Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 2947 Kant
Judgement Date : 27 January, 2025
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
WRIT PETITION NO.33812 OF 2024 (KLR-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI. LINGAPPA K. SUVARNA
S/O KOOSAPPA SUVARNA
AGED 55 YEARS
2. MR. LAKSHMAN K. SUVARNA
S/O KOOSAPPA SUVARNA
AGED 52 YEARS
BOTH ARE R/AT
RAMPRASAD HOUSE
KARAMBAR VILLAGE
BAJPE POST
MANGALURU-574 142.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. I.THARANATH POOJARY, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SMT. VEENA T.N., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
M.S. BUILDING
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2
2. THE THASILDAR
TALUK OFFICE
MANGALURU
DAKSHINA KANNADA - 575 001.
3. JAGADEESH
S/O LATE SESU MOILY
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
KARAMBAR
MALAVOOR VILLAGE
POST BAJPE
MANGALURU - 574 412.
(R-3 IMPLEADED V/O/DTD: 10.01.2025)
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI MANJUNATH K., HCGP FOR R1 & R2;
SRI K. CHANDRANATH ARIGA, ADVOCATE FOR R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 05.12.2024 PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT MADE IN NO.T.T.RCT 255/2020-21(B3) VIDE ANNEXURE-A.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 17.01.2025, THIS DAY ORDER WAS PRONOUNCED THEREIN, AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
CAV ORDER
In the captioned petition, petitioner has challenged
the fresh eviction notice issued by the respondent
No.2/Tahsildar against the petitioner herein in respect of
Poramboku land which is classified as a marginal road.
2. Learned Senior Counsel reiterating the grounds
urged in the petition has submitted that petitioners family is
in possession and occupation of 6 cents of land in
Sy.No.21/1B1B of Malavoor Village for the last 55 years and
are running a grocery shop with licence and the shop is
assessed for regular tax by the local authorities. Citing the
law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Olga Tellis and Others vs. Bombay Municipal
Corporation and Others1, he would vehemently argue
and contend that the right to live would be infringed if
petitioners are evicted without following due process of law
and without providing an opportunity of being heard. He
(1985) 3 SCC 545
would also point out that there are similarly encroached
individuals and no action is contemplated and the action is
contemplated against the petitioners selectively and this
amounts to hostile discrimination. He would further point
out that this action is contemplated only at the instance of
respondent No.2 who has filed a suit against the petitioner
and the same is pending consideration.
3. To buttress his arguments, he has placed
reliance on the following judgments:
1) Olga Tellis & Others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Others - (1985) 3 SCC 545;
2) State of Uttar Pradesh & Others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Others - (2024) SCC Online SC 3291;
3) C.Hanumanthappa vs. Bellary City Municipality - 1972 SCC Online Kar 97;
4) Muthammal vs. State of Tamil Nadu - (2006) 3 MLJ 216;
5) Malaprabha Co-operative Society vs. State of Karnataka
- ILR 1990 Kar 1730.
4. Reiterating the principles in the judgment cited
supra, he would contend that Poramboku land vest with
municipalities and therefore, respondent No.2/Tahsildar has
no jurisdiction. He would further point out that the
application tendered by petitioners father seeking
regularization is pending and that after their father's
demise, even petitioners have tendered their application
seeking regularization.
5. Per contra, learned HCGP would contend that
petitioners are blowing hot and cold. The fact that
petitioners are seeking regularization acknowledges the
jurisdiction of Tahsildar to take precipitative action against
the encroachers over marginal road. She would further
point out that petitioners application is rejected and
therefore, no further indulgence is warranted.
6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3
arguing in the same vein would also point out that
unfortunately petitioners are permitted to squat over
encroached portion as Poramboku Road (marginal road).
Citing the Division Bench judgment at unnumbered
paragraph 4, he would point out that petitioners right are
rightly declined by the Division Bench. Citing the above
said paragraph, he would point out that the petitioners
assertion that their family is entitled for regularization is
also given a quietus by the Division Bench.
7. Heard learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners, learned HCGP appearing for respondent Nos.1
and 2 and learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3.
8. Before this Court delves into the matter to
examine whether due process of law is followed by
respondent No.2/Tahsildar while issuing eviction notice, this
Court deems it fit to extract the relevant findings recorded
by the Division Bench while dismissing the writ appeal filed
by petitioners father namely Koosappa Suvarna in
W.A.No.5517/1997. The relevant paragraph is extracted
and the same reads as under:
"It is seen from the orders passed by the authorities, viz., the Tahsildar, the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, that they have concurrently held that the land in question is a Government road poramboke, i.e., reserved for road, and any encroachment on the same is objectionable. It is also noticed that as per the rules for regularization of unauthorized occupation, such reserved land cannot be granted or the unauthorized occupation of such land cannot be regularized, as the same would affect the public at large for whose benefit the land has been reserved. Merely because the appellant has filed an application, there is no justification to quash the well considered concurrent orders passed by the 3 authorities below. In view of the same, the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, is justified in rejecting the writ petition."
