Karnataka High Court
The State Of Karnataka vs Sri A.C Ananthaswamy on 19 December, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2023
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S. INDIRESH
WRIT PETITION NO.11700 OF 2023 (LR)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.15575 OF 2023
IN WP NO.11700 OF 2023
BETWEEN:
NANDI INFRASTRUCTURE CORRIDOR
ENTERPRISE LIMITED
NO.1, MIDFORD HOUSE,
MIDFORD GARDENS,
OFF MAHATMA GANDHI ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 001.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY
MR. SRINATH
MANGALURU.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. R.V.S.NAIK, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. NITIN PRASAD, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE LAND TRIBUNAL
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
D.C. OFFICE COMPOUND
KANDAYA BHAVAN
K.G. ROAD
2
BENGALURU-560 009.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY.
2. TAHSILDAR
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
D.C. OFFICE COMPOUND
KANDAYA BHAVANA
K.G. ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 009.
3. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION
OFFICER-1
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD
ARAVIND BHAVAN
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD
BENGALURU-560 001.
4. A.C. ANANTHASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS
S/O LATE PATEL CHIKKAHANUMAIAH
R/AT AVALAHALLI
KENGERI HOBLI
BENGALURU-560 026.
5. A.C. GURUMURTHY
S/O LATE PATEL CHIKKAHANUMAIAH
AGE NOT KNOWN
R/AT AVALAHALLI
MYSURU ROAD
KENGERI HOBLI
BENGALURU-560 026.
6. H. RAMAIAH
S/O HANUMAIAH
AGE NOT KNOWN
7. G. CHENNARAYAPPA
S/O GUMMAIAH
AGE NOT KNOWN
3
8. DEVAPPA
S/O GALAPPA
AGE NOT KNOWN
REPRESENTED BY GPA HOLDER
D. HEMANNA
S/O DEVAPPA
PANTHARAPALYA
KENGERI HOBLI, MYSURU ROAD
BENGALURU-560 026.
....RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. SHAHSIKIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL FOR
SRI. MOHAMMED JAFFAR SHAH, AGA FOR R1 AND R2;
SRI. B.R. SRINIVASA GOWDA, ADVOCATE FOR R3;
SMT. IRFANA NAZEER, ADVOCATE FOR R4;
NOTICE TO R5 TO R8 IS DISPENSED WITH V/O
DATED 08.06.2023)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 27.02.2023 PASSED BY RESPONDENT
NO.1 - LAND TRIBUNAL ON APPLICATION FILED BY RESPONDENT
NO.4 UNDER ORDER I RULE 10(2) OF CPC IN LRF/INA/CR/02/2020-
21 (ANNEXURE-M) AND QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED
27.02.2023 PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 - LAND TRIBUNAL IN
LRF/INA/CR/02/2020-21 (ANNEXURE-L); AWARD COSTS ETC.
IN WP NO.15575 OF 2023
BETWEEN
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY THE
TAHASILDAR
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
BENGALURU-560 009.
4
2. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION
OFFICER, KIADB,
ARAVINDA BHAVANA
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD
BENGALURU-560 001.
....PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. K. SHASHIKARAN SHETTY, A/W
SRI. MOHAMMED JAFFAR SHAH, AGA )
AND:
1. SRI. A.C. ANANTHASWAMY
S/O LATE CHIKKAHANUMAIAH
2. SRI. A.C. GURUMURTHY
S/O LATE CHIKKAHANUMAIAH
BOTH ARE R/AT AVALAHALLI
MYSURU ROAD
BENGALURU-560 026.
3. SRI. H. RAMAIAH
S/O HANUMAIAH
4. SRI. G. CHANNARAYAPPA
S/O GUMMAIAH
5. SRI. DEVAPPA
S/O GALAPPA
RESPONDENTS NO.3 TO 5 ARE
REPRESENTED BY GPA HOLDER
D. HEMANNA
S/O DEVAPPA
PANTHARAPALYA
KENGERI HOBLI, MYSURU ROAD
BENGALURU.
5
6. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF
NICE LIMITED
NO.1, MID FORD HOUSE
MID FORD GARDEN, M.G. ROAD
BENGALURU.
7. THE LAND TRIBUNAL
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRMAN
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
BENGALURU.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. IRFANA NAZEER, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI. R.V.S. NAIK, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. NITIN PRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR R6;
NOTICE TO R2 TO R5 DISPENSED WITH
V/O DATED 04.12.2023)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 27.02.2023 PASSED BY RESPONDENT
NO.1-LAND TRIBUNAL IN LRF/INA/CR/02/2020-21 (ANNEXURE-A),
AWARD COSTS, ETC.,
IN THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARGUMENTS BEING HEARD,
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR "PRONOUNCEMENT OF
ORDERS", THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
6
ORDER
1. In W.P.No.11700/2023, petitioner is assailing order dated
27.02.2023 (Annexure-L) passed by the Land Tribunal,
Bangalore South Taluk, Bengaluru, granting occupancy rights in
favour of one Sri. A.C. Ananthaswamy (respondent No.4), inter
alia sought for quashing order dated 27.02.2023 (Annexure-M),
passed by the Land Tribunal, in LRF/INA/CR/02/2020-21, on
application filed under order I Rule 10(2) of CPC, deleting the
applicant No.3 therein (petitioner herein), from the array of
parties.
In W.P. No. 15575/2023, petitioner-State is
assailing order dated 27.02.2023, passed by the Land
Tribunal conferring occupancy rights in favour of
Sri. A.C. Ananthaswamy.
2. Since, the petitioners in the above Writ Petitions are
challenging common order passed by the Land Tribunal, both
the Writ Petitions were heard and disposed of by this common
Order.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
3. The relevant facts for adjudication in these writ petitions
are that, one Sri. Hanumanthappa, grandfather of A.C.
Ananthawamy is said to have been the tenant of certain Inam
lands including the land in question bearing Sy. No.47 of
Pantharapalya Village, Bangalore South Taluk under two lease
deeds dated 30.06.1937 and 09.05.1936. After the
promulgation of Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams
Abolition Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), father
of A.C.Ananthaswamy- Patel Chikkahanumaiah, filed
application before the Special Deputy Commissioner for Inams
Abolition, Bangalore, seeking occupancy rights in respect of the
land in question. The Special Deputy Commissioner, by Order
dated 17.10.1964, granted occupancy right in respect of fifteen
survey numbers, including the subject land. The Pattanagere
Group Panchayat, challenged order of conferment of occupancy
rights in favour of father of A.C.Ananthaswamy - Patel
Chikkahanumaiah, before the Appellate Tribunal in Appeal
No. 1306/1971 and the said Appeal came to be partly allowed
whereby, the conferment of occupancy rights in respect of the
Sy No.47 came to be set aside. Feeling aggrieved by the same,
father of the A.C.Ananthaswamy-Patel Chikkahanumaiah, filed
W.P.No.1814/1972 before this Court and this Court, set aside
the order passed by the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal
and remanded the matter to the Appellate Tribunal, for fresh
consideration. Even on remand, the Appellate Tribunal set
aside the order of Special Deputy Commissioner, conferring
occupancy rights and feeling aggrieved by the same, father of
A.C.Ananthaswamy - Patel Chikkahanumaiah, approached this
Court in W.P.No.5202/1977. This Court, by order dated
08.01.1980 set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and
remanded the matter to the Special Deputy Commissioner, to
conduct spot inspection and to take decision on merits of the
case.
