part of the lands in Thokur, Kenjar and Kulai villages that were
provided free of cost.
69. It is stated on behalf of the KIADB that KIADB did not accept
the surrender of 200 acres of land as offered but, the KIADB had
identified another parcel of land, which was required to be
surrendered. The minutes of the three hundredth meeting of the
KIADB held on 21.05.2010 are placed on record. The said minutes
indicate that the land proposed to be offered by the appellant for
the cricket stadium was covered in a CRZ area and therefore, the
same was not acceptable. KIADB resolved that notice be issued to
JESCO to surrender the parcels of lands identified out of the
748.70 acres of land. Subsequently, on 27.09.2010, the KIADB
directed JESCO to surrender 193.57 acres out of the lands
remaining with the appellant. There is some mismatch in the extent
of lands referred to in various minutes. Whereas, the minutes of the
meeting of the KIADB held on 21.05.2010 record that 748.70 acres
of land were with the appellant, the minutes of the meeting held on
27.09.2010 indicate the area as 742.26 acres of land.
- 49 -
70. Admittedly, the appellant did not implement the projects for
setting up of the IT/ITES- SEZ and free trading and warehousing
SEZ over a land measuring 375 acres of land.
71. In the meanwhile, JESCO also furnished proposal for setting
up seven other projects over lands measuring 173.69 acres.
These proposals were also approved by SHLCC at the meeting
held on 19.11.2008. Admittedly, none of these projects were
implemented.
72. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that KIADB had
stalled the projects by demanding 193.52 acres of lands that were
required for the approved projects and refusing to issue the revised
possession certificates. However, at the material time, there were
nine approved projects: two SEZs, one over 125 acres and the
other over 250 acres; and seven other projects over 173.69 acres.
No work was executed on the ground in respect of any of these
nine projects.
73. On 15.10.2010, KIADB directed the appellant to surrender
possession of 193.57 acres of land as identified by it and to return
the original possession certificates to enable them to issue a
revised possession certificate. The appellant did not comply with
- 50 -
the same and responded by a letter dated 23.10.2010 contending
that it had already surrendered 200 acres of land and called upon
the KIADB to withdraw the said demand for surrendering 193.57
acres of land in Kenjar and Thokur villages. At that stage, KIADB
did not relent and issued another letter dated 03.11.2010 setting
out the particulars of 193.57 acres of land in Kenjar and Thokkur
villages, which were required, and called upon the appellant to
surrender the same by 05.01.2011. The said communication was
followed by a letter dated 16.12.2010, whereby KIADB once again
directed the appellant to surrender the specified areas of land
measuring 193.57 acres in Kenjar and Thokur Villages by
05.01.2011. The appellant was also put to notice that on failure to
surrender the said land, KIADB would take steps for forcible
possession of the same.
74. The appellant filed a writ petition (being W.P.No.41727/2010)
challenging the order dated 16.12.2010 directing it to surrender
193.57 acres of land. In the said petition, an interim order was
granted directing that the appellant's possession would not be
disturbed.
- 51 -
75. Thereafter, the appellant sought approval of two new
projects, one for setting up a fertilizer and chemical complex over
an area of 447 acres and the second for an integrated township
complex over an area of 101 acres. The SHLCC granted the
approval for the fertilizer project to the extent of 423.45 acres
subject to the condition of the appellant surrendering of 193.57
acres. The Government of Karnataka issued a Government order
dated 18.08.2011 to the aforesaid effect.
76. The appellant represented against the said order on
23.08.2011. It submitted a request to the Hon'ble Minister of Large
and Medium Industries, Government of Karnataka, seeking waiver
of the condition requiring it to hand over 193.57 acres of land as
identified by KIADB.
77. It is material to note that the KIADB required 193.57 acres of
identified land for setting up an industrial area. On 14.09.2011, the
Chief Executive Officer and The Executive Members of the KIADB
furnished their response to the appellant's request for waiver of the
said condition. They opposed the same on the ground that 193.57
acres was necessary to develop in the industrial area of Mangalore
District.
