Karnataka High Court
Sharanagowda (Mla) vs The State Of Karnataka on 16 January, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
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CRL.P No. 9378 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT
BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.9378 OF 2024
(482(CR.PC) / 528(BNSS)-)
BETWEEN:
1. SHARANAGOWDA (MLA)
S/O NAGANNAGOUDA KANDAKUR,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
R/AT NEAR THE NEW BUS STATION,
YADAGIRI, KARNATAKA-585214.
2. ANILA KUMARA ALIAS ANIL HEDAGAMADRI
S/O THIMANNA HEDAGIMADRI,
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
R/AT H.NO.2/4/98, NEAR MUKAMBIKA SCHOOL,
YADAGIRI CITY, YADGIRI,
KARNATAKA 585201.
3. BIRESH ALIAS BEERAPPA
VISHAL
VISHAL S/O SHIVANNA CHIRATENOR,
NINGAPPA
NINGAPPA
PATTIHAL
PATTIHAL
Digitally signed by VISHAL
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS,
R/AT H.NO.2-14-29, KOLIWADA,
NINGAPPA PATTIHAL
Digitally signed by
Location: High Court of
VISHAL NINGAPPA
Karnataka
PATTIHAL Dharwad Bench
Date: 2025.01.21 11:34:00
Location: High Court of
+0530
Karnataka Dharwad Bench
Date: 2025.01.21 11:33:44
+0530
GNAGA PARAMESHWARI KALYAN MANTAP,
YADAGIRI, KARNATAKA-585201.
4. SIDDALINGAPPA S/O RAJASHEKARA,
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
R/AT H.NO.2-6-112, CHAKKAR RAHA ROAD,
HATHIKADDA AREA, BHAVANI TEMPLE,
YADGIRI, KARNATAKA-585214.
5. DEVARAJA S/O SHIRIKANTH UPPARA
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
R/AT H.NO.2/4/105, NEAR GANGAPPA RICE MILL
BANDIGERA YADGIRI, KARNATAKA-585201.
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CRL.P No. 9378 of 2024
6. DEVARAJA S/O MALAPPA
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
R/AT SHAHAPUR YADGIRI,
KARNATAKA-585214.
7. KALINGA S/O SHARANAPPA NAYAK,
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
R/AT H.NO.2-3-97,RANGMAHAL,
BANDIGERA, YADGIRI, KARNATAKA-585201.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SMT. URMILA PULLAT, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY YADGIRI TOWN POLICE,
REPRESENTED BY THE SPP,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
BENGALURU-560001.
2. SRI. LAXMAN S/O MALLAYYA MEDAR,
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
R/AT ASHANHAL VILLAGE TALUK,
YADAGIR, KARNATAKA-585321.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI JAGADISH B.N., SPL.P.P FOR R1;
NOTICE TO R2 IS SERVED)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 CR.P.C 1973/S 528
BNSS, 2023, PRAYING TO, QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET
IN THE FILE OF YADGIRI POLICE STATION
CR.NO.62/2020 AND ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
CC.NO.28585/2024, PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE
42ND ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE,
BENGALURU, FOR THE OFFENCES U/S.342,506 R/W 149
OF IPC., IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION, COMING ON FOR
ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS
UNDER:
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CRL.P No. 9378 of 2024
ORAL ORDER
Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri Sandesh J.
Chouta appearing for the petitioner.
2. Learned Senior Counsel taking this Court through
the documents appended to the petition would seek to
demonstrate that the offences alleged are not made out
even to its remoteness. He would further contend that the
issue in the lis is answered by the judgment rendered by
this Court in Crl.P.No.4067/2023.
3. Learned HCGP would not dispute the position of
law as is laid down by this Court. Therefore, the
submission is in union.
4. This Court in Crl.P.No.4067/2023 has held as
follows:
"3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
would submit that the issue in the lis stands covered by two
orders passed by, one by the Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court in
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Crl.P.No.3916/2018 disposed on 17.02.2020 and one by
this Court in Crl.P.No.7575/2022 disposed on
22.08.2022, wherein held as follows:
In Crl.P.No.3916/2018 disposed on 17.02.2020 has
held as follows:
" This petition is filed by petitioners/accused Nos.1
to 48 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the
charge sheet in C.C. No.23259/2017 pending on
the file of VIII Additional CMM, Bengalulru for the
offence punishable under Section 143 read with
Section 149 of IPC.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for petitioners
and learned High Court Government Pleader for
respondent - State.
