Karnataka High Court
Sri Siddanna @ Siddu S/O Ramanna Poojari vs The State Of Karnataka on 7 January, 2025
Author: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
Bench: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
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CRL.A No.200078 of 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
KALABURAGI BENCH
DATED THIS THE 7TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.200078 OF 2020
[374(Cr.PC)/415(BNSS)]
BETWEEN:
SRI SIDDANNA @ SIDDU
S/O RAMANNA POOJARI,
AGE ABOUT 21 YEARS,
OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLLUR VILLAGE,
TQ: CHITTAPUR,
DIST: KALABURAGI.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI VISHAL PRATAP SINGH, ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed by
BASALINGAPPA
SHIVARAJ
DHUTTARGAON AND:
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS INSPECTOR WADI POLICE STATION,
TQ: CHITTAPUR,
DISTRICT: GULBARGA,
REPRESENTED BY ADDL. STATE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT BUILDINGS, KALABURAGI - 585 107.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI SIDDALING P. PATIL, ADDL. SPP)
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CRL.A No.200078 of 2020
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 374
(2) OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, PRAYING TO CALL FOR
THE RECORDS AND ALLOW THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL BY
SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF THE V
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE / SPECIAL JUDGE,
KALABURAGI, IN SPL. C.POCSO NO.43/2019 DATED 21 AND 23
MARCH 2020, AND ACQUIT THE APPELLANT, IN THE INTEREST
OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINAL
HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS
UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K)
This appeal by the convicted accused is directed
against the judgment of conviction dated 21.03.2020 and
order of sentence dated 23.03.2020 by the V-Additional
Sessions/Special Judge at Kalaburagi [hereinafter referred
to as 'the Special Judge'] in Special Case POCSO
No.43/2019, wherein the learned Special Judge convicted
the accused for the offences punishable under Sections
376 (2) (i) and (n) and 506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
[hereinafter referred to as 'the IPC'], Sections 3(1) (w) (i)
and 3 (2) (v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
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Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 [hereinafter
referred to as 'the SC/ST (POA) Act'] and Section 6 of the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
[hereinafter referred to as 'the POCSO Act'] sentenced the
accused - appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
ten years and directed to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/-, in
default of payment of fine, to undergo a further simple
imprisonment for 10 months for the offences punishable
under Sections 376 (2) (i) and (n) of IPC and for the
offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act.
Accused is further sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 6 months and is directed to pay a fine of
Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine, further directed
to undergo simple imprisonment for two months for the
offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC. The accused
is also directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two
years and is imposed a fine of Rs.20,000/-, in default of
payment of fine, further directed to undergo simple
imprisonment for four months for the offence punishable
under Section 3(1) (w) (i) of SC/ST (POA) Act. Lastly, the
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accused is directed to undergo imprisonment for life i.e.,
first ten years of imprisonment shall be rigorous
imprisonment and remaining part of the life shall be
simple imprisonment and is imposed a fine of Rs.50,000/-,
in default of payment of fine, further directed to undergo
simple imprisonment of ten months for the offence
punishable under Section 3(2) (v) of SC/ST (POA) Act. It
is also directed that all the sentences enumerated supra
shall run concurrently.
2. The abridged facts which led to the trial of the
appellant-accused are as follows:
The prosecutrix in this case was residing with her
parents in Kollur village, Chittapur taluk, Kalaburagi
district i.e., within the jurisdiction of the respondent -
police. On 09.04.2019 she lodged a complaint before
PW-13 - the then PSI of respondent-police as per Ex.P-1
alleging that the accused is the resident of the same
village, who was an acquaintance of her. A year prior to
09.04.2019, he expressed his desire to marry her. Later,
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six months prior to 09.04.2019, the accused instigated her
to follow him to an agricultural field and forcibly had
penetrative sexual intercourse with her. Thereafter, he
threatened her with dire consequences not to disclose the
same to anybody including her parents. It is the further
case of the prosecutrix that, following the said incident,
the accused once again on 05.04.2019 i.e., four days prior
to the date of lodging the complaint, made an attempt to
rape her near her place of residence. However, on hearing
her hue and cry, her parents rescued her and the accused
fled the spot. It is further averred in the complaint that
the accused committed such an act well aware that she
was a minor and also that she belonged to SC/ST
community.
3. Based on the complaint Ex.P-1, PW-13
registered an FIR against the accused-appellant in Crime
No.31/2019 dated 09.04.2019 for the aforementioned
offences as per Ex.P-25. Subsequent to registration of the
FIR, PW-13 apprehended the accused on the same day.
