Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 25119 Kant
Judgement Date : 22 October, 2024
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CRL.A No. 2184 of 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF OCTOBER, 2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SHIVASHANKAR AMARANNAVAR
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2184 OF 2018
BETWEEN:
MANJUNATHA
S/O HULUGABHOVI
AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS
R/AT HOSURU COLONY
HIRIYUR TALUK
CHITRADURGA - 577 598.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI VEERANNA G TIGADI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY RAMANAGARA TOWN P.S
REPRESENTED BY ITS
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Digitally signed HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
by HEMAVATHY BANGALORE - 560 001.
GANGABYRAPPA
Location: HIGH
COURT OF 2. SMT. LAKSHMI
KARNATAKA W/O SRINIVAS
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
R/AT KAYISOPPINA BEEDI
RAMANAGARA TOWN
RAMANAGARA - 562 159.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI K NAGESHWARAPPA, HCGP FOR R1
R2 SERVED, UNREPRESENTED)
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CRL.A No. 2184 of 2018
THIS CRL.A IS FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2) Cr.P.C
PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND
ORDER ON SENTENCE DATED 01.08.2018, PASSED BY THE I
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, RAMANAGARA
IN SPL.C.No.45/2017, CONVICTING THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED
FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 366A,
376(2)(i) OF IPC AND SECTION 4 OF POCSO ACT AND ETC.,
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR DICTATING JUDGMENT
THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SHIVASHANKAR AMARANNAVAR
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. This appeal is filed against the judgment of
conviction and order on sentence dated 01.08.2018
passed in Spl.C. No. 45/2017 by I Additional District and
Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Ramanagara, convicting the
appellant - accused for offence under Section 366-A,
376(2)(i) of IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act and
sentencing to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years
for offence punishable under Section 376(2)(i) of IPC and
rigorous imprisonment for 3 years for offence under
Section 366-A of IPC.
2. Factual matrix of the prosecution case is that
seven months prior to the incident the appellant - accused
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and victim girl - P.W.1 were known to each other. On
17.01.2017 the appellant - accused asked the victim girl
to come to the KSRTC bus stand and the victim girl came
at 04.00 pm and asked the appellant - accused why he
called her, for that the appellant - accused asked her to
come to his village. When she refused, he threatened that
he would die if she does not come. Therefore, the victim
girl boarded the KSRTC bus along with the appellant -
accused, he took her to Hosur Colony near Dindawara
Village to his house and stayed there till 26.01.2017. On
25.01.2017, at night hours, the appellant - accused
committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon the
victim girl even though she refused. Charge sheet came to
be filed against the appellant - accused for offence under
Section 366-A, 367(2)(i) of IPC and Section 4 of POCSO
Act. The Special Court has framed charge for the said
offence. The prosecution has examined 10 witnesses as
P.W.1 to P.W.10 and got marked Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.12 and
M.O.1 to M.O. 9. Statement of appellant - accused came to
be recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. After hearing
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arguments on both sides the trial Court formulated points
for consideration and convicted the appellant - accused for
the aforesaid offences. Said judgment of conviction and
order on sentence has been challenged in this appeal.
3. Heard learned counsel for the appellant -
accused and learned HCGP for respondent - State.
4. Learned counsel for appellant - accused would
contend that the age of the victim girl has not been proved
as required under Section 34 of the POCSO Act and
Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the `JJ
Act'). On that point he placed reliance on the decision of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of P. Yuvaprakash
Vs. State by Inspector of Police reported in 2023
INSC 626. He contends that the author of the school
certificate - Ex.P.10 has not been examined and it has
been marked in the evidence of the Investigating
Officer - P.W.10 who is not having any personal
knowledge regarding the date of birth of the victim girl. He
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contends that the victim girl and her mother who have
been examined as P.W.1 and P.W.2 have not stated the
date of birth of the victim girl. Therefore, the prosecution
has failed to prove that the victim girl is a child as defined
under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act. He contends that
there is no allegation against the appellant - accused in
the complaint filed by P.W.2 - mother of the victim girl
and name of one Santosh is stated in the complaint -
Ex.P.2 and who is that Santosh has not been investigated.
Even the cell number of the said Santosh has been
mentioned in the complaint. The victim girl has been
secured on 26.01.2017 and her statement has been
recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. on 30.01.2017 and
there is a delay in recording the statement. The delay in
recording the statement itself indicates that the victim girl
has been tutored in the meantime. P.W.1 - victim girl has
stated in her cross-examination that she has no knowledge
of sexual intercourse or forcible sexual intercourse.
