the
Labour Court. Hence, the order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court as to refund of
amount cannot be termed unjust, inequitable or
improper. Hence, even if it is held that a
'technical' contention raised by the workmen has
some force, this Court which again exercises
discretionary and equitable jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution, will not
interfere with a direction which is in consonance
with the doctrine of equity. It has been rightly
said that a person "who seeks equity must do
equity". Here the workmen claim benefits as
workmen of the Company, but they do not want
to part with the benefit they have received
towards retirement and severance of
relationship of master and servant. It simply
cannot be permitted. In our judgment,
therefore, the final direction issued by the
Division Bench needs no interference,
particularly when the Company has also
approached this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution."
22. "The person who seeks equity must do
equity" and the workmen claim benefits as
workmen of the company, but they do not want
to part with the benefits they have received
towards retirement and the severance of the
relationship between master and servant. It
simply cannot be permitted. The Respondent
herein having failed to deposit the settlement
amount, initiation of proceedings and
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AND 6 OTHERS
adjudication by the Respondent is not
justifiable.
23. In the instant case, neither the dispute is in
existence nor is the dispute apprehended since
Respondent Nos.2 to 52 have admitted that they
have opted for voluntary retirement from
service and also the benefits received under the
scheme. This being the position, this Court is of
the considered view that the Government ought
to have arrived at a subjective satisfaction as to
whether a prima-facie dispute is in existence or
is apprehended from the material on record, it is
evidently clear that the appropriate Government
has mechanically referred the matter without
discharging its obligation as required under law
and a serious error of law has been committed
by the appropriate authority, which is apparent
on the face of the record. Therefore, the order
of the reference made by the Government
deserves to be quashed. Accordingly, this Court
pass the following:
ORDER
i. Writ petition is allowed.
ii. Impugned order dated 22.06.2022 in No.LD-
IDM/370/2022/LD.DO.6LS at Annexure-R is
hereby quashed.
20.34. By relying on Triveni Turbine Limited case,
he submits that if at all the
employees/workmen wanted to raise a dispute.
The minimum that was required to be done by
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AND 6 OTHERS
the employees/workmen was to deposit the
amounts received by the employees/workmen
and thereafter, raise such a dispute. The
employee having received the benefits towards
the retirement and severance, a
workmen/employee cannot be permitted to
retain the benefit and raise a dispute. This
aspect has not been considered by the
appropriate Government. Lakhs of rupees have
been paid to the employees/workmen who have
resigned and continue to retain the same. The
appropriate Government ought not to have
referred the matter for adjudication.
20.35. He submits that while considering a proceeding
under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India, a writ Court would be required to balance
the interest and equities and while doing so,
mould the necessary relief considering the facts
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AND 6 OTHERS
of the case. The workmen having approached
the appropriate Government for reference of
the dispute, they having received large sums of
money through normal bank transfers and
having acknowledged receipt of the said
monies, have not even offered to refund those
monies let alone refund the same , nor have
they deposited those monies before the
appropriate Government or before this Court.
20.36. Thus, he submits that one who seeks equity
must do equity. The Respondents not having
parted or wanting to part with the benefits they
have received towards retirement/resignation
and the subsequent severance of the
relationship between the master and servant,
initiation of proceedings and or adjudication by
the appropriate government is not permissible.
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AND 6 OTHERS
20.37. He submits that this aspect though covered
under point No.2, the appropriate Government
has not taken into account the status of the
alleged workmen in as much as their
designation and their roles and responsibilities
not being considered.
20.38. In this regard, he has submitted a table to
contend that if the designation and the salary
had been taken into account, those persons
could not be said to be workmen and,
therefore, reference could not be made. The
table is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
Sl. Writ Petition Name Date of Amount Date of Remarks
Settled Reference/
No. No. Separation Nature of
dispute
1. 106038/2023 Srinivasa Rao 30.9.2020 Gratuity of 5.6.2023 a) Declared in the
JSW Energy Rs.691449/- composite claim of
Manager (Resignation) Paid on a) Whether the PF that he has left
(Operation 21.9.2020 Second the organization.
service) 6.8.2020 Annexure-C Respondent (Annexure-D page
Page 28 proves that he 30 to 34)
Annexure-B is a "workman"
PF Accumu- within the
Acceptance meaning of
lation to the Section 2(s) of b) Clearance
30.9.2020 tune of I.D.Act. certificate obtained
Rs.1947378/ (Annexure-E Page
- 80 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
AND 6 OTHERS
Annexure-B1 -Was paid b) If so 42-45)
on whether the
Gross Salary 28.12.2020 Second
Respondent
At the time of Annexure-F proves that his
Page 53 resignation has
Resignation been obtained
by force w.e.f
Rs.201897/- 30.9.2020.
Annexure- Annexure-H
Page 56 to 57
Page 40
2. 101114/2022 M.Hari 28.7.2020 Gratuity of 7.1.2022 a) Declared in the
(Asst. Manager) (Resignation) Rs.544892/- composite claim of
Annexure-D a) Whether the PF that he has left
Paid on Second the organization.
Page 28 Date Respondent (Annexure-G page
of Acceptance 27.10.2020 proves that he 32 to 33)
30.9.2020 Annexure-L is a "workman"
Annexure-E Page 40 within the
meaning of
PF Section 2(s) of b) Self declaration
Accumulatio I.D.Act. having left job
Page 29 Gross n to the tune (Annexure-H Page
Salary at the of 34)
time of Rs.1902524/
Resignation - b) If so
Rs.115533/- whether the
per month Paid on Second c) Declared in the
Respondent Gratuity Application
15.11.2020 proves that his form that he has
resignation has resigned the job.
Annexure-M been obtained
Page 43 by force w.e.f
1.8.2020.
(Annexure-J page
36)
3. 101907/2022 P.Somashekara 27.7.2020 Gratuity of 7.1.2022 a) Declared in the
(Asst. Manager) (Resignation) Rs.357115/- composite claim of
Paid on PF that he has left
Annexure-C 26.10.2020 the organization.
Page 27 Annexure-J a) Whether the (Annexure-E page
Page 38 Second 31 to 32)
30.9.2020 Respondent
Acceptance PF proves that he
Accumulatio is a "workman"
Annexure-D n to the tune within the b) Declared Gratuity
Page 29 of meaning of Application Form
Rs.1229468/ Section 2(s) of that he has resigned
- I.D.Act. (Annexure-G Page
- 81 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:7139
AND 6 OTHERS
Gross Salary Was paid on 35)
at the time of 31.12.2020
Resignation b) If so
Rs.85657/-per Annexure-K whether the
month Second
Page 42 Respondent
proves that his
resignation has
been obtained
by force w.e.f
28.7.2020.