4. At this juncture, it is to be noted that, the State
Government had entered into an agreement with the Nandi
Infrastructure Corridor Enterprise Limited (Petitioner in
W.P.No.11700/2023) to implement the express High Way and
Peripheral Ring Road connecting Bangalore and Mysore and
other infrastructural facilities. The State Government passed
Government Order disposing the Government lands including
the subject land, in favour of KIADB for onward transfer by way
of lease in favour of the petitioner in W.P.No.11700/2023.
Pursuant to the same, KIADB has executed lease deed in
favour of the petitioner to effectuate the project.
5. It is stated in the W.P.No.11700/2023, that the
respondent No.4 herein challenged the lease deed executed by
KIADB in favour of petitioner before this Court in
W.P.No.33962/2001 and this Court allowed the Writ Petition on
24.02.2006 and quashed the Government Order as well as the
lease deed in respect of the subject land on the ground of
pendency of proceedings before the Land Tribunal. Feeling
aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed Writ Appeal
No.385/2006 before this Court and this Court vide Judgment
dated 15.06.2011 (Annexure-C) dismissed the Writ Appeal and
observed that, if the Land Tribunal grants occupancy rights in
favour of claimant, then the land has to be acquired in
accordance with law and if the occupancy right is not granted,
then it is a different situation.
6. Be that as it may, on remand by this Court in W.P.
No.5202/1977, and Order dated 28.04.2005 in Civil Appeal
No.5684-85/1999 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, the
Special Deputy Commissioner had taken up the matter on
merits and by order dated 29.06.2016, rejected the application
made by the father of respondent No.4 for conferment of
occupancy rights (Annexure-D). Being aggrieved by the same,
respondent No.4 has filed W.P. No.37145/2016 before this
Court and this Court by order dated 05.04.2017 allowed the
writ petition (Annexure-G) and as such, set aside the order
dated 29.06.2016 passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner,
Bengaluru. Feeling aggrieved by Order passed in
W.P.No.37145/2016, respondent No.4 has filed W.A. No.2344-
47/2017 and the Division Bench of this Court, by Judgment
dated 12.09.2019 (Annexure-J), remitted the matter to the
Land Tribunal for fresh consideration. After remand by the
Division Bench, the Land Tribunal, Bengaluru South Taluk,
Bengaluru took up the matter in LRF/INA/CR/2/2021, wherein
A.C. Ananthaswamy (respondent No.1 therein) filed an
application under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC to delete the
Applicant No.3 therein (petitioner in W.P. 11700/2023) in
LRF/INA/CR/2/2021, and the said application came to be
allowed by Order dated 27.02.2023 (Annexure-M in W.P.
11700/2023). Further, the Land Tribunal, by a detailed order
dated 27.02.2023 conferred occupancy rights in respect of
subject land, in favour of A.C. Ananthaswamy(Annexure-L in
W.P. 11700/2023). Being aggrieved by the Orders at
Annexures - L and M, Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprise
Limited has approached this Court in W.P. No.11700/2023.
7. The State of Karnataka has preferred W.P.
No.15575/2023, challenging order dated 27.02.2023 passed
by the Land Tribunal conferring occupancy rights in favour of
respondent No.4, alleging that the land in question was
declared as "kallu marati" (stonehill/rock) and therefore, it is
contended by the petitioner - State that, the Land Tribunal
ought not to have conferred occupancy right.
8. I have heard Sri. R.V.S. Naik, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of Sri. Nitin Prasad, learned counsel for the
petitioner in W.P. No.11700/2023 and Sri. K. Shashikiran
Shetty, learned Advocate General along with Sri. Mohammed
Jaffar Shah, learned Additional Government Advocate for the
State of Karnataka in W.P. No.15575/2023 and Smt. Irfana
Nazeer, learned counsel appearing for the contesting
respondent - A.C. Ananthaswamy.
ARGUMENTS OF THE LEARNED ADVOCATES:
9. Sri. R.V.S. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner in W.P. No.11700/2023, contended that the land
bearing Sy. No.47 is Kallu marati - hillock and same is not a
cultivable land and therefore, disputed the nature of the land in
question. Learned Senior Counsel invited the attention of the
Court to the scheme of the Act particularly referring to Section
1(4) and contended that, Sections 1(4), 2, 27, 38 and 40 of
the Act came into force at once and the remaining provisions
through the Notification issued by the Government. Learned
Senior Counsel referred to Section 6, 7 and 9 of the Act and
contended that, the land in question excludes the purview of
grant as per the provisions of the Act and therefore, the said
aspect of the matter was not considered by the respondent
No.1, and further contended that, the perusal of the record
would indicate that, the entire land in question is a quarry land
and in this regard, he refers to the meaning of "quarry"
reflected in the concise Oxford Dictionary of current English
and argued that the said land is not a cultivable land and
accordingly, sought for interference of this Court. He also
emphasised that, as on the date of vesting of the land with the
Government, the land was not cultivable and therefore, the
land in question is not capable of being granted under Section
9 of the Act. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that in
RTC extracts, the land in question is classified as kallu marati /
kharab land and the said aspect has not been considered by
the respondent No.1 and urged that, the respondent No.1 -
Tribunal was completely misdirected itself in relying upon the
spot inspection conducted on 23.03.2022.
10. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, further
contended that, the Assistant Commissioner, Chairman of the
Land Tribunal was of the view that, the subject land is
Government kharab and cannot be granted in favour of the
respondent No.4, however, Members of the Land Tribunal
erroneously arrived at a conclusion to grant occupancy right in
favour of the respondent No.4/A.C. Ananthaswamy and the
said finding of the Members of the Land Tribunal is contrary to
the deposition made by the petitioners' witnesses and
accordingly, sought for interference of this Court. Learned
Senior Counsel, further contended that, Land Tribunal failed to
consider that it had already dismissed the application made by
the respondent No.4 seeking occupancy right and therefore,
the Land Tribunal has become functus officio to re-open the
case on merits and accordingly, he sought for setting aside the
order passed by the Land Tribunal/respondent No.1. He also
refers to the application filed by respondent No.4, which
categorically says about the valuation and not the survey
number and therefore, submitted that the finding recorded by
the Land Tribunal is not correct and accordingly, sought for
interference of this Court. To buttress his arguments, learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner refers to the
Judgment of this Court in STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs.