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Thereafter, the victim PW-1 was sent for medical
examination. Since the offence punishable under the
SC/ST Act is attracted in the case, further investigation
was conducted by PW-11 i.e., the jurisdictional DCP. PW-
11 conducted further investigation by recording the
statement of the victim under Section 164 of Cr.P.C.
before the Magistrate as per Ex.P-2. Further, he obtained
the age certificate from PW-8 as per Ex.P-12 following
which the caste certificate of the victim was obtained as
per Ex.P-8 from CW-19. After drawing the relevant
mahazars and obtaining other necessary documents, he
laid the charge sheet against accused before the Special
Court for the aforementioned offences.
4. After taking cognizance of the offences and on
securing the presence of the accused, the learned Special
Judge framed the charges against the accused for the
offences punishable under Sections 376 (2) (i) and (n),
506 of IPC, Sections 3(1)(r) (w) (i) and 3(2) (v) of SC/ST
(POA) Act and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The same was
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read over verbatim to the accused. However, the accused
denied the charges and claimed to be tried.
5. In order to prove the charges levelled against
the accused, the prosecution collectively examined
thirteen witnesses before the Trial Court as PW-1 to PW-
13, got marked twenty-six documents as Exs.P-1 to P-26
and identified four material objects as M.O.s-1 to 4.
6. After completion of the prosecution evidence,
the learned Special Judge read over the incriminating
evidence of the material witnesses to the accused as
stipulated under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. However, the
accused denied the same. The defence of the accused is
one of total denial and that of false implication. However,
the accused neither examined any witness nor got marked
any documents on his behalf.
7. After assessment of the oral and documentary
evidence placed before the Special Judge, the learned
Special Judge convicted the accused for the charges
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leveled against him and sentenced him as stated supra.
The said judgment is challenged under this appeal.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the
appellant Sri Vishal Pratap Singh so also the learned
Additional State Public Prosecutor for the respondent -
State.
9. The primary contention of the learned counsel
for the appellant is that the judgment challenged under
this appeal suffers from perversity and illegality since the
learned Special Judge grossly failed to appreciate the
evidence on record in right perspective and passed the
impugned judgment based on surmises and conjuncture.
He further submitted that, there is an inordinate delay in
lodging the complaint by the prosecutrix. The incident
allegedly took place six months prior to the date of lodging
the complaint and the prosecution failed to explain the
reason for such inordinate delay in lodging the complaint.
He further contended that, there are serious infirmities in
the evidence of the prosecutrix PW-1 about the alleged
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date of incident. According to him, the complaint and 164
statement of the victim are contradicting each other
regarding the date of incident and the manner in which the
alleged rape was said to have committed by the accused.
Additionally, he contended that, the prosecution has
comprehensively failed to prove the age of the prosecutrix
at the time of the alleged date of incident. The documents
placed by the prosecution i.e., Exs.P-10 and P-11 are not
the authenticated documents to prove the age of the
victim as stipulated under the provisions of Rule 12 of the
Juvenile Justice Rules. Nevertheless, the author of
Ex.P-11 i.e., PW-8, categorically admitted in his evidence
that, there is tampering in the register with respect to the
age of the victim. The learned counsel by enunciating his
arguments submitted that, the prosecution further failed
to prove the medical evidence that the victim was
subjected to penetrative sexual intercourse as stated by
her simply for the reason that the doctor who examined
the victim i.e., PW-10 has given her final opinion as per
Ex.P-17 that there are no traces of recent sexual
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intercourse on the victim. Lastly, he contended that, the
learned Special Judge failed to consider the fact that, the
provisions of SC/ST (POA) Act does not attract in the
instant case for the reason that, in order to attract Section
3 (2) (v) of SC/ST (POA) Act, the accused ought to have
committed the act by being well within his knowledge that
the victim belonged to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe
community and in order to belittle her caste, he has
committed the offence. But, on perusal of the entire
evidence, the prosecution has not come up with such a
plea. With these submissions, he prays to allow the appeal
and to set aside the impugned judgment passed by the
Trial Court.