3. Though this case is listed for admission, with
the consent of learned counsel appearing for both
the parties, the same is taken up for final disposal
4. The gist of the complaint is that on 23.05.2017
at about 11.30 a.m., received a credible
information that a group of people gathered on
Queen's Road shouting slogans against the
Government. Immediately, he went to the spot
and found that 50 young men assembled illegally
and disturbed the public and vehicles without prior
permission from the station. On enquiry he found
that they are the members of Campus Front of
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India Karnataka and protesting against
interference religious and personal freedoms by
imposing dress code in 'AIIMS Exam' which is
against the personal and religious rights of our
Constitution. Immediately they were disbursed
and a case has been registered and after
investigation, the charge sheet has been filed.
5. It is the submission of the learned counsel for
petitioners that though there is no substantial
material as against petitioners/accused Nos.1 to
48, the respondent have investigated the case and
have filed the charge sheet against
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48. It is his further
submission that in order to file a charge. sheet
under Section 143 of IPC, the unlawful assembly
must satisfy the ingredients as contemplated
under Section 141 of IPC but none of the
ingredients are satisfied in this case. It is his
further submission that mere presence in an
unlawful assembly, cannot render a person liable
unless there was a common object, they were
actuated by the common object and that object is
one of those set out under Section 141 of IPC. It is
his further submission that if the common object
of an unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused
persons cannot be convicted either under Section
143 of IPC or under Section 149 of IPC. It is his
further submission that the prosecution has to
prove the overtacts as against the persons who
have been alleged as a member of unlawful
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assembly. In order to substantiate his said
contention, he has relied upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of CHARAN SINGH
AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
reported in (2004) 4 SCC 205. It is his further
submission that as per the Licensing and
Controlling of Assemblies and Public Processions
(Bangalore City) Order 2009, the permission is
required in Bangalore City if the congregation of
more than 250 persons assembling at one place
with an intention to conduct the meeting, protest,
to hear a public speech including political, social,
religious and cultural meetings to which the public
have got free access. The said condition specially
says that no permission or license is required in
Bangalore City if the congregation of more than
250 persons assembling at one place with an
intention of conducting meeting to protest. It is
the specific submission that petitioners/accused
Nos.1 to 48 have given the letter dated
20.05.2017 seeking permission but no such
permission is granted by the Commissioner of
Police., under such circumstance, the said
assembly cannot be held as an unlawful assembly
and the provisions of Sections 141, 143, 147, 149,
188 of IPC are not attracted. On these grounds, he
prayed to allow the petition and to quash the
proceedings.
6. Per contra, learned High Court Government
Pleader vehemently argued and submitted that as
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per the Licensing and Controlling of Assemblies
and Public Processions (Bangalore City) order,
2009 the congregation of more than 250 persons
is required but as per Section 141 of IPC, an
assembly of five or more persons is considered to
be an unlawful assembly and if they have
assembled with a common object, then under such
circumstance, accused persons can be prosecuted
for the alleged offences. It is his further
submission that the contents of the complaint and
other materials clearly indicate that they were
intending to proceed to Raj Bhavan in that light,
they have obstructed the public traffic, public
movement and thereby, they have violated the
provisions of Section 141 of IPC and other
provisions of law. It is his further submission that
there are independent eye-witnesses and they
have also categorically stated with regard to the
overt-acts of each of the accused persons and
there is ample materials to connect the accused
persons to the alleged crime. On these ground, he
prayed to dismiss the petition.
7. I have carefully and cautiously gone through
the submissions made by the learned counsel
appearing for both the parties and perused the
records.
8. On perusal of records, it is the case of the
prosecution that the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to
48 have assembled and were protesting against
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interference and dress code imposed by AIIMS
exam and also have not obtained any permission
from the concerned Authorities. But as could be
seen from the Licensing and Controlling of
Assemblies and Public Processions (Bangalore
City) Order, 2009 assembly means a congregation
of more than 250 persons assembling at one place
with an intention of conducting meeting or protest,
to hear a public speech including political, social,
religious and cultural meetings to which the public
have got free access, license is required only when
more than 250 persons are there. Admittedly in
the instant case, the contents of the complaint and
other materials indicates that only 50 persons
have assembled. In that light, a license said to
have been is not necessary as per the Order of
2009. The only question which remains for
consideration of this Court is that whether the
assembly of petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 had
constituted an unlawful assembly as per Section
141 of IPC? In order to attract the said provision,
the assembly must satisfy five ingredients which
have been stated therein but on close reading of
the contents of the complaint, charge sheet
material and other materials, it indicates that none
of the ingredients are present as contemplated
under Section 141 of IPC.