Therefore, the evidence of victim girl that appellant -
accused committed forcible sexual intercourse cannot be
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relied to attract offence alleged against the appellant -
accused. The Doctor who examined the victim girl, i.e.,
P.W.9 has not given her final opinion. The final opinion has
been kept pending till receipt of FSL report. Even after
receipt of FSL report the Investigating Officer has not
sought final opinion of the Doctor. Said FSL report has not
been marked. The Doctor gave her provisional opinion only
on the basis that hymen of the victim girl was not in-tact.
He further contended that the evidence on record is not
sufficient to convict the appellant - accused for the offence
charged against him. Without considering all these
aspects learned Special Judge has erred in convicting the
appellant - accused. With this he prayed to allow the
appeal and acquit the appellant - accused.
5. Learned HCGP has argued that the school
certificate - Ex.P.10 indicate the date of birth of the victim
girl and based on that the Special Court has rightly held
that the victim girl is a child as defined under Section 2(d)
of the POCSO Act. P.W.1 has specifically stated the acts of
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this appellant - accused taking her to his house and
threatening her and committing forcible sexual intercourse
on her. Evidence of P.W.1 has been corroborated by
evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3. Sole evidence of P.W.1 is
sufficient to convict the appellant - accused for the offence
alleged against him. There is a presumption under
Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act. He has supported
the reasoning assigned by the trial Court. On these
grounds he sought for dismissal of the appeal.
6. On the grounds made out and considering the
arguments advanced the following point arises for my
consideration:
Whether the trial Court erred in convicting the
appellant - accused for offence under Sections
366-A, 376(2)(i) of IPC and Section 4 of the
POCSO Act?
7. My answer to the above question is in the
affirmative for the following reasons:
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In order to attract offence under the POCSO Act the
prosecution has to establish that the victim girl is a child
as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the POCSO Act. As per
Section 2(1)(d) of the POCSO Act child means any person
below the age of eighteen years. In order to ascertain
whether the prosecution has proved whether the victim
girl is a child or not, it is necessary to consider the
following provisions of law.
8. Section 34 of the POCSO Act reads as follows:
34. Procedure in case of commission of offence by child and determination of age by Special Court.-(1) Where any offence under this Act is committed by a child, such child shall be dealt with under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000).
(2) If any question arises in any proceeding before the Special Court whether a person is a child or not, such question shall be determined by the Special Court after satisfying itself about the age of such person and it shall record in writing its reasons for such determination.
(3) No order made by the Special Court shall be deemed to be invalid merely by any subsequent
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proof that the age of a person as determined by it under sub- section (2) was not the correct age of that person."
9. In view of Section 34(1) of the POCSO Act,
Section 94 of JJ Act becomes relevant and applicable.
Therefore the same is extracted and it reads as under:
"94. Presumption and determination of age. -(1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age.
(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining-
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the
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concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board:
Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order.
(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person."
10. It is evident from a conjoint reading of the
above provisions that to resolve whatever dispute with
respect to the age of a person that arises in the context of
her or him being a victim under the POCSO Act, the Courts
have to take recourse to the steps indicated in Section 94
of the JJ Act. The three documents in the order of which
the JJ Act requires consideration is that the concerned
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Court has to determine the age by considering the
following documents:
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board:
11. Section 94 of the JJ Act clearly indicates that
the date of birth certificate from the school or the
matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned
examination Board has to be firstly preferred in the
absence of which date of birth certificate issued by a
Corporation or Municipal Authority or a Panchayat can be
considered and it is only thereafter, in the absence of
these documents, age is to be determined through
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'ossification test' or `by any other latest medical age
determination test conducted on the orders of the
concerned authority, i.e., Committee or the Board or
Court'.
12. In the present case school certificate - Ex.P.10
has been produced to prove the age of the victim girl. The
author of Ex.P.10 has not been examined and it has been
marked in the evidence of P.W.10 - Investigating Officer.
P.W.10 - Investigating Officer has no personal knowledge
regarding the date of birth of the victim girl. A perusal of
the contents of Ex.P.10 - school certificate indicates that
the victim girl has been admitted in the said school for the
year 2014-15 and she is studying in 10th Standard during
March, 2017. Said aspect itself establishes that she might
have been admitted to the said school for 8th standard.
Said certificate has not been issued by the school first
attended by the victim girl. P.W.1 - victim girl has not
stated her date of birth in her evidence. P.W.2 - mother of
the victim girl has also not stated the date of birth of the
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victim girl. The document produced at Ex.P.10 do not
answer the description of any of the class of documents
mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) of the JJ Act. Therefore, the
trial Court could not have placed reliance on Ex.P.10 to
hold that the victim girl was below the age of 18 years at
the time of commission of offence. The Hon'ble Apex Court
in the case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State by Inspector
of Police reported in 2023 INSC 626, after considering
the provisions of Section 34 of the POCSO Act, Section 94
of the JJ Act, and decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh reported in 2021 (12) SCR 502, Sanjeev
Kumar Gupta Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and
others, reported in 2019 (9) SCR 735 and Abuzar
Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal
reported in 2012 (9) SCR 224 has observed thus:
"19. It is clear from the above narrative that none of the documents produced during the trial answered the description of "the date of birth certificate from the school" or "the
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matriculation or equivalent certificate" from the concerned examination board or certificate by a corporation, municipal authority or a Panchyat. In these circumstances, it was incumbent for the prosecution to prove through acceptable medical tests/examination that the victim's age was below 18 years as per Section 94(2)(iii) of JJ Act. ........."
