[Cites 25, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Sri. Venkatesh S/O. Raghavendra Gudi vs The State Of Karnataka on 2 December, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
-1-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
WP No. 100738 of 2022
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 2ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION NO. 100738 OF 2022 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
SRI. VENKATESH S/O. RAGHAVENDRA GUDI
AGE. 59 YEARS, OCC. BOND WRITER
R/O. NEAR LAKSMI-VENKATESH TEMPLE,
HIREBANA, TQ. LAXMESHWAR,
DIST. GADAG-582116.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. SOURABH A. SONDUR, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. K. L. PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH LOKAYUKTA POLICE STATION,
GADAG,
REPRESENTED BY
SPL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH 580 011.
...RESPONDENT
Digitally signed by
RAKESH S (BY SRI. ANIL KALE, ADVOCATE)
HARIHAR
Location: High Court
of Karnataka, THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
Dharwad Bench, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482 OF
Dharwad
CR.P.C. PRAYING TO: ISSUE A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI
QUASHING THE ENTIRE CHARGE SHEET DATED 19/08/2021 IN GADAG
A.C.B. POLICE STATION CRIME NO.17/2019 WHICH IS REGISTERED
AS SPL (S.V.C.) NO.09/2021 ON THE FILE OF PRL. DISTRICT AND
SESSIONS JUDGE AND SPECIAL COURT, GADAG, FOR OFFENCES
PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 7-A AND 12 OF PREVENTION OF
CORRUPTION ACT 1988 (AMENDMENT ACT 2018) AND RULE 10 AND
22 OF KARNATAKA REGISTRATION (BOND WRITERS LICENSE) RULES
1979, VIDE ANNEXURE-E, SO FAR AS THE PRESENT
PETITIONER/ACCUSED NO.3 IS CONCERNED, IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
-2-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
WP No. 100738 of 2022
HC-KAR
THIS WRIT PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
IN B GROUP THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
ORAL ORDER
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA)
1. The petitioner is before this Court calling in question
the proceedings in Spl. (SVC) No.9/2021.
2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits qua
most of the accused, this court has quashed the proceedings
and the petitioner, who is accused No.3, is entitled to the same
benefit that is passed qua accused No.1 and others.
4. Learned counsel Sri. Anil Kale appearing for the
Lokayukta has filed statement of objections refuting the
submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in
seeking dismissal of the petition.
5. This Court in Criminal Petition No.101560/2023 has
held has follows:
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question
proceedings in Special (SVC) No.9 of 2021 arising out of
Crime No.17 of 2019 registered for offences punishable
under Sections 7(a), 7A, 12 and 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for
short). The petitioner is accused No.1.
2. Facts adumbrated are as follows:-
An anonymous complaint emerges against the
functioning of the Sub-Registrar's office at Gadag. The
allegation was that all the staff in the office is in the habit
of demanding bribe and, therefore, a request was made to
personally visit the Sub-Registrar's office, look at the truth
and initiate proceedings. The complaint was made to the
Deputy Superintendent of Police of the Anti-Corruption
Bureau. Based upon this, a crime is registered in Crime
No.17 of 2019, a search warrant was secured and office of
the Sub-Registrar, Gadag was searched. What was found,
according to the search so conducted, from the hands of
the petitioner was allegedly Rs.9390/- and all others who
were in the office of the Sub-Registrar at the time of search
were either licensed deed writers or private parties who had
come to get the documents registered. Based upon the
search, alleging that there was demand and acceptance
against the staff of the Sub-Registrar's office and private
persons, an investigation is taken up. The investigation
leads to filing of charge sheet and filing of charge sheet
leads to securing sanction from the hands of the competent
authority to prosecute the petitioner as obtaining under
Section 19 of the Act. After the sanction being placed
before the concerned Court, the concerned Court takes
cognizance of the offence and registers Special case No.9 of
2021. It is at that point in time the petitioner knocks at the
doors of this Court in Criminal Petition No.100368 of 2022
in which an interim order of stay of further proceedings was
granted. The said criminal petition comes to be disposed of
by an order of the co-ordinate Bench on 06-07-2023 on the
score that the office of Anti Corruption Bureau by then
stood abolished by a judicial order and liberty was reserved
to file a fresh petition by arraigning the Lokayukta as a
party respondent. It is, therefore, the present petition has
emerged. This Court, in the light of the earlier interim order
subsisting till the disposal of the petition, granted an
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
interim order of stay of all further proceedings in the
subject petition as well. Therefore, further proceedings
have not taken place in Special case No.9 of 2021 qua the
petitioner/accused No.1.
3. Heard Smt G. Bharati, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner and Sri Anil Kale, learned Special Public
Prosecutor appearing for the respondent.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
would vehemently contend that there is no ingredient of
demand and acceptance for an allegation under Section 7
or 7A of the Act, be it under un-amended or amended Act.
The learned counsel would further submit that an
anonymous complaint emerges, a search warrant is taken
on that strength and the office of the Sub-Registrar, Gadag
is searched. There are no trap proceedings conducted,
there is no bait money, no test was conducted for the notes
being the same and all that the Police of the ACB would do
is search the office, found totally Rs.27,000/- and attribute
it to the petitioner and other staff of the office. She would
further emphasise that without there being any demand or
acceptance Section 7 or Section 7A of the Act cannot be
laid against the petitioner.
5. Per-contra, the learned Special Public Prosecutor
Sri Anil Kale who has filed a statement of objections would
submit that certain amount was recovered from the hands
of the petitioner which was beyond Rs.100/- and from the
hands of several private parties. Therefore, it was a case
where Section 7 (a) or Section 7A of the Act would clearly
get attracted. He would submit that all these factors are a
matter of trial and, therefore, the trial should be permitted
to continue, as the office of the Sub-Registrar at Gadag had
been brooding rampant corruption.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned counsel and
have perused the material on record.
7. Before embarking upon consideration of the issue
on merits of the matter, I deem it appropriate to notice the
provisions of the Act that are alleged against the petitioner
and their interpretation by the Apex Court and then proceed
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
to make the facts applicable to the law as declared by the
Apex Court.
8. The provisions of the Act that are alleged are as
follows:
"7. Offence relating to public servant
being bribed.--Any public servant who,--
(a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain
from any person, an undue advantage,
with the intention to perform or cause
performance of public duty improperly
or dishonestly or to forbear or cause
forbearance to perform such duty either
by himself or by another public servant;
or
(b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an
undue advantage from any person as a
reward for the improper or dishonest
performance of a public duty or for
forbearing to perform such duty either by
himself or another public servant; or
(c) performs or induces another public servant
to perform improperly or dishonestly a public
duty or to forbear performance of such duty
in anticipation of or in consequence of
accepting an undue advantage from any
person,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than three years but which
may extend to seven years and shall also be liable
to fine.
Explanation 1.--For the purpose of this
section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting
to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute
an offence even if the performance of a public duty
by public servant, is not or has not been improper.
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
Illustration.--A public servant, 'S' asks a
person, 'P' to give him an amount of five thousand
rupees to process his routine ration card application
on time. 'S' is guilty of an offence under this
section.
Explanation 2.--For the purpose of this
section,--
(i) the expressions "obtains" or "accepts" or
"attempts to obtain" shall cover cases where
a person being a public servant, obtains or
"accepts" or attempts to obtain, any undue
advantage for himself or for another person,
by abusing his position as a public servant or
by using his personal influence over another
public servant; or by any other corrupt or
illegal means;
(ii) it shall be immaterial whether such person
being a public servant obtains or accepts, or
attempts to obtain the undue advantage
directly or through a third party.]
7-A. Taking undue advantage to
influence public servant by corrupt or illegal
means or by exercise of personal influence.--
Whoever accepts or obtains or attempts to
obtain from another person for himself or for
any other person any undue advantage as a
motive or reward to induce a public servant,
by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of
his personal influence to perform or to cause
performance of a public duty improperly or
dishonestly or to forbear or to cause to
forbear such public duty by such public
servant or by another public servant, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than three years but
which may extend to seven years and shall
also be liable to fine.
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
... ... ...
12. Punishment for abetment of
offences.--Whoever abets any offence
punishable under this Act, whether or not that
offence is committed in consequence of that
abetment, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall be not
less than three years, but which may extend
to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.