Annexure-N
Page 47 to 48
4. 101908/2022 B. Vasantha 23.7.2020 Gratuity of 7.1.2022 a) Declared in the
(Resignation) Rs.627508/- a) Whether the composite claim of
Madhava Annexure-D Paid on Second PF that he has left
26.10.2020 Respondent the organization.
Page 32
(Deputy proves that he (Annexure-G page
Manager) Annexure-L is a "workman" 37 to 38)
Page 46 within the
meaning of
30.9.2020 PF Section 2(s) of
Acceptance Accumulatio I.D.Act. b) Declared Gratuity
n to the tune Application Form
of b) If so that he has resigned
Rs.2533344/ whether the (Annexure-J Page
Annexure-E - Second 41 to 42
Page 34 Respondent
Was paid on proves that his
18.11.2020 resignation has
Annexure-N been obtained
Gross Salary by force w.e.f
Page 48 1.8.2020.
at the time of
Resignation
Rs.124655/-
per month Annexure-R
Page 54 to 55
5. 101911/2022 Noor Ahmed (Dy. 22.9.2020 Gratuity of 7.1.2022 a) Declared in the
Manager- (Resignation) Rs.625033/- composite claim of
Operation) Annexure-C Paid on a) Whether the PF that he has left
26.10.2020 Second the organization.
Annexure-K Respondent (Annexure-F page
Page 35
proves that he 39 to 40)
is a "workman"
within the
PF meaning of
- 82 -
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AND 6 OTHERS
30.9.2020 Accumulatio Section 2(s) of b) Declared Gratuity
n to the tune I.D.Act. Application Form
Acceptance of that he has resigned
Rs.1189061/ b) If so (Annexure-H Page
- Was paid whether the 43)
on Second
Annexure-D 17.11.2020 Respondent
Annexure-M proves that his
Page 36 Page-51 resignation has
been obtained
Gross Salary by force w.e.f
30.9.2020.
at the time of
Resignation - Annexure-Q
Rs.139393/-
per month Page 59
6. 101912/2022 A.G.Joshi 31.7.2020 Gratuity of 7.1.2022 a) Declared in the
(Asst.Manager) Rs.682050/- composite claim of
(Resignation) Paid on a) Whether the PF that he has left
Annexure-C 26.10.2020 Second the organization.
Annexure-K Respondent (Annexure-F page
Page 28 Page 41 proves that he 36 to 37)
is a "workman"
within the b) Declared Gratuity
meaning of Application Form
PF Accumu Section 2(s) of that he has resigned
30.9.2020 Lation to the I.D.Act. (Annexure-H Page
tune of Rs. 40)
Acceptance 1601296/-
Was paid on b) If so
26.10.2020 whether the
Annexure-D Annexure-M Second
Page 29 Page 44 Respondent
proves that his
resignation has
been obtained
Gross salary At by force w.e.f
the time of 1.8.2020
Resignation
Rs.116926/per
month Annexure-Q
Page 49-50
7. 101915/2022 Sudarshana 23.07.2020 Gratuity of 7.1.2022 a) Declared in the
Rs.146175/- composite claim of
Sateesh Pai (Resignation) a) Whether the PF that he has left
Paid on Second the organization.
(Asst. Manager) Annexure-C Respondent (Annexure-F page
26.10.2020 proves that he 30 to 31)
is a "workman"
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AND 6 OTHERS
Page 26 Annexure-K within the
meaning of
Page 38 Section 2(s) of b) Declared Gratuity
I.D.Act. Application Form
4.9.2020 PF that he has resigned
Accumulatio b) If so (Annexure-H Page
Acceptance n to the tune whether the 33 to 34)
of Second
Rs.441311/- Respondent
Annexure-D
proves that his
Was paid on resignation has
Page 27
been obtained
15.11.2020 by force w.e.f.
Gross Salary
4.9.2020.
Annexure-M
At the time of Annexure-Q
Page 41
Resignation Page 47 to 48
Rs.61557/-
Annexure-E
Page 28
8. 101920/2022 Raghunath 29.7.2020 Gratuity of 7.1.2022 a) Declared in the
Rs.456415/- composite claim of
Ghorpade (Resignation) a) Whether the PF that he has left
Paid on Second the organization.
(Jr. Manager) Annexure-D Respondent (Annexure-G page
22.10.2020 proves that he 36 to 37)
Page 31
is a "workman"
Annexure-K within the
30.9.2020
meaning of
Page 42 Section 2(s) of b) Declared Gratuity
Acceptance
I.D.Act. Application Form
PF Accumu- that he has resigned
Annexure-E lation to the B) If so (Annexure-J Page
tune of whether the 40 to 41)
Page 33 Rs.1544923/ Second
- Respondent
Gross Salary proves that his
at the time of Was paid on resignation has
27.11.2020 been obtained
Resignation
Rs.93349/- by frce w.e.f
Annexure-N
9.9.2020.
Per month Page 46
Annexure-R
Annexure-F
Page 53 to 54
Page 34
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AND 6 OTHERS
20.39. Basing his submission on the said above-
extracted table, he submits that all of them are
in the 'Managerial Cadre'. The designation itself
indicates that they were Manager, Deputy
Manager, Assistant Manager, Junior Manager or
the like, and they were exercising supervisory
powers being part of the management, drawing
amounts ranging from Rs.61,557/- per month
to Rs.2,01,897/- per month, and in this regard
they cannot be termed to be workmen.
20.40. These aspects have not been looked into and or
considered by the appropriate government and
as such the appropriate government could not
have referred cases of persons who were
holding managerial cadre positions for
adjudication under the workmen category by
referring the same to the Industrial Tribunal.
20.41. He refers to a decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Secretary Indian Tea Association v.
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AND 6 OTHERS
Ajit Kumar Barat and Ors13, more
particularly para nos. 12 and 13 thereof, which
are reproduced here under for easy reference:
12. From the order of the State Government we
find that while deciding the question whether
Respondent 1 was a workman, it took into
consideration the salary and allowances of
Respondent 1 drawn at the relevant time and
also the nature of work. Respondent 1 who has
appeared in person did not dispute the salary
and allowances etc. as indicated in the order of
the Government but urged that his
responsibilities were neither supervisory nor
managerial in nature.
13. Mr Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the appellant has drawn our attention to the
circular dated 30-3-1994 issued by the appellant
Association. This circular indicates the duties of
Respondent 1 who was functioning as a Joint
Secretary at the relevant time and we find that
his duties were to deal with all legal matters and
court proceedings, labour and land laws and
publications (labour legislations labour welfare).
We also find from the records that Respondent 1
had power to sanction expenses incurred in
litigation by the appellant. On the above
materials on record the State Government
rightly formed the opinion that Respondent 1
was not a workman.
20.42. Based on Ajit Kumar Bharat's case (supra),
he submits that there was a responsibility
13 (2000) 3 SCC 93
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AND 6 OTHERS
vested in the appropriate Government to first
come to a prima-facie conclusion that the
person seeking for reference was actually a
workman or not and not particularly belonging
to the managerial cadre.
20.43. He relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of North Zone Cultural
Centre v. Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar14, more
particularly para no. 23 thereof, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
23. As noticed above, in the present case the
resignation is dated 18-11-1988 and the same
as found by us is accepted on 18-11-1988 itself.
The communication was on 1-12-1988 about 13
days thereafter which delay, in our opinion, is
not an undue delay so as to make us draw an
inference that there has been no acceptance of
the resignation. Even the fact that in the
meantime the Respondent either attended duty
or signed the attendance register will be of no
assistance to claim his resignation had not taken
effect. Even otherwise the appellants have
urged that because there was no responsible
officer on the headquarters from 18.11.1988
after the Responden's resignation was accepted
till 1.12.1988 and the Respondent took
advantage of the same and marked his
attendance and such attendance cannot be
treated as lawful attendant in view of the
14 (2003) 5 SCC 455
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AND 6 OTHERS
acceptance of his resignation on 18.11.1988. we
agree with the contention of the Appellant.
20.44. By relying upon Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar's
case (supra), he submits that even if the
alleged workman had attended duty and or
signed the attendance register, the same
cannot take away the effect of resignation.
Such attendance cannot be said to be lawful.
The acceptance of the resignation plainly puts
an end to the relationship of the employer-
employee.