KARNATAKA REVENUE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND
ANOTHER reported in ILR 1977 KAR 360 and in the case of
STATE OF GUJARAT Vs. GUJARAT REVENUE TRIBUNAL
AND OTHERS reported in (1979) 4 SCC 40 and made a
distinction between the waste lands and cultivable lands and
further argued that these lands are abandoned land, where
grass grew naturally and they were not desolate, abandoned or
barren waste land with no vegetation and accordingly, sought
for interference of this Court. He also referred to the Judgment
rendered by this Court in W.P.No.1843/1969 dated 11.07.1972
(K.R. GOVIND AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF MYSORE AND
OTHERS) and in the case of NINGANNA AND OTHERS Vs.
NARAYANA GOWDA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1983
KARNATAKA 116, with regard to interpretation of Section 9 of
the Act to the land in question.
11. Sri. K. Shashikiran Shetty, learned Advocate General for
the State (Petitioner in W.P. No.15575/2023) argued that, the
land in question is not a cultivable land and the name of the
respondent No.1/A.C. Ananthaswamy was not reflected in the
RTC extracts continuously and land in question is a waste land
/ quarry and as such, the Land Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
pass the impugned order conferring the occupancy right in
favour of A.C. Ananthaswamy (respondent No.1 in
W.P.15575/2023 and respondent No.4 in W.P. 11700/2023).
He further contended that, subject land is a valuable
Government land and is an integral part of Bangalore Mysore
Infrastructure Corridor Project (BMICP) and subject land is
required for implementation of the said project to link the
portion of the Mysuru - Bengaluru Express Highway and
accordingly, sought for setting aside the order passed by the
Land Tribunal. Learned Advocate General, further invited the
attention of the Court to Section 3 of the Act and argued that
the competent authority has to exercise power to grant in
favour of claimant/s under the provisions of the Act, only after
ensuring that the land is vested with the State Government,
and therefore, as there is clear prohibition under Section 7 of
the Act as the subject land is a quarry land / waste land and
therefore, he contended that there would not be a case for
grant in favour of the contesting respondents. In this regard,
he places reliance on the Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in the case of COMMISSIONER, SURVEY,
SETTLEMENT AND LAND RECORDS, A.P., HYDERABAD
AND OTHERS Vs. INDUPURU RAGHAVA REDDY AND
OTHERS reported in 2011 SCC OnLine AP 712 and argued
that the grant could not have been made in so far as the waste
lands are concerned even if efforts have been made to cultivate
the same. He also refers to the Judgment of this Court in the
case of THE STATE OF KARNATAKA Represented by
REVENUE SECRETARY Vs. H.B. MUNIVENKATAPPA
reported in ILR 2007 KAR 1893 and argued that this Court in
identical circumstances had arrived at a conclusion that no
grant could be made in so far as " kere angala" or "tank bed"
notwithstanding the same being cultivated, though it is vested
with the Government and accordingly, argued that the
impugned order passed by the respondent No.1 is based on no
evidence and accordingly, sought for setting aside the
impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal.
12. Per contra, Mrs. Irfana Nazeer, learned counsel
representing the respondent No.4 / grantee of the land, raised
preliminary objection relating to the locus standi of the
petitioner in W.P. No.11700/2023 and contended that, the said
petitioner is not an aggrieved party, nor having any legal right
to challenge the impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal,
not being an inamdar or rival claimant to claim occupancy right
in respect of the land in question. She further contended that,
the Land Tribunal, after considering the material on record and
taking into account the direction issued by this Court in W.A.
No.385/2006 and W.A. Nos.2344-47/2017, recorded the
evidence of the parties and after appreciating the material on
record, conducted spot inspection and arrived at a conclusion
that the land in question is "vyavasaya yogya (cultivable)" and
also she further contended that, the land in question does not
come within the purview of eleven categories stipulated under
Section 7 and 9 of the Act and as such, sought to justify the
impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal.
13. Mrs. Irfana Nazeer, invited the attention of the Court to
sketch showing the cultivation made in the land bearing Sy.
No.47, which is the subject land and argued that the said
sketch has been prepared at the instance of the Chairman and
Members of the Land Tribunal, which shows that the land is
cultivable in nature and accordingly, she sought for dismissal of
the Writ Petitions. She further contended that, this Court in
W.A. No.385/2006, observed that the land in question is
capable of being cultivated and as per doctrine of merger, the
impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal, conferring
occupancy right in favour of contesting respondent, is just and
proper. She also referred to two lease deeds dated 30.06.1937
and 09.05.1936 and contended that the grandfather of the
contesting respondent No.4 was tenant of certain inam lands
including the land in question bearing Sy. No.47 and therefore,
referring to order passed on 17.10.1964 by the Special Deputy
Commissioner for Inams Abolition, Bangalore, in case
No.18/1959-60, contended that, the land bearing Sy. No.47
was excluded while rejecting application in respect of other
survey numbers and as such, she submitted that, as on the
date of vesting itself, the land was in cultivation by the
grandfather of the respondent No.4 and therefore, countered
the submission made by the learned Advocate General,
referring to Section 3 and 7 of the Act.
FINDINGS OF THE COURT:
14. In the light of the submissions made by the learned
counsel appearing for the parties, before deciding the rights of
the parties relating to conferment of occupancy right by the
Land Tribunal in favour of the respondent No.4/grantee, it is
relevant to extract Sections 1(4), 2(6), 2(10), 3, 6, 7 and 9 of
the Act which read as under:
"Section 1(4) This section and Sections 2, 27, 38 and
40 shall come into force at once and the rest of this Act
shall come into force [in all minor inams in unalienated
village, on such date as the Government may by
notification, appoint, and in any inam village, on such
date as the Government may, by notification, specify in
repect of such inam village].