13. Criminal misconduct by a public
servant.--(1) A public servant is said to commit
the offence of criminal misconduct,--
(a) if he dishonestly or fraudulently
misappropriates or otherwise converts for his
own use any property entrusted to him or
any property under his control as a public
servant or allows any other person so to do;
or
(b) if he intentionally enriches himself illicitly
during the period of his office.
Explanation 1.--A person shall be presumed
to have intentionally enriched himself illicitly if he
or any person on his behalf, is in possession of or
has, at any time during the period of his office,
been in possession of pecuniary resources or
property disproportionate to his known sources of
income which the public servant cannot
satisfactorily account for.
Explanation 2.--The expression "known
sources of income" means income received from
any lawful sources.
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
(2) Any public servant who commits
criminal misconduct shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall be not
less than four years but which may extend
to ten years and shall also be liable to fine."
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 directs that any public servant who accepts or
attempts to obtain from any person undue advantage with
an intention to perform or cause performance of public duty
or to forbear such performance either by himself or by
another public servant is said to have committed the
offence of bribe. Therefore the soul of Section 7(a) is
demand and acceptance for the performance of public duty
or forbearance of such performance. Section 7A deals with
taking undue advantage to influence public servant by
corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of personal
influence. The section mandates that whoever accepts or
obtains or attempts to obtain from another person for
himself or for any other person undue advantage for
performance of a public duty or its forbearance is amenable
for punishment. Here again it should be demand and
acceptance by himself or through some other person.
Section 12 deals with abatement of offence which cannot be
applicable to the petitioner. Section 13(2) deals with
punishment for criminal misconduct. Criminal misconduct
is defined in Section 13(1)(a) that whoever dishonestly or
fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his
own use any property entrusted to him or enriches himself
illicitly during the period of his office. These are the
offences alleged against the petitioner. Since the soul is
Section 7 either under the un-amended Act or under the
amended Act, the interpretation of Section 7(a) or Section
7A by the Apex Court qua un-amended Act or the amended
Act is germane to be noticed.
INTERPRETATION UNDER THE UN-AMENDED ACT:
9. The Apex Court in the case of B.JAYARAJ v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH1 interprets Section 7 of the
Act and holds as follows:
(2014) 13 SCC 55
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
"7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is
concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand
of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the
said offence and mere recovery of currency notes
cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it
is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused
voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a
bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in
several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration
reference may be made to the decision in C.M.
Sharma v. State of A.P. [(2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2
SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [(2009) 3
SCC 779: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1]."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case of N.VIJAYAKUMAR v. STATE OF TAMILNADU2
the Apex Court holds as follows:
"26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery
by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution
against the accused. Reference can be made to the
judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779
: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and in B. Jayaraj v. State of
A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 :
(2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the aforesaid judgments of
this Court while considering the case under Sections 7,
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence
of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere
possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to
constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held
that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can
be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal
(2021) 3 SCC 687
- 10 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial
presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets
doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.
27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of the
judgment in B. Jayaraj [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P.,
(2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] read as
under: (SCC pp. 58-59)
"7. Insofar as the offence under Section
7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law
that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua
non to constitute the said offence and mere
recovery of currency notes cannot constitute
the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved
beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused
voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to
be a bribe. The above position has been
succinctly laid down in several judgments of
this Court. By way of illustration, reference
may be made to the decision in C.M.
Sharma v. State of A.P. [C.M. Sharma v. State
of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri)
89] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC
(Cri) 1] .
8. In the present case, the complainant did
not support the prosecution case insofar as demand
by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has
not examined any other witness, present at the
time when the money was allegedly handed over to
the accused by the complainant, to prove that the
same was pursuant to any demand made by the
accused. When the complainant himself had
disowned what he had stated in the initial
complaint (Ext. P-11) before LW 9, and there is no
other evidence to prove that the accused had made
any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the
contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to
- 11 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
come to the conclusion that the above material
furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by
the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold
that the learned trial court as well as the High
Court was not correct in holding the demand
alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The
only other material available is the recovery of the
tainted currency notes from the possession of the
accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the
accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of
the currency notes from the accused without proof
of demand will not bring home the offence under
Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar
as the offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is
concerned as in the absence of any proof of
demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt
or illegal means or abuse of position as a public
servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage cannot be held to be established.
9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to
be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned,
such presumption can only be in respect of the
offence under Section 7 and not the offences under
Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any
event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal
gratification that presumption can be drawn under
Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was
received for doing or forbearing to do any official
act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can
follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same
is lacking in the present case the primary facts on
the basis of which the legal presumption under
Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent."
The abovesaid view taken by this Court fully supports the
case of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by
us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on
behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view that the
- 12 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
demand for and acceptance of bribe amount and cellphone
by the appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Having regard to such evidence on record the acquittal
recorded by the trial court is a "possible view" as such the
judgment [State of T.N. v. N. Vijayakumar, 2020 SCC OnLine
Mad 7098] of the High Court is fit to be set aside. Before
recording conviction under the provisions of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, the courts have to take utmost care in
scanning the evidence. Once conviction is recorded under the
provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a
social stigma on the person in the society apart from serious
consequences on the service rendered. At the same time it is
also to be noted that whether the view taken by the trial
court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any definite
proposition and each case has to be judged on its own
merits, having regard to evidence on record."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court, later, in the case of K.SHANTHAMMA v.
STATE OF TELANGANA3 has held as follows:
"10. We have given careful consideration to the
submissions. We have perused the depositions of the
prosecution witnesses. The offence under Section 7 of the PC
Act relating to public servants taking bribe requires a
demand of illegal gratification and the acceptance thereof.
The proof of demand of bribe by a public servant and
its acceptance by him is sine qua non for establishing
the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act.
11. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P. [P.
Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152 :
(2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 11] , this Court has summarised the well-
settled law on the subject in para 23 which reads thus : (SCC
p. 159)
"23. The proof of demand of illegal
gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence
(2022) 4 SCC 574
- 13 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act
and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge
therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any
amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or
recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso
facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home
the charge under these two sections of the Act. As
a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the
demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and
mere recovery of the amount from the person
accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the
Act would not entail his conviction thereunder."
(emphasis supplied)
12. The prosecution's case is that the appellant had
kept pending the return of commercial tax filed by the said
Society for the year 1996-97. The appellant had issued a
notice dated 14-2-2000 to the said Society calling upon the
said Society to produce the record. Accordingly, the
necessary books were produced by the said Society. The case
made out by PW 1 is that when he repeatedly visited the
office of the appellant in February 2020, the demand of Rs
3000 by way of illegal gratification was made by the
appellant for passing the assessment order. However, PW 1,
in his cross-examination, accepted that the notice dated 26-
2-2000 issued by the appellant was received by the said
Society on 15-3-2000 in which it was mentioned that after
verification of the books of accounts of the said Society,
exemption from payment of commercial tax as claimed by
the said Society was allowed. PW 1 accepted that it was
stated in the said notice that there was no necessity for the
said Society to pay any commercial tax for Assessment Year
1996-97.
13. According to the case of PW 1, on 23-3-2000, he
visited the appellant's office to request her to issue final
assessment order. According to his case, at that time,
initially, the appellant reiterated her demand of Rs 3000. But
she scaled it down to Rs 2000. Admittedly, on 15-3-2000,
- 14 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
the said Society was served with a notice informing the said
Society that an exemption has been granted from payment of
commercial tax to the said Society. Therefore, the said
Society was not liable to pay any tax for the year 1996-97.
The issue of the final assessment order was only a procedural
formality. Therefore, the prosecution's case about the
demand of bribe made on 23-3-2000 by the appellant
appears to be highly doubtful.
14. PW 1 described how the trap was laid. In the pre-
trap mediator report, it has been recorded that LW 8, Shri R.
