THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER WRIT OR ORDER OR DIRECTION
QUASHING THE ORDER DATED 24.06.2023 MADE IN APPLICATION
NO.4687 OF 2021 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, BENGALURU, BEING ARBITRARY,
ERRONEOUS AND OPPOSED TO LAW, EQUITY AND JUSTICE.
THIS WRIT PETITION, HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
ON 25.02.2025 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER, THIS
DAY, VENKATESH NAIK T. J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.SOMASHEKAR
and
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
CAV ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T)
The petitioner has filed this petition challenging the
correctness of the order dated 24.06.2023 passed by the
Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Bengaluru, in
Application No.4687 of 2021, whereby the Tribunal rejected the
application of the petitioner.
2. The brief facts of the case are that during the period
from 02.04.2008 to 06.12.2008, the petitioner was working as
a Police Inspector at Mandi Police Station, Mysuru. He was
issued with a charge memo on the allegations that he has not
registered an First Information Report (F.I.R.) and not
conducted investigation against certain persons and thus,
committed misconduct under Rule 6 of the Karnataka State
Police (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules, 1965, and Rule 3(1)(ii)
and (iii) of Karnataka Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1966. The
petitioner replied the same by contending that he has done his
best and has not committed any misconduct. The Enquiry
Officer concluded the enquiry and filed a Report that the
petitioner has committed misconduct and on the basis of the
same, the respondent-Government Authority imposed penalty
withholding of two annual increments without cumulative effect
for a period of five years. Thus, the petitioner approached the
Tribunal. The Tribunal, by its order dated 24.06.2023,
dismissed Application No.4687 of 2021. Challenging the said
order of dismissal by the Tribunal, the petitioner is before this
Court.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted
that the Articles of charge were framed on 28.04.2016. On
22.10.2016, the petitioner submitted explanation denying the
charges. On 31.01.2017, the Enquiry Officer conducted enquiry
and submitted his Report holding that charges are proved and
the Upalokayukta recommended the Government to impose
penalty on the petitioner. Accordingly, respondent No.1
imposed penalty against the petitioner. Hence, he submits that
there is delay of eight years in initiating the Departmental
Enquiry. The petitioner is not at all responsible for the
misconduct alleged and in view of the long delay, the right of
the petitioner to raise defence is taken away. Further, the
Tribunal, without considering this vital aspect of the matter,
dismissed the application.
Learned counsel submits that there was inordinate delay
in issuing the charge memo, same would jeopardise the right of
the petitioner. Hence, he places reliance on the following
judgments:
i. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. RADHAKRISHNAN
reported in 1998 (4) SCC 154,
ii. P.V. MAHADEVAN v. MD, TN HOUSING BOARD
reported in 2005 (6) SCC 636, &
iii. UCO BANK v. RAJENDRA SHANKAR SHUKLA reported
in 2018 (14) SCC 92.
4. Learned Additional Government Advocate for
respondent Nos.1 to 3 and the learned Special counsel for
respondent No.4-Lokayukta supporting the impugned order,
submitted that, it is well settled legal principle that the Courts
should generally refrain from interfering with the initiation of
the disciplinary proceedings, more particularly, the charge
memo, imposing of penalty, not withstanding the delay caused
in issuing the charge memo having regard to the nature and
gravity of the charge and the circumstances of the case.
Therefore, the Tribunal has rightly dismissed the application
and the same deserves to be confirmed by this Court.
5. In this case, during the period from 02.04.2008 to
06.12.2008, the petitioner worked in the cadre of Police
Inspector at Mandi Police Station, Mysuru. On 14.03.2007,
Sri T. Nagaraju, a member of Vidhyavardhaka Sangha, Mysuru,
lodged a complaint to Mandi Police Station against the President
of the said Sangha alleging misappropriation of the funds of the
Sangha. On perusal of the said complaint, the then Police
Inspector issued endorsement on the ground that the matter
would lie before Registrar of Society. Again on
4-9-2008, Sri T. Nagaraju lodged another similar complaint
before the Police Commissioner, Mysuru, against the President
and Secretary of said Sangha alleging misappropriation of the
funds. In turn, the Police Commissioner forwarded the
complaint to Mandi Police Station on 6-9-2008 for necessary
action. Before the petitioner could take investigation on the said
complaint and submit a Report, on 30.10.2008, Sri T. Nagaraju
lodged complaint to the Lokayukta alleging that the Police
Authorities are causing delay in Investigation on the complaint
and have failed to register an F.I.R. Hence, the Lokayukta
conducted enquiry and submitted Report to the Government for
imposing penalty on the petitioner. Accordingly, the
Government imposed penalty on the petitioner withholding two
annual increments without cumulative effect for a period of five
years.