Section 2 (6) "Inamdar" means a person holding in
trust or owing for his own benefit an inam village or
minor inam or a share therein and includes the
successors in interest of an inamdar, and
(i) Where an inamdar is a minor or of unsound mind or
and idiot, his guardian, committee or other legal
curator;
(ii) Where an inamdar is a joint Hindu family, such joint
Hindu family;
Section 2(10) "Minor inam" means an alienated
holding other than an inam village, situated in an
alienated village or in an unalienated village;
Section 3. Consequence of the vesting of an inam
in the State :(1) When the notification under sub-
section (4) of Section 1 in respect of any inam has been
published in the Mysore Gazette, then notwithstanding
anything contained in any contract, grant or other
instrument or in any other law for the time being in
force, with effect on and from the date of vesting, and
save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the
following consequences shall ensue, namely,-
(a) the provisions of the Land Revenue Code relating to
alienated holdings shall, except as respects minor inams
to which this Act is not applicable, be deemed to have
been repealed in their application to the inam; and the
provisions of the Land Revenue Code and all other
enactments applicable to unalienated villages shall apply
to the said inam;
(b) all rights, title and interest vesting in the inamdar
including those in all communal lands, uncultivated
lands, whether assessed or not, waste lands, pasture
lands, forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and
streams, tanks and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries
shall cease and be vested absolutely in the State of
Karnataka, free from all encumbrances;
(c) the inamdar shall cease to have any interest in the
inam other than the interests expressly saved by or
under the provisions of this Act;
(d) all rents and land revenue including cesses and
royalties accruing in respect of lands comprised in such
inam on or after the date vesting shall be payable to the
State and not to the inamdar and any payment made in
contravention of this clause shall not be valid;
(e) all arrears of revenue, whether as jodi, quit-rent, or
khayamgutta and cesses, remaining lawfully due on the
date of vesting in respect of any such inam shall after
such date continue to be recoverable from the inamdar
by whom they were payable and may, without prejudice
to any other mode of recovery, be realised by the
deduction of the amount of such arrears and cesses
from the compensation money payable to such inamdar
under this Act;
(f) no such inam shall be liable to attachment or sale in
execution of any decree or other process of any court
and any attachment existing on the date of vesting or
any order for attachment passed before such date in
respect of such inam, shall, subject to the provisions of
Section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, cease
to be in force;
(g) the Government may, after removing any
obstruction that may be offered, forthwith take
possession of the inam and all accounts, registers,
pattas, mutchalikas, maps, plans and other documents
relating to the inam which the Government, may require
for the administration thereof:
Provided that the Government shall not
dispossess any person of any land in respect of which
they consider that he is prima facie entitled to be
registered as the occupant or as the holder of a minor
inam 1 [or to be continued as a tenant;]
(h) the inamdar and any other person whose rights
have vested in the State of Karnataka under clause (b)
shall be entitled only to compensation from the
Government as provided in this Act;
(i) the relationship of landlord and tenant shall, as
between the inamdar and a kadim tenant or permanent
tenant or quasi permanent tenant, be extinguished;
(j) the relationship of superior holder and inferior holder
shall, as between the inamdar and the holder of a minor
inam, be extinguished;
(k) Kadim tenants, permanent tenants and quasi-
permanent tenants in the inam and persons holding
under them and holders of minor inams shall, as against
the Government, be entitled only to such rights and
privileges and be subject to such conditions as are
provided for by or under this Act; and any other rights
and privileges which may have accrued to them in the
inam before the date of vesting against the inamdar
shall cease and determine and shall not be enforceable
against the Government or such inamdar.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall
operate as a bar to the recovery by the inamdar of any
sum which becomes due to him before the date of
vesting by virtue of his rights as inamdar and any such
sum shall be recoverable by him by any process of law
which but for this Act would be available to him.
Section 6. Quasi-permanent tenants to be
registered as occupants on certain conditions:
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), every
quasi permanent tenant shall, with effect on and from
the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an
occupant in respect of all lands of which he was a quasi-
permanent tenant, provided.-
(i) he continued to be a tenant of such lands until
the date of vesting; or
(ii) he had been unlawfully dispossessed of such
lands by the inamdar between the 30th day of
June, 1948 and the date of vesting:
Provided further that if by the operation of this
sub-section the inamdar is left with less than two and a
half acres of garden land or five acres of wet land or ten
acres of dry land in respect of which he is entitled to be
registered as an occupant, the right of quasi-permanent
tenants to be registered as occupants under this sub-
section shall be limited to the extent which shall be
determined as follows,-
(1) The total area of lands in respect of which
quasi-permanent tenants would have been entitled to
be registered as occupants shall be divided among the
quasi-permanent tenants and the inamdar in such
manner as may be prescribed by rules so that the
inamdar may get not less than two and a half acres of
garden land or five acres of wet land or ten acres of dry
land.
(2) In addition to the annual land revenue
payable in respect of the land, a quasi-permanent
tenant entitled to be registered as an occupant under
sub-section (1) shall be liable to pay to the
Government, as premium for acquisition of ownership of
that land, an amount equal to such number of multiples
of the land revenue payable in respect of the land or
such basic value per acre of the land, whichever is more
as is specified in Columns 3 and 4 respectively of the
Schedule as applicable to dry land, wet land and garden
land, as the case may be situated in the area specified
in the corresponding entry in column 2 of the said
Schedule. The amount of premium shall be payable in
not more than ten annual instalments along with the
annual land revenue, and in default of such payment,
the amount due shall be recoverable as an arrear of
land revenue due on the land in respect of which it is
payable.
Section 7. Lands and buildings to vest in the
holder of a minor inam to which the Act is
applicable: (1) Every holder of a minor inam to which
this Act is applicable shall, with effect on and from the
date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an
occupant of all lands which immediately before the date
of vesting were included in his holding other than-
(i) communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands,
forest lands, tank beds, mines, quarries, rivers,
streams, tanks and irrigation works;
(ii) lands in respect of which any person is
entitled to be registered under Section 4 or 5;
and
(iii) lands upon which have been erected buildings
owned by any person other than the holder of the
minor inam;
Provided that no holder of an unenfranchised
minor inam shall be registered as an occupant under
this sub-section unless he pays to the Government, as
premium, an amount equal to twenty-five times the
difference between the jodi or quit-rent, if any, paid by
him and the land revenue payable in respect of such
lands.
(2) Every building situated within the limits of
the minor inam (to which this Act is applicable) and
which was owned immediately before the date of
vesting by the holder of the minor inam, shall, with
effect on and from such date, vest in the holder of the
minor inam.
Section 9. Lands and buildings to vest in the
inamdar: (1) Every inamdar shall, with effect on and
from the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as
an occupant of all lands other than,-
(i) communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands, forest
lands, tank beds, mines, quarries, rivers, streams, tanks
and irrigation works;
(ii) lands in respect of which any person is entitled to be
registered under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8; and
(iii) lands upon which have been erected buildings
owned by any person other than the inamdar.
(2) Every building situated within the limits of the
inam which was owned immediately before the date of
vesting by the inamdar shall, with effect on and from
such date, vest in the inamdar.
Explanation: In this section 'inamdar' means an
inamdar other than a holder of a minor inam referred to
in Section 7. "
15. It is also necessary to deduce Rule 7 of Mysore (Personal
and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Rules, 1956.
