Mahesh P S vs State Of Karnataka
2023 Latest Caselaw 2532 Kant

                            1



      IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

           DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF MAY 2023

                          BEFORE

           THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.NATARAJAN

            CRIMINAL PETITION NO.11547 OF 2022

BETWEEN

MAHESH P.S.
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
DEPUTY TAHASILDAR
R/AT NO 48, 2ND FLOOR
1ST MAIN
CAUVERY LAYOUT
VIJAYANAGAR
BENGALURU 560060
                                         ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI SANDESH J. CHOUTA, SENIOR ADVOCATE
 FOR SRI ARUN G., ADVOCATE)

AND

1.    STATE OF KARNATAKA
      REP BY THE LOKAYUKTHA POICE STATION
      ERSTWHILE ANTI CORRUPTION BUREAU
      BENGALURU URBAN
      BENGALURU - 560 001
      (BY SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR)

2.    AJAM PASHA
      S/O MULA SAB
      AGED 42 YEARS
      NO 267/2, MASJID STREET
      BEGUR
      BENGALURU 560 068
                                          ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.B. PATIL, SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR R1
 SRI. MITHUN GERAHALLI A., ADVOCATE FOR R2)
                                 2



      THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482
OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT AND FIR IN
CR.NO.44/2022 REGISTERED BY THE ANTI CORRUPTION
BUREAU, BENGALURU FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER
SECTION 7(a) OF P.C ACT WHICH IS PENDING ON THE FILE OF
XXIII ADDL.CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND SPECIAL
JUDGE (P.C. ACT) BENGALURU.

     THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 21.4.2023, THIS DAY, THE COURT
MADE THE FOLLOWING:
                            ORDER

This criminal petition is filed by the petitioner-

accused No.1 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing

FIR in crime No.44/2022 registered by the then ACB, now

pending with the Lokayuktha police for the offence

punishable under Sections 7a of Prevention of Corruption

Act (hereinafter referred to as 'PC Act') pending on the

23rd Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru.

2. Heard the arguments of learned Senior

Counsel for the petitioner and learned Special Counsel for

the respondent No.1 and learned Counsel appearing for

respondent No.2.

3. The case of prosecution is that on the

complaint of one Ajam Pasha filed on 20.05.2022, the ACB

police registered the case. It is alleged that the

complainant is running a mutton shop at Begur. He is also

having a land measuring 38 guntas in Sy.No.190/5 at

Kodulu Grama, Anekal, purchased in the year 2014 and he

got transferred the revenue records in his name. The

complainant wanted to convert the said land into

residential land and there was a case pending before the

Assistant Commissioner of Revenue in R.A. No.3/2018-19

and the same came to be rejected on 24.12.2020. Hence,

the complainant filed a revision petition before the Deputy

Commissioner, Bengaluru urban, in R.P. No.16/2020-21.

After enquiry, the case was reserved for orders by the

Deputy Commissioner on 30.03.2022 and the order is

awaited. Subsequently, the complainant had approached

the office of the Deputy Commissioner on 18.05.2022 and

the said Deputy Commissioner returning back from the

duty. At that time, the complainant said to be met the

petitioner-accused No.1 and the Deputy Commissioner

went away. It is further alleged that when the de-facto

complainant went to the chambers of the petitioner and

sat in front of his table, at that time, the petitioner said to

be asked a staff to bring the case file of the complainant

and asked as to what was the arrangement that had been

done in the case and what was the bribe amount. The

petitioner said to be wrote on a piece of paper as '15', it is

meant for Rs.15.00 lakhs and the first

informant/complainant expressed his inability. Then the

petitioner wrote as '8' on the piece of paper, but the first

informant/complainant offered to pay only Rs.3.00 lakhs.

Then, the petitioner wrote '5' on the paper. Then the

complainant took the piece of paper with video and audio

recording and lodged the complaint to the ACB. Then the

ACB police registered FIR and set up a trap, and on

21.05.2022, the informant took money. While handing

over the same to accused No.2, accused No.2 was caught

red handed, a seizure panchanama was prepared and then

the police arrested this petitioner and shown as accused

No.1 and the police took up the investigation, which is

under progress, and it is challenged by the petitioner-

accused No.1 before this Court.

4. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has

contended that as per the complaint, a demand was made

in November 2021. The FIR was registered only on

20.05.2022. There was long gap between demand and

lodging of the complaint. As per proviso to Section 8 of

the PC Act, the complaint shall be filed within 7 days.