Hari Kishan, was to accompany PW 1 -- complainant at the
time of offering the bribe. PW 7 Shri P.V.S.S.P. Raju deposed
that PW 8 Shri U.V.S. Raju, the Deputy Superintendent of
Police, ACB, had instructed LW 8 to accompany PW 1 --
complainant inside the chamber of the appellant. PW 8 has
accepted this fact by stating in the examination-in-chief that
LW 8 was asked to accompany PW 1 and observe what
transpires between the appellant and PW 1. PW 8, in his
evidence, accepted that only PW 1 entered the chamber of
the appellant and LW 8 waited outside the chamber. Even PW
7 admitted in the cross-examination that when PW 1 entered
the appellant's chamber, LW 8 remained outside in the
corridor. Thus, LW 8 was supposed to be an independent
witness accompanying PW 1. In breach of the directions
issued to him by PW 8, he did not accompany PW 1 inside
the chamber of the appellant, and he waited outside the
chamber in the corridor. The prosecution offered no
explanation why LW 8 did not accompany PW 1 inside the
chamber of the appellant at the time of the trap.
15. Therefore, PW 1 is the only witness to the alleged
demand and acceptance. According to PW 1, firstly, the
demand was made of Rs 3000 by the appellant on 24-2-
2000. Thereafter, continuously for three days, she reiterated
the demand when he visited the appellant's office. Lastly, the
appellant made the demand on 29-2-2000 and 23-3-2000.
On this aspect, he was cross-examined in detail by the
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant. His
- 15 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
version about the demand and acceptance is relevant which
reads thus:
"In the vicinity of office of AO the jeep, in
which we went there was stopped and I was asked to
go into the office of AO and the trap party took
vantage positions. Accordingly, I went inside the
office of AO. I wished AO. At that time apart from AO
some other person was found in the office room of
AO and he was talking to the AO. AO offered me a
chair. After discussion with the AO the said other
person left the room of AO. I informed AO that I
brought the bribe amount as demanded by her and
also asked her to issue the final assessment orders.
Then I took the said tainted currency notes from my
shirt pocket and I was about to give the same to the
AO and on which instead of taking the same amount
directly by her with her hands she took out a diary
from her table drawer, opened the diary and asked
me to keep the said amount in the diary.
Accordingly, I kept the amount in the said diary. She
closed the said diary and again kept the same in her
table drawer and locked the drawer and kept the
keys in her hand bag which was hanging to her seat.
She pressed the calling bell and a lady attender came
into the room of AO, then she instructed the lady
attender to call ACTO concerned to her along with
the society records concerned.
Accordingly, ACTO came to AO along with record. After going
through the ledger and cash book, etc. AO signed on the last
page of the said ledger and cash book mentioning 26-2-2000
below her signature in the said register though she signed on
27-3-2000 in my presence. AO directed her attender to affix
official rubber stamp below her signature in the ledger and
cash book and accordingly attender affixed the same. AO
also signed on the office note of final assessment orders at
that time. Thereafter, I collected the general ledger and cash
book from the attender after affixing the said rubber stamp
- 16 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
thereon and came out of the office of AO and relayed the
pre-arranged signal to the trap party."
(emphasis supplied)
16. Thus, PW 1 did not state that the appellant
reiterated her demand at the time of trap. His version is that
on his own, he told her that he had brought the amount.
What is material is the cross-examination on this aspect. In
the cross-examination, PW 1 accepted that his version
regarding the demand made by the appellant on various
dates was an improvement. The relevant part of the cross-
examination of the appellant reads thus:
"I did not state to ACB Inspector in Section 161
CrPC statement that on the evening of 24-2-2000 I
met the AO and that she demanded the bribe. I did not
mention in Ext. P-3 complaint that continuously for 3
days after 24-2-2000 I met the AO and the AO
reiterated her demand. I did not mention in Ext. P-3
complaint that on 29-2-2000 I approached the AO and
the AO demanded bribe of Rs 3000 and that unless I
pay the said bribe amount she will not issue final
assessment orders. I did not state in my Section 164
statement before the Magistrate that 13-3-2000 to 16-
3-2000 I was on leave and from 1-3-2000 to 12-3-
2000, I was engaged in recovering the dues of the
society. It is not true to suggest that I did not meet
the AO continuously 3 days i.e. on 25-2-2000, 26-2-
2000 and 27-2-2000 and that 27-2-2000 is Sunday. It
is not true to suggest that I did not meet the AO in the
evening of 24-2-2000 and that AO did not demand any
money from me. I did not state in my Section 161
CrPC statement to Inspector of ACB that before I left
the office of DSP on the date of trap I made a phone
call enquiring about the availability of AO and the AO
was in the office and informed me that she should be
available in the office from 6.00 to 7.00 p.m. on that
- 17 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
day so also in my Section 164 CrPC. I made such a
phone call from the office of the DSP, ACB. I do not
remember as to from which phone number I made
phone call on that day. I cannot describe office
telephone number of the AO. It is not true to suggest
that I did not make any such phone call to AO and that
she did not give any such reply to me. I did not state
to ACB Inspector in my Section 161 CrPC statement or
to the Magistrate in my Section 164 CrPC statement
that I went inside the office of AO and I wished AO and
at that time apart from AO some other person was
found in the office room of AO and that he was talking
to the AO and that the AO offered me a chair and that
after discussion with the AO the said person left the
room of AO and then I informed the AO that I brought
the bribe amount. I did not state that said aspects to
DSP during the post trap proceedings also."
(emphasis supplied)
17. Thus, the version of PW 1 in his examination-in-
chief about the demand made by the appellant from time to
time is an improvement. As stated earlier, LW 8 did not enter
the appellant's chamber at the time of trap. There is no other
evidence of the alleged demand. Thus, the evidence of PW 1
about the demand for bribe by the appellant is not at all
reliable. Hence, we conclude that the demand made by the
appellant has not been conclusively proved.
18. PW 2, Shri B.D.V. Ramakrishna had no personal
knowledge about the demand. However, he accepted that on
15-3-2000, the said Society received a communication
informing that the said Society need not pay any tax for the
year 1996-97. PW 3 Shri L. Madhusudhan was working as
Godown Incharge with the said Society. He stated that on
15-3-2000, when he visited the appellant's office, ACTO
served the original notice dated 26-2-2000 in which it was
mentioned that the Society was not liable to pay any tax. It
is his version that when he met the appellant on the same
day, she enquired whether he had brought the demanded
- 18 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
amount of Rs 3000. However, PW 3 did not state that the
appellant demanded the said amount for granting any favour
to the said society.
19. PW 4 Ahmed Moinuddin was ACTO at the relevant
time. He deposed that on 27-3-2000, the appellant instructed
him to prepare the final assessment order, which was kept
ready in the morning. He stated that he was called at 6 p.m.
to the chamber of the appellant along with books of the said
Society. At that time, PW 1 was sitting there. He stated that
the appellant subscribed her signature on a Register of the
said Society and put the date as 26-2-2000 below it. He was
not a witness to the alleged demand. However, in the cross-
examination, he admitted that the appellant had served a
memo dated 21-3-2000 to him alleging that he was careless
in performing his duties."
The afore-quoted judgments were rendered interpreting
Section 7 as it stood prior to amendment. The Apex Court
holds that demand and acceptance are sine qua non for an
offence under Section 7 of the Act.
JUDGMENTS POST AMENDMENT:
10. The Apex Court has further interpreted Section
7(a) post amendment in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA v.
STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI4 and holds as follows:
"8. Before we analyze the evidence, we must note that
we are dealing with Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act as they
stood prior to the amendment made by the Act 16 of 2018
with effect from 26th July 2018. We are referring to Sections
7 and 13 as they stood on the date of commission of the
offence. Section 7, as existed at the relevant time, reads
thus:
"7. Public servant taking gratification
other than legal remuneration in respect of an
official act.--
2023 SCC OnLine SC 280
- 19 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public
servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or
attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or
for any other person, any gratification whatever,
other than legal remuneration, as a motive or
reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act
or for showing or forbearing to show, in the
exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour
to any person or for rendering or attempting to
render any service or disservice to any person, with
the Central Government or any State Government
or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or
with any local authority, corporation or Government
company referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or
with any public servant, whether named or
otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment
which shall be not less than three years but which
may extend to seven years and shall also be liable
to fine.
Explanations.-
(a) "Expecting to be a public servant"- If a
person not expecting to be in office obtains a
gratification by deceiving others into a belief
that he is about to be in office, and that he
will then serve them, he may be guilty of
cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence
defined in this section.