20.45. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of The Secretary, Technical
Education, U.P. and Ors v. Lalit Mohan
Upadhyay and Ors15, more particularly para
nos. 17 and 19 thereof, which are reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
17. The general principle is that a government
servant/or functionary who cannot, under the
15 (2007) 4 SCC 492
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conditions of his service/or office, by his own
unilateral act of tendering resignation, give up
his service/or office normally the tender of
resignation becomes effective and his service/or
office tenure gets terminated when it is
accepted by the competent authority. Thus,
having regard to the letter of resignation
(Annexure P-2), in the present case, there can
be no doubt that Shri L.M. Upadhyay had in his
letter dated 6-9-1993, indicated his unequivocal
intention to resign in the clearest possible terms
with immediate effect. The resignation was
tendered by Shri Upadhyay voluntarily without
any pressure or coercion from the Principal of
the College as recorded by all the enquiry
officers in their respective fact-finding reports
and the counter-allegation of Shri Upadhyay
against the Principal was found unwarranted and
unfounded. The Principal in fact, had protected
the reputation, saved the future career and
unnecessary humiliation and embarrassment of
Shri Upadhyay from the students, staff
members and teachers of the College by
permitting him to leave the College immediately
before his letter of resignation was forwarded to
the competent authority for its acceptance.
19. There cannot be any quarrel on the settled
principle of law that an employee is entitled to
withdraw his resignation before its acceptance
by the competent authority. We have gone
through the decisions of this Court in J.K. Cotton
Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of
U.P. [(1990) 4 SCC 27 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 570 :
AIR 1990 SC 1808] and Union of India v. Gopal
Chandra Misra [(1978) 2 SCC 301 : 1978 SCC
(L&S) 303] relied upon by the learned Senior
Counsel for Respondent 1. He contended that
before terminating the services of Respondent 1
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on the basis of the complaint of the girl student
and subsequent inquiry reports of the enquiry
officers, it was obligatory upon the authority to
hold regular departmental inquiry for the alleged
misconduct and then to proceed against
Respondent 1 in accordance with relevant rules.
We are afraid to accept this submission.
Admittedly, Shri L.M. Upadhyay was on
probation and the authority was empowered to
judge his fitness for work or suitability to the
post of teacher at the time of acceptance of his
resignation. In our view, the services of Shri
L.M. Upadhyay during probation period could
have been terminated by the authority, but the
Principal and the Board of Governors had
adopted a reasonable and fair mode of accepting
his pending letter of resignation instead of
terminating his services for unsuitability.
20.46. By relying on Lalit Mohan Upadhyay's case
(supra), he submits that a resignation can be
withdrawn before the acceptance by the
competent authority/employer, the same
cannot be withdrawn after acceptance.
20.47. On the basis of all the above submissions, he
submits that the appropriate Government not
having considered these matters in the proper
perspective, the reference made is bad in law
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and the aforesaid reliefs sought for are required
to be granted.
21. Sri. Abhishek Patil, the learned counsel appearing for
Respondent No.2 in WP No.106038/2023 submits
that;
21.1. While forming an opinion under sub-section (1)
of Section 10 of the ID Act, what is required is
only a formation of opinion that there is an
industrial dispute. The Appropriate
Government, having formulated such an
opinion and has referred the matter for
adjudication, the employer cannot dispute the
same in the manner sought to be done.
21.2. It is submitted that the Petitioner has
approached this Court at a premature stage
and that it is for the Industrial Tribunal/Labour
Court to answer the references made. While
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doing so, all the contentions of the Petitioner
would be answered by the Labour Court, more
particularly:
(i) Whether there is an industrial dispute?,
(ii) Whether there is a relationship between the
employer and workman?,
(iii) Whether Respondent No. 2 qualifies to be a
workman and continues to be a workman?
21.3. All the above are disputed questions of facts,
which could not be determined by the
appropriate government and as such the
reference has been made. It is for the industrial
tribunal to now decide on the same.
21.4. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Sharad Kumar v. Govt.
of NCT of Delhi and others16, more
16 (2002) 4 SCC 490
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particularly para no. 31 thereof, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
31. Testing the case in hand on the touchstone
of the principles laid down in the decided cases,
we have no hesitation to hold that the High
Court was clearly in error in confirming the
order of rejection of reference passed by the
State Government merely taking note of the
designation of the post held by the Respondent
i.e. Area Sales Executive. As noted earlier
determination of this question depends on the
types of duties assigned to or discharged by the
employee and not merely on the designation of
the post held by him. We do not find that the
State Government or even the High Court has
made any attempt to go into the different types
of duties discharged by the appellant with a
view to ascertain whether he came within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. The State
Government, as noted earlier, merely
considered the designation of the post held by
him, which is extraneous to the matters relevant
for the purpose. From the appointment order
dated 21-4-1983/22-4-1983 in which are
enumerated certain duties which the appellant
may be required to discharge it cannot be held
therefrom that he did not come within the first
portion of Section 2(s) of the Act. We are of the
view that determination of the question requires
examination of factual matters for which
materials including oral evidence will have to be
considered. In such a matter the State
Government could not arrogate on to itself the
power to adjudicate on the question and hold
that the Respondent was not a workman within
the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, thereby
terminating the proceedings prematurely. Such
a matter should be decided by the Industrial
Tribunal or the Labour Court on the basis of the
materials to be placed before it by the parties.
Thus the rejection order passed by the State
Government is clearly erroneous and the order
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passed by the High Court maintaining the same
is unsustainable.
21.5. By relying on Sharad Kumar's case, he
submits that the determination of questions
requiring examination of factual matters,
cannot be considered by the appropriate
Government. The appropriate Government
cannot arrogate to itself the power to
adjudicate on the question. Those disputed
questions ought to be referred to and left to the
discretion of the Industrial Tribunal or Labour
Court. He submits that the power to refer a
dispute to an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour
Court, is purely an administrative act and not a
judicial or quasi-judicial function requiring
reasons to be recorded.
21.6. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture
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Department and Another17, more particularly
para nos. 42.1 to 42.6 thereof, which are
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
42.1. An industrial dispute has to be referred by
the appropriate Government for adjudication
and the workman cannot approach the Labour
Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in
those cases which are covered by Section 2-A of
the Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of
the Act in those cases where the appropriate
Government forms an opinion that "any
industrial dispute exists or is apprehended". The
words "industrial dispute exists" are of
paramount importance, unless there is an
existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute
is apprehended or it is apprehended such a
dispute may arise in near future), no reference
is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension
of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for
making the reference. No doubt, at the time of
taking a decision whether a reference is to be
made or not, the appropriate Government is not
to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of
reference is only an administrative function. At
the same time, on the basis of material on
record, satisfaction of the existence of the
industrial dispute or the apprehension of an
industrial dispute is necessary. Such
existence/apprehension of industrial dispute,
thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it
will be only subjective satisfaction based on
material on record. Since, we are not concerned
with the satisfaction dealing with cases where
there is apprehended industrial dispute,
discussion that follows would confine to
existence of an industrial dispute.
42.2. Dispute or difference arises when one
party makes a demand and the other party
17 (2015) 15 SCC 1
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rejects the same. It is held by this Court in a
number of cases that before raising the
industrial dispute making of demand is a
necessary precondition. In such a scenario, if
the services of a workman are terminated and
he does not make the demand and/or raise the
issue alleging wrongful termination immediately
thereafter or within reasonable time and raises
the same after considerable lapse of period,
whether it can be said that industrial dispute still
exists.
42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it
gives right to the workman to raise the dispute
even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised
after a long period, it has to be seen as to
whether such a dispute still exists? Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation
does not apply, it is to be shown by the
workman that there is a dispute in praesenti.
For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that
even if considerable period has lapsed and there
are laches and delays, such delay has not
resulted into making the industrial dispute cease
to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to
give satisfactory explanation for these laches
and delays and demonstrate that the
circumstances disclose that issue is still alive,
delay would not come in his way because of the
reason that law of limitation has no application.
On the other hand, if because of such delay
dispute no longer remains alive and is to be
treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent
dispute which cannot be referred.