Absolutely, there is no demand and acceptance by this

petitioner. The amount has been seized from accused

No.2. There is no telephonic conversation between the

petitioner and complainant for demanding any bribe.

There is no work pending with this petitioner. The revision

case was is pending for orders before the Deputy

Commissioner, who is accused No.3. The learned Senior

Counsel further contended that there was discussion of the

complainant with the petitioner said to be held on

18.05.2022 in the chambers of this petitioner, but the

telephonic conversation reveals that the petitioner told

that they are in the month of January, upto February and

March, it can be done. It is further contended that if at all

the demand was made on 18.05.2022, the question of

conversation could not be January, February or March and

it falsifies the contention of the complainant that the

demand was made on 18.05.2022 and it must be either in

December 2021 or January 2022. Therefore, the

contention of the complainant demanding gratification on

18.05.2022, is false, therefore, the case of the

complainant is false.

5. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also

contended that the acceptance of bribe was from accused

No.2, who is a private person, and he is nothing to do with

the present petitioner-accused No.1. The genesis of the

complaint itself is shown as false. The police in spite of

lapse of almost a year, they are not able to file charge

sheet against the petitioner, since they are not able to get

proper evidence. Therefore, it is argued that as per the

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of

NEERAJ DUTTA Vs. STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI)

reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1724, there is no

demand or acceptance or work pending with the petitioner.

Hence, conducting investigation against the petitioner is

abuse of process of law and therefore, prayed for quashing

the FIR.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1-

Lokayuktha objected the petition contending that the

prosecution case is based upon the circumstantial

evidence. It can be proved against the petitioner-accused

No.1. There is telephonic conversation between petitioner-

accused No.1 and the complainant. It is contended that

the conversation like January, February or March are all

code words used by the accused persons for demanding

money. The work is pending with the Deputy

Commissioner-accused No.3 but the file was seized from

the custody of petitioner. There is prima facie material

against the petitioner-accused No.1 for investigation.

Therefore prayed for dismissing the petition.

7. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2

also objected the petition contending that the respondent

No.2-complainant visited the office of the petitioner-

accused No.1 in the month of May and video was recorded.

The video clipping clearly reveals the demand made by this

petitioner. During conversation between the petitioner-

accused No.1 and the complainant, the petitioner-accused

No.1 took the news paper dated 'May 2022' which reveals

that there was meeting between the petitioner and

respondent No.2 and therefore, contended that there is no

delay in lodging the complaint. Hence, prayed for

dismissing the petition.

8. Having heard the arguments of learned Counsels

appearing for the parties, perused the records. The

records reveal that the complainant/first informant is

having a case before the Deputy Commissioner (Urban)

accused No.3 in R.P. No.16/2020-21 and admittedly, the

work is pending with Deputy Commissioner (Urban)-

accused No.3. The petitioner-accused No.1 is of the rank

of Tahsildar working in the office of the Deputy

Commissioner. The complainant said to be approached

this petitioner on 30.03.2022, wherein the complainant

was informed that the case was reserved for orders by the

Deputy Commissioner. It is contended by the complainant

that the order should be prepared on 18.03.2022. The

complainant has categorically stated that he met the

petitioner-accused No.1 on 18.05.2022 where the

petitioner said to be demanded bribe of Rs.15.00 lakhs and

reduced the same into Rs.5.00 lakhs after bargaining. The

petitioner is said to be mentioned the bribe amount in a

chit, i.e. piece of paper. The learned Senior counsel for

the petitioner contended that the pre trap panchanama

and transcription of telephonic conversation is altogether

different and there is no demand and acceptance by the

petitioner.

9. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner

brought to the notice of this Court that the very demand

made on 22.05.2022 is not correct and it is a fictitious

date fixed by the police in order to overcome the proviso

to Section 8 of the PC Act. On perusal of pre-trap

panchanama, it is mentioned "now we are in January

and it can be done upto February or March". The

learned Senior Counsel further contended that if the

conversation was 18.05.2022, the question of mentioning

that they are in January and it can be done up to February

or March, does not arise and it directly falsifies the case of

prosecution.