(b) "Gratification". The word "gratification" is not
restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to
gratifications estimable in money.
(c) "Legal remuneration"- The words "legal
remuneration" are not restricted to
remuneration which a public servant can
lawfully demand, but include all
remuneration which he is permitted by the
- 20 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
Government or the organisation, which he
serves, to accept.
(d) "A motive or reward for doing". A person
who receives a gratification as a motive or
reward for doing what he does not intend or
is not in a position to do, or has not done,
comes within this expression.
(e) Where a public servant induces a person
erroneously to believe that his influence with
the Government has obtained a title for that
person and thus induces that person to give
the public servant, money or any other
gratification as a reward for this service, the
public servant has committed an offence
under this section."
9. Section 13(1)(d), as existed at the relevant time,
reads thus:
"13. Criminal misconduct by a public
servant.--
(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of
criminal misconduct,-
(a) ....................................
(b) ....................................
(c) ....................................
(d) if he,-
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself
or for any other person any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant,
obtains for himself or for any other person any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
- 21 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains
for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage without any public interest; or
(e) ........................................"
10. The demand for gratification and the acceptance
thereof are sine qua non for the offence punishable under
Section 7 of the PC Act.
11. The Constitution Bench4 was called upon to decide
the question which we have quoted earlier. In paragraph 74,
the conclusions of the Constitution have been summarised,
which read thus:
"74. What emerges from the aforesaid
discussion is summarised as under:
(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in
issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non
in order to establish the guilt of the
accused public servant under Sections 7
and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the
accused, the prosecution has to first prove
the demand of illegal gratification and the
subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact.
This fact in issue can be proved either by
direct evidence which can be in the nature
of oral evidence or documentary evidence.
(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof
of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification can also be proved by
circumstantial evidence in the absence of
direct oral and documentary evidence.
(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification
- 22 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
by the public servant, the following aspects have
to be borne in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe
giver without there being any demand from the
public servant and the latter simply accepts the
offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is
a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the
Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior
demand by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant
makes a demand and the bribe giver
accepts the demand and tenders the
demanded gratification which in turn is
received by the public servant, it is a case
of obtainment. In the case of obtainment,
the prior demand for illegal gratification
emanates from the public servant. This is an
offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of
the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer
by the bribe giver and the demand by the
public servant respectively have to be
proved by the prosecution as a fact in
issue. In other words, mere acceptance or
receipt of an illegal gratification without
anything more would not make it an
offence under Section 7 or Section
13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the
Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in
order to bring home the offence, there must be
an offer which emanates from the bribe giver
which is accepted by the public servant which
would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior
demand by the public servant when
accepted by the bribe giver and in turn
there is a payment made which is received
by the public servant, would be an offence
of obtainment under Section 13(1)(d) and
(i) and (ii) of the Act.
- 23 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the
demand and acceptance or obtainment of
an illegal gratification may be made by a
court of law by way of an inference only
when the foundational facts have been
proved by relevant oral and documentary
evidence and not in the absence
thereof. On the basis of the material on record,
the Court has the discretion to raise a
presumption of fact while considering whether
the fact of demand has been proved by the
prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of
fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in
the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.
(f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or
has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence
during trial, demand of illegal gratification can
be proved by letting in the evidence of any other
witness who can again let in evidence, either
orally or by documentary evidence or the
prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial
evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it
result in an order of acquittal of the accused
public servant.
(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is
concerned, on the proof of the facts in
issue, Section 20 mandates the court to
raise a presumption that the illegal
gratification was for the purpose of a
motive or reward as mentioned in the said
Section. The said presumption has to be raised
by the court as a legal presumption or a
presumption in law. Of course, the said
presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section
20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii)
of the Act.
- 24 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under
Section 20 of the Act is distinct from
presumption of fact referred to above in point
(e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while
the latter is discretionary in nature."
(emphasis added)
12. The referred question was answered in paragraph
76 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus:
"76. Accordingly, the question referred for
consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered
as under:
In the absence of evidence of the
complainant (direct/primary, oral/ document-
tary evidence), it is permissible to draw an
inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a
public servant under Section 7 and Section
13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act
based on other evidence adduced by the
prosecution."
(emphasis added)
13. Even the issue of presumption under Section 20 of
the PC Act has been answered by the Constitution Bench by
holding that only on proof of the facts in issue, Section 20
mandates the Court to raise a presumption that illegal
gratification was for the purpose of motive or reward as
mentioned in Section 7 (as it existed prior to the amendment
of 2018). In fact, the Constitution Bench has approved two
decisions by the benches of three Hon'ble Judges in the cases
of B. Jayaraj1 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy2. There is
another decision of a three Judges' bench in the case of N.
Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu5, which follows the view
taken in the cases of B. Jayaraj1 and P. Satyanarayana
- 25 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
Murthy2. In paragraph 9 of the decision in the case of B.
Jayaraj1, this Court has dealt with the presumption under
Section 20 of the PC Act. In paragraph 9, this Court held
thus:
"9. Insofar as the presumption
permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the
Act is concerned, such presumption can only be
in respect of the offence under Section 7 and
not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and
(ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof
of acceptance of illegal gratification that
presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of
the Act that such gratification was received for
doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof
of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if
there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in
the present case the primary facts on the basis of
which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be
drawn are wholly absent."
(emphasis added)
14. The presumption under Section 20 can be invoked
only when the two basic facts required to be proved under
Section 7, are proved. The said two basic facts are 'demand'
and 'acceptance' of gratification. The presumption under
Section 20 is that unless the contrary is proved, the
acceptance of gratification shall be presumed to be for a
motive or reward, as contemplated by Section 7. It means
that once the basic facts of the demand of illegal gratification
and acceptance thereof are proved, unless the contrary are
proved, the Court will have to presume that the gratification
was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward as
contemplated by Section 7. However, this presumption is
rebuttable. Even on the basis of the preponderance of
probability, the accused can rebut the presumption.
15. In the case of N. Vijayakumar5, another bench of
three Hon'ble Judges dealt with the issue of presumption
- 26 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
under Section 20 and the degree of proof required to
establish the offences punishable under Section 7 and
clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)
of PC Act. In paragraph 26, the bench held thus:
"26. It is equally well settled that mere
recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the
prosecution against the accused. Reference can be
made to the judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC
779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and in B.
Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of
A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In
the aforesaid judgments of this Court while
considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1)
(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the
charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted
money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of
demand for illegal gratification and mere possession
or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to
constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is
also held that even the presumption under Section
20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for
and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is
also fairly well settled that initial presumption of
innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled
by acquittal recorded by the trial court."
(emphasis added)
16. Thus, the demand for gratification and its
acceptance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
17. Section 7, as existed prior to 26th July 2018, was
different from the present Section 7. The unamended Section
7 which is applicable in the present case, specifically refers to
"any gratification". The substituted Section 7 does not use
the word "gratification", but it uses a wider term "undue
- 27 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
advantage". When the allegation is of demand of gratification
and acceptance thereof by the accused, it must be as a
motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official
act. The fact that the demand and acceptance of gratification
were for motive or reward as provided in Section 7 can be
proved by invoking the presumption under Section 20
provided the basic allegations of the demand and acceptance
are proved. In this case, we are also concerned with the
offence punishable under clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d)
which is punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Clause
(d) of sub-section (1) of Section 13, which existed on the
statute book prior to the amendment of 26th July 2018, has
been quoted earlier. On a plain reading of clauses (i) and (ii)
of Section 13(1)(d), it is apparent that proof of acceptance of
illegal gratification will be necessary to prove the offences
under clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d). In view of what
is laid down by the Constitution Bench, in a given case, the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public
servant can be proved by circumstantial evidence in the
absence of direct oral or documentary evidence. While
answering the referred question, the Constitution Bench has
observed that it is permissible to draw an inferential
deduction of culpability and/or guilt of the public servant for
the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read
with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The conclusion is that in
absence of direct evidence, the demand and/or acceptance
can always be proved by other evidence such as
circumstantial evidence.
