Karnataka High Court

Sri Srinath Venkataramanan vs Smt Anjana Subramanian on 11 July, 2025

     IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

         DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF JULY, 2025

                       PRESENT

       THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN

                         AND

        THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO

     WRIT PETITION (HABEAS CORPUS) NO.52 OF 2025

BETWEEN:

SRI. SRINATH VENKATARAMANAN
S/O RAMANATHAN VENKATARAMANAN
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS
No.108, LARK COURT, NOVATO
CALIFORNIA-94947, USA
REPRESENTED BY HIS GPA HOLDER
LAKSHMI VENKATARAMANAN
W/O RAMANAATHAN VENKATARAMANAN
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
No.57, SAMMANDA MURTHY AVENUE
BHARATHIYAR SALAI ATHIYAMAN NAGAR
SEVILLIMEDU, KANCHEEPURAM
TAMIL NADU-631 502
                                           ...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. RAJADITHYA SADASIVAN, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1.   SMT. ANJANA SUBRAMANIAN
     W/O SRINATH VENKATARAMANAN
     AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS

2.   JAYALAKSHMI SUBRAMANIAM
     W/O SUBRAMANIAN
     AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS

3.   SUBRAMANIAN JAYARAMAN
     S/O JAYARAMAN
     AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
 -

                                 2




    RESPONDENTS No.1 TO 3 ARE
    RESIDING AT D-2102
    I TOWERS EXENTE
    ELECTRONIC CITY PHASE-2
    BENGALURU-560 100
                                                 ...RESPONDENTS

(BY SMT. JAYNA KOTHARI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
    SRI. KAPIL DIXIT, ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO R3)

     THIS WP(HC) IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO (a) A WRIT IN THE
NATURE OF HABEAS CORPUS DIRECTING THE RESPONDENTS,
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY TO CAUSE THE PRODUCTION OF THE
MINOR DAUGHTER NAMELY SRIJA, BORN ON 04.08.2020 AND
FURTHER    DIRECT   THAT   THE       LEGAL   CUSTODY   OF   THE
AFORESAID MINOR DAUGHTER BE HANDED OVER TO THE
PETITIONER AND ETC.


     THIS WP(HC) HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT     ON     03.07.2025       AND     COMING    ON   FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, ANU SIVARAMAN
J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM:    HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
          and
          HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO

                      CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN)

This Writ Petition is filed by the petitioner seeking for

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to the respondents to

produce the minor daughter of the petitioner and respondent

No.1 and further to direct the legal custody of the daughter

to be handed over to the petitioner.

2. We have heard Shri. Rajadithya Sadasivan,

learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Smt. Jayna

Kothari, learned senior counsel as instructed by Shri. Kapil

Dixit learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 to 3.

3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner

submits that the petitioner and respondent No.1 were

residing in United States of America ('USA' for short) and

got married on 10.04.2019 at Kancheepuram, Tamil Nadu.

After their marriage, they were residing at the petitioner's

residence in USA. The petitioner and respondent No.1 have

a daughter who is 4 years and 9 months and is a citizen of

the USA by birth.

4. It is further submitted that there were no issues

or any troubles in their marriage. The petitioner had

travelled to work and upon returning home on 15.11.2024,

he found a note left by respondent No.1 stating that she had

left to India for her medical treatment and would return as

soon as possible and subsequently, the petitioner sent an

email seeking details of her medical appointments.

5. It is further submitted that respondents No.1 and

2, without informing or obtaining the consent of the

petitioner, unlawfully abducted the minor daughter from her

school and left USA to settle in Bengaluru with respondents

No.2 and 3- parents of respondent No.1. The act of

respondents No.1 and 2 constitutes child abduction under

Section 278 of the California Penal Code, which criminalises

the removal of a child from lawful custody by a parent

without the consent of the other parent. Further, the

unauthorized removal of the child from the United States

constitutes a federal offence under Section 18 U.S. Code §

1204 - International Parental Kidnapping which is a non-

compoundable offence. In cases involving domestic violence

that necessitate removal of a child, California law mandates

that such removal must be reported to the District Attorney

within 10 days, no such report or complaint was filed by

respondent No.1.