42.4. Take, for example, a case where the
workman issues notice after his termination,
questioning the termination and demanding
reinstatement. He is able to show that there
were discussions from time to time and the
parties were trying to sort out the matter
amicably. Or he is able to show that there were
assurances by the Management to the effect
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that he would be taken back in service and
because of these reasons, he did not
immediately raise the dispute by approaching
the Labour Authorities seeking reference or did
not invoke the remedy under Section 2-A of the
Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that
the dispute was live and existing as the
workman never abandoned his right. However,
in this very example, even if the notice of
demand was sent but it did not evoke any
positive response or there was specific rejection
by the Management of his demand contained in
the notice and thereafter he sleeps over the
matter for a number of years, it can be treated
that he accepted the factum of his termination
and rejection thereof by the Management and
acquiesced into the said rejection.
42.5. Take another example. A workman
approaches the civil court by filing a suit against
his termination which was pending for a number
of years and was ultimately dismissed on the
ground that the civil court did not have
jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal
service and does not grant any reinstatement.
At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he
withdraws that suit and then involves the
machinery under the Act, it can lead to the
conclusion that the dispute is still alive as the
workman had not accepted the termination but
was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong
forum.
42.6. In contrast, in those cases where there
was no agitation by the workman against his
termination and the dispute is raised belatedly
and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it
would be presumed that he had waived his right
or acquiesced into the act of termination and,
therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised
it had become stale and was not an "existing
dispute". In such circumstances, the appropriate
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Government can refuse to make reference. In
the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial
Court can also hold that there is no "industrial
dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of
the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted.
21.7. By relying on Prabhakar's case, his submission
is that the jurisdiction of the reference court to
adjudicate on an industrial dispute although
flows from the statute, the same requires the
appropriate government to grant such
reference to the concerned body
notwithstanding the merits of the matter.
Further, albeit 'demand' being a pre-condition
for dispute, there is no period of limitation that
applies as regards when such a demand could
be raised.
21.8. Insofar as Respondent No. 2 in WP
No.106038/2023 is concerned, he submitted
that Respondent No.2 had been forced to
submit a resignation letter on 06.08.2020. This
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resignation letter was withdrawn by Respondent
No.2 vide his E-mail dated 08.08.2020 i.e.,
within two days from the date of forceful
resignation.
21.9. In the said withdrawal, Respondent No.2 has
categorically stated that he had received a
sudden call from the HR section and asked to
sign a document of resignation under pressure,
succumbing to the same, he had signed the
said document and therefore there is no wilful
resignation on part of Respondent No.2.
21.10. The said withdrawal of resignation has been
produced along with the memo dated
12.02.2025. He submits that the employer had
resorted to the modus of accepting forced
resignation letters to terminate the services of
workmen during the Covid-19 pandemic period.
21.11. When there was a specific embargo on the
employers not to terminate the services of
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workmen, the employer has acted in a manner
not befitting its stature, the employer was
required to safeguard the interests of the
employees/workmen, without doing so, the
employer resorted to forcing people to resign to
take undue advantage of the position held by
the employer as against its workmen.
21.12. In so far as whether Respondent No.2 is a
workman or not, he relies upon the decision of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Hussan
Mithu Mhasvadkar v. Bombay Iron & Steel
Labour Board18, more particularly para no. 10
thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
10. No doubt, in deciding about the status of an
employee, his designation alone cannot be said
to be decisive and what really should go into
consideration is the nature of his duties and the
powers conferred upon as well as the functions
assigned to him. Even if the whole undertaking
be an industry, those who are not workmen by
definition may not be benefited by the said
status. It is the predominant nature of the
18 (2001) 7 SCC 394
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services that will be the true and proper test.
Operations of the Government which are pure
and simpliciter administrative and of a
governmental character or incidental thereto
cannot be characterized to be "industrial" in
nature, be they performed by a department of
the Government or by a specially constituted
statutory body to whom anyone or more of such
functions are delegated or entrusted with.
When, as in this case, as disclosed from Section
15 of the Act as also the provisions of the
Scheme, the primary duties of an employee and
the dominant purpose, aim and object of
employment was to carry out only certain
specific statutory duties in the matter of
effective enforcement and implementation of the
Welfare Scheme in order to ameliorate and
rehabilitate a particular cross section of labour,
and, if need be, on the basis of his own decision
which calls for a high degree of discretion and
exercise of power to prosecute the violator of
the provisions of the Act, Rules and the
provisions of the Scheme, we are unable to
accord our approval to the claim made on behalf
of the appellant that he can yet be assigned the
status of a "workman", without doing violence to
the language of Section 2(s) and the very
purpose and object of the ID Act, 1947. That
apart, even judging from the nature of powers
and the manner of its exercise by an Inspector,
appointed under the Act, in our view, the
appellant cannot be considered to be engaged in
doing any manual, unskilled, technical,
operational, clerical or supervisory work and the
mere fact that in the course of performing his
duties he had to also maintain, incidentally,
records to evidence the duties performed by
him, day to day, cannot result in the conversion
of the post of "Inspector" into any one of those
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nature noticed above, without which, as held by
a Constitution Bench of this Court in the decision
in H.R. Adyanthaya case the appellant cannot
fall within the definition of "workman". The
powers of an Inspector and duties and
obligations cast upon him as such are identical
and akin to law enforcing agency or authority
and also on a par with a prosecuting agency in
the public law field.
21.13. By relying on Hussan Mithu Mhasvadkar's
case (supra), he submits that while deciding
whether a person is a workman or not, the
designation is not important. It is the duties,
which are discharged, which is important.
According to him, Respondent No.2 did not
exercise any supervisory functions and or
managerial functions. The designation which
has been provided by the employer, is only for
promotional purposes and no other purposes at
all.
21.14. Respondent No.2 satisfies the definition of
workman under Section 2(s) of the ID Act.
Alternatively, he submits that this aspect would
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have to be decided by the Court to which the
matter is referred to, where evidence would be
laid by both the parties. For now, the
appropriate Government has come to a prima-
facie finding that Respondent No.2 is a
workman and as such, the same cannot be
found fault with.
22. Sri. Ravi Hegde, learned counsel appearing for
Respondent No.2 in the other matters would submit
that;
22.1. What the Government was required to consider
prima facie waswhether an industrial dispute
exists or is apprehended before reference of the
dispute, and had come to a conclusion that
there exists a prima facie dispute which
requires adjudication.
22.2. His submission is that the subjective
satisfaction of the appropriate Government to
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refer the matter for adjudication cannot be
called in question in the writ proceedings. A
reference made is more in the nature of a
show-cause, it is for the claimant/workman to
establish the allegations and for the employer
to counter it.
22.3. These aspects would be adjudicated by the
Labour Court by applying the appropriate law.
The appropriate Government cannot prejudge
whether there is an industrial dispute or not,
and whether there is an employer-
employee/employer-workman relationship or
not prior to reference of the matter to the
Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court.
22.4. If same were to be done, that would amount to
usurpation of the powers of the Industrial
Tribunal/Labour Court, the appropriate
Government only discharging administrative
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powers could not exercise quasi-judicial or
judicial powers to make such a determination.
22.5. He again reiterates that mere designation of a
person as a 'manager' would not make such
person a part of the managerial cadre nor
would the salary be a decisive factor to decide
the status of a workman.
22.6. His submission is that it would be for the
employer to establish that Respondent No.2 in
each of the above cases has discharged
managerial functions and has exercised
supervisory powers over any of his
subordinates. These are all factual aspects
which would have to be considered by the
Industrial Tribunal Labour Court.