18. The allegation of demand of gratification and
acceptance made by a public servant has to be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of the Constitution
Bench does not dilute this elementary requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution Bench was
dealing with the issue of the modes by which the demand can
be proved. The Constitution Bench has laid down that the
proof need not be only by direct oral or documentary
evidence, but it can be by way of other evidence including
circumstantial evidence. When reliance is placed on
- 28 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
circumstantial evidence to prove the demand for gratification,
the prosecution must establish each and every circumstance
from which the prosecution wants the Court to draw a
conclusion of guilt. The facts so established must be
consistent with only one hypothesis that there was a demand
made for gratification by the accused. Therefore, in this case,
we will have to examine whether there is any direct evidence
of demand. If we come to a conclusion that there is no direct
evidence of demand, this Court will have to consider whether
there is any circumstantial evidence to prove the demand."
Subsequent to NEERAJ DUTTA'S case the Apex Court in the case of
SOUNDARAJAN v. STATE5 has held as follows:
"FINDING ON PROOF OF DEMAND
9. We have considered the submissions. It is well
settled that for establishing the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, proof of demand of
gratification and acceptance of the gratification is a sine qua
non. Moreover, the Constitution Bench in the case of Neeraj
Dutta3 has reiterated that the presumption under
Section 20 of the PC Act can be invoked only on proof of
facts in issue, namely, the demand of gratification by the
accused and the acceptance thereof.
10. As stated earlier, complainant PW-2 has not
supported the prosecution. He has not said anything in his
examination-in-chief about the demand made by the
appellant. The public prosecutor cross-examined PW-2. The
witness stated that there was no demand of a bribe made by
the appellant. According to him, he filed a complaint as the
return of the sale deed was delayed. Though PW-2 accepted
that he had filed the complaint, in the cross-examination, he
was not confronted with the material portions of the
(2023) SCC OnLine SC 424
- 29 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
complaint in which he had narrated how the alleged demand
was made. The public prosecutor ought to have confronted
the witness with his alleged prior statements in the complaint
and proved that part of the complaint through the concerned
police officer who had reduced the complaint into writing.
However, that was not done.
11. Now, we turn to the evidence of the shadow
witness (PW-3). In the examination-in-chief, he stated that
the appellant asked the PW-2 whether he had brought the
amount. PW-3 did not say that the appellant made a specific
demand of gratification in his presence to PW-2. To attract
Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand for gratification has to
be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
The word used in Section 7, as it existed before 26th July
2018, is 'gratification'. There has to be a demand for
gratification. It is not a simple demand for money, but it has
to be a demand for gratification. If the factum of demand of
gratification and acceptance thereof is proved, then the
presumption under Section 20 can be invoked, and the Court
can presume that the demand must be as a motive or reward
for doing any official act. This presumption can be rebutted
by the accused.
12. There is no circumstantial evidence of demand for
gratification in this case. In the circumstances, the offences
punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)(d) have not been established. Unless both
demand and acceptance are established, offence of obtaining
pecuniary advantage by corrupt means covered by clauses (i)
and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d) cannot be proved."
The Apex Court in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA (supra) was
clarifying and interpreting the judgment in the case of
NEERAJ DUTTA which was rendered by a Constitution Bench
and further holds that proof of demand and acceptance of
gratification is sine qua non for any allegation under Section 7
of the Act, be it pre-amendment or post-amendment. This is
reiterated in the case of SOUNDARAJAN (supra).
- 30 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
11. On a coalesce of the judgments rendered by the
Apex Court, as quoted supra, the soul of Section 7 is demand
and acceptance. The unmistakable inference on the
interpretation, in the considered view of the Court would be, if
there is demand but no acceptance it would not make an
offence under Section 7. If there is acceptance but no
demand, it would then also make no offence under Section 7.
An act alleged under Section 7 should have the ingredients of
demand and acceptance and it is for the performance of a
public duty or forbearance from performance. Therefore,
demand and acceptance should be for the purpose of
performance of some duty. For such performance there should
be work pending at the hands of the public servant against
whom Section 7 is alleged.
APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS OF THE
CASE:
12. What triggers registration of the crime is an
anonymous complaint. The complaint is made to the Deputy
Superintendent of Police of the then Anti Corruption Bureau.
It reads as follows:
"UÉ,
gÀªÀjUÉ
r.J¸ï.¦, J.¹.¦
¸Àgï,
«µÀAiÀÄ: ¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀ ºÀwÛPÀÄ̪À PÀÄjvÀÄ.
¸Àgï ªÉÄð£À «µÀAiÀÄPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ £ÁªÀÅUÀ¼ÀÄ £ÉÆAzÀ ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ ¥ÀlÖt
ºÁUÀÆ ¥ÀlÖtzÀ ¸ÀÄvÀÛªÀÄÄvÀÛ°£À d£ÀgÀ ¥ÀgÀªÁV vÀªÀÄä°è «£ÀAw¹PÉƼÀÄîªÀÅzÉãÉAzÀgÉ, £ÀªÄÀ ä
¸À¨ï jf¸ÁÖçgï PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ°è zÀ¯Áè½UÀ¼À ºÁªÀ½ «Äw«ÄÃjzÀÄÝ, ¤AiÀÄAvÀætPÉÌ §gÀzÀ PÁgÀt
£Á£ÀÄ vÀªÀÄä°è ¤ªÉâ¹PÉƼÀÄîªÀÅzÉãÉAzÀgÉ ¸ÀzÀj PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ°è ºÀtzÀ D¸ÉUÉ «ÄÃwUÉ ¥ÁgÀªÉÃ
E¯Áè, E°ègÀĪÀ C¢üPÁj ªÀUÀðzÀªÀgÁUÀ° ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¹§âA¢UÀ¼ÁUÀ° ºÁUÀÆ CªÀgÀ ¨ÁAqï
gÉÊlgïUÀ¼ÁUÀ° ºÀt E®èzÉà AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà PÉ®¸ÀªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀÄÄlÄÖªÀÅ¢¯Áè, £ÁªÀÅ F §UÉÎ ªÀiÁ£Àå
¸À¨ï gÉf¸ÁÖçgï £ÀªÀgÀ°è «£ÀAw¹zÁUÀ CªÀgÀÄ ¹¸ÀÖªÀiï ºÉÃVzÉ CzÉà jÃw PÉ®¸ÀªÀ£ÄÀ ß
ªÀiÁr¹PÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃUÀ¨ÉÃPÀÄ, AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà jÃwAiÀÄ ªÁzÀ«ªÁzÀPÉÌ zÁj E®è CAvÁ £ÀªÄÀ UÉ
§Ä¢Þ ªÀiÁvÀ£ÀÄß ºÉý ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÉýzÀµÀÄÖ ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß PÉÆlÄÖ PÉ®¸ÀªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀiÁr¹PÉÆAqÀÄ ¸ÀgÀ¼À
jÃw¬ÄAzÀ ºÉÆÃUÀ¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ ºÉüÀÄvÁÛgÉ. DzÀÝjAzÀ EªÀgÀ ªÀiÁw¤AzÀ £ÉÆAzÀ £ÁªÀÅ
- 31 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
¤ªÀÄä°è «£ÀAw¹PÉƼÀÄîªÀÅzÉãÉAzÀgÉ E°è §AzÀÄ vÁªÀÅUÀ¼ÀÄ RÄzÁÝV ¥Àj²Ã°¹zÀgÉ vÀªÄÀ UÉ
¸ÀzÀj PÀbÉÃj §UÉÎ ¸ÀvÁå ¸ÀvÀåvÉ w½AiÀÄÄvÀÛzÉ, EzÀÄ vÀ«ÄäAzÀ ¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀ vÀUÀÄÎvÀÛzÉ JAzÀÄ
£Á£ÀÄ ¨sÁ«¹zÉÝãÉ; DzÀÝjAzÀ ªÀiÁ£ÀågÀªÀgÀÄ EzÀgÀ §UÉÎ PÀÆ®APÀµÀªÁV ¥Àj²Ã°¹ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ
PÀæªÀĪÀ£ÀÄß vÉUÉzÀÄPÉƼÀî¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ £Á£ÀÄ F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ £ÉÆAzÀ ¥ÀlÖt ºÁUÀÆ UÁæªÀÄ ¤ªÁ¹UÀ¼À
¥ÀgÀªÁV PÉýPÉƼÀÄîvÉÛÃ£É ¸Àgï."