"Rule 7. (1) For the purpose of claims under Section
10, a kadim tenant, a permanent tenant, a quasi-
permanent tenant, the holder of a minor inam or
inamdar claiming to be registered as an occupant under
Sections 4, 5, 6,7 or 9, as the case may be, or the
holder of a minor inam claiming to be registered as
holder under Section 8[or any person claiming to be
continued as tenant under Section 9-A shall within six
months from the date of vesting apply to the Deputy
Commissioner or any officer authorised by him under
Section 32 of the Act:
Provided that application after the expiry of the
said period of six months shall be made to the State
Government which may, if the applicant satisfies it that
he had sufficient cause for not making the application
within the said period, direct the admission of such
application by the Deputy Commissioner or any other
officer authorised by him under Section 32 of the Act:
Provided further the State Government shall not
consider any application received after the 28th day of
February, 1970.
(1-A) Every such application shall be in writing and
signed and verified by the applicant. Such application
may be made in person or by Advocate or Pleader or
authorised agent or sent by registered post.
(2) Every such application shall be restricted to a
single inam.
(3) Where the application is made by any person
other than the inamdar, the inamdar shall be made a
respondent to the application.
(3-A) Where the application is made by the
inamdar or any persons claiming through him, such
Officer as the Government may by order from time to
time specify, shall be respondent to the application.
(4) Every application shall contain the following
particulars, namely:
(a) Name of the inam village or minor inam;
(b) Name of the applicant;
(c)Whether he is the inamdar or not;
(d) If he is not the inamdar, the natue of interest
possessed by him in the inam, along with detailed
particular in support of his claim.
(5) The notice of the date on which an enquiry
will be held in respect of the application shall be served
on the parties to the application, and shall be published
by affixture on the notice board of the office of the
Deputy Commissioner or any Officer authorised by him
under Section 32 of the Act. Service of the notice shall
be effected by giving or tendering the notice to the
person concerned or if it cannot be so effected by
sending the notice to him by registered post.
(6) The Deputy Commissioner or any Officer
authorized by him under Section 32 of the Act shall hold
an enquiry at the inam village or the village in which the
inam is situated and, in the case of an enquiry held by
an Officer authorized by the Deputy Commissioner
under the said section, such Officer shall make a report
to the Deputy Commissioner within seven months from
the date of vesting or within one month from the date
of application:
Provided that in the case of Surveyed and Settled
Inam villages which vested in the Government under
Notification No.R.8347-1.S. 63-56-2, dated 15th
September, 1956, he shall make a report to the Deputy
Commissioner within fifteen months from the date of
vesting or within three months from the date of
application.
(7) The Deputy Commissioner either on his own
enquiry or on receipt of a report from any Officer
authorised by him under Section 32 of the Act, shall
examine the nature and history of the lands in question
and decide in respect of which lands the claim of the
applicants should be allowed."
16. On careful examination of the aforementioned provisions
under the Act and Rules, make it clear that Section 3 of the Act
empowers the vesting of an inam land with the State. At this
juncture, it is relevant to cite the Judgment of this Court in the
case of PATTANAGERE GROUP PANCHAYAT Vs.
MUDDANNA, reported in 1990 (1) KLJ 181 wherein, this
Court has held that the vesting of land takes place in respect of
both cultivated and uncultivated lands.
17. It is pertinent to mention here that, after the exercise of
power by the competent authority under Section 3, as the land
is being vested with the Government, there are three types of
tenants under the Act namely, kadim tenants (Section 4),
permanent tenants (Section 5), quasi permanent tenants under
certain conditions (Section 6) and the occupancy right could be
granted to such tenants if such tenants fulfil the conditions
stipulated under Section 7, 8 and 9 of the Act.
18. On conjoint reading of Section 7 and 9 of the Act,
emphasize that there are eleven categories of land, namely,
communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands, forest lands, tank
beds, mines, quarries, rivers, streams, tanks and irrigation
works which are excluded from the purview of conferring
occupancy right in favour of the applicants / claimants. It is
well established principle that, whether the land is cultivable or
not, has to be determined as on the date of vesting of inam
village (See State of Karnataka Vs. KRAT reported in 1980 (2)
KLJ SN 67.) Perusal of the record would indicate that the
grandfather of contesting respondent No.4 - Hanumanthappa,
filed application based on two lease deeds dated 30.06.1937
and 09.05.1936. After the promulgation of the Act, 1954, the
father of the contesting respondent No.4 - Chikkahanumaiah,
son of Hanumanthappa, sought for grant of occupancy right in
respect of subject land, and pursuant to the same, as per order
passed by the then Additional Special Deputy Commissioner for
Inams Abolition, Bangalore, granted occupancy right in respect
of land bearing Sy. No.47 to an extent of 24 acres 37 guntas,
however, in the said order, it is stated that the claimant has
not proved his possession and enjoyment in respect of Sy.
No.26 to 32 and 34 to 37 prior to date of vesting. In that view
of the matter, it is not in dispute that the land in question was
cultivable land as on the date of conferment of occupancy right
in favour of father of A.C. Ananthaswamy, as per order dated
17.10.1964. On careful examination of the said order produced
by the parties, makes it clear that the land in question was
declared as Inam Land, since the entire village of
Pantharapalya was declared as Inam Village, as per the
Notification No. RD3MIN58 dated 13.01.1959.
19. It is also to be noted from the records that, the Division
Bench of this Court at para 4, 6 and 13 in W.A. No.385/2006
disposed of on 15.06.2011, held as follows:
"4. So far as the nature of the land being a jodi
inam and grand father of the writ petitioner being in
possession and enjoyment of the land under lease deeds
is not in dispute. Subsequent to the demise of the late
Hanumanthappa his son Patel Chikka Hanumaiah
continued in possession and enjoyment of the said land
and after coming into force of the Inam Abolition Act, it
was Patel Chikka Hanumaiah who applied for grant of
occupancy rights before the Spl. Deputy Commissioner.
This is also not in dispute. Occupancy right was granted
not only in respect of Sy.No. 47 but was in respect of
several other lands. However, the grant of occupancy
rights was the subject matter before the revenue
appellate authority and the said order was also
questioned before the High Court as already state
above.
***** ***** *****
6. Admittedly, it was not the writ petitioner who
sought grant of occupancy rights but it was his father
Patel Chikka Hanumaiah who sought grant of occupancy
rights not only in respect of Sy.No.47 but also several
other lands. When once vesting of inam land in the
State comes into play, by virtue of coming into force of
the enactment, the Act envisages the consequences of
vesting of inam land in the State as well. When once
notification under sub-sec.4 of sec.1 of the Act gets
published in the gazette in respect of any inam land,
then notwithstanding anything contained in the
contract, grant or other instrument or any other law for
the time being in force, w.e.f. the date of vesting certain
consequences provided under the Act will follow. In
other words, if any pre-existing right, title or interest is
created in favour of any other person, the same is
subject to the consequences of vesting of the land under
the Act. This is the law declared by the Apex Court in
the case of LOK RAJ AND OTHERS vs. KISHAN LAL AND
ORS. reported in (1995) 3 SCC 291. Even in respect of
such vesting of the lands, it is always subject to the
right of the person who is entitled to seek for grant of
occupancy rights as envisaged under the Act. Therefore,
such vesting of the land in the Government is subject to
the right conferred on persons as envisaged under
proviso to sec. 3 (1)(g) of the Inams Abolition Act. i.e.
to say the person who is entitled to get occupancy rights
cannot be dispossessed from the land.
