Karnataka High Court

B V Venkatagiriyappa vs State Of Karnataka on 24 November, 2023

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

       DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2023

                        BEFORE

       THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S. INDIRESH

        WRIT PETITION NO.19086 of 2021 (LR)

BETWEEN:

1.   B.V. VENKATAGIRIYAPPA
     S/O LATE VENKATAPPA
     AGED ABOUT 78 YEARS
     R/AT BHATTARAHALLI VILLAGE ,
     BIDARAHALLI HOBLI
     BENGALURU EAST TALUK,
     BENGALURU - 560049.

2.   SRI. CHANDRAIAH
     S/O SHANTHAPPA
     AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS,
     R/AT "MALA NILAYA",
     GOVERNMENT JUNIOR COLLEGE ROAD,
     2ND CROSS, KRISHNARAJAPURAM,
     BENGALURU EAST TALUK,
     BENGALURU - 560049.

3.   SRI. MAYANNA
     S/O MUNIBYRAPPA
     AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS,
     RESIDINGA AT PPA KOTE,
     VENKATARAMANA SWAMY TEMPLE,
     KRISHNARAJAPURAM,
     BENGALURU - 560036.


                                        ...PETITIONERS
                              2




(BY SRI. V.B. SHIVA KUMAR, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1.   STATE OF KARNATAKA
     DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
     REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
     VIDHANA SOUDHA,
     VIDHANA VEEDHI,
     BENGALURU - 560001.

2.   THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
     BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT,
     K G ROAD,
     BENGALURU - 560001.

3.   LAND TRIBUNAL
     BENGALURU EAST TALUK,
     KANDAYA BHAVAN,
     K G ROAD,
     BENGALURU - 560001.

4.   PRIMARY BOYS SCHOOL
     BHATTARAHALLI VILLAGE
     BIDARAHALLI HOBLI
     BENGALURU EAST TALUK
     BENGALURU - 560 036.

     KAMALA BAI
     SINCE DECEASED BY LRS

5.   SRI B.R. GURURAJ
     S/O LATE B. RANGA RAO
     AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS,
     NO.14, TATA SILK FARM
     BENGALURU -560 004.
                            3




6.    V. MUNIRATHNAM
      SINCE DECEASED BY LRS.

6a.   CHANDRASHEKAR M.
      S/O LATE V. MUNIRATHNAM
      AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,

6b.   ASHWATH KUMAR
      S/O LATE V. MUNIRATHNAM
      AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,

6c.   BHAGYALAKSHMI
      D/O LATE V. MUNIRATHNAM
      AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,

6d.   MANJUNATH
      S/O LATE V. MUNIRATHNAM
      AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,

6e.   GEETHANJALI ASHWATHKUMAR
      D/O LATE V. MUNIRATHNAM
      AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,

      RESPONDENTS 6(a) TO 6(e)
      ARE RESIDING AT
      2/1 "SAI KRUPA NILAYA"
      T C PALYA ROAD, V B LAYOUT
      KRISHNARAJAPURAM
      BENGALURU-560 036.

6f.   DHANALAKSHMMA
      W/O LATE V. MUNIRATHNAM,
      AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS

6g . GAJENDRA M.
     S/O LATE V. MUNIRATHNAM
     AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
                            4




6h.   SHYAMALA
      D/O LATE V. MUNIRATHNAM,
      AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,

6(i) . KAMALA
       D/O LATE V. MUNIRATHNAM
       AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,

6(j) . HEMALATHA
       D/O LATE V. MUNIRATHNAM
       AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,

      RESPONDENTS 6(f) TO 6(j) ARE
      RESIDING AT NO.2/1
      NEW POLICE STATION ROAD
      BEHIND GOVERNMENT HOSPITAL
      K R PURAM
      BENGALURU-560 036.

                                          ....RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. V.G. BHANUPRAKASH, AGA A/W
SRI. C.N. MAHADESHWARAN, AGA FOR R1 TO R4;
SRI. B.R. VISHWANATH, ADVOCATE FOR R5;
SRI. C.S. PRASANNA KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. G.B. MANJUNATHA, ADVOCATE FOR R6(a) TO R6(j))

      THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE
ORDER DATED 23.07.2021 ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN CASE
NO.LRF(B)   BH/5/937/1975-76     PASSED   BY   THE   LAND
TRIBUNAL, BENGALURU EAST TALUK BY RESPONDENT NO.3
AT ANNEXURE-A AND ETC.
                                 5




      IN THIS WRIT PETITION ARGUMENTS BEING HEARD,
JUDGMENT RESERVED, COMING ON FOR "PRONOUNCEMENT
OF ORDERS", THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:


                          ORDER

1. In this Writ Petition, petitioners are assailing

the order dated 23.7.2021 in case No.LRF (B)

BH5/937/1975-76 passed by the Land Tribunal,

Bengaluru East Taluk (Annexure-A), inter-alia sought for

declaration that the schedule property belongs to the

respondent-Government as per the confirmation of rights

under Vidyadan and Bhoodan Scheme during 1954-55,

utilized by the Primary Boys School, Bhattarahalli Village

as per Order dated 04.07.1960, passed by the Special

Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams vide

Annexure-G.