10. Perusal of the pre-trap panchanama, clearly

reveals the conversation between the petitioner-accused

No.1 and complainant. Page No.7 of pre-trap

panchanama, reads as under:

¦gÁå¢ ªÉÊmï CAzÉæà JµÀÄÖ ¢ªÀ¸À ªÀiÁqÁÛgÉ DgÉÆæ FUÀ d£Àªj À AiÀÄ°è E¢Ýë ¥sɧª æ Àj ªÀiÁZÀð §gÉÆà vÀ£ÀPÀ ªÀiÁqÀ¨ÉÃPÀÄ

11. On perusal of the aforesaid conversation, it

clearly reveals that the conversation must be held in

January, otherwise the question of going to complete in

February or March does not arise. If the conversation was

on 18.05.2022, the accused could have told that they are

in May, 2022 and it could be done either June or July, but

no such conversation was held to show that the petitioner

demanded any bribe from the complainant on 18.05.2022.

Even if the bribe is demanded indirectly, it must be some

where in January 2022. Therefore, it is a clear case that it

must be in January 2022 and therefore, the complaint, if

any, could have been filed within 7 days from the demand

by the petitioner as per proviso to Section 8 of the PC Act.

12. Admittedly, the trap was conducted and the

amount was paid to accused No.2, who is a private person,

and the same was seized from accused No.2, which reveals

that there was no demand and acceptance of bribe from

the petitioner-accused No.1. Apart from that, the work is

also not pending with the petitioner. In fact, the working

is pending with the Deputy Commissioner-accused No.3,

who is an authority to pass the order in revision petition.

Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 has also

produced status of the case which reveals that the case

was heard on 15.02.2022 and posted to 13.03.2022 where

the Presiding Officer (Deputy Commissioner) was not

present and hence, it was adjourned to 30.03.2022 and

later, it was re-listed on 23.06.2022 as it is after the trap

of accused No.2.

13. Learned Special Counsel for respondent No.1-

Lokayuktha has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of STATE BY KARNATAKA

LOKAYUKTHA POLICE STATION, BENGALURU Vs.

M.R. HIREMATH reported in (2019) 7 SCC 515, where

the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the Court

cannot enter into the evidentiary value and material

adduced by the prosecution at the time of discharge.

14. The learned Special Counsel for Lokayuktha has

also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in case of NEERAJ DUTTA (Supra). The learned

Senior Counsel for the petitioner has contended that in

NEERAJ DUTTA (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has

answered that in the absence of evidence of the

complainant (direct/primary, oral/documentary evidence),

it is permissible to draw inferential deduction of

culpability/guilt of a public servant under the PC Act based

on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the various

judgments in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA (Supra), at

paragraph 74 of the judgment has held as under:

"11. The Constitution Bench was called upon to decide the question which we have quoted earlier. In paragraph 74, the conclusions of the Constitution have been summarised, which read thus:

"74. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under:

(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal

gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.

(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.

(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment.

In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant.

This is an offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an

offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.

(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

(f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.

(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct

from presumption of fact referred to above in point"

15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in NEERAJ

DUTTA's case (Supra), has mainly laid down that in the

event of complainant turns hostile or dies or he is

unavailable to lead his evidence during trial, then the

demand of illegal gratification can be proved by any other

witness, either oral or documentary evidence, and prove

the same by circumstantial evidence and the trial does not

abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the

public servant. Perusal of the said judgment would clearly

indicate that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has once again

held that the demand and acceptance and work

entrustment shall be proved, which is a basic principle in

the illegal gratification case.

16. Here, in this case, the petitioner-accused No.1

neither demanded nor accepted any bribe from the

complainant. That apart, there is no work pending with

the petitioner. The work is pending with accused No.3,

who is the Deputy Commissioner and who is the authority

to pass an order in revision petition. There is no

document to show that the petitioner has demanded bribe

from the complainant and the alleged bribe amount has

been seized from accused No.2, who is a private person

and unconnected with the petitioner-accused No.1.

17. Even otherwise, the demand must be in

January,2022 and not in 18.05.2022. If the demand was

made in January 2022, then the complaint was a delayed

complaint and the complaint shall be filed within 7 days

from the date of demand.

18. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner

has relied upon the judgment of this Court in W.P.

No.9151/2022 dated 21.3.2022 wherein, this Court has

quashed the FIR by relying upon the judgment of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in KAPIL AGARWAL AND

OTHERS Vs. SANJAY SHARMA AND OTHERS reported

in (2021) 5 SCC 524.