***** ***** *****
13. In W.P.5202/77 the order of the Dy.
Commissioner came to be quashed and the matter was
remitted to the Spl. Dy. Commissioner for fresh
consideration with a direction to hold an enquiry and
find out as to whether the lands in question were
agricultural lands or waste lands or stone quarries and
to decide the same afresh in accordance with law after
giving opportunity to the parties concerned to lead
additional evidence, if any. This matter is still pending.
Meanwhile, the eviction notice sent to the writ petitioner
herein was also quashed by this Court in the writ
petition filed by Mr. Ananthswamy as by that time Patel
Chikka Hanumaiah was dead. The eviction notice was
quashed on the ground that no notice was issued to the
present petitioner as contemplated under the Karnataka
Revenue Act. If the authority grants occupancy rights to
the petitioner herein, then, the land has to be acquired
in accordance with law if it is required for the project. If
the occupancy right is not granted, then it is a different
situation. We are of the opinion that the learned single
Judge has dealt with the matter form all angles both
factual and legal and it does not call for interference.
There is no valid reason to interfere with the impugned
order."
20. The Division Bench of this Court dismissed the Writ
Appeal No.385/2006 preferred by the Appellant - NICE Ltd.
therein. Thereafter, the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.
Nos.2344-2347/2017, by Judgment dated 12.09.2019,
remitted the matter to the Land Tribunal, reserving liberty to
the parties to let in additional evidence. In conformity with the
order passed by Division Bench of this Court, the evidence was
recorded by the Land Tribunal, wherein, the perusal of the
evidence adduced by the parties would indicate that, the entire
extent of land is in cultivation and establishes the fact of
plantation made by the contesting respondent No.1 therein. It
is also recorded in the deposition of witnesses by the Land
Tribunal that there are three borewells and farmhouse situate
in the schedule land. The said aspect has not been countered
by the petitioner -State or NICE Ltd. The other witnesses
examined along with the respondent No.1(A.C.Ananthaswamy),
reiterate the fact that the land is in cultivation and fruit bearing
trees as well as the animal husbandry is being made in the land
in question.
21. Though the learned Advocate General as well as the
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner - NICE Ltd.
contended that the entire extent is covered with quarry / waste
land and refer to the tippani and sketch appended to the writ
petition at Annexure - Q by stating that the land in question is
covered with kallu marati, however, on careful examination of
the evidence adduced by the parties and the spot inspection
conducted by the Members of the Tribunal along with the
Chairman, would demonstrate the fact that the land is under
cultivation by the respondent No.1 before the Land Tribunal.
At this juncture, it is relevant to reiterate the deposition of the
neighbouring land owners namely Sriramaiah and Pulasaiah,
wherein it is clearly established that the land in question is
under cultivation of the father of the respondent No.1. The
shanubhog - Sri. Narahariappa deposed about the cultivation of
the land in question and same is supported by one Dr. K.R.
Chandran, Retired Deputy Director, Horticultural Department,
Bengaluru. The Land Tribunal, after considering the entire
material on record, has arrived at a conclusion to conduct spot
inspection and noticed the existence of three borewells and
labour quarters and arrived at a conclusion that land is not a
quarry or waste land and is under cultivation of the respondent
No.1 therein and rightly conferred occupancy right in favour of
respondent No.1 - A.C. Ananathaswamy.
22. In this backdrop of factual aspects on record, I have
carefully examined the Judgments referred to by the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for NICE Ltd. and learned Advocate
General, and these Judgments are relating to waste land /
uncultivable land and therefore, the aforementioned Judgments
cannot be made applicable to the facts on record as the
Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.385/2006 in
unequivocal terms arrived at a conclusion that the land is
under cultivation of Patel Chikkahanumaiah - father of A.C.
Ananathaswamy.
23. In the light of these aspects on record, I am of the view
that, the reasons assigned by the Land Tribunal to confer
occupancy right in favour of the respondent No.1/A.C.
Ananthaswamy is based on evidentiary value and as the said
finding was that the land is cultivable one and therefore, the
eleven categories of lands enshrined under Section 7 and 9 of
the Act, is not applicable to the case on hand and therefore, I
am of the opinion that, the contentions raised by the learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioner NICE Ltd., as well by learned
Advocate General for the State cannot be accepted. The
Judgments referred to by them are relating to waste land /
tank bed / quarry and fact finding by the Land Tribunal would
make it clear that the subject land was under cultivation by
father of A.C. Ananthaswamy and therefore, the ratio laid down
in the Judgments referred to by the petitioners cannot be made
applicable to the facts of these Writ Petitions. Having arrived
at a conclusion that the land is a cultivable land, it is relevant
to go through the observation of this Court in STATE OF
KARNATAKA Vs. KARNATAKA REVENUE APPELLATE
TRIBUNAL AND ANOTHER reported in ILR 1977 KAR 360.
Para 4 to 6 therein read as under:
"4. It is clear from sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the
Act that the inamdar will not be entitled to the
registration of the lands as an occupant if the lands are
communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands, forest lands,
tank beds, mines quarries, rivers, streams, tanks and
irrigation works or if the lands are such which are
required to be registered under Sections 4 to 8 of the Act,
or the lands are such upon which having errected
buildings owned by any person other than the inamdar. It
is nobody's case that the land Sy. No. 37 is one falling
under clauses (ii) and (iii) of sub-section (1) of Section 9
of the Act. As already stated, the only controversy
between the parties is as to whether the land S. No. 37 is
a waste land or not. The expression 'waste lands' has not
been defined in the Act. The Tribunal has taken the view
that the expression 'waste land' means uncultivable
lands. The Tribunal rejected the contention put forward
on behalf of the State that the expression 'waste lands'
means lands which are not cultivated for a long period.
Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act provides for
registration of all the lands which vested in the State
under the Act except the lands specified in clauses (i) to
(iii). As already stated, it is not the case of the State that
the land S. No. 37 is a communal land, gomal land, forest
land, tank bed, mine, quarry, river, stream, tank and
irrigation work. Its specific case is that the land S. No. 37
is a waste land.