2. The relevant facts in brief for adjudication of

the Writ Petition are that, the petitioners claim to be the

residents of Bhattarahalli Village and were impleaded

before the Land Tribunal in case No.LRF

(B)/BH5/937/1975-76. It is stated in the Writ Petition

that, the petitioners have no personal interest in respect

of the subject matter and their aim is to protect the land

in favour of the respondent-Government and as such,

presented this writ Petition.

3. It is stated by the petitioners that, the land

bearing Sy. No.19 measuring 6 acres 17 guntas of

Bhattarahalli Village, Bangalore East Taluk is a

Government land earmarked for the purpose of Primary

Boys School at Bhattarahalli Village. It is further stated

in the writ petition that, one V. Munirathnam (father of

respondent Nos.6(a) to 6(j)), has filed an application

before the competent authority seeking occupancy rights

in respect of the subject matter. It is contended that, the

land in question is Inam land and belongs to one

Narayana Rao-landlord and father of Sri. V. Munirathnam

- N. Venkataramanaiah (grandfather of the respondent

Nos.6(a) to 6(j) ), claims to be a tenant. After the death

of said Narayana Rao, Smt. Kamala Bai - wife of

Narayana Rao, has allowed the tenant - N.

Venkataramanaiah to cultivate the land in question.

Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner, by order dated

14.12.1970, granted occupancy rights in favour of Smt.

Kamala Bai. However, the application made by the said

N. Venkataramanaiah was rejected by order dated

31.01.1975. Being aggrieved by the same, V.

Munirathnam, Son of N. Venkataramanaiah, filed W.P.

No.19913/1982 before this Court challenging the

rejection of the application seeking occupancy rights and

this Court by order dated 22.11.1985, set aside the order

of the Land Tribunal and as such, remanded the matter

for fresh consideration (Annexure-R1). Pursuant to the

remand, the Land Tribunal, after considering the material

on record, conferred occupancy rights in respect of the

subject land in favour of V. Munirathnam under Section

48A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (hereinafter

referred to as 'the Act'), vide order dated 14.07.2009

(Annexure-R2). Thereafter, the respondent - authorities

have issued Form No.10 in favour of the said V.

Munirathnam. It is to be noted that in the said

proceedings, certain persons who had not filed Form No.7

were also included (petitioners herein). Feeling

aggrieved by the same, the persons who had not filed

Form No.7 and impleaded before the Land Tribunal, had

preferred W.P. No.31051/2009 challenging the order of

the Land Tribunal dated 14.07.2009. This Court by order

dated 10.07.2010, set aside the order passed by the Land

Tribunal and remitted the matter to the Special Deputy

Commissioner / competent authority to consider the issue

afresh which is at Annexure-R4. Thereafter, V.

Munirathnam filed RP No.761/2013 before this Court and

this Court allowed the Revision Petition making necessary

corrections in the order dated 10.07.2013 in W.P.

No.31051/2009 by referring to the order passed by the

Division Bench in W.A.No.15392/2002. It is also

forthcoming from the writ petition that, portion of the

land has been acquired for the formation of the road /

National Highway. It is the grievance of the petitioners

that the Land Tribunal, after remand by this Court in

W.P.No.31051/2009, heard the matter and passed

impugned order dated 23.07.2021 conferring occupancy

rights in favour of V. Munirathnam in respect of land

bearing Sy. No.19, measuring to an extent of 6 acres 17

guntas of Bhattarahalli Village, Bidarahalli Hobli,

Bangalore East Taluk (Annexure-A). Feeling aggrieved by

the same, petitioners have presented this Writ Petition.

4. I have heard Sri. V.B. Shivakumar, learned

counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri Bhanuprakash,

learned Additional Advocate General appearing along with

Sri C.N.Mahadeshwaran, learned Additional Government

Advocate appearing for respondent-Government and Sri.

C S Prasanna Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of Sri G.B.Manjunatha, for respondent No.6(a) to (j).

5. Sri. V.B. Shivakumar, learned counsel

appearing for the petitioners contended that, the land in

question belongs to the respondent-Government and it is

a playground and as such, in the larger public interest,

the petitioners herein are agitating the matter. He

further contended that, the Land Tribunal ought not to

have decided the rights of the parties under the

provisions of the Act. He further emphasised that, as the

property in question is a Government land, conferring

occupancy right does not arise at all and as such, he

sought for interference of this Court.

6. Sri. V.B. Shivakumar, learned counsel for the

petitioners further contended that, the land in question

belongs to Inamdar, who in turn gifted the property

under Vidhyadan and Bhoodan Scheme during the year

1954-55 and possession was given to the School and

therefore, the said aspect has not been considered by the

Land Tribunal. He further contended that, the name of

the Primary Boys' School, Bhattarahalli is shown in the

record of rights and as such, the land in question is

belonging to the respondent-Government. Accordingly, he

sought for setting aside the impugned order passed by

the Land Tribunal.