- 52 -
78. Notwithstanding the above, the Hon'ble Minister of Large and
Medium Industries, Government of Karnataka, recommended that
the condition imposed in the Government order dated 18.08.2011
requiring surrender of 193.57 acres of land be waived. Following
the said recommendation, the Government issued an order dated
07.05.2012 waiving the condition imposed by KIADB to hand over
193.57 acres of land required for KIADB for setting up an industrial
area. The said order indicates that out of the 200 acres of land,
which was surrendered by JESCO, 48.39 acres of land was found
suitable for starting a boundary fee office. The same was directed
to be handed over to Mangalore SEZ Limited. Thereafter, the
appellant withdrew its writ petition in W.P.No.41727/2010 on
05.06.2012.
79. The aforesaid events pose several questions. The first
relates to the surrender of 200 acres of land, which JESCO states
that it had voluntarily done. The minutes of the meeting of KIADB
held on 21.05.2010 records that the lands proposed to be offered
by JESCO for the cricket stadium, was fell in the CRZ area and
therefore, the same was not acceptable. KIADB had resolved that
JESCO be directed to surrender the lands as identified by KIADB in
its possession. Our attention was not drawn to any document on
- 53 -
record, which would explain as to why the 200 acres of land -
which were found to be not acceptable by KIADB - was
subsequently accepted by KIADB or the Government.
80. It is also material to note that 204.75 acres had been handed
over to the appellant free of cost. There could be no impediment
for recovering possession of these lands (95.81 acres in
Baikampady, 83.07 acres in Thokur, 14.25 acres in Kenjara and
11.62 acres in Kulai villages). Once it was found that JESCO was
not proceeding with the project, there could be no impediment in
taking over the said lands for which JESCO had not paid any
consideration. There could be no issue of return of compensation
insofar as the said 204.75 acres of lands are concerned. The
extracts of the minutes of 254th meeting of KIADB held on
06.12.2003 also records that the extent of 204.75 acres of land be
excluded while arriving at the cost of land as the same were
handed over free of cost. The only cost paid by JESCO was for
private lands, which were acquired from land owners.
Notwithstanding the said minutes, there is no clarity as to further
steps taken in respect of the said land.
- 54 -
81. As noted at the outset, the appellant did not implement the
project for setting up a fertilizer plan and integrated township, the
approval of which was granted in terms of the revised Government
order dated 07.05.2012.
82. It is to be noted that approval for setting up the fertilizer and
chemical unit was granted on 18.08.2011 and it was valid for two
years. The said approval was subsequently modified on
07.05.2012 at the request of the appellant, by withdrawing the
condition requiring the appellant to surrender 193.57 acres. The
approvals were valid till 17.08.2013. In the meanwhile, the
Karnataka Udyog Mitra [KUM], sought information regarding the
status of the project, by its letter dated 25.10.2012. The appellant
responded by letter dated 08.11.2012 setting out the various steps
taken by it. However, it is apparent that even as of 08.11.2012,
any concrete steps had been taken on ground to establish the
fertilizer plant. The steps taken were largely related to seeking
approvals and reports.
83. After the term of the approval had expired, the appellant sent
a letter dated 16.08.2013 seeking extension of three years to
complete the project. It stated that it had been unable to achieve
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the desired level of progress in implementing the two projects -
fertilizer and chemical complex over an extent of 447.70 acres and
an integrated township over an extent of 101.00 acres. The said
letter indicates that the only steps taken by the appellant were
regarding "survey work, soil investigation, water analysis, land
filling, fencing, appointment of consultants and financial tie-up and
filing applications for seeking approvals".
84. The appellant stated in its letter that it was making sincere
and vigorous efforts for early clearance and approvals. It
acknowledged that it had not been able to achieve the desired level
of progress. It claimed that the same was on account of various
factors including land documentation, execution of lease-cum-sale
deed, recession in the economy, waiting clearance from the
Ministry of Environment and Forest. It is material to note that the
projects would entail investments of 1984 crores (1500 crores of
fertilizer and chemical complex and 484 crores for integrated
township). However, there was no indication as to the amount
invested. JESCO's letter did not indicate as to the extent of
investments already made or any evidence of incurring the same.
- 56 -
85. After receipt of the said recommendation, the KUM by a letter
dated 25.10.2012 requested CEO and EM of KIADB to conduct a
spot investigation and send a report regarding the development
work carried out by JESCO on the subject lands. The Joint
Director, Dakshina Kannada submitted a report dated 06.12.2013
stating that no development work had been carried out by the
JESCO on the property in question. In the meanwhile, the
Government issued a communication dated 11.11.2013 directing
KIADB to resume the land from JESCO to the extent of 742.26
acres. A plain reading of the said order indicates that it is based on
the fact that no industrial activity had been undertaken by JESCO
for the last 25 years. It is material to note that the said order also
records that JESCO had not surrendered 200 acres of land.