5. The expression 'waste land' is used in Section 17 of
the Land Acquisition Act (Central Act I of 1894). Section
17 of the Land Acquisition Act gives special powers which
can be exercised in case of emergency and can be
invoked only in respect of any waste or arable land. The
expression 'waste land' or 'arable land' has not been
defined in the Land Acquisition Act. In Raja Anand
Brahama Shah v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others
(AIR 1967 SC 1081) the Supreme Court after considering
the meaning given to the word 'waste' in the Oxford
Dictionary having regard to the context of Section 17(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act, held that the expression
'waste land' means the land which is unfit for cultivation
or habitation, desolate and barren land with little or no
vegetation thereon. Having regard to the context in which
the expression 'waste land' occurs in Section 9(1) of the
Act, the said expression has to be given the same
meaning as given by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid
decision.
6. It therefore follows that a land which is not unfit for
cultivation cannot be regarded as a waste land. In other
words, a land which is fit for cultivation cannot be
regarded as a waste land. As the essence of the matter is
the suitability of the land for cultivation, the question as
to whether the land was in fact cultivated or not is not
relevant. If the land is fit for cultivation even though the
same is not actually cultivated, it cannot be regarded as a
waste land. The discussion in the order of the Tribunal
shows that the Tribunal has also taken the same view."
24. I have also noticed from the spot inspection (sthala
tanikha varadi ) conducted by the Land Tribunal wherein it is
stated as follows:
"F d«Ää£À°è ºÁzÀÄ ºÉÆÃVgÀĪÀ ©©JA¦ gÀ¸ÉÛ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀ®Äè
§AqÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ºÉÆgÀvÀÄ¥Àr¹ G½zÀ ¥ÀæzÉñÀzÀ°è ««zsÀ PÀȶ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ
ºÉÊ£ÀÄUÁjPÉ ZÀlĪÀnPÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß £ÀqɸÀÄwÛgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ¸ÀܼÀ vÀ¤SɬÄAzÀ
w½zÀÄ §A¢gÀÄvÀÛzÉ."
25. It is well established principle in law that the interference
of this Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India is very limited in respect of the fact finding made by the
Tribunal. This Court cannot sit in appeal over the fact finding
made by the Tribunal unless the same is based on no evidence.
In this aspect, it is relevant to cite the Judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the Case of GENERAL MANAGER,
ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT,
ORISSA AND OTHERS Vs. GIRIDHARI SAHU AND
OTHERS, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 695, wherein the scope
of Certiorari jurisdiction is summarized and the relevant
paragraphs 22 to 28 are extracted below:
"22. The question arose in Dharangadhara Chemical
Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra (AIR 1957 SC 264).
The question was whether the finding by the Tribunal
under the Act about the party respondents being
workmen was liable to be interfered with. After dealing
with various tests relating to determining the issue, this
Court also made the following observations: (AIR p.
269, para 19)
"19. ... '... It is equally well settled that
the decision of the Tribunal on a question
of fact which it has jurisdiction to
determine is not liable to be questioned
in proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution unless at the least it is shown
to be fully unsupported by evidence.' "
(emphasis supplied)
23. A Constitution Bench of this Court,
in Yakoob v. K.S.Radhakrishnan (AIR 1964 SC 477) ,
has spoken about the scope of writ of certiorari in the
following terms: (AIR pp. 479-80, para 7)
"7. The question about the limits of the
jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of
certiorari under Article 226 has been
frequently considered by this Court and the
true legal position in that behalf is no longer
in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued
for correcting errors of jurisdiction
committed by inferior courts or tribunals:
these are cases where orders are passed by
inferior courts or tribunals without
jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a
result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A
writ can similarly be issued where in exercise
of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or
tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for
instance, it decides a question without giving
an opportunity to be heard to the party
affected by the order, or where the
procedure adopted in dealing with the
dispute is opposed to principles of natural
justice. There is, however, no doubt that the
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a
supervisory jurisdiction and the Court
exercising it is not entitled to act as an
appellate court. This limitation necessarily
means that findings of fact reached by the
inferior court or tribunal as a result of the
appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened
or questioned in writ proceedings. An error
of law which is apparent on the face of the
record can be corrected by a writ, but not an
error of fact, however grave it may appear to
be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by
the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued
if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused
to admit admissible and material evidence,
or had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which has influenced the impugned
finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based
on no evidence, that would be regarded as
an error of law which can be corrected by a
writ of certiorari. In dealing with this
category of cases, however, we must always
bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded
by the tribunal cannot be challenged in
proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the
ground that the relevant and material
evidence adduced before the tribunal was
insufficient or inadequate to sustain the
impugned finding. The adequacy or
sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the
inference of fact to be drawn from the said
finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the tribunal, and the said points cannot be
agitated before a writ court. It is within
these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on
the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a
writ of certiorari can be legitimately
exercised(vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad
Ishaque (AIR 1955 SC 233) , Nagendra Nath
Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals
(AIR 1958 SC 398) and Kaushalya
Devi v.Bachittar Singh(AIR 1960 SC 1168))."
(emphasis supplied)
24. We may more importantly also advert to the view
expressed by this Court in a matter which again arose
under the Act in Parry & Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal (AIR 1970
SC 1334) . It was a case related to the scope of the
jurisdiction of the tribunal in the matter of retrenchment
under Section 25-F. This is what the Court held inter
alia: (AIR p. 1340, para 11)
"11. The grounds on which interference
by the High Court is available in such writ
petitions have by now been well established.
In T.C. Basappa v. T.Nagappa (AIR 1954 SC
440) it was observed that a writ of certiorari
is generally granted when a court has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction. It is
available in those cases where a tribunal,
though competent to enter upon an enquiry,
acts in flagrant disregard of the rules of
procedure or violates the principles of
natural justice where no particular procedure
is prescribed. But a mere wrong decision
cannot be corrected by a writ of certiorari as
that would be using it as the cloak of an
appeal in disguise but a manifest error
apparent on the face of the proceedings
based on a clear ignorance or disregard of
the provisions of law or absence of or excess
of jurisdiction, when shown, can be so
corrected. In Dharangadhara Chemical
Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, this Court
once again observed that where the Tribunal
having jurisdiction to decide a question
comes to a finding of fact, such a finding is
not open to question under Article 226
unless it could be shown to be wholly
unwarranted by the evidence. Likewise,
in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao (AIR
1963 SC 1723), this Court observed that
where the Tribunal has disabled itself from
reaching a fair decision by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence
and the merits of the case or where its
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable
person can ever have arrived at that
conclusion, interference under Article 226
would be justified."