7. Sri. V. Bhanuprakash, learned Additional

Advocate General supports the submission made by Sri.

V. B. Shivakumar and reiterates the averments made in

the statement of objections filed by the respondent -

State.

8. It is the primary contention of learned

Additional Advocate General that as the Inamdar has

gifted the property to run the school, and as such, after

referring to the order dated 04.07.1960 produced at

Annexure-R2 in the statement of objections of

respondent No.2-State contended that, the occupancy

rights granted in favour of V. Munirathnam has to be set

aside.

9. On the other hand, Sri. C S Prasanna Kumar,

appearing on behalf of Sri. G.B.Manjunath, learned

counsel appearing for respondent No.6(a) to (j), raised

preliminary objection that, the petitioners are neither

interested parties nor have locus-standi to maintain the

instant Writ Petition. It is further contended that, as the

petitioners herein have no personal interest and

therefore, the Land Tribunal has committed an error in

allowing the petitioners to come on record as petitioners

therein in the absence of having not filed Form No.7

seeking occupancy rights. Sri. C. S Prasanna Kumar,

learned counsel further submitted that, the Land Tribunal,

despite after providing opportunity to the petitioners

herein, though have no authority under law, rightly

granted occupancy rights in favour of said V.

Munirathnam and as such, sought to justify the impugned

order.

10. Nextly, Sri C.S.Prasanna Kumar, learned

counsel refers to the proceedings referred to in

Annexures - R1 and R2 of statement of objections filed by

the State, contended that, there is no registered gift deed

made by Smt. Kamala Bai in favour of the respondent-

school in question. Hence, it is the categorical submission

that ownership does not pass in favour of the

respondent- School in question and therefore, argued

that, the Writ Petition deserves to be dismissed in limine.

It is the submission of Sri C.S.Prasanna Kumar, that it is

the duty of the Government / Primary Boys School to

establish that there is transfer of the property in favour of

the respondent no. 4- Primary Boys School, and on the

contrary, as there is no valid title has been transferred,

the petitioners have no authority under law. He also

refers to the observation made by this Court in W.P.

No.19913/1982 and submitted that this Court has already

given a finding that, the grandfather of the petitioner - N.

Venkataramanaiah was cultivating the land in question

from 1972-73 upto 1981-82 and in that view of the

matter, the finding recorded by the Land Tribunal is just

and proper and accordingly, he sought for dismissal of

the Writ Petition.

11. It is contended by the learned counsel

appearing for the respondents that, argument advanced

relating to the fact that, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction

to entertain the issue, cannot be accepted in view of the

judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

case PILLAMMA (DEAD) AND OTHERS VS.

M.RAMAIAH REDDY (DEAD) THROUGH LRS AND

ANOTHER reported in (2022) SCC ONLINE SC 987.

Placing reliance on the judgment, Sri C. S. Prasanna

Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the contesting

respondents pleaded that there is no bar under the

Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, claiming occupancy

rights. It is also the categorical submission of the learned

counsel appearing for the private respondents that, if the

respondent-School is the interested party, the State

Government or the School ought to have challenged the

impugned order passed by Land Tribunal and that apart,

the petitioners are not rival claimants, and have not filed

application seeking occupancy rights in respect of the

land in question and therefore, he argued that, the writ

petition itself is not maintainable. It is also contended by

the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that,

the petitioners are strangers and the scope of challenging

the order passed by the Land Tribunal vests with the

claimants and the landlords alone and therefore, he

sought for dismissal of the writ petition.

12. Sri C S Prasanna Kumar, learned counsel

appearing for the respondent invites the attention to the

provisions under the Karnataka Bhoodan Yagna Act,

1963, and contended that, the said Act, envisages for

donating land to the Government for the purpose of

distributing the same to the landless poor persons and

therefore, contended that, the arguments advanced by

the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and

learned Additional Advocate General cannot be accepted.

In order to buttress his arguments, learned counsel

appearing for the respondents places reliance on the

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

SMT. SUGUNA RAJKUMAR VS. R. RAJMAL AND

ANOTHER reported in ILR 2005 KAR 1583 and in the

case of SMT. KAMALABAI VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA

in W.A. No.15392 of 2011 decided on 20.09.2012.

13. In reply to the submission of the learned

counsel appearing for the respondents, Sri

V.B.Shivakumar, learned counsel appearing for the

petitioners argued that, the Karnataka Bhoodhan Yagna

Act, 1963 is not applicable to the case on hand. He

further contended that, the land in question is a play

ground and never been regarded as agricultural land and

therefore, reiterates that, the petitioners are the

interested persons to safeguard the play ground in which,

their children are playing and therefore, sought for

allowing the writ petition.