9. Be that as it may. If 50 persons have assembled
at a particular place, then under such circumstance, it
cannot be held as an unlawful assembly. Mere presence of a
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person in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person
liable unless there was a common object and he was
actuated by that common object and that object is one of
those set out in Section 141 of IPC. This proposition of law
has been laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
CHARAN SINGH (Quoted supra) at paragraph No.13, it has
been observed as under:
"13. Coming to the others who were armed with
double-barrelled guns and country-made pistols,
the question is regarding applicability of Section
149 IPC. Section 149 IPC has its foundation on
constructive liability which is the sine qua non for
its operation. The emphasis is on the common
object and not on common intention. Mere
presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a
person liable unless there was a common object
and he was actuated by that common object and
that object is one of those set out in Section 141.
Where common object of an unlawful assembly is
not proved, the accused persons cannot be
convicted with the help of Section 149. The crucial
question to determine is whether the assembly
consisted of five or more persons and whether the
said persons entertained one or more of the
common objects, as specified in Section 141. It
cannot be laid down as a general proposition of
law that unless an overt act is proved against a
person, who is alleged to be a member of an
unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a
member of an assembly. The only thing required is
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that he should have understood that the assembly
was unlawful and was likely to commit any of the
acts which fall within the purview of Section 141.
The word "object" means the purpose or design
and, in order to make it "common", it must be
shared by all. In other words, the object should be
common to the persons, who compose the
assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware
of it and concur in it. A common object may be
formed by express agreement after mutual
consultation, but that is by no means necessary. It
may be formed at any stage by all or a few
members of the assembly and the other members
may just join and adopt it. Once formed, it need
not continue to be the same. It may be modified
or altered or abandoned at any stage. The
expression "in prosecution of common object" as
appearing in Section 149 has to be strictly
construed as equivalent to "in order to attain the
common object". It must be immediately
connected with the common object by virtue of the
nature of the object. There must be community of
object and the object may exist only up to a
particular stage, and not thereafter. Members of
an unlawful assembly may have community of
object up to a certain point beyond which they
may differ in their objects and the knowledge,
possessed by each member of what is likely to be
committed in prosecution of their common object
may vary not only according to the information at
his command, but also according to the extent to
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which he shares the community of object, and as a
consequence of this the effect of Section 149 IPC
may be different on different members of the
same assembly."
10. On close perusal of the charge sheet material, it
indicates that none of the ingredients specify in Section 141
of IPC are present so as to attract the provisions of Sections
141, 143, 149, 188 of IPC. When that being the case, then
under such circumstances, the proceedings initiated as
against petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 appears to be not
in accordance with law and the same is liable to be
quashed.
11. Accordingly, petition is allowed and the
proceedings initiated in C.C. No.23259/2017 pending on the
file of VIII Additional CMM, Bengaluru for the offence
punishable under Section 143 read with Section 149 of IPC
is hereby quashed.
I.A. No.1/2018 does not survive for consideration.
Accordingly, it is disposed off"
In Crl.P.No.7575/2022 disposed on 22.08.2022 has
held as follows:
"The petitioners are before this Court calling
in question the proceedings in C.C.No.2052/2014
registered for offences punishable under Sections
143, 144, 145, 353 read with Section 149 of the
IPC.
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2. Heard the learned counsel, Sri. Mohammed
Tahir, appearing for the petitioners, Smt. K.P.
Yashodha, learned HCGP appearing for the
respondents and have perused the material on
record.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
submits that the issue in the petition is akin to
what is decided in Crl.P.No.3916/2018 disposed on
17.02.2020, wherein this Court has examined
identical facts and offences alleged against the
petitioners therein. While so examining, this Court
has held as follows:
"4. The gist of the complaint is that
on 23.05.2017 at about 11.30 a.m.,
received a credible information that a
group of people gathered on Queen's Road
shouting slogans against the Government.
Immediately, he went to the spot and
found that 50 young men assembled
illegally and disturbed the public and
vehicles without prior permission from the
station. On enquiry he found that they are
the members of Campus Front of India
Karnataka and protesting against
interference religious and personal
freedoms by imposing dress code in 'AIIMS
Exam' which is against the personal and
religious rights of our Constitution.