(emphasis supplied)
25. We may advert to the decision of this Court
in Mukand Ltd. v. Staff & Officers' Assn. (2004) 10 SCC
460. We may only advert to the following paragraphs:
(SCC pp. 486-87, paras 47-49)
"47. In support of his contention that this Court
while exercising its power under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India in an appeal from the
judgment of the High Court rendered in exercise of
its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India will exercise the same power
which the High Court could exercise and will not
interfere with the finding of facts recorded by a
tribunal, the learned counsel cited the judgment
in Parry & Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal. In the said case, this
Court held as under: (AIR p. 1341, para 13)
'13. Since this is an appeal arising from a
writ petition for certiorari we also would not
interfere with the conclusions arrived at by
the Tribunal except on grounds on which the
High Court could have done.'
48.In Fuel Injection Ltd. v. Kamger Sabha ((1978)
1 SCC 156) this Court observed as under: (SCC p.
157, para 3)
'3. ... But the present appeals are from a
judgment of the High Court under Article 226
and so the jurisdiction of this Court in
entertaining an appeal by special leave
under Article 136 must ordinarily be confined
to what the High Court could or would have
done under Article 226.'
49. In our view, the material that was placed
before the Tribunal was not considered or
discussed and that there was, as such, no
adjudication by the Tribunal. The whole award of
the Tribunal, in our view, is liable to be set aside on
the ground of non-application of mind by the
Tribunal to the material on record. In the first
place, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain
and decide a dispute which covered within its fold
"persons who are not workmen". That the material
on record before the Tribunal as regards the
comparable concerns was admittedly "sketchy" and
incomplete as observed by the learned Single
Judge of the High Court and that the award based
on such material could not have been sustained."
(emphasis supplied)
26. In Durga Das Basu's Commentary on the
Constitution of India, 9th Edn., in regard to the
concept of no evidence, we find the following
discussion:
" "No evidence" does not mean only a total
dearth of evidence. It extends to any case where
the evidence taken as a whole is not reasonably
capable of supporting the finding, or where, in
other words, no tribunal could reasonably reach
that conclusion on that evidence. This "no
evidence" principle clearly has something in
common with the principle that perverse or
unreasonable action is unauthorised and ultra
vires. An order made without "any evidence" to
support it is in truth, made without order made
without "any evidence" is worthless, it is equal to
having "no evidence" jurisdiction."
(emphasis supplied)
27. In fact, in the decision relied upon by the applicants
viz. S. Viswanathan [Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills
Ltd. v. S. Viswanathan (2005) 3 SCC 193] it is, inter alia,
held as follows: (SCC p. 196, para 12)
"12. Normally, the Labour Court or the
Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final
court of facts in these types of disputes, but if a
finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not
based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a
power either under Article 226 or under Article 227
of the Constitution can go into the question of fact
decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But
before going into such an exercise it is necessary
that the writ court must record reasons why it
intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the
absence of any such defect in the order of the
Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the
realm of factual disputes and finding given
thereon."
(emphasis supplied)
28. On the conspectus of the decisions and material, we
would hold as follows: the jurisdiction to issue writ of
certiorari is supervisory and not appellate. The Court
considering a writ application of certiorari will not don the
cap of an appellate court. It will not reappreciate
evidence. The writ of certiorari is intended to correct
jurisdictional excesses. A writ of prohibition would issue
when a tribunal or authority has not yet concluded its
proceedings. Once a decision is rendered by a body
amenable to certiorari jurisdiction, certiorari could be
issued when a jurisdictional error is clearly established.
The jurisdictional error may be from failure to observe the
limits of its jurisdiction. It may arise from the procedure
adopted by the body after validly assuming jurisdiction. It
may act in violation of principles of natural justice. The
body whose decision which comes under attack may
decide a collateral fact which is also a jurisdictional fact
and assume jurisdiction. Such a finding of fact is not
immune from being interfered with by a writ of certiorari.
As far as the finding of fact which is one within the
jurisdiction of the court, it is ordinarily a matter "off
bounds" for the writ court. This is for the reason that a
body which has jurisdiction to decide the matter has the
jurisdiction to decide it correctly or wrongly. It would
become a mere error and that too an error of fact.
However, gross it may amount to, it does not amount to
an error of law. An error of law which becomes vulnerable
to judicial scrutiny by way of certiorari must also be one
which is apparent on the face of the record. As held by
this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath , as to what constitutes
an error apparent on the face of the record, is a matter to
be decided by the court on the facts of each case. A
finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence
would be perverse and in fact would constitute an error of
law enabling the writ court to interfere. It is also to be
noticed that if the overwhelming weight of the evidence
does not support the finding, it would render the decision
amenable to certiorari jurisdiction. This would be the
same as a finding which is wholly unwarranted by the
evidence which is what this Court has laid down
(see Parry & Co. Ltd.)"
26. It is also relevant to cite the Judgment of Constitution
Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of RAJENDRA
DIWAN Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA AND ANOTHER
reported in (2019) 20 SCC 143, wherein the Hon'ble Apex
Court, at paragraphs 85 and 86 has held as follows:
"85. The power of superintendence conferred by Article
227 is, however, supervisory and not appellate. It is
settled law that this power of judicial superintendence
must be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate courts
and tribunals within the limits of their authority. When a
Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, the High Court
does not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary writ
jurisdiction unless there is grave miscarriage of justice
or flagrant violation of law. Jurisdiction under Article
227 cannot be exercised "in the cloak of an appeal in
disguise".
86. In exercise of its extraordinary power of
superintendence and/or judicial review under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High
Courts restrict interference to cases of patent error of
law which go to the root of the decision; perversity;
arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of
principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and
usurpation of powers. The High Court does not re-
assess or re-analyse the evidence and/or materials on
record. Whether the High Court would exercise its writ
jurisdiction to test a decision of the Rent Control
Tribunal would depend on the facts and circumstances
of the case. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court
cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum,
just because there is no other provision of appeal in the
eye of the law."
27. Following the declaration of law made by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the aforementioned Judgments and applying
the same to the case on hand, I am of the opinion that the
Land Tribunal having noticed the entire factual aspects on
record, based on the evidentiary value, rightly conferred
occupancy right in favour of the respondent No.1 before the
Land Tribunal and on the other hand, no acceptable document
has been produced by the petitioners herein to declare that the
land in question is not a cultivable land. In that view of the
matter, the Writ Petitions are dismissed as devoid of merits
and the order dated 27.02.2023 passed by the Land Tribunal,
Bengaluru South Taluk, Bengaluru, in Dispute
No.LRF/INA/CR/02/2020-21 is hereby confirmed.
Consequently, the order dated 27.02.2023 passed by the Land
Tribunal under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of CPC relating to the
petitioner - NICE Ltd. is hereby confirmed as the said petitioner
has no locus standi to challenge the impugned order passed by
the Land Tribunal based on the Government Order dated
07.10.1999 and Deed of Lease dated 04.07.2002, not being a
tenant or Inamdar under the Act.
28. In the result, writ petitions are dismissed.
SD/-
JUDGE
sac*