14. In the light of the submission made by the

learned counsel appearing for the parties, the primary

question to be answered is whether the petitioners are

"aggrieved parties" / "Interested Parties". The main

argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for

the private respondents is with regard to the locus-standi

of the petitioners to maintain the present writ petition. In

this regard, the petitioners at paragraph 1 of the writ

petition, state that, they are the citizens of Bhattarahalli

village and have no personal interest except safeguard

the play ground attached to respondent no.4- Primary

Boy's School Bhattarahalli, which is a Government

property. The entire dispute revolves around the

provisions contained under Karnataka Land Reforms Act,

1961. Section 2(18) of the Act provides for definition of

"Land". Section 2(20) of the Act, envisages the definition

of "Landlord". Section 2(20) reads as under:

"Landlord means a person who has leased land to a tenant and includes a person entitled to receive rent from a tenant."

15. Section 2(23) of the Act, defines "Permanent

tenant" which reads under:

(23)"Permanent tenant" means a tenant [who cultivates land personally].-

(a) the commencement or duration of whose tenancy cannot satisfactorily be proved by reason of antiquity of such tenancy; or

(b) whose name or the name of whose predecessor-

in-title has been entered in the record of rights or in any public record or in any other revenue record as permanent tenant; or

(d) who holds land as mulgenidar, mirasdar or khata kul; and includes any person whose tenancy is under the provisions of any law presumed to be co-extensive with the duration of the tenure of the landlord.

16. Having taken note of the aforementioned

provisions, in order to decide the application filed before

the Land Tribunal for conferment of occupancy rights, it is

only the owner of land in question being a landlord and

the application made by the cultivator of the land in

question as a tenant, are alone empowered to challenge

the order passed by the Land Tribunal. In this regard,

the petitioners herein never made application seeking

occupancy rights in respect of the land in question.

Indisputably, the State has not preferred any writ petition

challenging the impugned order passed by the Land

Tribunal. It is the case of the petitioners that, the

petitioners are interested persons and to safeguard the

interest of the Government, agitating their rights in this

writ petition. If at all such remedy is available to the

petitioners, it is not in this writ petition, challenging the

impugned order as a 'Pro bono Publico'. On this ground

alone, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed as

petitioners are neither interested parties nor aggrieved

parties agitating their rights in the present writ petition,

challenging the order passed by the Land Tribunal-

respondent No.3. The Division Bench of this Court in the

case of SMT. SUGUNA RAJKUMAR Vs. R. RAJABAL

AND ANOTHER reported in ILR 2005 KAR 1583, after

referring to the various Judgments of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, relates to invoking jurisdiction under

Article 226 of Constitution of India for enforcement of

private right to immovable property, at paragraph 22

held as follows:

"22. The following well settled principles emerge from the aforesaid decisions:

(i) Writ Petition is a public law remedy and cannot be invoked for resolution of private law disputes.

Therefore, a Writ Petition is not maintainable for

resolution of a property dispute or for declaration of title.

(ii) Where there is an alternative effective and efficacious remedy available under law, the High Court will not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. But, rule of such exclusion is a rule of discretion and where the matter involves enforcement of fundamental right or failure to follow principles of natural justice discretion may be exercised to entertain petition under Article 226.

(iii) A Writ Petition is not intended to replace ordinary remedies by way of suit or application. Where an alternative remedy was available, a petitioner cannot allow that remedy to be time-barred or allow it to be dismissed and then apply under Article 226 contending that he has no other remedy.

(iv) A Writ Petition is not an appropriate remedy where the matter requires determination of disputed questions of fact involving elaborate examination of evidence. But, where fundamental rights are infringed, Writ Petition may, in appropriate cases, be entertained, even if the matter involves determination of disputed questions of fact."

17. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of CULCATTA GAS

COMPANY (PROPRIETARY) LTD VS. STATE OF WEST

BENGAL AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1962 SC 1044

at paragraph 5 held as follows:

"5. The first question that falls to be considered is whether the appellant has locus standi to file the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The argument of learned counsel for the respondents is that the appellant was only managing the industry and it had no proprietary right therein and, therefore, it could not maintain the application. Article 226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, clear that persons other than those claiming fundamental rights can also approach the court seeking a relief thereunder. The article in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder; but it is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right. In State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta this Court has ruled that the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India it has been held by this

Court that the legal right that can be enforced under Article 32 must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the court for relief. We do not see any reason why a different principle should apply in the case of a petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution. The right that can be enforced under Article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified. The question, therefore, is whether in the present case the petitioner has a legal right and whether it has been infringed by the contesting respondents. The petitioner entered into an agreement dated July 24, 1948, with Respondent 5 in regard to the management of Oriental Gas Company. Under the agreement, the appellant was appointed as manager and the general management of the affairs of the Company was entrusted to it for a period of 20 years. The appellant would receive thereunder by way of remuneration for its services,

(a) an office allowance of Rs 3000 per mensem, (b) a commission of 10 percent on the net yearly profit of the Company, subject to a minimum of Rs 60,000 per year in the case of absence of or inadequacy of profits, and (c) a commission of Rs 1 per ton of all

coal purchased and negotiated by the manager. In its capacity as manager, the appellant Company was put in charge of the entire business and its assets in India and it was given all the incidental powers necessary for the said management. Under the agreement, therefore, the appellant had the right to manage Oriental Gas Company for a period of 20 years and to receive the aforesaid amounts towards its remuneration for its services. Section 4 of the impugned Act reads:

"With effect from the appointed day and for a period of five years thereafter.