Immediately they were disbursed and a
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case has been registered and after
investigation, the charge sheet has been
filed.
5. It is the submission of the
learned counsel for petitioners that though
there is no substantial material as against
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48, the
respondent have investigated the case and
have filed the charge sheet against
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48. It is his
further submission that in order to file a
charge sheet under Section 143 of IPC, the
unlawful assembly must satisfy the
ingredients as contemplated under Section
141 of IPC but none of the ingredients are
satisfied in this case. It is his further
submission that mere presence in an
unlawful assembly, cannot render a person
liable unless there was a common object,
they were actuated by the common object
and that object is one of those set out
under Section 141 of IPC. It is his further
submission that if the common object of
an unlawful assembly is not proved, the
accused persons cannot be convicted
either under Section 143 of IPC or under
Section 149 of IPC. It is his further
submission that the prosecution has to
prove the overt-acts as against the
persons who have been alleged as a
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member of unlawful assembly. In order to
substantiate his said contention, he has
relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of CHARAN SINGH
AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH reported in (2004) 4 SCC 205. It
is his further submission that as per the
Licensing and Controlling of Assemblies
and Public Processions (Bangalore City)
Order 2009, the permission is required in
Bangalore City if the congregation of more
than 250 persons assembling at one place
with an intention to conduct the meeting,
protest, to hear a public speech including
political, social, religious and cultural
meetings to which the public have got free
access. The said condition specially says
that no permission or license is required in
Bangalore City if the congregation of more
than 250 persons assembling at one place
with an intention of conducting meeting to
protest. It is the specific submission that
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 have given
the letter dated 20.05.2017 seeking
permission but no such permission is
granted by the Commissioner of Police.,
under such circumstance, the said
assembly cannot be held as an unlawful
assembly and the provisions of Sections
141, 143, 147, 149, 188 of IPC are not
attracted. On these grounds, he prayed to
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allow the petition and to quash the
proceedings.
6. Per contra, learned High Court
Government Pleader vehemently argued
and submitted that as per the Licensing
and Controlling of Assemblies and Public
Processions (Bangalore City) order, 2009
the congregation of more than 250
persons is required but as per Section 141
of IPC, an assembly of five or more
persons is considered to be an unlawful
assembly and if they have assembled with
a common object, then under such
circumstance, accused persons can be
prosecuted for the alleged offences. It is
his further submission that the contents of
the complaint and other materials clearly
indicate that they were intending to
proceed to Raj Bhavan in that light, they
have obstructed the public traffic, public
movement and thereby, they have violated
the provisions of Section 141 of IPC and
other provisions of law. It is his further
submission that there are independent
eye-witnesses and they have also
categorically stated with regard to the
overt-acts of each of the accused persons
and there is ample materials to connect
the accused persons to the alleged crime.
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On these ground, he prayed to dismiss the
petition.
7. I have carefully and cautiously
gone through the submissions made by the
learned counsel appearing for both the
parties and perused the records.
8. On perusal of records, it is the
case of the prosecution that the
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 have
assembled and were protesting against
interference and dress code imposed by
AIIMS exam and also have not obtained
any permission from the concerned
Authorities. But as could be seen from the
Licensing and Controlling of Assemblies
and Public Processions (Bangalore City)
Order, 2009 assembly means a
congregation of more than 250 persons
assembling at one place with an intention
of conducting meeting or protest, to hear a
public speech including political, social,
religious and cultural meetings to which
the public have got free access, license is
required only when more than 250 persons
are there. Admittedly in the instant case,
the contents of the complaint and other
materials indicates that only 50 persons
have assembled. In that light, a license
said to have been is not necessary as per
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the Order of 2009. The only question
which remains for consideration of this
Court is that whether the assembly of
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 had
constituted an unlawful assembly as per
Section 141 of IPC? In order to attract the
said provision, the assembly must satisfy
five ingredients which have been stated
therein but on close reading of the
contents of the complaint, charge sheet
material and other materials, it indicates
that none of the ingredients are present as
contemplated under Section 141 of IPC.
9. Be that as it may. If 50 persons
have assembled at a particular place, then
under such circumstance, it cannot be held
as an unlawful assembly. Mere presence of
a person in an unlawful assembly cannot
render a person liable unless there was a
common object and he was actuated by
that common object and that object is one
of those set out in Section 141 of IPC. This
proposition of law has been laid down by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
CHARAN SINGH (Quoted supra) at
paragraph No.13, it has been observed as
under:
"13. Coming to the others who
were armed with double-barrelled guns
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and country-made pistols, the question is
regarding applicability of Section 149 IPC.