86. On 17.12.2013, the appellant filed a writ petition being
W.P.No.57644/2013 impugning the order dated 11.11.2013. On
09.12.2013, this Court passed an ad-interim order directing the
appellant not to be dispossessed of the said lands. It is material to
note that the appellant had sought two reliefs in the said petition
namely, (a) to quash the order dated 11.11.2013 directing
resumption of the land; and (b) for a writ in the nature of
mandamus to the Government of Karnataka to consider the
- 57 -
appellant's representation dated 16.08.2013 and an online
application dated 19.11.2013, inter alia seeking extension of the
approval.
87. During the course of the proceedings, on 14.06.2017, the
petitioner unconditionally withdrew the relief seeking quashing of
the order dated 11.11.2013 (prayer a) and confined the petition to
the relief as seeking consideration of his representation dated
16.08.2013 and online application dated 19.11.2013. The said
petition was accordingly disposed of by an order dated 14.06.2017
in view of the submissions made by the learned Additional
Government Advocate that the application would be considered, in
accordance with law.
88. In the meanwhile, KIADB had issued a notice dated
10.01.2014 under Section 34-B of the KIAD Act. In terms of the
said notice, it was noted that the appellant had failed to utililze the
land, which was handed over after a lapse of more than 17 years.
The appellant was called upon to remedy the specific breach within
a period of ninety days, failing which steps would be taken to
terminate the allotment. The said notice continued to be
outstanding. However, no steps could be taken for resuming the
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land in view of the interim orders dated 17.12.2013 passed by this
Court in W.P.No.57644/2013. The appellant continued to enjoy the
protection of the said order till it was vacated with the disposal of
the writ petition on 14.06.2017. As noted above, the petition was
disposed of as the appellant had accepted the order dated
11.11.2013 and had withdrawn the relief seeking setting aside of
the said order.
89. The appellant's representation was considered by the
SHLCC in its 48th meeting held on 31.08.2017. The minutes of the
meeting indicate that the SHLCC had examined the course of
events that had transpired after it had approved JESCO's proposal
to set up the integrated plant on 07.05.1992. Considering the
same, SHLCC resolved to reject the request and the representation
for extension dated 16.08.2013 and the appellant's online
application dated 19.11.2013 seeking extension of time for
implementation of the projects (Fertilizer and Chemical Project and
Integrated Township project). The SHLCC also resolved to take
necessary action for resumption of the total extent of land provided
to JESCO.
- 59 -
90. In the aforesaid backdrop, the KIADB passed an order dated
14.11.2017 under Section 34B(4) of the KIAD Act, directing the
appellant to surrender the land within a period of seven days. As
noted above, the appellant challenged the said order by filing a writ
petition (being W.P.No.52937/2017). On 22.11.2017, this Court
passed an order directing status quo. As noted above, it is the
respondent's contention that the possession of the lands was taken
over at 1.00 p.m. on 22.11.2017 and the mahazar to the aforesaid
effect has been placed on record. The appellant contends that the
said mahazar is liable to be set aside, as it was passed in violation
of the status quo order dated 22.11.2017. This is countered by the
State on the ground that the order dated 22.11.2017 was received
after the possession of the land was taken over. The learned
Single Judge had rightly found that it was not necessary to
examine the same in the writ petition for essentially two reasons.
First that the order directing resumption of land - order dated
11.11.2013 - had attained finality. The appellant having withdrawn
his challenge to the said order, could not resist the implementation
of the same.
91. The appellant's relief was now confined to the question
whether it was entitled to extension of time as sought for in its
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representation dated 16.08.2013 and its online application dated
19.11.2013. The same was rejected by SHLCC in its 48th meeting.
92. The appellant thus challenged the same by filing a writ
petition (being W.P.No.566/2018) challenging the decision of the
SHLCC rejecting the representation dated 16.08.2013 and the
online application dated 19.11.2013. The appellant also challenged
the mahazar dated 22.11.2017.
93. The learned Single Judge passed an order dated 08.01.2018
staying further proceedings pursuant to the minutes of the meeting
dated 31.08.2017 and mahazar dated 22.11.2017. These orders
were subsequently modified.