22.7. In all the cases, Respondent No.2-Engineers,
did not exercise any managerial responsibility,
but have been performing technical functions
and or duties. Respondent No.2 in each of the
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above matters, did not have the power to issue
any charge sheet or punish his subordinates or
the power to sanction leave or take any policy
decisions. Therefore, he would not be a part of
the management and he would not discharge a
managerial function let alone be a part of the
management.
22.8. In so far as the resignation is concerned, his
submission is that many persons like
Respondent No.2 were called by the Human
Resources Department and forced to sign the
resignation letter. The resignation was not
given by Respondent No.2 out of their own
volition, but instead were forced to do so.
22.9. All these resignations were taken during the
Covid-19 period, after the lockdown was
imposed and when the company's activities
were closed. The employer wanting to reduce
its financial burden and not comply with the
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requirement of Section 2(s) of the ID Act, has
forced its workmen to resign. These aspects
could be established by Respondent No.2
during the course of trial. Many of these details
had been furnished to the appropriate
Government who having considered these
issues and documents referred the matter for
adjudication by formulating the points for
adjudication.
22.10. A forcible resignation would not bring to an end
the relationship between an employer-
employee. These aspects are all disputed in
nature. There is an industrial dispute, which is
existing between the parties. When there is a
relationship of employer-employee or Employer
-Workman, it would have to be decided by the
concerned tribunal and the same cannot be
pre-decided by the Appropriate Government.
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22.11. He refers to a paper cutting dated 01.01.2020
of 'Vijayavaani' Daily Kannada newspaper
indicating that the Petitioner was seeking to
forcibly obtain resignation letters from its
employees.
22.12. He then refers to a letter addressed to the
Hon'ble Chief Minister by the 'JSW Suffered
Employees Forum' dated 31.08.2020, where
allegations have been placed by the forum as
regards the actions of the Petitioner. He also
refers to the letters dated 01.01.2020 and
04.12.2020 given by some of the workers to
the Deputy Labour commissioner placing on
record the highhanded actions taken by the
employer.
22.13. He refers to a letter dated 06.02.2021 issued by
JSW's ex-employees stating that JSW has taken
forcible resignation from them and an appeal
has been made to the Deputy Labour
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Commissioner to resolve the said issue. The
said letter has also been marked to the Hon'ble
Prime Minister, Hon'ble Chief Minister, the
Labour Commissioner, the Deputy
Commissioner and the Chairman and Managing
Director of the Petitioner herein.
22.14. He refers to the factual report dated
26.07.2021 of the Deputy Labour
Commissioner, Kalaburagi and a letter dated
31.07.2021 given to the Deputy Commissioner
and he submits that these would also indicate
the highhanded actions taken by the
authorities. He submits that these facts being
disputed, would have to be established during
the course of trial and as such, reiterated that
these could not be pre-decided by the
appropriate Government at the stage of
reference.
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22.15. He relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Sharad Kumar vs
Government of NCT of Delhi and Others19,
more particularly para nos. 23, 29 to 31
thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for
easy reference:
23. A similar question came up for consideration
before a Bench of three learned Judges of this
Court in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and
Distribution Co. of India Ltd. v. Burma Shell
Management Staff Assn. wherein it was held,
inter alia, that if a person is mainly doing
supervisory work and incidentally or for a
fraction of the time also does some clerical
work, it would have to be held that he is
employed in a supervisory capacity, and
conversely, if the main work done is of clerical
nature the mere fact that some supervisory
duties are also carried out incidentally or as a
small fraction of the work done by him will not
convert his employment as a clerk into one in
supervisory capacity. This Court, considering
several classes of employees including Sales
Engineering Representative and District Sales
Representative, held on the materials placed
before the Industrial Tribunal that both these
classes of employees do not come within the
meaning of the expression "workman" in Section
2(s). It is relevant to note here that this Court
was considering the validity of an interim award
passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra,
Bombay in the case.
19 2002 (93) FLR 826
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29. In S.K. Maini v. Carona Sahu Co.
Ltd. [(1994) 3 SCC 510 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 776]
this Court interpreting Section 2(s)(iv) made the
following observations : (SCC p. 518, para 9)
"9. After giving our careful consideration to the
facts and circumstances of the case and the
submissions made by the learned counsel for
the parties, it appears to us that whether or not
an employee is a workman under Section 2(s) of
the Industrial Disputes Act is required to be
determined with reference to his principal
nature of duties and functions. Such question is
required to be determined with reference to the
facts and circumstances of the case and
materials on record and it is not possible to lay
down any straitjacket formula which can decide
the dispute as to the real nature of duties and
functions being performed by an employee in all
cases. When an employee is employed to do the
types of work enumerated in the definition of
workman under Section 2(s), there is hardly any
difficulty in treating him as a workman under
the appropriate classification but in the
complexity of industrial or commercial
organizations quite a large number of
employees are often required to do more than
one kind of work. In such cases, it becomes
necessary to determine under which
classification the employee will fall for the
purpose of deciding whether he comes within
the definition of workman or goes out of it. In
this connection, reference may be made to the
decision of this Court in Burmah Shell Oil
Storage and Distribution Co. of India
Ltd. v. Burma Shell Management Staff
Assn [(1970) 3 SCC 378] . In All India Reserve
Bank Employees' Assn. v. Reserve Bank of
India [AIR 1966 SC 305] it has been held by this
Court that the word 'supervise' and its
derivatives are not words of precise import and
must often be construed in the light of context,
for unless controlled, they cover an easily simple
oversight and direction as manual work coupled
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with the power of inspection and
superintendence of the manual work of
others. It has been rightly contended by both
the learned counsel that the designation of an
employee is not of much importance and what is
important is the nature of duties being
performed by the employee. The determinative
factor is the main duties of the employee
concerned and not some works incidentally
done. In other words, what is, in substance, the
work which employee does or what in substance
he is employed to do. Viewed from this angle, if
the employee is mainly doing supervisory work
but incidentally or for a fraction of time also
does some manual or clerical work, the
employee should be held to be doing
supervisory works. Conversely, if the main work
is of manual, clerical or of technical nature, the
mere fact that some supervisory or other work
is also done by the employee incidentally or only
a small fraction of working time is devoted to
some supervisory works, the employee will
come within the purview of 'workman' as
defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes
Act."
31. Testing the case in hand on the touchstone
of the principles laid down in the decided cases,
we have no hesitation to hold that the High
Court was clearly in error in confirming the
order of rejection of reference passed by the
State Government merely taking note of the
designation of the post held by the Respondent
i.e. Area Sales Executive. As noted earlier
determination of this question depends on the
types of duties assigned to or discharged by the
employee and not merely on the designation of
the post held by him. We do not find that the
State Government or even the High Court has
made any attempt to go into the different types
of duties discharged by the appellant with a
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view to ascertain whether he came within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. The State
Government, as noted earlier, merely
considered the designation of the post held by
him, which is extraneous to the matters relevant
for the purpose. From the appointment order
dated 21-4-1983/22-4-1983 in which are
enumerated certain duties which the appellant
may be required to discharge it cannot be held
therefrom that he did not come within the first
portion of Section 2(s) of the Act. We are of the
view that determination of the question requires
examination of factual matters for which
materials including oral evidence will have to be
considered. In such a matter the State
Government could not arrogate on to itself the
power to adjudicate on the question and hold
that the Respondent was not a workman within
the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, thereby
terminating the proceedings prematurely. Such
a matter should be decided by the Industrial
Tribunal or the Labour Court on the basis of the
materials to be placed before it by the parties.
Thus the rejection order passed by the State
Government is clearly erroneous and the order
passed by the High Court maintaining the same
is unsustainable.
22.16. By relying on Sharad Kumar's case, he
submits that whether an employee can be
considered a workman or otherwise under
section 2(s) of the ID Act is a matter of
reference, and further, the merits of the same
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ought to be concluded on the principal nature of
the work/duties carried out by such an
employee and not merely on the basis of the
nomenclature of his role in the
company/institution.