6. It is contended that in the various legal

proceedings initiated by respondent No.1, no allegation of

domestic violence has been established that would justify

the removal of the child and that respondents No.1 and 2

have no justifiable grounds to remove the child from the

custody of the petitioner.

7. It is further submitted that the petitioner

acknowledges his legal obligation to report and file a police

complaint with the appropriate authorities in California

against respondents No.1 and 2. However, the petitioner

has, for time being, refrained from initiating criminal

proceedings in an effort to preserve the marriage. In view of

the implications, particularly with regard to the child's

custody, parental rights and respondent No.1's immigration

status, the petitioner has initiated an administrative

proceeding with the U.S. Department of State, documenting

the abduction of the minor daughter.

8. It is further submitted that, respondent No.1 has

filed a false police complaint in December, 2024 alleging

physical abuse in the year 2022 at Bengaluru. However, this

allegation does not appear in any of the legal proceedings

previously initiated by her. The prosecution of the said police

complaint has been stayed by the trial Court in

Crl.P.No.2824/2025 by order dated 21.03.2025. Respondent

No.1 has also sought for guardianship of the child in G&WC

No.124/2024, which is currently pending before the III

Additional Senior Civil Judge, Bengaluru Rural. However,

the child is not an ordinary resident of India, no Court in

India has Jurisdiction to pass valid custody order and no

Court in US can enforce such an order issued by an Indian

Court. The petitioner is therefore left with no alternate legal

remedy to seek custody of the child through Indian Judicial

Mechanisms, hence this Writ Petition of Habeas Corpus.

9. It is also contended that the child's schooling in

USA would start from August 2025 and if the child is not

taken back to USA, she would loose one academic year.

From the legal proceedings initiated by the petitioner

seeking divorce, as well as the application filed for interim

maintenance, it is evident that the respondents are unable

to provide the basic necessities of the petitioner's daughter

and that the respondents are using the daughter as an

instrument to extract money from the petitioner by initiating

various proceedings.

10. In support of his contention, the learned counsel

appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance in the case

of Lahari Sakhamuri v. Sobhan Kodali reported in AIR

2019 SC 2881.

11. The learned senior counsel appearing for the

respondent-mother submitted that there were several issues

and troubles between the petitioner and respondent No.1

and that she was subjected to domestic violence by the

petitioner. Being unable to endure the alleged abuse,

respondent No.1 had no other alternative but to leave USA.

It is also submitted that the minor child was not unlawfully

abducted and that Section 278 of the California Penal Code

applies only to individuals who do not possess lawful custody

rights. Since the petitioner has not initiated any custody

proceedings before the American Courts nor is there any

subsisting order revoking respondent No.1's custodial rights,

her custody over the minor child remains legally intact and

the actions of respondent No.1 do not constitute child

abduction warranting penal action under Section 278 of the

California Penal Code. Respondent No.1 left the matrimonial

house with the minor child due to domestic violence which

qualifies as a defence under Section 18(c)(2) of the U.S

Code § 1204 and that respondent No.1's action does not

attract International Parental Kidnapping. As per Section

6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the

mother is the natural and preferred guardian of a minor

child under the age of five, thereby reinforcing respondent

No.1's custodial rights.

12. It is further submitted that the child has

commenced her schooling, her educational activities are

ongoing and that she is not deprived of any education in

Bengaluru and her removal from the US has not affected her

in any manner. It is also submitted that no order of interim

stay was granted in Crl.P.No.2824/2025, but only directed

the jurisdictional police not to take any coercive action and

that the investigation has not been stayed. It is further

contended that in matters involving child custody where the

child is being moved across international borders, the Family

Court is competent to adjudicate custody proceedings and in

such cases Doctrine of First Strike Principle will be

applicable.