Certain persons claiming to be aggrieved have made the
complaint, but against whom is not clear and against what
staff of the Sub-Registrar's office who are alleged to have
indulged themselves in the act of demanding money for the
purpose of registration of document is also not forthcoming.
Post the said complaint, a Police Inspector makes a
communication to the ACB. The communication reads as
follows:
"EªÀjUÉ,
¥Éưøï G¥Á¢üÃPÀëPÀgÀÄ,
¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀ ¤UÀæºÀ zÀ¼À ¥Éưøï oÁuÉ
UÀzÀUÀ EªÀjUÉ.
ªÀiÁ£ÀågÉ,
«µÀAiÀÄ: ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ°èAiÀÄ ¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀzÀ «gÀÄzÀÞ
¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀ ¤UÀæºÀ PÁAiÉÄÝ 1988 gÀ C£ÀéAiÀÄ PÀæªÀÄ dgÀÄV¸À®Ä PÉÆÃj.
G¯ÉèÃR: vÀªÀÄä DzÉñÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ: 06.12.2019.
****
ªÉÄîÌAqÀÀ «µÀAiÀÄPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ, £Á£ÀÄ, «±Àé£ÁxÀ.ºÉZï, ¥Éưøï E£ïì¥ÉPÖÀgï
¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀ ¤UÀæºÀ zÀ¼À, ¥Éưøï oÁuÉ UÀzÀUÀ, F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ F ¢£À ¸À°è¸ÀÄwÛgÀĪÀ ªÀgÀ¢
K£ÉAzÀgÉ,
UÀzÀUÀ f¯ÉèAiÀÄ ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ ¥ÀlÖtzÀ°èAiÀÄ G¥À£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁj PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ C¢üPÁj
ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¹§âA¢UÀ¼ÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀgÀÄ, zÀ¯Áè°UÀ¼ÀÄ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀ ¸ÀPÁðj PÉ®¸À
PÁAiÀÄð ªÀiÁrPÉÆqÀ®Ä CPÀæªÀĪÁV ¸ÁPÀµÀÄÖ ®AZÀzÀ ºÀt ¥ÀqÉzÀÄ, PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁr PÉÆqÀÄwÛzÄÀ Ý,
EzÀ£ÀÄß ¥Àæ²ß¹zÀªÀjUÉ ªÀåªÀ¸ÉÜAiÉÆA¢UÉ ºÉÆA¢PÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃUÀ¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ w½¸ÀÄwÛgÀĪÀªÀgÀ
«gÀÄzÀÞ PÀæªÀÄ PÉÊUÉƼÀÄîªÀAvÉ CAZÉ ªÀÄÆ®PÀ §AzÀ CfðAiÀÄ §UÉÎ ¢£ÁAPÀ:06.12.2019gÀAzÀÄ
£À£ÀUÉ ¸ÀÆZÀ£É ¤Ãr, CfðAiÀÄ°èAiÀÄ «µÀAiÀÄzÀ §UÉÎ ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ ¥ÀlÖtzÀ°èAiÀÄ
- 32 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
G¥À£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁj PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ ¸ÀÄvÀÛªÀÄÄvÀÛ°£À zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀgÀ PÉÃAzÀæUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ
eÉgÁPïì ¸ÉAlgïUÀ¼À PÁAiÀÄð ZÀlĪÀnPÉUÀ¼À §UÉÎ UË¥ÀåªÁV ªÀiÁ»w ¸ÀAUÀ滸À®Ä ¸ÀÆa¹zÀÄÝ
EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
¤ªÀÄä ¸ÀÆZÀ£ÉAiÀÄAvÉ £Á£ÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ:07.12.2019 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 10.12.2019 gÀAzÀÄ
¹§âA¢, JA.J£ï.PÀjUÁgÀ, ¹¦¹ EªÀgÉÆA¢UÉ ®PÉëöäñÀégÀPÉÌ ¨sÉÃn ¤Ãr, ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ PÉÆÃlð
ºÀwÛgÀ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀZÉÃj ºÁUÀÆ CzÀgÀ®°gÀĪÀ zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀgÀ
PÉÃAzÀæzÀ°è dgÀÄUÀĪÀ ªÀåªÀºÁgÀUÀ¼À §UÉÎ UË¥ÀåªÁV ¥Àj²Ã®£É ªÀiÁr ªÀiÁ»w ¸ÀAUÀ滹zÉ£ÄÀ .
G¥À£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjUÉ §gÀĪÀ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀ PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁrPÉÆqÀ®Ä PÉ®ªÀÅ
zÀ¯Áè½UÀ¼ÀÄ, zÀ¸ÀÄÛ§gÀºÀUÁgÀgÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ eÉgÁPïì ¸ÉAlgï£ÀªÀgÀÄ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀ£Á¢üPÁjUÀ¼À
PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ C¢üPÁj ºÁUÀÆ ¹§âA¢AiÀÄ ¥ÀgÀªÁV ¸ÀPÁðgÀzÀ ¤UÀ¢vÀ ±ÀÄ®ÌQÌAvÀ ºÉaÑ£À ºÀt
ªÀ¸ÀÆ° ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛgÀĪÀ DA±À UÀªÀÄ£ÀPÉÌ §A¢gÀÄvÀÛzÉ. ®AZÀzÀ ºÀt ¤ÃrzÀ°è ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀ
PÉ®¸À ¨ÉÃUÀ DUÀÄvÀÛzÉ JAzÀÄ ¥ÀĸÀ¯Á¬Ä¸ÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ, ªÉAPÀtÚ UÀÄr JA§ zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀ
¥Àæ¨sÁ« ªÀåQÛAiÀiÁVzÀÄÝ, ¸À¨ï jf¸ÁÖçgï PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ ¥ÀæªÀÄÄR ªÀÄzsÀåªÀwðAiÀiÁVgÀÄvÁÛ£É JAzÀÄ
w½zÀÄ §A¢zÉ. EªÀgÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄÄ ¸À¨ï jf¸ÁÖçgï PÀbÉÃj ºÀwÛgÀzÀ ªÉAPÀmÉñÀégÀ zÉêÀ¸ÁÜ£ÀzÀ
DªÀgÀtzÀ°ègÀÄvÀÛzÉ. G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÁAiÀÄðªÉÊRjAiÀÄ §UÉÎAiÀÄÆ ¸ÀºÀ
¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀ°è M¼ÉîAiÀÄ C©ü¥ÁæAiÀÄ EgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀÄ CvÀȦÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß
ªÀåPÀÛ¥Àr¸ÀÄwÛzÀÝ£ÀÄß UË¥ÀåªÁV UÀªÀĤ¸À¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
CfðAiÀÄ°è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹zÀ ªÀÄ°èPÁdÄð£À ºÁUÀÆ EvÀgÉà ªÀåQÛUÀ¼À §UÉÎ
¥Àj²Ã°¸À¯ÁV ºÁUÀÆ ¥sÉÆÃ£ï ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁV ¸ÀA¥ÀPÀðPÉÌ zÉÆgÉwgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. UË¥Àå ¸ÁܤPÀ
¥Àj²Ã®£ÉAiÀÄ ¸ÀAzÀ¨ÀsðzÀ°è CfðAiÀÄ «µÀAiÀÄzÀ°è £ÉÊdvÉ EgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ªÀÄ£ÀªÀjPÉAiÀiÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
F jÃwAiÀiÁzÀ ¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀªÀ£ÀÄß vÀqÉUÀnÖ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀÄ ¤gÁvÀAPÀªÁV vÀªÀÄä ªÀåªÀºÁUÀªÀ£ÄÀ ß
¥ÀÆgÉʹPÉƼÀÄîªÀÅzÀPÌÉ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ C¢üPÁj ºÁUÀÆ ¹§âA¢, zÀ¸ÄÀ Û
§gÀºÀUÁgÀgÀÄ, ªÀÄzÀåªÀwðUÀ¼À «gÀÄzÀÞ ¨sÀæµÁÖZÁgÀ ¥Àæw§AzsÀPÀ PÁAiÉÄÝ 1988 gÀr ¥ÀæPÀgÀt
zÁR°¹, ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃj, zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀgÀ PÉÃAzÀæ, ªÉAPÀtÚ
UÀÄr EªÀgÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£É ªÀiÁrzÀ°è ¸ÁªÀðf¤PÀjAzÀ CPÀæªÀĪÁV ¸ÀAUÀ滹zÀ ºÀt,
¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀ ºÁUÀÆ ¸ÀPÁðgÀPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼ÀÄ zÉÆgÉAiÀÄĪÀ ¸ÁzsÀåvÉ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
PÁgÀt F §UÉÎ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ PÀæªÀÄPÉÊUÉƼÀÄîªÀÅzÀÄ CªÀ±Àå«gÀÄvÀÛzÉ JAzÀÄ ªÀiÁ£ÀåjUÉ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ£ÀÄß
¤ªÉâ¹PÉÆArgÀÄvÉÛãÉ.
vÀªÀÄä «±Áé¹
UÀzÀUÀ ¸À»/
¢£ÁAPÀ:12.12.2019 («±Àé£ÁxÀ.ºÉZï)
- 33 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
¥Éưøï E£Àì¥ÉPÀÖgï-2,
J.¹.©.UÀzÀUÀ"
It appears that on 07-12-2019 and 10-12-2019 the Police
Inspector of ACB, Gadag along with his staff appears to have
watched the functioning of the office of sub-registrar and
comes to know that there was corruption on those two days.