22.17. He relies upon the decision of the Division
Bench of this Court in the case of My power
Mazdoor Welfare Union v. Secretary and
Commissioner Social Welfare and Labour
Department, Government of Karnataka20,
more particularly para nos.5 and 6 thereof,
which are reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
5. To the same effect is the judgment of
Supreme Court in 1991 SCC (L&S) 1125; of this
Court in B.S. Nageswara v. State of Karnataka,
[1987 (55) F.L.R. 229], and other host of
authorities.
6. On the basis of various pronouncements
made by the Apex Court and this Court it can be
safely held that:
20 1977 (77) FLR 205
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(a) making of reference is obligatory upon the
appropriate Government where the existence or
apprehension of an industrial dispute is prima
facie established;
(b) in exercise of its powers the appropriate
Government exercises the administrative
function and not a judicial or quasi-judicial
function;
(c) the appropriate Government is not
empowered to decide the merits of industrial
dispute under the garb of giving reasons for
refusal to make reference;
(d) appropriate Government cannot decide
disputed questions of fact,
(e) the dispute regarding the existence of the
dispute between employer and the employee
and then relationship cannot be adjudicated;
(f) as no period of limitation is prescribed for
making the reference, the appropriate
Government has no power to reject a claim
merely on the ground of the same being belated
or stale;
(g) the questions of law sought to be
adjudicated cannot be determined by the
Government while deciding the question of
making reference under S. 10 of the Act.
22.18. He submits that the Division Bench of this Court
in the case of Mypower Mazdoor Welfare
Union (supra), has dealt with and referred to
various judgments relating to industrial
disputes and on the basis of various
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pronouncements, formulated the points that
could be regarded as guidelines that would
have to be considered.
22.19. By referring to the above, he submits that the
appropriate Government cannot decide on
disputed questions of fact. The existence of the
dispute between employer and the employee
and their relationship cannot be adjudicated
and that making a reference is obligatory on
the appropriate Government where existence or
apprehension of an industrial dispute is
primarily established.
22.20. He refers to the decision of this Court in the
case of Mahajan Borewell Company v.
Rajaram Bhat21, more particularly para no. 10
thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
10. The question as to whether a particular
person was a workman or not is a pure question
of fact which is normally not interferred with by
21 ILR 1998 Kar 172
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this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, unless
such finding is shown to be perverse or based
upon no evidence. The Supreme Court
in Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State
of Saurashtra [AIR 1957 SC p. 264.] held that
the question whether the relationship between
the parties is one as of employer and employee
or that of the master and servant is a pure
question of fact. The decision of the Industrial
Tribunal on the question of fact which it has
jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be
questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution unless at the least it is shown
to be fully unsupported by the evidence. Where
there existed material on record, on the basis of
which the labour Court could come to the
conclusion that the person employed was a
workman, the High Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution was not competent to set aside the
finding of the fact recorded by the Labour Court.
Mere possibility of arriving at a different
conclusion was held to be no ground to interfere
with the finding of fact arrived at by such labour
Court. In Andhra Scientific Co. Ltd. v. A.
Seshagiri Rao [AIR 1967 SC p. 408.] it was
held:--
"What functions were actually being performed
by the employee is a question of fact and the
High Court has rightly pointed out that when the
Labour Court has on a consideration of the
evidence come to a conclusion as regards these
functions and has on the basis thereof held that
the employee comes within the definition of
workman in Section 2(s) of the Act, the High
Court would not interfere under Article 226
except in cases where there is clear error on the
face of the record. The High Court, however,
proceeded to consider the evidence itself and
held that the correct picture of the functions
that were being performed by Shri Seshargiri
Rao was afforded by Ex. A-10 in these terms:--
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'Maintenance of general stores-packing and
despatching stock-accounts and effective check
over them-stock requisitions".
Similarly in Hindustan Antibiotics v. Workmen
[AIR 1967 SC 948.] the Court declined to
interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by
the Tribunal constituted under the Act. There
has, therefore been a consistent view of the
constitutional Courts not to interfere with the
findings of fact arrived at by the Boards, Courts
or Tribunals constituted under the Act.
22.21. By relying on Mahajan Borewell Company's
case (supra), he submits that the question as
to whether a particular person was a workman
or not, is a pure question of fact, which is not
to be interfered with by a Court exercising writ
jurisdiction, even after an adjudication by an
Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court and hence
the relief sought for in the present petition is
not within the scope of this Court, requiring
dismissal of the same.
22.22. In the present case, the adjudication is yet to
be done and as such, this Court ought not to
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intervene at such a pre-mature stage. On the
basis of the above, he submits that the writ
petition ought to be dismissed.
23. Sri. V.S. Kalasurmath, learned Additional
Government Advocate appearing for the Respondent-
State submits that:
23.1. The appropriate Government taking into
consideration the various complaints received
from the workmen and the contentions raised
therein, has referred the matter for
adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal or Labour
Court. It is for the said Industrial Tribunal or
Labour Court to decide the said dispute
between the parties.
23.2. There being a dispute categorically established,
no fault can be found in the appropriate
Government for making a reference in the
manner as done and the questions as
formulated. The appropriate government taking
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into consideration the disputed facts by both
the parties as regards their relationship, has
left the matter to be decided by the Industrial
Tribunal/Labour Court.
23.3. Having considered that the person who has
raised the claim was working with the
employer, the master and servant relationship
being established, whether it is an employer-
employee or an employer-workman
relationship, would have to be adjudicated by
the Industrial Tribunal/labour Court. On the
basis of the above, he submits that no fault can
be found with the actions taken by the
appropriate Government.
24. Heard Sri. Subramanya, learned counsel appearing
for the Petitioners, Sri. Abhishek Patil, learned
counsel appearing for Respondent No.2 in
WP No.106038/2023, Sri. Ravi Hegde, learned
counsel appearing for Respondent No.2 in all the
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above matters and Sri. V.S. Kalsurmath, learned
Additional Government Advocate appearing for the
Respondent No.1-State. Perused the papers.
25. The points that would arise for the consideration of
this Court are:
1. Whether the appropriate Government
was required to adjudicate on the
dispute between the parties as
regards employer-workman
relationship or a prime-facie opinion
is sufficient for granting reference?
2. Whether the appropriate Government
had to consider the aspect of
resignation namely whether the said
resignation is voluntary or otherwise
to come to a conclusion that on
resignation the employer-workman
relationship has ceased to exist?
3. Whether the appropriate Government
is justified in referring the matter for
adjudication in the present matter?
4. Whether the reference order passed
by the appropriate Government
requires any interference at the
hands of this Court?
5. What order?
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26. Answers to the above points are as under:
27. Answer to Point No.1:- Whether the appropriate
Government was required to adjudicate on the
dispute between the parties as regards
employer-workman relationship or a prime-
facie opinion is sufficient for granting
reference?
27.1. The submission of Shri. Subramanya learned
counsel for the Petitioner is that there was a
requirement for the appropriate Government to
firstly adjudicate and or come to a conclusion
that there is an employer-workman relationship
or at least a prima facie opinion in relation
thereto before referring the matter for
adjudication. His submission is that this being a
preliminary aspect which could be determined
by the appropriate Government, the same
would save the judicial time as also would save
unnecessary adjudication in the matter by the
Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal.
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27.2. The basic premise for reference of a matter for
adjudication requiring a preliminary view to be
formulated by the appropriate Government is
that there is an 'industry', there is a
relationship of an employer-workman in
contrast with an employer-employee
relationship, therefore requiring a preliminary
conclusion to be drawn as to whether the
person claiming a reference is a workman
under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes
Act or not. Without a prima facie conclusion
being arrived at, by the appropriate
Government, no reference could be made.