13. Further, it is submitted that the petitioner has

never been denied visitation and that he has made no

attempts to contact the child nor filed any application

seeking interim visitation before the trial Court. It is further

contended that issues relating to domestic violence,

maintenance and custody cannot be adjudicated in this

petition as they are matters to be decided during trial.

14. In support of her contentions, she has relied on

the following decisions:-

• Vayu Kishore v. The State of Karnataka and Others in WPHC No.43 of 2023 dated 20.12.2023;

• Prateek Gupta v. Shilpi Gupta and Others reported in (2018) 2 SCC 309;

• Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another reported in (2017) 8 SCC 454;

• Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo reported in (2011) SCC 479;

• Sarita Sharma v. Sushil Sharma reported in (2000) 3 SCC 14; and

• Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde reported in (1998) 1 SCC 112.

15. In the case of Lahari Sakhamuri (supra), the

Apex Court was considering an appeal from an order of the

High Court holding that the Family Court, Hyderabad had no

jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Guardian and Wards Act,

1890 to consider an application for custody since the

children were not ordinarily residing within the jurisdiction of

the Family Court. In the said case, the children were born in

USA and were ordinarily resident there. An application for

divorce as well as the custody of minor children was filed by

the appellant mother before the Court of Common Pleas of

Lehigh County, Pennsylvania Civil Division on 21.12.2016. It

was her admission in the declaration form annexed to the

application that she or her children were not subjected to

any mode of domestic violence or abuse. The respondent

husband had purchased to and fro tickets for the appellant

and the minor children and as also his mother-in-law to visit

India on 23.03.2017 due to the death of her maternal

grandmother. The appellant refused to return to the US and

filed the guardianship petition before the Family Court,

Hyderabad and obtained an ex-parte order concealing the

fact of the pendency of a petition for divorce and custody

before the US Court. The US Court heard the counsel for

both the parties and passed an order on 22.05.2017

granting temporary physical custody of the children to the

appellant with a direction to her to return along with the

children to the jurisdiction of the US Court. It was on

account of her refusal to abide by the said order of the US

Court, the jurisdiction of which she herself had invoked that

the Habeas Corpus Petition had been filed. After considering

the facts of the said case and gauging welfare of the children

on the crucial factors including their maturity and judgment,

mental stability, ability to provide access to schools, moral

character, ability to provide continuing involvement in the

community, financial sufficiency and relationship with the

child, the Apex Court held that the direction issued by the

High Court was perfectly justified. Leaving open all other

questions to be decided by the Court having jurisdiction in

the USA, whose jurisdiction had already been invoked by the

mother, the mother was directed to return to the USA with

the children.

16. The learned senior counsel appearing for the

respondent mother in the instant case would contend that

the situation is completely different in the present case and

that there are serious allegations of mental cruelty and

domestic abuse by the writ petitioner. It is submitted that

the child is in Bengaluru since November 2024 and that the

wife who is an Indian National is staying with her parents in

Bengaluru and is gainfully employed here. It is submitted

that she has no citizenship of the foreign country and has

not prevented the petitioner from contacting the child or

interacting with her at any point in time.

17. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the

case of Surya Vadanan v. State of Tamil Nadu and

Others reported in (2015) 5 SCC 450, it is contended that

the question whether the child should be repatriated to the

jurisdiction of the Court of the country of her birth requires

an enquiry as to what exactly is the best interest of the

child. The Apex Court in the said decision further held as

under:-

"53. There may be a case, as has happened in the present appeal, where one parent invokes the jurisdiction of a court but does not obtain any substantive order in his or her favour and the other parent invokes the jurisdiction of another court and obtains a substantive order in his or her favour before the first court. In such an event, due respect and weight ought to be given to the substantive order passed by the second court since that interim or interlocutory order was passed prior in point of time. As mentioned above, this situation has arisen in the present appeal--Mayura had initiated divorce proceedings in India before the custody proceedings were initiated by Surya in the UK but the foreign court passed a substantive order on the custody issue before the domestic court. This situation also arose in Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo [(2011) 6 SCC 479], where Ruchi Majoo had invoked the jurisdiction of the domestic court before Rajiv Majoo but in fact Rajiv Majoo obtained a substantive order from the foreign court

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before the domestic court. While the substantive order of the foreign court in Ruchi Majoo was accorded due respect and weight but for reasons not related to the principle of comity of courts and on merits, custody of the child was handed over to Ruchi Majoo, notwithstanding the first strike principle.