6. Admittedly, the petitioner, being a responsible Police
Inspector, on receipt of complaint lodged by Sri T. Nagaraju, in
respect of cognizable offence, did not register the F.I.R. Hence,
it is just and necessary to analyse the ratio laid down in the
case of LALITA KUMARI v. GOVERNMENT OF UTTAR
PRADESH AND OTHERS reported in 2014 (2) SCC 1,
wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph Nos.83 to 86 and
93, observed as under:
"83. In terms of the language used in Section 154 of
the Code, the police is duty-bound to proceed to
conduct investigation into a cognizable offence even
without receiving information (i.e. FIR) about
commission of such an offence, if the officer in
charge of the police station otherwise suspects the
commission of such an offence. The legislative intent
is therefore quite clear i.e. to ensure that every
cognizable offence is promptly investigated in
accordance with law. This being the legal position,
there is no reason that there should be any
discretion or option left with the police to register or
not to register an FIR when information is given
about the commission of a cognizable offence. Every
cognizable offence must be investigated promptly in
accordance with law and all information provided
under Section 154 of the Code about the commission
of a cognizable offence must be registered as an FIR
so as to initiate an offence. The requirement of
Section 154 of the Code is only that the report must
disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and
that is sufficient to set the investigating machinery
into action.
84. The insertion of sub-section (3) of Section 154,
by way of an amendment, reveals the intention of
the legislature to ensure that no information of
commission of a cognizable offence must be ignored
or not acted upon which would result in unjustified
protection of the alleged offender/accused.
85. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
(expression of one thing is the exclusion of another)
applies in the interpretation of Section 154 of the
Code, where the mandate of recording the
information in writing excludes the possibility of not
recording an information of commission of a
cognizable crime in the special register.
86. Therefore, conducting an investigation into an
offence after registration of FIR under Section 154 of
the Code is the "procedure established by law" and,
thus, is in conformity with Article 21 of the
Constitution. Accordingly, the right of the accused
under Article 21 of the Constitution is protected if the
FIR is registered first and then the investigation is
conducted in accordance with the provisions of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Significance and compelling reasons for
registration of FIR at the earliest
93. The object sought to be achieved by registering
the earliest information as FIR is inter alia twofold :
one, that the criminal process is set into motion and
is well documented from the very start; and second,
that the earliest information received in relation to
the commission of a cognizable offence is recorded
so that there cannot be any embellishment, etc.
later."
Therefore, the petitioner, being Police Inspector/Station
House Officer, was duty bound to register the F.I.R. and to
proceed with investigation in cognizance offence as required
under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
However, the petitioner failed to do so.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there
is delay of eight years in issuing Articles of charge. A Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in M.R. VADDAR v. THE STATE
OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER reported in 2021 (3) KCCR
2097 (DB) at paragraph Nos.9 and 10 observed as under:
9. In the case of P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D.,
T.N. Housing Board and others relying on two other
reported decisions, namely, State of Madhya Pradesh
v. Bani Singh reported in 1990 Supp. SCC 738 and in
the case of State of A.P. v. N. Radhakrishnan
reported in (1998) 4 SCC 154, at paragraph No.19 of
the later case it is held by Apex Court as under:
"It is not possible to lay down any
predetermined principles applicable to all cases
and in all situations where there is delay in
concluding the disciplinary proceedings.
Whether on that ground the disciplinary
proceedings are to be terminated each case
has to be examined on the facts and
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circumstances in that case. The essence of the
matter is that the Court has to take into
consideration all the relevant factors and to
balance and weigh them to determine if it is in
the interest of clean and honest administration
that the disciplinary proceedings should be
allowed to terminate after delay particularly
when the delay is abnormal and there is no
explanation for the delay. The delinquent
employee has a right that disciplinary
proceedings against him are concluded
expeditiously and he is not made to undergo
mental agony and also monetary loss when
these are unnecessarily prolonged without any
fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In
considering whether the delay has vitiated the
disciplinary proceedings the Court has to
consider the nature of change, its complexity
and on what account the delay has occurred. If
the delay is unexplained prejudice to the
delinquent employee is writ large on the face of
it. It could also be seen as to how much the
disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the
charges against its employee. It is the basic
principle of administrative justice that an officer
entrusted with a particular job has to perform
his duties honestly, efficiently and in
accordance with the rules. If he deviates from
this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed.