94. KIADB had filed an application seeking permission to allot
160 acres of land at Baikampady village in favour of Coast Guard.
This Court modified the status quo order passed in
W.P.No.52937/2017 and W.P.No.566/2018 granting liberty to the
KIADB to proceed with the allotment of land for establishing Indian
Coast Guard Training Centre. The Indian Coast Guard had
submitted an application seeking change in the name of the village
from Baikampady to Kenjaru and on 08.03.2018, a corrigendum to
the aforesaid effect was issued and the allotment letter was
- 61 -
modified. The KIADB also filed an application in W.P.No.566/2018,
seeking modification, which was allowed by an order dated
23.04.2018.
95. The appellant filed yet another petition (being
W.P.No.41829/2019) impugning the corrigendum. As noted above,
these petitions were disposed of by the impugned order.
96. The principal question that requires to be examined is as to
the appellant's right in respect of the subject lands. We concur with
the findings of the learned Single Judge that the appellant had no
right, title or interest in the subject lands. The possession of the
subject lands was handed over on issuance of certificate of
possession. Although no allotment was made, any allotment of land
by KIADB would necessarily require to be made for the purposes of
the Act. In this case, KIADB had issued an allotment letter in
respect of 160 acres of land, which set out detailed conditions to be
complied with. However, no lands were handed over pursuant to
the said allotment letter. And, the subject lands were handed over
albeit without executing any allotment letter or any other document
setting out the conditions on which such allotment could be made.
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Plainly, the terms of allotments of the subject lands could not be
any different, if the same had been articulated.
97. Indisputably KIADB had handed over possession to JESCO
without following any statutory requirements or norms.
98. Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Regulations,
1969 [the Regulations] set out the manner in which the
applications for allotment are required to be made and the manner
in which the allotment is to be made. In terms of clause (a) of
Regulation 10 of the Regulations, the allotment can be made by
KIADB on being satisfied that the person who has made an
application is likely to start production within a reasonable period.
In terms of clause (c) of Regulation 10 of the Regulations, the
application to whom allotment is made is required to be notified to
execute an agreement in Form 3 or 4 or 5, as the case may be,
with certain modifications.
99. In the present case, no documents were executed for either
allotting the said land or setting out the conditions for the allotment.
The possession of the subject land was handed over merely on
JESCO's proposal that it would set up an integrated steel plant.
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KIADB did not undertake any review of the steps taken by JESCO
for implementing the project.
100. Since JESCO decided had not pursue the project; the
fundamental premise on which land was provided to did not
survive. The question whether JESCO would be entitled to recover
any amount against the tentative cost paid by it, is a separate
issue. Since the subject land was never transferred to JESCO and
the very purpose for which the JESCO had taken possession of the
lands was admittedly not pursued, it had no right to retain the
possession of the same. The subject lands continued to vest with
the Government/KIADB.
101. Regulation 5 of the Regulations expressly requires KIADB to
decide the manner of disposal of the land. The said regulation is
set out below:
"5. Manner of disposal of land.-- The Board shall decide
the manner of disposal of land / shed in each industrial
area or part thereof, i.e., whether by lease, lease-cum-
sale, sale, auction-sale, auction-lease, assignment or
otherwise. In each case, the Board will also have the
discretion to decide the detailed conditions which shall be
binding on the applicant."
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102. In the present case, there appears to be no particular
decision on record regarding the manner of disposal of land to the
appellant. However, the allotment letter dated 31.10.1992 clearly
sets out the manner in which the KIADB had decided disposing the
land in favour of the appellant. It is also not disputed that the
conditions as set out in the said letter are ordinarily imposed by the
KIADB.
103. It is a matter of concern as to how the JESCO had acquired
the possession of the land without any formal allotment letter and
without KIADB setting out the manner of disposal. Copies of the
possession certificates, which have since been placed on record,
merely record that possession of the subject lands have been
handed over to JESCO. We may refer to one such Possession
Certificate, Possession Certificate dated 07.10.1996, the same is
set out below:
"POSSESSION CERTIFICATE
Sub: Handing over of 204.75 acres of I
land in favour of JESCO (Unit of NFCL)
Ref: 1. INo.RD/72/LGA/92 dt. 21.12.1993.
2. Letter No.CI 84/SPI 95 dt: 4.10.96
from the Principal Secretary
to I.Commerce & Industries Dept.