(a) the undertaking of the company shall stand transferred to the State Government for the purpose of management and control;

(b) the company and its agents, including managing agents, if any, and servants shall cease to exercise management or control in relation to the undertaking of the company;

(c) all contracts, excluding any contract or contracts in respect of agency or managing agency, subsisting immediately before the appointed day and affecting the undertaking of the company shall cease to have effect or to be enforceable against the company, its agents or any person who was a surety thereto or had guaranteed the performance

thereof and shall be of as full force and effect against or in favour of the State of West Bengal and shall be enforceable as fully and effectively as if instead of the company the State of West Bengal had been named therein or had been a party there to:"

Under the said section, with effect from the appointed day and for a period of five years thereafter, the management of the company shall stand transferred to the State Government, and the company, its agents and servants shall cease to exercise management or control of the same. Under clause (c) of the section, the contracts of agency or managing agency are not touched, but all the other contracts cease to have effect against the Company and are enforceable by or against the State. It is not necessary in this case to decide whether under the said agreement the appellant was constituted as agent or managing agent or a servant of Oriental Gas Company. Whatever may be its character, by reason of Section 4 of the impugned Act, it was deprived of certain legal rights it possessed under the agreement. Under the agreement, the appellant had the right to manage Oriental Gas Company for a period of 20 years and to receive remuneration for the same. But under Section 4 of the impugned Act, it was deprived of that right for a period of five

years. There was certainly a legal right accruing to the appellant under the agreement and that was abridged, if not destroyed, by the impugned Act. It is, therefore, impossible to say that the legal right of the appellant was not infringed by the provisions of the impugned Act. In the circumstances, as the appellant's personal right to manage the Company and to receive remuneration therefor had been infringed by the provisions of the statute, it had locus standi to file the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution."

18. In the case of JASBHAI MOTIBHAI DESAI

VS. ROSHAN KUMAR BASHIR AHMED AND OTHERS

reported in (1976) 1 SCC 671 at paragraph 48 held as

follows:

"48. In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim

to hang on. Therefore he is not a "person aggrieved"

and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the no-objection certificate."

19. The aforementioned aspect was considered by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SHRIPAL

BHATI AND ANOTHER VS. STATE OF UTTAR

PRADESH AND OTHERS reported in 2020 (12) SCC

87.

20. It is also relevant to cite the judgment of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of AYAAUBKHAN

NOORKHAN PATHAN VS. STATE OF MAHARASTRA

AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2013 SC 58. Paragraph 7

to 15 held as follows:

"7. Per contra, Shri Shankar Chillarge, learned counsel appearing for the Scrutiny Committee, has made elaborate submissions, in support of the impugned judgment and subsequent proceedings. Mr Udaya Kumar Sagar and Ms Bina Madhavan, learned counsel appearing for Respondent 5, have also supported the impugned judgment of the High Court and has further submitted that even though

Respondent 5, does not belong to the Scheduled Tribes category, he most certainly could file a complaint against the appellant, at such a belated stage, as the appellant had obtained employment in 1989, by way of misrepresentation and fraud. Respondent 5, being a public-spirited person has espoused the cause of the real persons who have been deprived of their right to be considered for the said post occupied by the appellant. Respondent 5 has also filed affidavits of relevant persons before the Scrutiny Committee, to prove his allegations. Thus, the present appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.

8. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

Person aggrieved

9. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the authority/court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order, etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the appellant that there has been a

breach of statutory duty on the part of the authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can, of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. In fact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. [Vide State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta , Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. , Calcutta Gas Co.

(Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of W.B , Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Assn. (2) v. S.C. Sekar .]

10. A "legal right", means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by

the rule of law. The expression, "person aggrieved"

does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be one whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised. (Vide Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York and State of Rajasthan v. Union of India )

11. In Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University of, a similar view was taken by this Court, observing that, if a person claiming relief is not eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved regarding the election or the selection of other persons.

12. In A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P. , this Court held : (SCC pp. 628-29, para 25)

"25. ... The expression 'aggrieved person' denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which the contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the complainant's interest and the nature and the extent of the

prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant."

13. This Court, even as regards the filing of a habeas corpus petition, has explained that the expression "next friend" means a person who is not a total stranger. Such a petition cannot be filed by one who is a complete stranger to the person who is in alleged illegal custody. [Vide Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of , Sunil Batra (2) v. Delhi Admn. , Nilima Priyadarshini v. State of Bihar , Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India , Karamjeet Singh v. Union of India and Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. ]

14. This Court has consistently cautioned the courts against entertaining public interest litigation filed by unscrupulous persons, as such meddlers do not hesitate to abuse the process of court. The right of effective access to justice, which has emerged with the new social rights regime, must be used to serve basic human rights, which purport to guarantee legal rights and, therefore, a workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system must be provided. Whenever any public interest is invoked, the court must examine the case to ensure that there is in fact, genuine public interest involved. The court must maintain strict vigilance to ensure that there is no abuse of the process of court and

that, "ordinarily meddlesome bystanders are not granted a visa". Many societal pollutants create new problems of non-redressed grievances, and the court should make an earnest endeavour to take up those cases, where the subjective purpose of the lis justifies the need for it. (Vide P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam , Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. , State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Amar Singh v. Union of India.)