Even the victim girl in her statement recorded under
Section 164 of Cr.P.C. (Ex.P.1) has not stated her date of
birth. The document produced i.e., Ex.P.10 - study
certificate is not what Section 94(2)(i) of the JJ Act
mandates and it is not in accordance with Section 94(2)(i)
of the JJ Act. In these circumstances, only basing on the
evidence accorded under Section 94 of the JJ Act was the
medical ossification test. Said ossification test has not
been conducted. Therefore, under these circumstances
there is no material on record to establish the date of birth
of the victim girl as per Section 94(2) of the JJ Act and the
prosecution has failed to establish that the victim girl was
a child as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the POCSO Act.
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13. P.W.2 - mother of victim girl has filed complaint
as per Ex.P.2. In Ex.P.2 mother of victim girl suspected
that victim girl might have gone with one Santosh having
mobile number 9845593109 as she had contacted him
over phone. Who is that Santosh has not been
investigated. As per the evidence of P.W.1 - victim girl she
came in contact with this appellant - accused when she
received a missed call from him. The victim girl had not
seen the appellant - accused prior to the date of incident.
On receiving the phone call from the appellant - accused
she went to the bus stand to meet him. How the victim girl
had identified the appellant - accused in the bus stand is
not forthcoming. The victim girl went with the appellant -
accused to his village and stayed for 8 days. What efforts
were made by the victim girl to come out of the house of
appellant - accused has not been stated by her in her
evidence. As per the evidence of P.W.1 - victim girl, on
25.01.2017 the appellant - accused in his house
committed forcible sexual intercourse on her. P.W.1 -
victim girl in her cross-examination has stated as under:
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'¯ÉÊAVPÀ ¸ÀA¨sÉÆÃUÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ CvÁåZÁgÀ JAzÀgÉ K£ÉAzÀÄ £À£ÀUÉ UÉÆwÛ®è ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀiÁ»w E®è J£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¸Àj'.
14. Said admission given by P.W.1 - victim girl in
her cross-examination indicate that she is not aware of
what is sexual intercourse and what is forcible sexual
intercourse. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.1 - victim girl
that appellant - accused had committed forcible sexual
intercourse on her cannot be taken into consideration to
attract offence under Section 376 of IPC or under Section
4 of the POCSO Act.
15. P.W.9 is the Doctor who examined the victim
girl and gave report as per Ex.P.7. In Ex.P.7 it is stated
that the victim girl is knowing the appellant - accused for
last 7 months. P.W.9 - the Doctor has deposed that there
are no signs of force and final opinion is reserved pending
FSL report and sexual violence cannot be ruled out. After
receipt of FSL report the Investigating Officer has not
sought final opinion of the Doctor - P.W.9. P.W.10 - the
Investigating Officer has stated in his evidence that he
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received the RFSL report on 20.07.2017 and submitted the
same to the Court on 21.07.2017. Evidence of P.W.9 -
Doctor has been recorded on 04.07.2018 after receipt of
the RFSL report. Said RFSL report, even though said to
have been produced before the Court by the Investigating
Officer on 21.07.2017, has not been marked. Considering
all these aspects a doubt arises with regard to the
appellant - accused kidnapping the victim girl from the
KSRTC bus stand and taking her to his house and
committing forcible sexual intercourse on her. Therefore,
benefit of doubt requires to be extended to the appellant -
accused. In view of the above, the prosecution has failed
to prove the guilt of the appellant - accused beyond all
reasonable doubt.
16. In the result, the following;
ORDER
i. The appeal is allowed.
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ii. The judgment of conviction and order on sentence
dated 01.08.2018 passed in Spl.C. No. 45/2017
by the I Additional District and Sessions Judge,
Ramanagara is set aside.
iii. The appellant - accused is acquitted of offence
under Section 366-A, 376-2(i) of IPC and Section
4 of POCSO Act.
iv. Issue intimation to the concerned prison
authorities for release of appellant - accused if he
is not required in any other case.
In view of disposal of the appeal, all pending IAs
stands disposed off.
Sd/-
(SHIVASHANKAR AMARANNAVAR) JUDGE
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