19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

NIHARIKA Vs. STATE OF MAHARASTRA reported in

2021 SCC Online 315, at paragraph 57, has held as

under:

57. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Khawaja Nazir Ahmad (supra), the following principles of law emerge:

i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences;

ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

iii) However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the 'rarest of rare cases'. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is not to be confused with the norm

which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court);

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482 Cr. P.C.

ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-

interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process

should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires

the court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; and xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C., only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.

20. In the case of VIJAY KUMAR Vs. STATE OF

TAMIL NADU, reported in 2021(3) SCC 687, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, at paragraph 27, has held as under:

"27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment in B. Jayaraj read as under: (SCC pp. 58-59)

"7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration, reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI.

8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext. P-11) before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold

that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established.

9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on

the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent."

The above said view taken by this Court fully supports the case of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and acceptance of bribe amount and cellphone by the appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having regard to such evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a "possible view" as such the judgment [State of T.N. v. N. Vijayakumar, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7098] of the High Court is fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is recorded under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart from serious consequences on the service rendered. At the same time it is also to be noted that whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any definite proposition and each case has to be judged on its own merits, having regard to evidence on record."

21. In view of the judgments of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, cited supra, there is no demand and

acceptance of bribe by the petitioner and also there is no

work entrustment with this petitioner. There is delay of

more than four months in lodging the complaint and the

Lokayuktha police are also not able to file charge sheet

since long as there is no availability of evidence against

the petitioner for filing charge sheet.

22. This Court also summoned the case report from

the Lokayuktha police. Perusal of the said report shows

that there is no incriminating evidence recovered by the

police against the petitioner, even though they conducted

investigation for more than 8-9 months. It is stated that

the FSL report is yet to be received, which is pertaining to

accused Nos.2 and 3 and the Lokayuktha police are still

conducting investigation and waiting for the report.

Absolutely, there is no material collected against the

petitioner-accused No.1 by the investigation officer in

order to show that the petitioner was holding the file of the

complainant and the work was with him. However, the

work was pending with accused No.3 who required to pass

the order. Except a piece of paper, which was produced

by the complainant by showing a paper cutting, that is not

connected with the petitioner accused No.1. Absolutely,

there is no connecting evidence to show that there are

circumstantial evidence against the petitioner for having

demanded the bribe from the complainant on 18.05.2022.

Therefore, conducting investigation against the petitioner

is nothing but abuse of process of law and is liable to be

quashed.

23. It is noticed by this Court in recent past that the

police officers in ACB were not collected any proper

evidence or proper ingredients of the provisions of law

before registering the case in order to attract Section 7 or

8 of the PC Act. Subsequently, the ACB police officials

have filed 'B' final reports and in some of the cases they

are struggling to collect the evidence against the accused

persons in order to file charge sheet against them within

the prescribed time of 60 days and this case is also one of

the best examples by the ACB police not able to file charge

sheet within 60 days and thereby the petitioner has came

out on statutory bail. It is also found that the investigation

officers are not having any proper training in the trap

cases as well as disproportionate assets case in order to

investigate effectively. Though the ACB has been scrapped

and all the powers and cases were transferred to

Lokayuktha police and even then the Lokayuktha police

were not able to investigate the matters and collect the

materials in order to file charge sheets. In view of the

registering the FIR without proper materials and lapse in

technical knowledge of investigation which enables the

accused persons for getting out of the cases especially in

PC Act cases which were ended in quashing the FIR and

charge sheets due to technical reasons. In most of the

cases, the FIR registered by the ACB were remained as

only formalities and the said police not able to file charge

sheets in those cases. Even otherwise, the Lokayukta

police also kept pending nearly 1000 cases under the guise

of investigation. Therefore, it is warranted for this Court

to issue direction to the Registrar of the Lokayukta to

appoint eminent investigation officers and they shall also

provide proper training for investigating the matter with

this above observation, I pass the following order:

The petition is allowed.

The FIR in Crime No.44/2022 registered against the

petitioner-accused No.1 by the then ACB, now pending

before the Lokayukta police, is hereby quashed.

Registry is directed to send the copy of this order to

Registrar of Lokayukta for compliance of the order at

paragraph 23 and to write letter to the State Government

for providing investigation officers for effective

investigation and to file the final reports, which were now

pending before the Lokayukta police amounts to nearly

1000 cases.

Sd/-

JUDGE Cs