Section 149 IPC has its foundation on
constructive liability which is the sine qua
non for its operation. The emphasis is on
the common object and not on common
intention. Mere presence in an unlawful
assembly cannot render a person liable
unless there was a common object and he
was actuated by that common object and
that object is one of those set out in
Section 141. Where common object of an
unlawful assembly is not proved, the
accused persons cannot be convicted with
the help of Section 149. The crucial
question to determine is whether the
assembly consisted of five or more persons
and whether the said persons entertained
one or more of the common objects, as
specified in Section 141. It cannot be laid
down as a general proposition of law that
unless an overt act is proved against a
person, who is alleged to be a member of
an unlawful assembly, it cannot be said
that he is a member of an assembly. The
only thing required is that he should have
understood that the assembly was
unlawful and was likely to commit any of
the acts which fall within the purview of
Section 141. The word "object" means the
purpose or design and, in order to make it
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"common", it must be shared by all. In
other words, the object should be common
to the persons, who compose the
assembly, that is to say, they should all be
aware of it and concur in it. A common
object may be formed by express
agreement after mutual consultation, but
that is by no means necessary. It may be
formed at any stage by all or a few
members of the assembly and the other
members may just join and adopt it. Once
formed, it need not continue to be the
same. It may be modified or altered or
abandoned at any stage. The expression
"in prosecution of common object" as
appearing in Section 149 has to be strictly
construed as equivalent to "in order to
attain the common object". It must be
immediately connected with the common
object by virtue of the nature of the
object. There must be community of object
and the object may exist only up to a
particular stage, and not thereafter.
Members of an unlawful assembly may
have community of object up to a certain
point beyond which they may differ in their
objects and the knowledge, possessed by
each member of what is likely to be
committed in prosecution of their common
object may vary not only according to the
information at his command, but also
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according to the extent to which he shares
the community of object, and as a
consequence of this the effect of Section
149 IPC may be different on different
members of the same assembly."
10. On close perusal of the charge
sheet material, it indicates that none of the
ingredients specify in Section 141 of IPC
are present so as to attract the provisions
of Sections 141, 143, 149, 188 of IPC.
When that being the case, then under such
circumstances, the proceedings initiated as
appears to be not in accordance with law
and the same is liable to be quashed
11. Accordingly, petition is allowed
and the proceedings initiated in C.C.
No.23259/2017 pending on the file of VIII
Additional CMM, Bengalulru for the offence
punishable under Section 143 read with
Section 149 of IPC is hereby quashed."
The aforesaid order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench
of this Court would cover the case at hand on all its fours.
That apart, no untoward incident has occurred in the
protest. There are no independent witnesses who would
speak about the incident as alleged against the petitioners,
which has happened in a broad day light, apart from police
officials, who are examined as witnesses.
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4. Therefore, in the light of the order passed by a
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court supra, the following:
ORDER
i. Criminal Petition is allowed.
ii. ii. Proceedings pending in C.C.No.2052/2014 on
the file of the II Additional Civil Judge and
JMFC, Mysuru, stands quashed qua the
petitioners."
4. In the light of the orders passed by this Court and
the Co-ordinate Bench (supra) and for the reasons
aforementioned, the following:
ORDER
(i) The Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) (ii) The proceedings in C.C.No.10277/2022
pending on the file of the Principal Civil Judge (Jr.
Dn) & JMFC Court, Hoskote, Bangalore Rural
District stands quashed."
5. In another order passed by this Court wherein
this Court has held as follows:
"8. The complaint then becomes a crime in
crime No.222/2022 for the offences punishable
under Sections 341, 504 and 506 of IPC. Since the
allegations are for the aforesaid offences, it is
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germane to notice whether the complaint meets
the necessary ingredients of those offence or
otherwise, Section 341 reads as follows:
341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.- Whoever
wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred
rupees, or with both.
9. Section 341 has its ingredients in Section
339 of IPC. Section 339 of IPC reads as follows:
339. Wrongful restraint.-Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from
proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right
to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.
10. Section 339 of IPC has its ingredients of
wrongful restraint for an act to become an offence
under Section 341 of IPC, mandates that the
victim should be restrained from a movement in a
manner that he would not be able to move
towards any side. The complaint does not narrate
any such circumstances, the complaint is only
hurling of certain abuse with regard to reason why
the complainant approaches the petitioner for
registering the complaint and beyond that there is
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nothing narrated about any fact that would
become ingredients of any wrongful restraint.