15. Even as regards the filing of a public interest litigation, this Court has consistently held that such a course of action is not permissible so far as service matters are concerned. (Vide Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra , Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and Neetu v. State of Punjab.)"

21. Applying the aforementioned principles to the

case on hand, the petitioners being neither interested nor

aggrieved parties as there is no relationship as landlord

and tenant as per the Act in the proceedings referred to

above, I am of the view that, the petitioners have no

locus standi to challenge the impugned order passed by

the Land Tribunal, Bengaluru East Taluk (Annexure-A). It

is well settled principle that, insofar as the claiming land

under a tenancy law, only the tenant or land lord or any

rival claimants if any are the 'aggrieved party' to be

heard in the matter, and the petitioners herein, neither

filed Form No.7 seeking occupancy rights nor the

landlords of the property in question and as such, there is

no legal right existing with the petitioners herein to

challenge the conferment of occupancy rights made in

favour of contesting respondents herein. If the petitioners

are allowed to be heard in the matter, then the very

object of the Act would be defeated and therefore, I do

not find any acceptable grounds as urged by the learned

counsel appearing for the petitioners.

22. It is also submitted by the learned counsel

appearing for the parties at the time of hearing the

petition that, writ petition be heard and dispose of the

same on merits and as such, writ petition was taken up

on merits also. It is the case of the petitioners that, the

land in question has been gifted by the Inamdar in favour

of the respondent No.4 - School. Though it is argued

that, the land in question was gifted to effectuate the

Bhoodan movement and if such being the case, same

shall be done in terms of statutory provisions, however,

neither the petitioners nor the Government have referred

to any statutory provision, making gift through Bhoodan

movement as urged in this writ petition and that apart,

the private respondents referred to the provisions under

the Karnataka Bhoodana Yajna Act, 1963, where, Section

3 and 4 of the said Act provide for establishment of the

Board and only after the confirmation made by such

Board, the land be vested with the Bhoodana Yajna

Board. The petitioners or the State Government have not

produced any material before this Court relating to the

transfer of land to the respondent No.4-School through

Vidyadhan or Bhoodhan Scheme during 1954-55 by

producing any registered documents. The petitioners,

place reliance on the deposition of one Sri. Poojappa in

Case No.53/1959-60, however, in the said deposition

itself, it reveals that there is no registered gift deed made

in favour of the respondent-School. In that view of the

matter, as the land in question was never transferred in

favour of the respondent-School in a manner known to

law and therefore, neither respondent No.4 nor

petitioners herein have any semblance of right in respect

of the subject matter.

23. On the other hand, the contesting private

respondents have produced order dated 20.09.2012 in

Writ Appeal No.15392/2011, whereby, the Inamdar has

challenged the order dated 31.03.2011 in W.P.

No.37147/2009 and the Division Bench of this Court,

allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Land

Tribunal for fresh consideration. It is pertinent to mention

here that, neither the respondent No.4 - School nor the

petitioners herein are parties in the writ appeal. This

Court, at paragraph No.7 in the said appeal passed the

following order:

"7. Having heard the Learned Counsel for the parties we do see some force in the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant because the Tribunal did not consider the case of respondent-3 on merits. Evidence said to have been let in by respondent-3 has not even discussed by the Land Tribunal while granting occupancy rights to respondent-3, based on certain observations made by this Court in the earlier round of litigation cannot be a sole reason for granting occupancy rights. Certain observations made by this Court in the earlier round of litigation is the sole reason for the Tribunal in granting occupancy right in favour of respondent-3. Any observations made by any court for disposal of a case cannot be a reason for the Tribunal to grant occupancy rights because the Tribunal is required to consider whether respondent- 3 was a tenant under deceased Kamala Bai and whether as on 01.03.1974 he was cultivating the land as a tenant or not. Without there being a finding to this effect the Tribunal had granted occupancy rights. According to us the order of the

Land Tribunal has to be set aside on the ground of non application of mind."

24. Perusal of the RTC extracts would indicate

that, the name of the father of V. Munirathnam - late

Venkataramanaiah was reflected in the revenue records.

It is also evident from the writ papers wherein the

husband of Smt. Kamalabai - Narayanarao, under whom

the father of the claimant was cultivating the land in

question, it is recorded that the father of the petitioners

was paying 'gutta' or 'wara' in favour of said Narayana

rao and thereafter to Smt. Kamalabai. It is the

submission of the contesting respondents that, the father

of Sri. V. Munirathnam had filed Form No.7, seeking

occupancy rights and thereafter, the petitioners and this

Court by order dated 20.07.2012 in W.A. 15392/2011

remitted the matter to the Land Tribunal for fresh

consideration.