27.3. His submission is that the appropriate
Government ought to have come to a
conclusion as to whether the person employed
is engaged in skilled or unskilled manual,
supervisory, technical or clerical work, falling
under subsection (s) of Section 2 of the ID Act.
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Without such a conclusion being arrived at, no
reference could be made. In this regard, he
relies upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Sundarambal's case, Steel
Authority of India's case, Everestee's case,
Karnataka Lingayat Education Society's
case and Gadigayya's case. (all referred to
supra)
27.4. The submission of Sri. Abhishek Patil and Sri.
Ravi Hegde, learned counsel for the workmen is
that the appropriate Government cannot
adjudicate as regards the employer-workman
relationship. It is only a prima facie conclusion
which is required to be arrived at. If there are
any factual aspects which are required to be
determined, the same would have to be
determined by the Industrial Tribunal or Labour
Court by permitting the parties to lead their
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evidence. The appropriate Government, before
referring the matter for adjudication, cannot
hold a mini-trial to decide on the relationship
before referring the matter to adjudication. In
this regard, reliance is placed on Sharad
Kumar's case, My Power Mazdoor Welfare
Union's case and Mahajan Borewell
Company's case. What is required to be
assessed by this Court is as to whether there
was a requirement for the appropriate
Government to hold a preliminary inquiry as to
whether there was an employer-workman
relationship.
27.5. In any industry, there could be an employer-
employee relationship relating to persons who
have been engaged in the managerial cadre,
that is, persons who are discharging managerial
responsibilities, which would include
supervisory responsibilities. The Industrial
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Disputes Act is a special enactment which has
been brought about to protect the interests of
the labour/workmen and does not deal with the
managerial or supervisory staff who do not
come within the purview of Section 2(s) of the
ID Act. Thus, only persons who come within the
purview of Section 2(s) of the ID Act can raise
a dispute requiring reference by the appropriate
government after conciliation proceedings have
failed.
27.6. The ID Act also envisages disputes being raised
by a trade union. When a trade union were to
raise a dispute on behalf of all the workmen,
needless to say, the appropriate Government
would have to refer the matter for adjudication
without coming to any conclusion as to whether
there is employer and workmen relationship. It
is only when an individual workman or a group
of workmen who are not represented by a trade
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union, who raise a dispute and seek for
reference, that firstly the appropriate
Government could refer the matter for
conciliation and if during the conciliation
process, a settlement were to be arrived at,
close the matter at that stage. If no settlement
is arrived at, then to refer the matter for
adjudication by an Industrial Tribunal or a
Labour Court, so designated.
27.7. Once a reference is made, a claim petition
would have to be filed by the workman,
evidence would have to be led, and the
witnesses would have to be cross-examined.
Similarly, for the employer, a written statement
or objections would have to be filed, they would
have to cross-examine the claimant's witness,
the employer could lead evidence, and the
witnesses of the employer would be subjected
to cross-examination. Thereafter, the matter is
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heard and decided. Thus, once a reference is
made, it is the adjudicatory process that would
have to be resorted to by the Industrial
Tribunal/Labour Court by following the due
procedure.
27.8. It is in the above background that the
submission of Shri. Subramanya is that an
employer need not be unnecessarily subjected
to the above adjudicatory process if ex facie the
appropriate Government can come to a
conclusion that there is no employer-workman
relationship between the parties, and on that
basis, he submits that it is obligatory on the
part of the appropriate Government to come to
such a conclusion.
27.9. In the present matter, as could be seen, the
contention of the employer is that there is no
employer-workman relationship. The persons
who have raised the dispute are all belonging to
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the managerial cadre and therefore, those
persons not being workmen, reference could
not be made. This aspect could be appreciated
if there is no dispute or ex facie conclusion, it is
clear that the person who raised a dispute is
not a workman within the definition of Section
2(s).
27.10. Section 2(s) of the ID Act is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
2(s) "workman" means any person (including an
apprentice) employed in any industry to do any
manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational,
clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward,
whether the terms of employment be express or
implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding
under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute,
includes any such person who has been dismissed,
discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a
consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal,
discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute,
but does not include any such person--
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of
1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the
Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an
officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or
administrative capacity; or
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(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity,
draws wages exceeding ten thousand rupees per
mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the
duties attached to the office or by reason of the
powers vested in him, functions mainly of a
managerial nature.
27.11. A perusal of the above definition would indicate
that a workman is any person, including an
apprentice, employed in any industry to do any
manual, unskilled, skilled, technical,
operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire
or reward, and includes any person who has
been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in
connection with or in consequence of a dispute,
but does not include any person who is subject
to the Air Force Act, Army Act or the Navy Act,
who is employed in the police service or as an
officer or other employee of a prison, employed
mainly in a managerial or administrative
capacity, or a person who is employed in a
supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding
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Rs.10,000/- per mensem, or exercises either by
nature of the duties attached to the office or by
reason of the powers vested in him, functions
mainly of a managerial nature.
27.12. Insofar as the Petitioner being an industry, the
same is not in dispute. Insofar as the person
raising the dispute being employed by the
employer is also not in dispute. What would
have to be seen is whether the workman would
come in the exceptions to subsection (s) of
Section 2. For the purpose of assessment of
this aspect, there being a divergent contention
of both the employer and the employee on the
ground that the designation of the employee is
as an engineer, manager, assistant manager,
deputy manager, manager of operations, junior
manager. The very designation indicating to be
a manager, he would come within the exception
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at (iii) of subsection (s) of Section 2 of the ID
Act.
27.13. The submission on part of the Respondent,
however, is that though the designation may be
as a manager, the role discharged by such
person is as an engineer discharging skilled
technical operational work. The designation as
a manager is only for the purposes of
promotion or otherwise. The same does not
have any basis as regards the same coming
under (iii) of subsection (s) of Section 2.
27.14. They have not been employed in the
managerial or administrative capacity, and they
are not discharging any role in respect thereto.
They do not have any powers to employ any
person or hire any person. There are no
decision-making powers or authority. Merely
referring to them as 'manager' would not make
them come under (iii) of subsection (s) of
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Section 2. There being a serious dispute, it is
contended that the appropriate Government
has rightly left the matter to be decided by the
Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court.
27.15. The above being the divergent contentions, as
can be seen, the Petitioner company is a large
company having a Board of Directors and
several persons engaged by the company as an
employee or as workmen. It would not be in
such circumstances possible for the appropriate
Government to ascertain as to whether the
person is an employee or a workman. The same
would require evidence to be led. Though, of
course, in the order of reference, the
appropriate Government could have stated this
aspect more clearly and indicated that due to
the disputed relationship, the matter would
have to be adjudicated by the Industrial
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Tribunal/Labour Court, it has not done so
clearly.
27.16. The appropriate Government has formulated
questions to be decided by the Industrial
Tribunal/Labour Court. In almost all the cases,
it is as to whether the person is a workman
within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the
Industrial Disputes Act 1947. As indicated
supra, if the appropriate Government had gone
into the issue of whether a person is a
workman or not, the same would require
holding a mini-trial, examination of the
documents submitted without following the
requirements of an adjudicatory process,
thereby depriving the parties of being
adequately represented.
27.17. The employment not being disputed, it not
being disputed that the employer is an industry.
One of the disputes is to ascertain whether that
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person is a workman or not. On the face of the
records that have been placed before this
Court, it is not possible to come to a conclusion
as to whether that person is a workman within
the definition of subsection (s) of Section 2 of
the ID Act without holding a trial and examining
the documents which may be produced by the
parties.