10. Refuting the above submissions made by the
learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Additional
SPP contended that, the judgment challenged in this
appeal neither suffers from perversity nor illegality and no
exception can be taken from the judgment passed by the
Trial Court for the reasons assigned by the Trial Court
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under a well-reasoned judgment. He contended that, the
learned Special Judge analysed the evidence of the
prosecutrix in great detail and on perusal of the same, the
prosecutrix has categorically deposed in her evidence
regarding the forcible sexual act committed by the
accused on different occasions. Further, her version was
corroborated by the evidence of her parents and supported
by the evidence of the Investigation Officers PW-11 and
PW-13. He further contended that, the prosecution has
also proved the age of the victim that she was a minor at
the time of the incident by placing relevant documents
i.e., Exs.P-10 and P-11 issued by PW-8 the Headmistress
of the school in which the victim studied. On perusal of
Ex.P-11, the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as
18.09.2003. As such, on the date of incident, the victim
was aged about 16 years. Further, the doctor - PW-10
who examined the victim has categorically deposed that
the hymen of the victim was ruptured. As such, it is clear
that the accused committed an act of penetrative sexual
assault. Additionally, the Investigation Officer - PW-11
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obtained the caste certificate of the victim as per Ex.P-8
that she belonged to Scheduled Caste community. In such
circumstances, on a careful perusal of the evidence of the
material witnesses, the prosecution has proved the guilt of
the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. With these
submissions the learned Addl. SPP prays to dismiss the
appeal by confirming the judgment passed by the Trial
Court.
11. Having heard the learned counsel for the
respective parties and on perusal of the entire evidence on
record including the impugned judgment passed by the
learned Special Judge, the points that arise for our
consideration are:
(i) Whether the judgment under this appeal
suffers from perversity and illegality?
(ii) Whether the learned Special Judge is
justified in convicting the accused-
appellant for the offences punishable
under Sections 376(2)(i) & (n) and 506
of IPC, Sections 3(1)(w)(i) and 3(2)(v) of
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SC/ST (POA) Act and Section 6 of the
POCSO Act?
12. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused,
the prosecution has primarily relied on the evidence of
PW-1 - the prosecutrix, PW-6 the sister of the victim,
PW-8 the headmistress who issued the age certificate of
the victim and also the evidence of PW-10 the doctor who
had examined the victim. Though the prosecution has
examined in total 13 witnesses, it is not necessary for us
to refer the evidence of all the witnesses.
13. On careful perusal of the evidence of PW-1 i.e.,
the prosecutrix, she lodged the complaint Ex.P-1 on
09.04.2019 before PW-13 the then PSI alleging that one
year prior to the incident, she knew the accused and that
she frequently was engaged in conversation with him over
mobile phone. Thereafter, their friendship turned into love
and six months prior to the date of lodging the complaint,
the accused committed an act of forcible penetrative
sexual intercourse on her for the first time. However, she
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neither revealed the same to her parents nor anybody else
in the village. Subsequently, after six months i.e., on
05.04.2019, the accused once again made an attempt to
rape her and also outraged her modesty. Following which
the victim was threatened with dire consequences. On
receiving the complaint, the respondent - police recorded
her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the
learned Magistrate as per Ex.P-2. On careful perusal of the
same, it is established that one year prior to the date of
lodging of the complaint, the accused has committed
forcible sexual intercourse on her. Later, 15 days prior to
the date of incident, he had once again committed sexual
intercourse on her. However, the victim in her evidence
before the Court deposed that the alleged incident of
sexual assault was committed by the accused five months
before lodging of the complaint and 2 to 3 months
thereafter, he once again attempted to rape her. On
careful analysis of these versions of PW-1, there are
serious discrepancies forthcoming in her version regarding
the date of the incident. The different date and months
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stated by the victim in her complaint, statement under
Section 164 of Cr.P.C so also before the Court, creates
doubt in the genesis of the crime. As rightly pointed out by
the learned counsel for the appellant, there is inordinate
delay of more than six months in lodging the complaint.
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijayan
vs. State of Kerala1 held that, in a case where the sole
testimony of prosecutrix is available, it is very dangerous
to convict the accused noticing that the prosecutrix could
venture to wait for 7 months for filing the FIR for rape.
This leaves the accused totally defenceless.
15. Applying the findings of the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the above judgment to the instant case, we have no
other alternative but to hold that, there is an inordinate
delay in lodging the compliant and the prosecution grossly
failed to explain the same. Further, the said delay and the
(2008) 14 SCC 763
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discrepancies in the date of incident goes to the root of the
prosecution case.
16. On coming to the evidence placed by the
prosecution on the alleged sexual assault committed by
the accused, prosecutrix has stated that after the incident
she neither revealed the same to her parents nor anybody
else for a period of six months. Further, in her cross-
examination, she has stated that while she was working as
a coolie alongside the accused, her parents were very
much present in the field. According to her, after the
incident, she visited the accused's house and stayed there
for four days. Thereafter, since the accused and his
parents refused to solemnize the marriage of the victim
with the accused, she lodged a complaint. Hence, there
arises doubt in the evidence of PW-1 about her veracity in
respect of the alleged sexual assault committed by the
accused. In such circumstances, the evidence of
prosecutrix leaves some doubt in respect of the occurrence
of the incident itself as stated by her. The version of PW.1
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cannot be construed as sterling quality as held by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments.