3. Letter No.KIADB/937/I 9002/96-97
- 65 -
dt. 5.10.96 from Head Office.
4. Letter No.LAQ.1/93-94/596 dt: 18.9.95
of Spl. Land Acquisition Officer,
K.I.A.D.B., Mangalore.
-----
With reference above, I am handing over an extent
of 204.75 acres of Govt. land in Kulai, Baikampady, 62
Thokur and Kenjar villages as detailed in Annexure to
M/s. JESCO (Unit of NFCL) today the, 7th October 1996."
104. As is apparent, the said Possession Certificate refers to
certain letters from KIADB, which are not on record. However, the
certificate simply states that the land to the extent of 204.75 acres
of Government lands are handed over to JESCO.
105. The contention that the said Possession Certificate must be
construed as an allotment letter - as was earnestly contended by
Sri Nandkumar on behalf of the appellant - is unmerited. The
possession certificate does not set out any terms of allotment. It
does not set out whether the subject land would be disposed of by
execution of a lease, lease-cum-sale agreement, or otherwise. In
each case, KIADB has the discretion to decide the conditions which
should be binding on the allottee. However, in the present case,
the possession certificates do not set out any conditions.
- 66 -
106. We are thus unable to accept that the possession certificates
can be construed as allotment letters which embody the decision of
the KIADB for disposal of the subject lands.
107. If the terms and conditions as set out in the allotment letter
dated 31.10.1992 - are accepted as the decision of KIADB as to
the terms on which allotment of the subject land was to be made -
which we are inclined to accept - it is apparent that the allotment
was required to be cancelled, as those conditions were not
complied with.
108. The subject lands, which measured totally 986.52 acres
comprised of two components - 204.75 acres of Government land
which was provided free of cost - and 781.77 acres of private land
for which certain amounts were paid by the JESCO.
109. The manner in which the possession of the said lands were
handed over to JESCO, raises serious questions as to the conduct
of the parties. In effect, the authorities have simply parted with
possession of the lands, which were acquired for specific purpose,
without ensuring that the said purpose is implemented.
- 67 -
110. Once it is clear that the JESCO was not proceeding with the
purpose for which possession of the subject lands were provided, it
was incumbent upon the KIADB to resume possession of the
same. However, the KIADB only resumed part of the land which
was then allotted to other industries. It appears that it was also
ensured that the process was one that was remunerative to
JESCO. The 244.25 acres of land which were allotted to other
industries was against the payment of compensation which far
exceeded the amount paid by JESCO to KIADB for the private
lands. This is despite the fact that the JESCO had no interest in the
subject land. And, the Government land was handed over free of
costs.
111. In the present case, agricultural lands were acquired. It is
obvious that several farmers would have lost their means of
livelihood from the said lands. The acquisition would be justified if
the public purpose for which it is acquired was fulfilled, as the same
would generate employment. However, it is apparent that instead
of acquisition of land working in public interest, it has worked quite
to the contrary. Apart from JESCO aggregating possession of
large tracts of land, which it would find extremely difficult to do
without the statutory machinery for land acquisition, no other
- 68 -
person benefited. We concur with the learned Single Judge that
the manner in which the authorities and the Government have
proceeded, requires to be enquired into. It also appears that the
conduct of certain persons may fall foul of the provisions of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. We were inclined to issue
directions in this regard. However, at this stage, we consider it
suffice to direct that an enquiry be conducted by a team of persons
headed by a person not below the rank of Secretary to the
Government of India, in order to examine the manner in which the
public property has been dealt with. Needless to state that if the
enquiry finds that any offence punishable under the Prevention of
Corruption Act or any other law has been committed, the
concerned authorities shall take necessary steps to institute
proceedings in this regard.
112. The contention that the appellant was required to be afforded
further opportunities under Section 34-B of the KIAD Act or the
belated action taken by the respondents was in violation of
principles of natural justice, is unpersuasive. First of all, Section
34B of the KIAD Act is inapplicable in the facts of this case. The
said section would be applicable only where allottee of any
premises has violated any terms and conditions of the allotment.
- 69 -
113. In the present case, it is contended on behalf the appellant
that Possession Certificates must be deemed to be allotment. It is
difficult to accept the said contention. In fact, there is no specific
order or instrument allotting the subject lands. Further, if it is
assumed that the subject lands were allotted, it would also be
necessary to assume that it was on the conditions as set out in the
allotment letter dated 31.10.1992.