9. Upon careful examination of the findings recorded
by the Division Bench in W.A.No.5517/1997, it is
abundantly clear that the facts of the case are not in
dispute. The records unequivocally reveal that the
petitioners father has been in unauthorized occupation of
the subject land since 1982. This land, identified as a
Government road, has been designated for public use.
Despite being served with an eviction order by the then
Tahsildar, the petitioners father challenged this order before
the learned Single Judge of this Court in
W.P.No.33721/1995. The petition was dismissed by the
learned Single Judge on 01.09.1997, a decision that was
subsequently affirmed by the Division Bench in the writ
appeal. In its judgment, the Division Bench made it clear
that the petitioners father was found to be an unlawful
occupant of Government land, which had been specifically
reserved for public road use, and as such, any
encroachment on this land was both objectionable and
illegal. This finding was conclusive, and it categorically
affirmed that the unauthorized occupation of such land
could not be regularized, given the public nature of the
land. The Division Bench further emphasized that the filing
of an application by the appellant (petitioners father) did
not justify the quashing of the orders passed by the
authorities, all of which were well-considered and based on
sound reasoning. In light of these facts, the learned Single
Judge was fully justified in rejecting the writ petition.
10. In light of the findings of the Division Bench, it is
evident that there is no dispute regarding the facts of the
case. The records confirm that the petitioners father has
been in unauthorized occupation of the land for more than
four decades, since 1982. This occupation was initially
challenged by the petitioners father, but the eviction order
issued by the Tahsildar was upheld through the dismissal of
the writ petition by the learned Single Judge in 1997, with
the Division Bench subsequently affirming this decision. The
Division Bench's ruling categorically declared that the
petitioners father was a trespasser, and the land in question
was a marginal road, thereby rendering any attempt to
regularize the occupation legally untenable. The judgment
of the Division Bench, having attained finality, stands as an
irrefutable declaration of the status of the land and the
ineligibility of the petitioners father for regularization.
11. Despite the eviction order having been affirmed
by the Division Bench, it is regrettable that the authorities
have failed to enforce the order for an extended period.
However, it must be noted that the fresh eviction notice
issued in 2024 by the authorities aims to rectify this lapse
and ensure that the eviction order, which has remained
unexecuted for so long, is now enforced. The petitioner's
contention that the issuance of a fresh eviction notice
necessitates the initiation of a new inquiry and a compliance
with procedural requirements is not one this Court is
inclined to accept. The judgment rendered by the Division
Bench has attained finality, and its findings conclusively
determined the status of the petitioners father as a
trespasser on public land. These findings also definitively
affirmed the ineligibility of the petitioners father for
regularization of the occupation, given that the land in
question is a reserved public road. Once these findings were
made and upheld by the Courts, there was no requirement
for the authorities to initiate a fresh inquiry or provide
further notices to the petitioners.
12. The principle of natural justice cannot be invoked
repetitively in order to prolong an unauthorized occupation
of land, particularly in the case of land designated as a
marginal road, which is intended for public use. The
authorities' action to issue an eviction notice was first
contemplated in 1982, when a notice was issued to the
petitioners father. Since then, the petitioners family has
continued to occupy this marginal road without legal
justification. Now, in 2025, the occupation remains
unaddressed, and it is clear that no indulgence can be
granted at this juncture. The petitioners family has been
occupying public land for more than four decades, flagrantly
disregarding the law and the judgments passed by this
Court. The issuance of the fresh eviction notice in 2024 is
nothing more than a procedural step aimed at enforcing the
eviction order that has been upheld for many years.
13. It is essential to recognize that public land,
especially land designated as a marginal road, serves an
important public purpose. The continued encroachment on
such land undermines the larger public interest, as it
interferes with the intended use of the land and
compromises the safety and functionality of the road.
Allowing such encroachment to continue indefinitely is not
only unjust to the public but also detrimental to the proper
utilization of public resources. The petitioner's continued
occupation of the land, in defiance of the law and in
violation of the Court's orders, has had long-lasting adverse
effects on the community that relies on the land for public
access and road safety.
14. While this Court had initially considered granting
some indulgence to the petitioners and offering them a
limited period of time to vacate the premises, it has become
apparent that the petitioners are determined to persist in
their unauthorized occupation. Despite the clear and final
judgments against them, the petitioners continue to resist
the enforcement of the eviction order. Learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioners attempted to persuade the Court
to quash the eviction notice and return the matter to the
Tahsildar for further procedural steps. However, this Court
finds that there is no merit in such a request, as the
judgment of the Division Bench, which has attained finality,
does not warrant any further delay or procedural
extensions.
15. For the reasons outlined above, this Court
concludes that the petition lacks merit and cannot be
sustained. The competent authorities are directed to take
immediate and necessary steps to enforce the eviction
order in strict accordance with the law, without further
delay. Although this case could warrant the imposition of
exemplary costs, the Court has decided to refrain from
imposing any costs, adopting a more lenient approach given
the long-standing nature of the matter. The authorities
must now proceed expeditiously to implement the eviction
order and ensure the land is vacated in the public interest.
16. Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed.
The pending interlocutory application, if any, does not
survive for consideration and stands dismissed.
Sd/-
(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE CA
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