27.18. Thus, I am of the considered opinion that, in
the present case, the aspect of whether the
person is a workman can only be determined
after holding a trial and cannot be so
determined on the face of the documents in a
prima facie manner. Of course, if the same
could have been determined prima facie, the
appropriate Government could not have
referred the matter to the Industrial Tribunal to
adjudicate as to whether the person raising a
dispute is a workman. When the documents
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and material on record do not ex facie indicate
and establish as to whether the person is a
workman, the appropriate Government has
rightly referred the matter to the Industrial
Tribunal / Labour Court for adjudication. The
employer cannot find fault with the same.
27.19. The employer would always have the
opportunity to place all the relevant material
before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court in
order to enable the adjudication as regards the
relationship and status of the parties. This
would be the case even if the appropriate
Government were to come to a prima facie
conclusion that the concerned person was a
workman, even then the same would have to
be finally determined by the Tribunal/Labour
Court. The prima facie conclusion of the
Appropriate Government would not cast an
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embargo on such final determination by the
Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court.
27.20. Hence I answer Point No.1 by holding that the
appropriate Government was not required
to adjudicate on the dispute between the
parties as regards employer-workman
relationship, a prime-facie opinion is
sufficient for granting reference, the
dispute as regards the relationship would
have to be determined by the Industrial
Tribunal/Labbour Court after evidence is
lead and opportunity is granted to all the
parties.
28. Answer to Point No.2: Whether the appropriate
Government had to consider the aspect of
resignation namely whether the said
resignation is voluntary or otherwise to come
to a conclusion that on resignation the
employer-workman relationship has ceased to
exist?
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28.1. The submission of Shri Subramanya, learned
counsel for the Petitioner - employer is that the
Respondents have submitted a resignation. This
resignation having been accepted, the
relationship of an employer-workman had
ceased and as such, no reference could be
made on an allegation made by an ex-workman
as regards a relationship which had ceased to
exist.
28.2. His submission is also that on the resignation
being accepted, all the amounts which were
due to the employee have been released
inasmuch as the provident fund, gratuity, which
were to the credit of the employee have been
released. Lastly, he submits that the employee
having received these amounts have not
deposited the said amounts, they have not
even offered to deposit the said amounts. They,
having received the benefit of the said
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amounts, cannot now raise a dispute in relation
thereto.
28.3. Reference is made to the decision of National
Engineering Industries to contend that with
an application for resignation having been made
and having been accepted, no dispute can be
raised thereafter.
28.4. Further reference is made to Everstee's
decision to contend that when a resignation
submitted in pursuance of a scheme for a
voluntary retirement is made, no dispute can
be raised since there is no relationship in
existence. Reliance is placed on Karnataka
Lingayat Education Society's case (supra) to
contend that a retired workman would not be a
workman under Section 2 (s) of the ID Act. For
similar argument, reference is made to
Gadigayya's case.
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28.5. By relying on Sriram Manohar Bande's case,
it has been contended that the resignation
having been accepted, the dispute was raised
14 months thereafter. Once a resignation is
submitted, the same cannot be withdrawn.
28.6. Per contra, the submission of the Respondent's
Counsel is that insofar as Respondent No.2 in
WP No.106038/2023, he had been forced to
submit a resignation on 06.08.2020, vide email
dated 08.08.2020, within two days, the
resignation was withdrawn. This resignation,
insofar as that particular Respondent is
concerned, was withdrawn even before the
acceptance.
28.7. The submission of the Respondent's counsel is
that these resignations were forced upon the
workmen, inasmuch as all these resignations
were in the year 2020, after the onset of COVID
pandemic. The employer had prevailed upon
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the workmen to sign pre-formatted, pre-
addressed resignation letters and at the same
time, the signatures of the workmen were
obtained on applications for disbursement of
monies. These were not voluntary actions on
part of the workmen.
28.8. Reliance has been placed on certain newspaper
articles and the letter addressed by JSW's
Suffered Employees Forum to the Chief
Minister, the proceedings before the Deputy
Labour Commissioner contends that all the
resignations were forceful, they were not
voluntarily given so as to bind the workmen.
28.9. It is in the above circumstances that the
aforesaid point is required to be considered and
answered. The question that has been referred
to by the appropriate Government in this
regard in most of the matters is as to whether
the applicant proves that the Petitioner has
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obtained his resignation forcefully and relieved
him without paying compensation. Of Course in
some of the matters the question referred is
whether the management proves that the
termination of services is justified.
28.10. Thus in so far as the majority of the matters the
aspect of reignatiuon has been referred to the
Industrial Tribunal/Labour court for adjudication
which cannot be found fault with.
28.11. If the resignation letters were voluntary, the
relationship of an employer-workman would
cease to exist and as such, no dispute could be
raised by a person who had voluntarily
resigned. What would have to be ascertained is
whether there was a voluntary resignation or
not. If the resignation letter were forced upon
the workmen, the employer cannot take
advantage of such a situation. In this regard, in
a majority of the matters the aspect of
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resignation is referred, which would be
considered by the Tribunal/Court after evidence
is lead and by providing adequate opportunity
to all concerned. Merely because in some
matters the aspect of termination of services is
referred will not take away the fact that the
aspect of resignation would not be considered.
All these requiring evidence, the same could
not be determined by the Appropriate
Government and cannot be determined by this
court.
28.12. Thus, I answer point No.2 by holding that the
appropriate Government has rightly left the
aspect of resignation, whether it is voluntary or
involuntary in most of the cases as also the
aspect of termination of services in some of the
matters to be detemined by the Industrial
Tribunal/Labour Court, the Burden of Proof
being on the applicant the Petitioner would also
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have an opportunity of placing all the relevant
material on record. There can be no prejudice
which can be said to have been caused to the
Petitioner by such reference.
29. Answer to Point No.3: Whether the appropriate
Government is justified in referring the matter
for adjudication in the present matter?
above, it is clear that the appropriate
Government has not given a finding prima facie
or otherwise as regards the relationship of the
employer-workman, employer-employee, but
has referred the same for adjudication by the
Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court.
29.2. Insofar as resignation is concerned, the
appropriate Government has also not given any
finding as to whether there is a voluntary or
involuntary resignation, but has referred the
same for adjudication by the Industrial
Tribunal/Labour Court.
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29.3. These being the two questions which have been
referred by the appropriate Government to the
Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court, both of them
being with application of mind, I am of the
considered opinion that the reference made as
such is justified.
29.4. The appropriate Government has left the
disputed issues/questions to be decided by the
Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court. I am of the
considered opinion that the reference made as
such is justified.
29.5. Thus, I answer Point No.3 by holding that the
appropriate Government is justified in referring
the questions for adjudication in the manner as
referred, all the parties would have enough
oppertunity to place their respective
contentions before the Industrial
Tribunal/Labour Court.
30. Answer to Point No.4: Whether the reference
order passed by the appropriate Government
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requires any interference at the hands of this
Court?
30.1. In view of my answers to Points No.1, 2 and 3
above, having come to a conclusion that the
appropriate Government was justified in
referring the matter in the manner as done, I
am of the considered opinion that the reference
order made by the appropriate Government
requires no interference at the hands of this
Court.
31. Answer to Point No.5: What order?
31.1. In view of the above discussions, I pass the
following:
ORDER
1) No grounds being made out, all the Writ
Petitions are dismissed.
2) Needless to say, all the parties would be
required to be given adequate opportunity to
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place all the documents and evidence that they
rely upon in support of their respective cases.
3) It is made clear that the Appropriate
Government not having expressed any opinion
on the merits of the controversy, this Court has
also not expressed any opinion. It would be for
the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court to
determine the issues independently, in
accordance with law, by considering the
evidence lead.
Sd/-
(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
JUDGE
AMM/PRS
