Karnataka High Court

Sunny Joseph vs The Chief Administrative Officer on 24 June, 2022

Bench: Ashok S.Kinagi

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

        DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF JUNE 2022

                      BEFORE

       THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE ASHOK S. KINAGI

  WRIT PETITION NO.8947 OF 2021 (GM-CPC)

BETWEEN:

SUNNY JOSEPH
S/O M J JOSEPH
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
R/AT NO.8, NIRMITHA
4TH CROSS, SRINIVASA EXTENSION
BEGUR ROAD, HONGASANDRA
BOMMANAHALLI
BENGALURU-560 068.
                                      ...PETITIONER

(BY SRI. PRITHVI RAJ B N, ADVOCATE)

AND:

THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE (SR. DVN), RAMANAGARA
RAMANAGAR COURT COMPLEX
RAMANAGARA - 571 511.
                                     ....RESPONDENT

(BY SRI. RUPA K.R., HCGP A/W
    SMT. ARCHITHA SURESH, ADVOCATE FOR
    SRI. K.V. NARASIMHAN, ADVOCATE)
                             2




     THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH
THE ORDER DATED 29-8-2020 PASSED BY THE
ADDL.SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT RAMANAGAR IN
O.S NO.484/2013 ON I.A FILED U/SEC.151 OF CPC VIDE
ANNEXURE-A.

     THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING IN 'B' GROUP THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:

                         ORDER

The petitioner aggrieved by the order dated

29.08.2020, passed in O.S.No.484/2013 by the Addl.

Senior Civil Judge & JMFC, Ramanagara has filed the

present writ petition.

2. Brief facts leading rise to filing of this petition

are as under:

Petitioner along with others filed suit in

O.S.No.484/2013 on the file of Addl. Senior Civil

Judge & JMFC, Ramanagara against the defendants

therein. The defendants appeared before the Trial

Court and filed written statement. When the case was

set for petitioner's evidence, the husband of the

petitioner was examined as PW-1. When the case was

at the stage of cross-examination of PW-2, parties to

the suit have entered into a compromise and terms of

compromise was reduced into writing in a compromise

petition and same was filed before the Trial Court on

18.11.2009. The Trial Court accepted the compromise

petition and decreed the suit in terms of compromise

petition. The petitioner filed an application to refund

the Court fee paid by the petitioner. The Trial Court

vide its order dated 29.08.2020, declined to refund

the Court fee. Hence this writ petition.

3. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and

learned counsel for respondent.

4. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that

the parties to the suit have entered into a settlement

out of Court and filed an application under Section 66

of the Karnataka Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act

(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short) for

refund of Court fees. The Trial Court has declined to

refund the Court fees paid by the petitioner. In

support of his contention he has placed reliance on the

judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS, REPRESENTED

BY ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL VS. M.C.SUBRAMANIAM &

ORS., reported in LL 2021 SC 97, and prayed to

allow the writ petition.

5. Per contra, Sri. K.N.Nitish, learned counsel

and Smt. K.N.Roopa, learned HCGP, supports the

impugned order.

6. Perused the records and considered the

submissions made by learned counsel for the parties.

7. It is not in dispute that the petitioner and 12

others instituted a suit for declaration and cancellation

of various sale deeds and gift deeds in O.S.No.

484/2013 before the Senior Civil Judge & JMFC,

Ramanagara. The petitioner paid a sum of

Rs.2,72,465/- towards Court fees in the said suit. The

petitioner being the power of attorney holder of

plaintiff No.1 tendered his evidence on behalf of other

plaintiffs as PW-1. When the case was posted at the

stage of cross-examination of PW-2, the parties

entered into compromise and compromise was

reduced into writing in a compromise petition which

was filed before the Trial Court on 18.11.2019. The

compromise petition was accepted by the Trial Court

vide order dated 25.11.2019, and suit was decreed in

terms of the compromise petition. The petitioner filed

an application under Section 66 of the Act for refund

of full Court fees. The Trial Court observed that at the

time of entering into compromise, evidence of the

plaintiffs was commenced and the case was not

disposed of before Lok Adalat or through any other

mode as provided under Section 89 of the Code of

Civil Procedure and declined to refund the Court fees

as provided under Section 66 of the Act.