11. The Apex Court in the case of Keki
Hormusji Gharda & Ors vs Mehervan
Rustom Irani & Anr reported in (2009) 6
SCC 475 interpreting section 339 has held as
follows:
12. Wrongful restraint' has been defined
under Section 339 of the IPC in the following words:
"339. Wrongful restraint - Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any person so as to prevent that person
from proceeding in any direction in which that person
has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain
that person.
Exception.- The obstruction of a private way over
land or water which a person in good-faith believes
himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an
offence within the meaning of this Section."
The essential ingredients of the
aforementioned provision are:
(1) Accused obstructs voluntarily;
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(2) The victim is prevented from proceeding in
any direction;
(3) Such victim has every right to proceed in that
direction.
13. Section 341 of the IPC provides that :
341. Punishment for wrongful restraint-
Whoever wrongfully restrains any person, shall be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term which
may extend to one month, or with fine which may
extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
14. The word `voluntary' is significant. It
connotes that obstruction should be direct. The
obstructions must be a restriction on the normal
movement of a person. It should be a physical
one. They should have common intention to
cause obstruction.
12. The said judgment of the Apex Court, this
court is followed by this Court in the case of Kota
Rohit Karanth V/s State of Karnataka By
Police Sub-Inspector, Sanjayanagar Police
Station, Bengaluru and another reported in
2023(2) Kar.L.J 372 and in
W.P.No.1254/2023, dated 11.7.2023, wherein
this Court has held
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11. The only offence that remains is Section
341 of the IPC. For an offence to become punishable
under Section 341 of the IPC, the ingredients as
obtaining under Section 339 of the IPC is necessary to
be present. Section 339 of the IPC reads as follows:
"339. Wrongful restraint - Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from
proceeding in any direction in which that person has a
right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that
person.
Exception.--The obstruction of a private way over
land or water which a person in good faith believes
himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an
offence within the meaning of this section."
In terms of Section 339 of the IPC (supra) for a
wrongful restraint to be proved, the foundation should
be that the person against whom such wrongful
restraint is made should not be permitted to move
around in any direction. That is not the issue in the
case at hand. The complaint narrates that when he
wanted to step into the office of the accused he was
stopped and not let in. This is not wrongful restraint
as obtaining in Section 339 of the IPC for it to become
an offence. The Apex Court in the case of KEKI
HORMUSJI GHARDA V. MEHERVAN RUSTOM
IRANI1 has delineated as to what would amount to
(2009)6 SCC 475
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wrongful restraint under Section 341 of the IPC. The
Apex Court holds as follows:
"12. "Wrongful restraint" has been defined under
Section 339 IPC in the following words:
"339. Wrongful restraint.--Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any person so as to prevent that person
from proceeding in any direction in which that person
has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain
that person.
Exception.--The obstruction of a private way over
land or water which a person in good faith believes
himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an
offence within the meaning of this section."
The essential ingredients of the aforementioned
provision are:
(1) Accused obstructs voluntarily;
(2) The victim is prevented from proceeding in
any direction;
(3) Such victim has every right to proceed in that
direction.
13. Section 341 IPC provides that:
"341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.--
Whoever wrongfully restrains any person, shall be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term which
may extend to one month, or with fine which may
extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."
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14. The word "voluntary" is significant. It
connotes that obstruction should be direct. The
obstructions must be a restriction on the normal
movement of a person. It should be a physical one.
They should have common intention to cause
obstruction."
12. In the light of the judgments of the Apex
Court quoted (supra) and also in view of none of the
facts meeting the ingredients that are necessary to
drive home the offences as alleged, permitting further
proceedings against the petitioners would amount to
abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage
of justice.
13. If the facts obtaining in the case at hand or
the complaint is considered on the bedrock of the
principles laid down by the Apex Court in the
aforesaid judgment, as followed by this court supra,
the complaint so registered for the offences as
aforequoted would be rendered unsustainable. The
unsustainability of it would lead to its obliteration."
6. In that light, issue standing answered by the
aforequoted orders, I deem it appropriate to obliterate
the crime against the petitioners.
7. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
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ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) The proceedings in C.C. No.28585/2024
pending on the file of 42nd Addl. Chief Judical
Magistrate, Bengaluru, stand quashed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
NAA/VP