The petitioner has produced documents to demonstrate that
he was not even present on 07-12-2019. But, the
communication records that he was present and was in the
habit of demanding bribe. This results in registration of
crime in Crime No.17 of 2019 for the aforesaid offences.
Pursuant to registration of crime, a search is conducted in
the office of the Sub-Registrar on 12-12-2019. The search
report depicts that search was conducted on 12-12-2019
and certain amount was recovered from several persons
including the petitioner. A search panchanama is drawn. In
terms of search panchanama what could be gathered against
the petitioner is as follows:
".... .... ....
®PÉëöäñÀégÀ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ°ègÀĪÀ J®è ¯ÁPÀgïUÀ¼À£ÀÄß,
¸À¨ï gÀf¸ÁÖçgï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ E£ÀÆß½zÀ PÉ®¸ÀUÁgÀgÀÄ PÀĽvÀÄ PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁqÀĪÀ ¸ÀܼÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß
¥Àj²Ã®£É ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁVzÀÄÝ, G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß
ºÉÆgÀvÀÄ¥Àr¹, C£ÀĪÀiÁ£Á¸ÀàzÀ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼ÀÄ, £ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀt zÉÆjwgÀĪÀÅ¢®è.
zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀ ²æà ªÉAPÀmÉñÀ UÀÄr EªÀgÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£Á PÁAiÀÄðPÉÌ
ºÉÆÃVzÀÝ zsÁgÀªÁqÀ J.¹.©.¦.L. gÀªÀgÀÄ ¸ÁAiÀÄAPÁ® 6-30 UÀAmÉUÉ zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀ
²æà ªÉAPÀmÉñÀ UÀÄr EªÀgÉÆA¢UÉ ªÀÄgÀ½ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjUÉ §AzÀÄ
r.J¸ï.¦. gÀªÀjUÉ ¨sÉÃnAiÀiÁV, ªÉAPÀmÉñÀ EªÀgÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£Á PÁ®PÉÌ zÉÆgÉvÀ
£ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀt 55360 gÀÆ ºÁUÀÆ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁj PÀbÉÃjUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ
zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼ÀÄ zÉÆgÉwgÀĪÀ §UÉÎ ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀiÁr, ¸ÀzÀj £ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀt ºÁUÀÆ
zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£Á ¥ÀAZÀ£ÁªÉÄAiÀÄ PÁ®PÉÌ d¥ÀÛ ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀÅzÁV w½¹
ºÁdgÀ¥Àr¹zÀgÀÄ. r.J¸ï.¦. gÀªÀgÀÄ ¸ÀzÀj zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß
vÀªÀÄä ªÀ±ÀPÉÌ ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀgÀÄ.
®PÉëöäñÀégÀ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ PÁå±ï rPÉëÃgÉñÀ£ï
gÀf¸ÁÖçgïzÀ°è ¸À¨ï gÀf¸ÁÖçgÀ gÀªÀgÀÄ vÀªÀÄä §½ 100/- gÀÆ EgÀĪÀÅzÁV £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹zÀÄÝ,
- 34 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
±ÉÆÃzsÀ£ÉAiÀÄ PÁ®PÉÌ CªÀgÀ §½ 9390/- gÀÆ zÉÆgÉwgÀÄvÀÛªÉ. CzÀgÀAvÉ EAzÀÄ
¢£ÁAPÀ:12.12.2019 gÀAzÀÄ £ÉÆÃAzÀtÂAiÀiÁzÀ PÁUÀzÀUÀ¼À ªÀ¸ÀÆ° ªÀiÁrzÀ MlÄÖ ±ÀÄ®Ì,
¸À¨ï gÀf¸ÁÖçgÀ ²æà ¸ÀĨÁæAiÀÄ ¨sÀmï ºÁUÀÆ CªÀgÀ PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ dªÁ£À ºÁUÀÆ ªÀÄzsÀåªÀwð
²æà UÀuÉñÀ CAUÀr EªÀgÀ §½ zÉÆgÉvÀ gÀÆ.17200/- UÀ½UÉ vÁ¼ÉAiÀiÁUÀĪÀÅ¢®è.
C®èzÉà zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀ ªÉAPÀmÉñÀ UÀÄr EªÀgÀ §½ zÉÆgÉvÀ £ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀt ªÀÄvÀÄÛ CªÀgÀ
ªÁ¸ÀzÀ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è zÉÆgÉvÀ £ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀtzÀ §UÉÎ ªÉAPÀmÉøÀ UÀÄr EªÀgÀÄ AiÀiÁªÀzÉÃ
«ªÀgÀuÉ ¤ÃrgÀĪÀÅ¢®è ºÁUÀÆ £ÉÆÃAzÁuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ zÀ¸ÁÛªÉÃdUÀ¼ÀÄ CªÀgÀ
ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è zÉÆgÉwgÀÄvÀÛªÉ. DzÀÝjAzÀ 1)²æÃPÁAvï ¸ÀĨÁæAiÀiï ¨sÀmï, G¥À-
£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁj ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ, 2) UÀuÉñÀ ¹zÀÝ¥Àà CAUÀr, dªÁ£À ºÁUÀÆ
ªÀÄzsÀåªÀwð, ªÁ¸ÀÀoÀoÀ : PÉAZÀ¯Á¥ÀÆgÀ ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ vÀªÀÄä §½ ºÁUÀÆ vÀªÀÄä
ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è £ÀUÀzÀÄ ºÀt ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ
zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ElÄÖPÉÆAqÀ zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀ ºÁUÀÆ ªÀÄzsÀåªÀwðAiÀiÁzÀ 3) ²æÃ
ªÉAPÀmÉñÀ gÁWÀªÉÃAzÀæ UÀÄr, ªÁ¸À : ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ EªÀjUÉ F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è zÀ¸ÀÛVj
ªÀiÁqÀĪÀÅzÁV r.J¸ï.¦.gÀªÀgÀÄ w½¹zÀgÀÄ. DUÀ ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄ ¸ÀAeÉ 7 UÀAmÉAiÀiÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
²æÃPÁAvï ¸ÀĨÁæAiÀiï ¨sÀmï, G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁj ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ EªÀgÀ£ÀÄß
zÀ¸ÀÛVj ªÀiÁrzÀ §UÉÎ ²æà UÉÆÃ¥Á® gÁªÀÄ¥Àà ©®PÉÃj, J¸ï.r.J. G¥À-
£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃj UÀzÀUÀ EªÀjUÉ, UÀuÉñÀ ¹zÀÝ¥Àà CAUÀr, dªÁ£À ºÁUÀÆ
ªÀÄzsÀåªÀwð, ªÁ¸À : PÉAZÀ¯Á¥ÀÆgÀ ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ EªÀgÀ£ÀÄß zÀ¸ÀÛVj ªÀiÁrzÀ §UÉÎ ²æÃ
gÀ«.ºÀ.¨ÉlUÉÃj, PÀA¥ÀÆålgï D¥ÀgÉÃlgï, G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃj ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ
ºÁUÀÆ ²æà ªÉAPÀmÉñÀ gÁWÀªÉÃAzÀæ UÀÄr, ªÁ¸À : ®PÉëöäñÀégÀ EªÀgÀ£ÀÄß zÀ¸ÀÛVj ªÀiÁrzÀ
§UÉÎ ²æà gÁd±ÉÃRgÀ.N.ªÀÄļÀUÀÄAzÀ, zÀ¸ÀÄÛ §gÀºÀUÁgÀ, ªÁ¸À : ²Vè EªÀjUÉ
r.J¸ï.¦.gÀªÀgÀÄ °TvÀ ªÀiÁ»w MzÀV¹, zÀ¸ÀÛVj ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥Á°¹zÀgÀÄ.
