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G Shivakumar vs State Of Karnataka
2024 Latest Caselaw 5493 Kant

Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 5493 Kant
Judgement Date : 22 February, 2024

Karnataka High Court

G Shivakumar vs State Of Karnataka on 22 February, 2024

                               1


        IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

          DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2024

                           BEFORE

      THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

         WRIT PETITION NO.10111 OF 2020 (S-RES)

BETWEEN:

     SRI G. SHIVAKUMAR
     AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
     S/O GOVINDAPPA
     WATCHMAN, ACCOUNTS-II
     HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
     BENGALURU-560 001

                                               ...PETITIONER

(BY SRI.SAMEER SHARMA, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1.    STATE OF KARNATAKA
      DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND JUSTICE
      BENGALURU-560001
      KARNATAKA
      REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY

2.    HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
      BENGALURU-560001
      REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL
                                             ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.PRATHIBHA, AGA FOR R1;
SRI.M.A.SUBRAMANI, ADVOCATE FOR R2)
                                 2


     THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED
ORDER (ANNEXURE-A) PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 DATED
DECEMBER 10, 2015 VIDE ORDER NO.HCE.1194/2010 IN AS MUCH
AS IT TREATS THE PERIOD OF SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER
AS SUCH AND ETC.,

    THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
ORDERS ON 15.02.2024, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
ORDER THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

                            ORDER

The captioned petition is filed assailing the order dated

10.12.2015 passed by the respondent No.2 vide Annexure-A

and the consequent memo issued on a representation

submitted by the petitioner herein as per Annexure-B. The

petitioner is seeking a mandamus against respondent No.2 to

consider the representation dated 08.04.2019 and sanction

backwages and salary due to the petitioner during his period

of suspension.

2. The facts leading to the case are as under:

The petitioner was appointed by respondent No.2 to the

post of watchman at High Court of Karnataka, Kalaburagi

Bench. The petitioner was placed under suspension on

account of registration of crime in Crime No.324/2010 for the

offences punishable under Sections 9, 39, 40, 44 and 51 of the

Wild Life (Prevention) Act, 1972 read with Section 379 of IPC.

In the said complaint, it was alleged against the petitioner that

he has stolen 10 live turtles from the forest and had illegally

kept them at High Court quarters without any licence, permit

and pass. Based on the said compliant, investigation was

conducted and charge sheet was laid against the present

petitioner and other accused.

3. The petitioner made a representation on

08.08.2013 and brought to the notice of respondent No.2

about his acquittal of all the charges in C.C.No.2820/2011 and

therefore, a request was made to revoke his suspension. The

grievance of the petitioner is that though respondent No.2

taking cognizance of acquittal has revoked his suspension with

immediate effect, however, declined to grant monetary

benefits. Petitioner, therefore, submitted a representation on

08.04.2019 thereby requesting to grant full salary for the

period he was placed under suspension. The respondent No.2

as per Annexure-B declined to grant monetary benefits on the

ground that acquittal was by giving benefit of doubt. The

second reason for denying salary for the suspension period

was on the ground that petitioner has not discharged official

duty during the period of suspension and has reported for duty

only on 11.12.2015.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner reiterating the

grounds urged in the petition has placed reliance on the

following judgments:

1) Union of India and Ors. vs. Kameshwar Prasad - (1997) 11 SCC 650;

2) Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation vs. M.Prabhakar Rao - (2011) 8 SCC 155;

3) Krishnakant R.Bibhavnekar vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. - (1997) 3 SCC 636;

4) C.R.Radhakrishnan vs. State of Kerala and Ors. - (2017) 13 SCC 365;

5) P.Ramaswamy vs. General Manager, Canara Bank and Anr.

- (1998) 3 LLN 686;

6) Anish Gupta vs. Union of India and Anr. - 2019 SCC Online Del 7383;

7) Union of India and Ors. vs. K.V.Jankiraman and Ors. - (1991) 4 SCC 109;

8) Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Anr. vs. Mehar Singh - (2013) 7 SCC 685;

9) Union of India vs. Methu Meda - (2022) 1 SCC 1;

10) Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. - (2024) 1 SCC 175;

11) State of West Bengal and Ors. vs. Debashish Mukherjee and Ors. - (2011) 14 SCC 187.

5. Placing reliance on the judgment rendered in

P.Ramaswamy vs. General Manager, Canara Bank

(supra) and in the case of Anish Gupta vs. Union of India

(supra), he would vehemently argue and contend that where

disciplinary proceedings post acquittal in criminal proceedings

are not conducted, full consequential monetary benefits are

required to be accorded to the concerned personnel. Reliance

is also placed on the judgments rendered in Commissioner

of Police, New Delhi vs. Mehar Singh, Union of India vs.

Methu Meda and Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan (supra).

Referring to these judgments, he would contend that

'Honourable acquittal' and such other concepts are only

relevant vis-à-vis departmental proceedings. On account of

acquittal in a fully contested criminal proceedings, he would

point out that the petitioner is entitled to seek monetary

benefits during the suspension period. He would also place

reliance on the judgment rendered in Union of India vs.

K.V.Jankiraman (supra) to substantiate that principle of 'no

work, no pay' has no application to the present set of facts

and therefore, he would request this Court to quash the

impugned endorsement issued by the respondent No.2 as per

Annexure-B.