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Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be
allowed to take their course as per relevant
rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay
causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it
can be shown that he is to blame for the delay
or when there is proper explanation for the
delay in conducting the disciplinary
proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance
these two diverse considerations.
This Court held that there was hardly any
explanation worth consideration as to why the
delay occurred. In the circumstances, this
Court held that the Tribunal was justified in
quashing the charge memo dated 31.07.1995
and directing the State to promote the
respondent as per recommendation of the DPC
ignoring memos dated 27.10.1995 and
01.06.1996. Accordingly, the appeal filed by
the State of Andhra Pradesh was dismissed."
In the case of UCO Bank and others v.
Rajendra Singh Shukla reported in (2018) 14 SCC 92
the Apex Court at paragraph No.12 has held as
under:
"12. We do not find any reason to interfere
with the judgment and order passed by the
High Court. However, it is necessary for us to
highlight a few facts of which were brought to
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our notice during the course of submissions
made by the learned Counsel. The first issue of
concern is the enormous delay of about 7 years
in issuing a charge-sheet against Shukla. There
is no explanation for this unexplained delay. It
appears that some internal discussions were
going on within the Bank but that it took the
Bank 7 years to make up its mind is totally
unreasonable and unacceptable. On this ground
itself, the charge-sheet against Shukla is liable
to be set aside due to the inordinate and
unexplained delay in its issuance."
10. In the aforesaid judgment, Apex Court came to a
conclusion that allowing the respondents to proceed
further with the departmental proceedings at that
distance of time would be prejudicial to the
appellant. Keeping a higher Government official
under charges of corruption and disputed integrity
would cause unbearable mental agony and distress
to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary
enquiry against the government employee should
therefore be avoided not only in the interest of the
Government employee but in public interest and also
in the interest of inspiring confidence in the minds of
the government employee. It is also held that it is
necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to
the enquiry as appellant therein had already suffered
enough and more on account of pendency of
disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the
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mental agony and sufferings of the appellant therein
was due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings
and it would be much more than the punishment. For
the mistakes committed by the department in the
procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings,
the appellant should not be made to suffer."
8. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner
contended that the Authorities have not explained the delay
aspect.
9. We have perused the statement of objections filed by
the learned Special counsel for the respondent-Lokayukta. A
detailed explanation has been offered at paragraph No.7,
wherein it is stated that from 25.10.2008 to 20.04.2015, the
Lokayukta was engaged in investigation of mining cases. Hence,
there was delay.
10. The Honb'le Apex Court in the case of CHAIRMAN,
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
v. A. MASILAMANI reported in 2013 (6) SCC 530, at
paragraph No.18 observed as under:
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"18. The court/tribunal should not generally set
aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the
charges on the ground of delay in initiation of
disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is dehors
the limits of judicial review. In the event that the
court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its
power of judicial review at the very threshold.
Therefore, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice,
issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings,
cannot ordinarily be quashed by the court. The same
principle is applicable in relation to there being a
delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The
facts and circumstances of the case in question have
to be examined taking into consideration the
gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The
essence of the matter is that the court must take
into consideration all relevant facts and to balance
and weigh the same, so as to determine if it is in fact
in the interest of clean and honest administration,
that the judicial proceedings are allowed to be
terminated only on the ground of delay in their
conclusion."
11. Reference made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of UCO BANK AND OTHERS v. RAJENDRA
SINGH SHUKLA, reported in (2018) 14 SCC 92 and the case
of Masilamani, referred supra, would support the case of the
respondents.
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12. An endeavour made by the learned counsel for the
petitioner on the merits of the case is wholly unwarranted as
the same could be very well put forth before the Enquiry
Officer. It is trite that interference with the disciplinary
proceedings on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary
proceedings is not within the power of judicial review, as
enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Masilamani's case,
referred supra.
13. In this case, the Disciplinary Authority has imposed
penalty of withholding two increments without cumulative
effect. Rule 8 of the Karnataka State Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, contemplates
the nature of penalties. Accordingly, the Disciplinary Authority,
considering the nature of allegations made against the
petitioner, imposed penalty by withholding two increments in
accordance with Rule 8(iii) of the Karnataka State Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, which does not
call for any interference by this Court.
14. In the light of the aforesaid judgments, merely on the
ground of delay in issuing the Articles of charge, in the absence
of other supporting material, the disciplinary proceedings and
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imposition of penalty cannot be interfered with, at this stage.
15. The petition, devoid of any merits, stands dismissed.
In view of the dismissal of the main petition, pending
interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand dismissed.
Sd/-
(K.SOMASHEKAR)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VENKATESH NAIK T)
JUDGE
KVK