G¥À-£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£É PÁ®PÉÌ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀjAzÀ
AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà vÉÆAzÀgÉ DUÀzÀAvÉ PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ PÁAiÀÄðPÀ¯Á¥ÀPÉÌ CqÀZÀuÉ DUÀzÀAvÉ
£ÉÆÃrPÉƼÀî¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. G¥À£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼À PÀbÉÃj ºÁUÀÆ «±ÉõÀ
vÀºÀ²Ã®zÁgÀ PÀbÉÃjUÀ¼ÀÄ MAzÉ PÀlÖqÀzÀ°è EgÀÄvÀÛªÉ. ¸ÀzÀj PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ ZÀPÀÌ §A¢ü
«ªÀgÀ F PɼÀV£ÀAvÉ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
¥ÀƪÀðPÉÌ : «±ÉõÀ - vÀºÀ²Ã®zÁgÀ PÀbÉÃj CzÀgÁZÉUÉ RįÁè eÁUÉ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
¥À²ÑªÀÄPÉÌ : RįÁè eÁUÉ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ CzÀgÁZÉ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀ gÀ¸ÉÛ
GvÀÛgÀPÉÌ : RįÁè eÁUÉ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ CzÀgÁZÉ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀ gÀ¸ÉÛ
- 35 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
zÀQëtPÉÌ : RįÁè eÁUÁ ºÁUÀÆ ºÀ¼É PÉÆÃlð ©°ÝAUï
¸ÀzÀj PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£É £ÀAvÀgÀ vÀ¤SÁ vÀAqÀzÀªÀgÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £ÁªÀÅUÀ¼ÀÄ £ÀªÀÄä
§½ EgÀĪÀ ªÀ¸ÀÄÛUÀ¼À §UÉÎ ¥ÀÄ£ÀB CAUÀ ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£É ªÀiÁrPÉƼÀÄîªÀ ªÀÄÆ®PÀ
G¥À£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁj ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀbÉÃj ¹§âA¢AiÀĪÀjUÉ ªÀÄ£ÀªÀjPÉ ªÀiÁrPÉÆlÄÖ ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£É
PÁAiÀÄðªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀÄÄPÁÛAiÀÄUÉƽ¹zÀÄÝ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
®PÉëöäñÀégÀ G¥À£ÉÆÃAzÀuÁ¢üPÁj PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß dgÀÄV¹zÀ §UÉÎ
¢£ÁAPÀ : 12.12.2019 gÀAzÀÄ 15-15 UÀAmɬÄAzÀ 19-30 UÀAmÉAiÀĪÀgÀUÉ
¥ÀAZÀ¸ÁQëzÁgÀgÁzÀ £ÀªÀÄä ¸ÀªÀÄPÀëªÀÄzÀ°è vÀ¤SÁ¢üPÁjAiÀiÁzÀ rªÁAiÀiïJ¸ï¦ gÀªÀgÀ
GRÛ¯ÉÃR£ÀzÀAvÉ ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£Á ¥ÀAZÀ£ÁªÉÄAiÀÄ£ÀÄß J.¹.©.¹§âA¢ ²æà CAiÀÄå£ÀUËqÀgÀ,
¹JZï¹ gÀªÀgÀÄ ¯Áå¥ÀmÁ¥ïzÀ°è ¨ÉgÀ¼ÀZÀÄÑ ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ ºÁUÀÆ ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£ÉAiÀÄ PÁ®PÉÌ
¹§âA¢ ªÀÄAdÄ£ÁxÀ PÀjUÁgÀ EªÀjAzÀ J.¹.©.PÀbÉÃjAiÀÄ PÁåªÀÄgÁ ªÀÄÆ®PÀ
¥ÉÆÃmÉÆÃUÀ¼À£ÀÄß vÉUɬĸÀ¯ÁVzÉ."
The panchanama or the examination at the time of conduct of
search of persons nowhere reveals that there was any
demand from the hands of the petitioner nor he has accepted
bribe. The amount that was recovered allegedly from the
hands of the petitioner was Rs.9390/- and from his pocket
Rs.50/-. The petitioner immediately at the time of search
itself has explained about cash that cash was received for
registration of document and which document was also
shown to the search party. Even otherwise, from where does
the demand and acceptance spring is a mystery. For an
offence under Section 7(a) of the Act which is now alleged
against the petitioner, there must be demand and acceptance
and if trap is to be laid nuances of trap must be present for
which demand and acceptance is again a sine qua non. There
must be work pending on the table of the petitioner for the
complainant to be aggrieved of such demand. The concept of
demand and acceptance cannot spring from air. There must
be a complainant and there must be public servant; the
public servant must have demanded from the complainant
and accepted bribe from the complainant for performing a
duty or forbearing such performance. These ingredients are
necessary in any of the documents that the prosecution
wants to rely on. If there is not even an iota of semblance of
demand and acceptance in a given case, though the matter is
- 36 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
still at the stage of preliminaries, permitting further
proceedings would become an abuse of the process of law.
13. The learned counsel for the respondent would
submit that Section 20 of the Act raises a presumption of
guilt against the accused, though rebuttable. Section 20 of
the Act reads as follows:
"20. Presumption where public servant
accepts any undue advantage.--Where, in any trial of
an offence punishable under Section 7 or under Section
11, it is proved that a public servant accused of an
offence has accepted or obtained or attempted to obtain
for himself, or for any other person, any undue advantage
from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the
contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or
attempted to obtain that undue advantage, as a motive or
reward under Section 7 for performing or to cause
performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly
either by himself or by another public servant or, as the
case may be, any undue advantage without consideration
or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate
under Section 11."
Section 20 has also borne interpretation by the Apex Court
in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA (supra). The interpretation
is that even for presumption to operate, basic ingredients
of demand and acceptance must be present in a given
case. I reiterate that the basic ingredients of demand and
acceptance are not present in the case at hand. Therefore,
the plea of presumption that the learned counsel for the
respondent would urge would also tumble down due to
lack of basic ingredients that are necessary to lay an
offence under Section 7 or Section 7A of the Act.
14. A scrutiny of the documents appended to the
petition, as analysed hereinabove, would clearly indicate
that further proceedings cannot be permitted to continue
against the petitioner. It is one thing to contend that this
- 37 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C., should not interfere unless it would result in
miscarriage of justice. It is another thing to say that if this
Court would not interfere in certain cases despite there
being clear documentary evidence for no offence being
made out would by itself result in miscarriage of justice.
Therefore, in a proceeding not to result in miscarriage of
justice, I deem it appropriate to exercise my jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and obliterate the
proceedings against the petitioner/accused No.1, failing
which it would be permitting a process to become an abuse
of the process of law.
15. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) Proceedings in Special (SVC) No.9 of 2021 pending
before the Principal District and Sessions Judge,
Gadag stand quashed qua the petitioner/accused
No.1.
(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the
course of the order are only for the purpose of
consideration of the case of petitioner under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. and the same shall not bind or
influence the proceedings against any other accused
pending before any other fora.
6. In the light of the reasons so rendered to quash the
proceedings qua accused No.1, the petitioner deserves the same
benefit.
7. Accordingly, the following:
- 38 -
NC: 2025:KHC-D:16913
HC-KAR
ORDER
i. Writ Petition is allowed.
ii. Proceedings in Special (SVC) No.9/2021 pending
before the Principal District and Sessions Judge and
Special Court, Gadag, stand quashed qua the
petitioner/accused No.3.
iii. It is made clear that the observations made in the
course of the order are only for the purpose of
consideration of the case of the petitioner under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and same shall not bind or
influence the proceedings against the other accused
pending before any other fora.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Kmv
CT:ANB