17. Be that as it may be, coming to the next aspect
i.e., the age of the victim that she was a minor and aged
about 16 years at the time of incident as claimed by the
prosecution. On perusal of the evidence of PW-8 i.e., the
Headmistress of the school in which PW-1 studied and
Exs.P-10 and 11 the certificate and the School Register
respectively, states that the victim was aged about 16
years, nevertheless as rightly pointed out by the learned
counsel for the appellant, PW-8 i.e., the author of Ex.P-11
categorically admitted in her evidence that there is
tampering of Ex.P-11 involving the date of birth of the
victim. The prosecution failed to place the original register
before the Trial Court. In such circumstances, the
admission of PW-8 the author of Ex.P-11 regarding the
tampering of Ex.P-11 cannot be ignored. Further, PW-8
also admitted in her evidence that, Exs.P-10 and 11 are
not based on any authenticated documents like birth
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certificate issued by the concerned authorities. Further,
on perusal of the evidence of PW-10 - Doctor who
examined the victim also stated in her evidence that, the
age of the victim was 18 years at the time of the alleged
incident and the same was reiterated in the medical
certificate Ex.P-16 . The co-ordinate bench of this Court in
Criminal Appeal No.200109/2014 dated 05.11.2024 held
regarding determination of the age of the victim at
paragraph Nos.40 and 41 as under:
"40. As regards the age of the victim, it is the
settled position of law that the same test of
juvenility vis - a-vis an accused who seeks benefit
of being a juvenile would be sufficient test to
determine age of the victim. The Apex Court in
Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, [(2013) 7 SCC
263] at para 23 has observed as follows:
"23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only
to determine the age of a child in conflict with law,
we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory
provision should be the basis for determining age,
even of a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our
view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the
issue of minority is concerned, between a child in
conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of
crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it
would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of
the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the
prosecutrix VW, PW 6. The manner of determining
age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule
(3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the
aforesaid provision, the age of a child is
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ascertained by adopting the first available basis
out of a number of options postulated in Rule
12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule
12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding
clause, it has overriding effect over an option
expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest
rated option available would conclusively
determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of
Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate
of the child concerned is the highest rated option.
In case, the said certificate is available, no other
evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence
of the said certificate, Rule 12(3) envisages
consideration of the date of birth entered in the
school first attended by the child. In case such an
entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth
depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and
conclusive, and no other material is to be relied
upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule
12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate
issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or
a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is
available, then no other material whatsoever is to
be taken into consideration for determining the
age of the child concerned, as the said certificate
would conclusively determine the age of the child.
It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid,
that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of
age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical
opinion."
41. Under Rule 12 of Juvenile Justice Rules, the
documents that could be relied for the determination
of the age are as follows:
"12. Procedure to be followed in determination of
Age.--
Xxx
(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile
in conflict with law, the age determination
inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the
Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by
seeking evidence by obtaining--
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(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates,
if available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school
(other than a play school) first attended; and in
the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or
a municipal authority or a panchayat;"
18. On perusal of the above judgment passed by
the co-ordinate bench of this Court, it is relatively clear
that as per Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, in order
to prove the age of the child or juvenile, the procedure to
be followed and the documents to be relied by the
prosecution are the matriculation or equivalent certificates
if available; and in the absence the date of birth certificate
from the school (other than a pay school) first attended;
and in the absence the birth certificate given by a
Corporation or a Municipal Authority or a Panchayat.
Hence, considering the above aspect, we are of the
considered view that, the prosecution also failed to prove
that the victim was a minor as on the date of incident.
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19. Coming to the aspect of the medical evidence
placed by the prosecution to prove that the victim was
subjected to sexual intercourse, on careful perusal of the
evidence of PW-10 and the certificates issued by her i.e.,
Exs.P-15 to P-17, no doubt in Ex.P-16 PW-10 has stated
that the hymen of the victim was ruptured. However, PW-
10 kept her opinion pending after examination of the
victim initially and after obtaining the FSL report from the
concerned authority, has issued final opinion as per
Ex.P-17 which enumerates that there no traces of recent
sexual intercourse on the victim. The FSL report further
revealed that there is no spermatozoa found on the
clothes worn either by the accused or by the victim, which
were seized by the Investigation Officer, PW.11.
Admittedly, there is no such physical injury found on the
body of the victim. The rupture of the hymen itself cannot
be a ground to conclude that the victim was subjected to
sexual intercourse.