6. Referring to these judgments, he would point out

the fact that respondent No.2 has not initiated any

departmental enquiry and the fact that petitioner was

acquitted by the competent court, petitioner has to be deemed

to have been on duty for the period of suspension and

therefore, is entitled for full pay and allowances. While taking

this Court through the reasons assigned in the memo dated

12.09.2019 as per Annexure-B, he would point out that no

reasons are forthcoming to deny full salary during the period

of suspension.

7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the

respondents would point out that the criminal proceedings in

C.C.No.2820/2011 ended in acquittal as two prime witnesses

turned hostile. Referring to the gravity of charges levelled

against the petitioner, learned counsel for the respondents

would point out that petitioner being watchman in a higher

judiciary, the conduct alleged is relevant and a foundation for

prosecution and dehors acquittal for lack of sufficient evidence

which has culminated into an acquittal, though entitled for

reinstatement, cannot seek full salary. Reliance is placed on

the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case

of Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation vs.

M.Prabhakar Rao1.

(2011) 8 SCC 155

8. Referring to the conduct of petitioner, learned

counsel for the respondents would point out that the

petitioner's suspension was revoked on 10.12.2015 and the

representation seeking full salary is submitted only on

08.04.2019. Therefore, he would contend that there is

complete laxness on the part of petitioner and only on account

of inordinate delay, the petitioner is liable to be dismissed.

9. Referring to Rule 14 and Rule 20 of the High Court

of Karnataka Services (Conditions of Services and

Recruitment) Rules, 1973 (for short 'Rules, 1973'), he would

contend that Hon'ble Chief Justice is the controlling and

disciplinary authority and the services of the High Court

employees shall be subject to superintendence and control of

the Hon'ble Chief Justice. The memo dated 12.09.2019 as per

Annexure-B is passed by the Chief Justice after considering

various factors by exercising power under Rule 20 and

therefore, no judicial review is warranted in the present case

on hand.

10. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and

learned counsel for the respondents.

11. Petitioner who was appointed as a watchman was

prosecuted for the offence punishable under Sections 9, 39,

40, 44 and 51 of the Wild Life (Prevention) Act, 1972 read

with Section 379 of IPC. The allegations are that the present

petitioner along with other accused have stolen 10 live turtles

from the forest and they were illegally kept in High Court

quarters. Though the Investigating Officer has laid a charge

sheet, on account of prime witnesses having turned hostile,

the Court on account of witnesses to seizure mahazar having

given adverse statement was of the view that seizure mahazar

is not proved beyond doubt. The Court also found that there

is some discrepancies in the colours of the turtles and the

same was no indicated in the mahazar.

12. The petitioner was charge sheeted for the offence

punishable under Sections 9, 39, 40, 44 and 51 of the Wild

Life (Prevention) Act, 1972 read with Section 379 of IPC and

the Investigating Officer has laid a charge sheet. The very

cause for suspension of petitioner was on account of grave

offences indicated while registering crime and also while laying

charge sheet. Therefore, bearing in mind the conduct alleged

against the petitioner by the prosecution, though has ended in

acquittal for lack of sufficient evidence, the question that

emerges for consideration before this Court is, as to whether

petitioner though is reinstated by taking a lenient view is

entitled to seek full salary for the period of suspension. If

respondent No.2, taking note of acquittal of the charges in

criminal trial, for lack of evidence, has formed its opinion that

petitioner is not entitled to seek monetary benefits for the

period of suspension, this Court is not inclined to interfere with

the order passed by respondent No.2 as per Annexure-B.

Having regard to the gravity of allegations, respondent No.2

was justified in treating suspension period as a period of not

on duty and I do not find any error in declining either payment

of suspension allowances or full salary as claimed by the

petitioner.

13. The conduct of employees of a higher judiciary has

to be put on a higher pedestal. Though legal evidence may be

insufficient to bring home the guilt of the petitioner, the act of

reinstatement itself would send a wrong signal to the society

as well as to the employees of the judiciary. Merely because

respondent No.2 has taken a lenient view and ordered for

reinstatement, that will not in itself constitute a ground for

petitioner to seek full salary for the period of suspension.

14. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for

the respondents, the petitioner's action seeking full salary

lacks bonafides. Petitioner's suspension was revoked on

10.12.2015 and his claim for full salary in the representation

dated 08.08.2013 was rightly declined by respondent No.2.

The petitioner has submitted one more representation on

08.04.2019. There is a delay of more than three years in

seeking sanction of backwages due to the petitioner during his

period of suspension.

15. It is a trite law that Doctrine of laches in Court of

equity is not an arbitrary or a technical Doctrine, where it

would be practically unjust to give a remedy as the petitioner's

conduct in the present case on hand is found to be grossly

unfair and has to be regarded as equivalent to a waiver. The

lapse of time and delay are most material. Court while

examining such stale case have to be cautious and have to

take cognizance of the long delay and the nature of acts done

by a litigant during the interval. Court has to be also cautious

and examine as to whether any relief, if granted, which might

affect either party and gives a balance of justice or injustice.

Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the order passed

by respondent No.2 as per Annexure-A and the consequent

memo issued by respondent No.2 vide Annexure-B.

16. For the reasons stated supra, I pass the following:

ORDER

Writ petition is devoid of merits and accordingly, stands

dismissed.

Sd/-

JUDGE

CA

 
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