25. In so far as the argument advanced by the

learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and the

learned Additional Advocate General, relating to

jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal, the said aspect has been

considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PILLAMMA

(supra) at paragraphs 15 to 19, held as follows:

"15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance examined the record.

16. The scope and ambit of the two Acts, namely, Act 1954 and Act, 1961 has been examined by this Court in Muniyallppa (supra) in paragraph 5 as under:-

"5. It may be stated that the purpose and scope of the two Acts are distinct. The Inam Abolition Act was enacted for the purpose of abolition of inam tenures and conversion of such tenures into ryotwari tenure and in that process, grant of occupancy rights to the inamdars and the three classes of tenants specified in that Act. The purpose of the Land Reforms Act, however, is quite different. The main purpose was to abolish the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of tenanted lands and to confer occupancy rights on tenants who are in

personally cultivating the lands. Therefore, the rejection of the claim of the appellant under the Inams Abolition Act does not lead to the inference that he has no claim for occupancy right under the Land Reforms Act. The appellant claims that he is a deemed tenant as provided under Section 4 of the Land Reforms Act. The requirement of deemed tenant, as provided under Section 4 of the Tenancy Act, must be determined by the Land Tribunal. The High Court having come to the conclusion that the procedure adopted by the Land Tribunal was not in accordance with the rules of natural justice ought ought to have remitted the matter to the Tribunal for fresh disposal.

17. Under the scheme of the Act 1954, all lands in Inam villages vested in the State Government. But under the Act 1961, not all agricultural lands vest in the State; only lands held by or in possession of tenants immediately prior to 1st March, 1974 vest in the State Government. The claim of the tenant or tenants for registration of occupancy rights under the Act, 1961 has to be decided with reference to the date of vesting under Section 44, viz., 1st March 1974. Under the Act 1954, the rights of the Inamdars and tenants were decided with reference to the date of vesting, viz, 1st February, 1959 under the said Act.

18. The scope and purport of the two Acts being different, termination of the proceedings under the Act, 1954 in regard to grant of occupancy rights cannot bar an enquiry to establish the claim under Section 45 of the Act, 1961 by the Land Tribunal. What the Tribunal, under the Act, has to inquire into, in whether the lands claimed by the applicant before it, have vested in the State Government under Section 44 of the Act 1961. Fro the purpose, it has to decide whether the lands were held by or in the possession of any tenant immediately prior to 1st March, 1974 (the date of vesting).

19. This is what has been examined by the Tribunal in extensor and thereafter finding was recorded that the first respondent was in possession and was cultivating the subject land in question immediately prior to 1st March, 1974 (the vesting date) under Section 44 of the Act, 1961 and accordingly declared to confer the occupancy rights to the first respondent under its order dated 16th December 2002."

26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Case of GENERAL MANAGER, ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, ORISSA AND OTHERS VS. GIRIDHARI SAHU AND OTHERS, reported in (2019)

10 SCC 695, Summarised the scope of Certiorari jurisdiction and the relevant paragraph 22 to 28 reads as follows:

22. The question arose in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra [Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra,. The question was whether the finding by the Tribunal under the Act about the party respondents being workmen was liable to be interfered with. After dealing with various tests relating to determining the issue, this Court also made the following observations: (AIR p. 269, para 19) "19. ... '... It is equally well settled that the decision of the Tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless at the least it is shown to be fully unsupported by evidence.'"

(emphasis supplied)

23. A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477] , has spoken about the scope of writ of certiorari in the following terms: (AIR pp. 479-80, para 7)

"7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of

certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.

In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque , Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills

Division and Appeals and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh)."

(emphasis supplied)

24. We may more importantly also advert to the view expressed by this Court in a matter which again arose under the Act in Parry & Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal . It was a case related to the scope of the jurisdiction of the tribunal in the matter of retrenchment under Section 25-F. This is what the Court held inter alia: (AIR p. 1340, para 11) "11. The grounds on which interference by the High Court is available in such writ petitions have by now been well established. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa it was observed that a writ of certiorari is generally granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. It is available in those cases where a tribunal, though competent to enter upon an enquiry, acts in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or violates the principles of natural justice where no particular procedure is prescribed. But a mere wrong decision cannot be corrected by a writ of certiorari as that would be using it as the cloak of an appeal in disguise but a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings based on a clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law or absence of

or excess of jurisdiction, when shown, can be so corrected. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, this Court once again observed that where the Tribunal having jurisdiction to decide a question comes to a finding of fact, such a finding is not open to question under Article 226 unless it could be shown to be wholly unwarranted by the evidence. Likewise, in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, this Court observed that where the Tribunal has disabled itself from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or where its conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person can ever have arrived at that conclusion, interference under Article 226 would be justified."