114. No instrument of transfer (lease-cum-sale or sale) had been
executed and registered in favour of the appellant. Thus, the
question of the appellant acquiring any right or interest on the
subject lands does not arise. Absent any right or interest in the
subject land, and failure to use the same for the purpose for which
the possession was handed over, KIADB's resumption of the same
cannot be faulted.
115. We consider it relevant to refer to the decision in the case of
Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation vs.
MESCO Kalinga Steel Limited and Others : (2017) 5 SCC 586.
In the said case, MESCO had applied for 2500 acres of land to
Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (IDCO).
IDCO in turn had requested the Government to issue necessary
- 70 -
orders for possessing the allotment. The Government of Orissa
had conveyed its principal approval for allotment of land of 2500
acres for establishing a steel plant. In the first place, IDCO had
requested MESCO to take over possession of 1756.29 acres of
land and to submit a draft lease for execution. MESCO took over
possession of the land but did not execute the lease deed. There
were other issues, which were also raised in the said case. IDCO
had issued a notice for resumption of the land and issued a notice
directing payment of consideration and resumption of land and
finally resumed the land and the possession later was cancelled.
In the said context, the Court held that the relationship of lessor
and lessee never came into being in the absence of a lease deed.
The possession was enjoyed by MESCO without execution of a
lease deed. The Court held that "MESCO had no enforceable right
for grant of any relief by mere handing over of possession."
Accordingly, the Court set aside the order of the High Court
directing to execute a lease in respect of part of the said lands.
116. In the present case as well, the appellant acquired no right or
interest in the subject land. Having stated the above, we also note
that a notice under Section 34-B of the KIAD Act was in fact issued
to the appellant on 10.01.2014 expressly calling upon the appellant
- 71 -
to remedy the breach of not undertaking the industrial work, failing
which the land would be resumed. It is the appellant's response
that the delay was inter alia attributable to recession in economy
and delay in KIADB in execution of lease-cum-sale deed. It is also
material to note that the appellant responded by stating that
Section 34-B of the KIAD Act was not applicable. It is KIADB's
stand in response to the said notice that Section 34-B is not
applicable. The appellant had claimed that,
"KIADB cannot invoke Section 34-B on JESCO under
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 in the
absence of terms and conditions on allotment of land as
KIADB has not executed Lease cum Sale Deed so far and
while JESCO is executing the approved projects. Any action
of KIADB in the matter is a contempt of court as the matter is
before the High Court of Karnataka."
117. The contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant before
this Court are clearly contrary to the aforesaid stand as articulated
in the letter sent in response to the notice dated 10.01.2014. Thus,
the appellant cannot make a grievance of the process under
Section 34-B of the KIAD Act not being followed. It is also material
to note that the said notice had been issued after an order dated
11.11.2013 was passed for resumption of the subject lands. As
noted above, that order had been challenged and was then
- 72 -
withdrawn on 14.06.2017 and had thus attained finality. The notice
dated 10.04.2014 was outstanding as on that date and the period
of ninety days as provided in the notice was over. It is clear that
the appellant had confined its relief for seeking consideration of its
representation for extension of the approval for the project. The
said extension was duly considered by SHLCC at its meeting held
on 31.08.2017 and the same was rejected. Thereafter, KIADB had
issued a final order under Section 34-B(4) of the KIAD Act.
118. The appellant was provided sufficient opportunity spanning
over several years to address the issue as to why the lands should
not be resumed. Having confined its relief to only seeking for
consideration of the representation for extension of time for
completing the project - which was duly considered - it is not open
for the appellant now to challenge the order of resumption albeit on
the ground that Section 34-B had not been followed particularly
when it was the appellant's stand that the said section is
inapplicable in the absence of any allotment or lease-cum-sale in
its favour.
119. We find no merit in the present appeal. The same is
accordingly, dismissed.
- 73 -
120. JESCO has enjoyed the possession of the subject land for
several years till it was taken over. We clarify that this order would
not preclude the State / KIADB from making an appropriate claim
for compensation for the same. The question whether the
appellant would be entitled to refund of the amount paid or any
portion of the same, is also left open.
Sd/-
(VIBHU BAKHRU)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
(C M JOSHI)
JUDGE
KS / AHB
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