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20. On perusal of deposition of PW.10, Medical
Officer, coupled with medical certificate as per Exs.P16
and 17, we are of the considered view that, the
prosecution failed to prove medical evidence in this case
that the victim was subjected to sexual intercourse. As
such, it is hard to believe that the accused committed an
act of forceful penetrative sexual intercourse on the
victim.
21. In such circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the case of Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State Of NCT Of
Delhi2 has held as under:
"32. In the decision reported as Krishan
Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana (supra) in
respect of the offence of gang rape under
Section 376 (2) (g), IPC, it has been held as
under in paras 31 and 32:
"31. No doubt, it is true that to hold an
accused guilty for commission of an offence of
rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is
sufficient provided the same inspires confidence
and appears to be absolutely trustworthy,
unblemished and should be of sterling quality.
But, in the case in hand, the evidence of the
2012 (8) SCC 21 Para 32
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prosecutrix, showing several lacunae, which
have already been projected hereinabove,
would go to show that her evidence does not
fall in that category and cannot be relied upon
to hold the appellant guilty of the said offences.
32. Indeed there are several significant
variations in material facts in her Section 164
statement, Section 161 statement (CrPC), FIR
and deposition in court. Thus, it was necessary
to get her evidence corroborated
independently, which they could have done
either by examination of Ritu, her sister or
Bimla Devi, who were present in the house at
the time of her alleged abduction. The record
shows that Bimla Devi though cited as a
witness was not examined and later given up
by the public prosecutor on the ground that she
has been won over by the appellant."
(emphasis added)
22. On perusal of the above dictum, it is clear that,
though there is no bar to rely solitary evidence of the
prosecutrix, the said evidence of prosecutrix is to be
trustworthy, unblemished and it should be of sterling
quality.
23. In the case on hand, the evidence of the
prosecutrix creates doubt in respect of manner in which
the act was committed by the accused and she has failed
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to state the very date of incident and non-corroboration of
her version with the medical evidence. Hence, testimony
of PW.1 cannot be considered as sterling quality.
24. It is vehemently contended by the learned Addl.
SPP that the prosecution has clearly proved the offence
committed by the accused under the provisions of Sections
3(1) (w) (i) and 3 (2) (v) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.
25. We have perused the evidence of the
prosecutrix, so also the evidence of PW.11, the
Investigation Officer and PW.13, the then PSI who
registered the FIR and the caste certificate obtained by
PW.1 as per Ex.P8. The caste of the victim has not been
disputed there is no doubt that she belonged to Scheduled
Caste community.
26. Section 3 (2) (v) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
reads thus:
"Section 3 (2) (v): Section 3 Punishments for
offences of atrocities (2) Whoever, not being a
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member of a scheduled caste or a scheduled
tribe
(v) commits any offence under the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) punishable with
imprisonment for a term of ten years or more
against a person or property knowing that such
person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such
member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for
life and with fine;"
27. From the perusal of above provision, it is clear
that in order to attract the above provision, the
prosecution has to prove the aspect that the accused has
committed an act to the victim by knowing well that she
belong to SC/ST and also to disrespect her caste.
28. A perusal of the evidence of PW.1 or the
evidence of PW.11 and PW.13, Investigation Officers,
nowhere these witnesses have stated that the accused
was aware about the caste of the victim and with such
knowledge he has committed the sexual intercourse on
her.
29. Hence, on careful consideration of the above
aspect, it is clear that the prosecution has failed to prove
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the offences punishable under the provisions of the SC/ST
(POA) Act against the accused.
30. On overall perusal of the entire evidence on
record, in our considered view, the learned Special Judge
has misread the evidence and has wrongly convicted the
accused for the charges leveled against him. The evidence
placed by the prosecution is not cogent, reliable,
convincing and trustworthy. In such circumstances,
interference is required in the impugned judgment passed
by the learned Special Judge. In that view of the matter,
we answer the point No.1 in affirmative and point No.2 in
negative and proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
Accordingly, Crl.A 200078/2020 is allowed.
The judgment of conviction and order of sentence
passed by the V Additional/ Special Judge at Kalaburagi in
Spl.C POCSO No.43/2019 dated 21.03.2020 is set aside.
- 27 -
NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB
The appellant-accused is acquitted of the offences
punishable under Sections 376(2) (i) and (n) and Section
506 of IPC, Section 3 (1) (w) (i) and 3 (2) (v) of SC/ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and for the offence
punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012.
The concerned Jail authorities are directed to release
the appellant-accused forthwith, if he is not required in
any other case.
The fine amount, if any, deposited by the accused
shall be refunded to him on proper identification.
Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to
the concerned Jail authorities.
Sd/-
(S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(RAJESH RAI K)
JUDGE
SWK,NP
Ct;VK