54. As has been held in Arathi Bandi v. Bandi Jagadrakshaka Rao [(2013) 15 SCC 790], a violation of an interim or an interlocutory order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction ought to be viewed strictly if the rule of law is to be maintained. No litigant can be permitted to defy or decline adherence to an interim or an interlocutory order of a court merely because he or she is of the opinion that that order is incorrect--that has to be judged by a superior court or by another court having jurisdiction to do so. It is in this context that the observations of this Court in Sarita Sharma v. Sushil Sharma, [(2000) 3 SCC 14], and Ruchi Majoo have to be appreciated. If as a general principle, the violation of an interim or an interlocutory order is not viewed seriously, it will have widespread deleterious effects on the authority of courts to implement their interim or interlocutory orders or compel their adherence. Extrapolating this to the courts in our country, it is common knowledge that in cases of matrimonial differences in our country, quite often more than one Family Court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter in issue. In such a situation, can a litigant say that he or she will obey the interim or interlocutory order of a particular Family Court and not that of another? Similarly, can one Family Court hold that an interim or

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an interlocutory order of another Family Court on the same subject-matter may be ignored in the best interests and welfare of the child? We think not. An interim or an interlocutory is precisely what it is--interim or interlocutory-- and is always subject to modification or vacation by the court that passes that interim or interlocutory order. There is no finality attached to an interim or an interlocutory order. We may add a word of caution here--merely because a parent has violated an order of a foreign court does not mean that parent should be penalised for it. The conduct of the parent may certainly be taken into account for passing a final order, but that ought not to have a penalising result.

55. Finally, this Court has accepted the view L. (Minors), In re, (1974) 1 WLR 250 that in a given case, it might be appropriate to have an elaborate inquiry to decide whether a child should be repatriated to the foreign country and to the jurisdiction of the foreign court or in a given case to have a summary inquiry without going into the merits of the dispute relating to the best interests and welfare of the child and repatriating the child to the foreign country and to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

56. However, if there is a pre-existing order of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction and the domestic court decides to conduct an elaborate inquiry (as against a summary inquiry), it must have special reasons to do so. An elaborate inquiry should not be ordered as a matter of course. While deciding whether a summary or an elaborate inquiry should be conducted, the domestic court must take into consideration:

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(a) The nature and effect of the interim or interlocutory order passed by the foreign court.

(b) The existence of special reasons for repatriating or not repatriating the child to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

(c) The repatriation of the child does not cause any moral or physical or social or cultural or psychological harm to the child, nor should it cause any legal harm to the parent with whom the child is in India. There are instances where the order of the foreign court may result in the arrest of the parent on his or her return to the foreign country. In such cases, the domestic court is also obliged to ensure the physical safety of the parent.

(d) The alacrity with which the parent moves the foreign court concerned or the domestic court concerned, is also relevant. If the time gap is unusually large and is not reasonably explainable and the child has developed firm roots in India, the domestic court may be well advised to conduct an elaborate inquiry."

18. In the instant case, we notice that the respondent

mother has raised allegations of domestic abuse against the

petitioner. The mother has come to India with the child in

November 2024. She has invoked the jurisdiction of the

Family Court in Bengaluru and has filed an application

seeking permanent custody of the child. The petitioner

herein has been put on notice and has entered appearance

and has raised the question of jurisdiction of the Family

Court at Bengaluru and has also joined issues on the

question of the best interest and welfare of the child. The

Family Court is in seisin of the matter and no orders have

been passed. There is no order issued by a Court having