(emphasis supplied)

25. We may advert to the decision of this Court in Mukand Ltd. v. Staff & Officers' Assn. We may only advert to the following paragraphs: (SCC pp. 486-87, paras 47-49)

"47. In support of his contention that this Court while exercising its power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in an appeal from the judgment of the High Court rendered in exercise

of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India will exercise the same power which the High Court could exercise and will not interfere with the finding of facts recorded by a tribunal, the learned counsel cited the judgment in Parry & Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal. In the said case, this Court held as under: (AIR p. 1341, para 13)

'13. Since this is an appeal arising from a writ petition for certiorari we also would not interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal except on grounds on which the High Court could have done.'

48. In Fuel Injection Ltd. v. Kamger Sabha this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 157, para 3)

'3. ... But the present appeals are from a judgment of the High Court under Article 226 and so the jurisdiction of this Court in entertaining an appeal by special leave under Article 136 must ordinarily be confined to what the High Court could or would have done under Article 226.'

49. In our view, the material that was placed before the Tribunal was not considered or discussed and that there was, as such, no adjudication by the Tribunal. The whole award of the Tribunal, in our view, is liable to be set aside

on the ground of non-application of mind by the Tribunal to the material on record. In the first place, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide a dispute which covered within its fold "persons who are not workmen". That the material on record before the Tribunal as regards the comparable concerns was admittedly "sketchy" and incomplete as observed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court and that the award based on such material could not have been sustained."

(emphasis supplied)

26. In Durga Das Basu's Commentary on the Constitution of India, 9th Edn., in regard to the concept of no evidence, we find the following discussion:

" "No evidence" does not mean only a total dearth of evidence. It extends to any case where the evidence taken as a whole is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding, or where, in other words, no tribunal could reasonably reach that conclusion on that evidence. This "no evidence" principle clearly has something in common with the principle that perverse or unreasonable action is unauthorised and ultra vires. An order made without "any evidence" to support it is in truth, made without order made

without "any evidence" is worthless, it is equal to having "no evidence" jurisdiction."

(emphasis supplied)

27. In fact, in the decision relied upon by the applicants viz. S. Viswanathan [Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. S. Viswanathan , it is, inter alia, held as follows: (SCC p. 196, para 12) "12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final court of facts in these types of disputes, but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon."

(emphasis supplied)

28. On the conspectus of the decisions and material, we would hold as follows: the jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is supervisory and not appellate. The Court considering a writ application of certiorari will not don

the cap of an appellate court. It will not reappreciate evidence. The writ of certiorari is intended to correct jurisdictional excesses. A writ of prohibition would issue when a tribunal or authority has not yet concluded its proceedings. Once a decision is rendered by a body amenable to certiorari jurisdiction, certiorari could be issued when a jurisdictional error is clearly established. The jurisdictional error may be from failure to observe the limits of its jurisdiction. It may arise from the procedure adopted by the body after validly assuming jurisdiction. It may act in violation of principles of natural justice. The body whose decision which comes under attack may decide a collateral fact which is also a jurisdictional fact and assume jurisdiction. Such a finding of fact is not immune from being interfered with by a writ of certiorari. As far as the finding of fact which is one within the jurisdiction of the court, it is ordinarily a matter "off bounds" for the writ court. This is for the reason that a body which has jurisdiction to decide the matter has the jurisdiction to decide it correctly or wrongly. It would become a mere error and that too an error of fact. However, gross it may amount to, it does not amount to an error of law. An error of law which becomes vulnerable to judicial scrutiny by way of certiorari must also be one which is apparent on the face of the record. As held by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath , as to what constitutes an error

apparent on the face of the record, is a matter to be decided by the court on the facts of each case. A finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence would be perverse and in fact would constitute an error of law enabling the writ court to interfere. It is also to be noticed that if the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not support the finding, it would render the decision amenable to certiorari jurisdiction. This would be the same as a finding which is wholly unwarranted by the evidence which is what this Court has laid down (see Parry & Co. Ltd.

27. It is also relevant to cite the judgment of Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of RAJENDRA DIWAN VS. PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA AND ANOTHER reported in (2019) 20 SCC 143 at paragraphs 85 and 86 held was:

85. The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, however, supervisory and not appellate. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence must be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the limits of their authority. When a Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, the High Court does not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction unless there is grave miscarriage of

justice or flagrant violation of law. Jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be exercised "in the cloak of an appeal in disguise".

86. In exercise of its extraordinary power of superintendence and/or judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Courts restrict interference to cases of patent error of law which go to the root of the decision;

perversity; arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and usurpation of powers. The High Court does not re-assess or re-analyse the evidence and/or materials on record. Whether the High Court would exercise its writ jurisdiction to test a decision of the Rent Control Tribunal would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum, just because there is no other provision of appeal in the eye of the law.

28. Applying the aforementioned dictum of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court to the facts on hand, the

proceedings before the Land Tribunal, Bengaluru East

Taluk are just and proper and therefore, the contentions

of the petitioners in this regard cannot be accepted.

Having taken note of the finding recorded by the Land

Tribunal at Annexure-A, the Land Tribunal, after taking

into consideration the entire material on record has

rightly come to the conclusion to confer occupancy right

under Section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act,

1961, in respect of the subject land in Survey No.19 of

Bhattarahalli Village to Sri. V. Munirathnam and the Land