8. In order to consider the contention of the

parties whether the refund of Court fees is permissible

under Section 66 of the Act, it is necessary to extract

Section 66 of the Act which reads as under:

"66. Refund on settlement before hearing. - (1) Where the Court refers the parties to the suit to any one of the modes of settlement of dispute referred to in Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the dispute is settled, seventy five percent of the amount of Court fee paid in respect of the claim or claims in the suit shall be ordered by the Court to be refunded to the parties by whom the same have been respectively paid.

(2) In cases not covered by sub- section (1); Whenever by agreement of parties:-

(a) any suit is dismissed as settled out of Court before any evidence has been recorded on the merits of claim; or

(b) any suit is compromised ending in a compromise decree before any evidence has been recorded on the merits of the claim; or

(c) any appeal is disposed of before the commencement of hearing of such appeal;

Seventy five percent of the amount of Court fee paid in respect of the claim or claims in the suit or appeal shall be ordered by the Court to be refunded to the parties who have paid such fee."

9. Section 66 of the Act provides that refund on

settlement before hearing where parties to the suit to

any one of the mode of settlement of dispute referred

to in Section 89 of CPC and the dispute is settled,

75% of the amount of the Court fees paid in respect

of the claim or claims shall be ordered by the Court to

be refunded to the parties. Insofar as modes of

settlement is concerned, Section 89 of CPC provides

settlement of dispute outside the Court, which reads

as under:

"89. Settlement of disputes outside the Court. - (1) Where it appears to the Court that there exist elements of a settlement which may be acceptable to the parties, the Court shall formulate the terms of settlement and give them to the parties for their observations and after receiving the observations of the parties, the Court may reformulate the terms of a possible settlement and refer the same for

(a) arbitration;

(b) conciliation;

(c) Judicial settlement including settlement through Lok Adalat; or

(d) mediation.

             (2)   Where      a       dispute   has   been
     referred:

(a) for arbitration or conciliation, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply as if the proceedings for arbitration or Conciliation were

referred for settlement under the provisions of that Act;

(b) to Lok Adalat, the Court shall refer the same to the Lok Adalat in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 (39 of 1987) and all other provisions of that Act shall apply in respect of the dispute so referred to the Lok Adalat;

(c) for judicial settlement, the Court shall refer the same to the suitable institution or person and such institution or person shall be deemed to be a Lok Adalat and all the provisions of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 (39 of 1987) shall apply as if the dispute were referred to a Lok Adalat under the provisions of that Act;

(d) for mediation, the Court shall effect a compromise between the parties and shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed."

10. After giving due consideration to the above

provisions, they must be interpreted liberally in a

manner that would serve their object and purpose

construing them narrowly would lead to a situation

wherein parties would settle their dispute through a

mediation center or other centers of alternative

judicial settlement under Section 89 of CPC would be

entitled to claim refund of the Court fee, while parties

who settle or negotiate the disputes privately will be

entitled to the same benefits as those who have been

referred to explore alternate dispute settlement

methods under Section 89 of CPC. The Hon'ble Apex

Court had occasion to consider the identical issue in

the case of HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

(supra), wherein it has observed as under:

"20. Thus, even though a strict construction of the terms of section 89, CPC and 69-A of the 1955 Act may not encompass such private negotiation and settlements between the parties, we emphasize that the participants in such settlements will be entitled to the same benefits as those who have been referred

to explore alternate dispute settlement methods under section 89, CPC. Indeed, we find it puzzling that the petitioner should be so vehemently opposed to granting such benefit. Though the Registry/State Government will be losing a one-time Court fee in the short term, they will be saved the expense and opportunity cost of managing an endless cycle of litigation in the long term. It is therefore in their own interest to allow the Respondent No.1's claim.

21. Thus, in our view, the High Court was correct in holding that section 89 of the CPC and section 69-A of 1955 Act be interpreted liberally. In view of this broad purposive construction, we affirm the High Court's conclusion, and hold that Section 89 of CPC shall cover, and the benefit of section 69-A of the 1955 Act shall also extend to, all methods of out of Court dispute settlement between parties that the Court subsequently finds to have been

legally arrived at. This would, thus, cover the present controversy, wherein a private settlement was arrived at, and a memo to withdraw the appeal was filed before the High Court. In such a case as well, the appellant, I.e., respondent No.1 herein would be entitled to refund of Court fee."

(emphasis supplied)

11. The said judgment is aptly applicable to the

present case in hand. This Court, considering the law

laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, is of the opinion

that if a private settlement or negotiation is arrived at

between the parties, then they shall cover under

Section 89 of CPC. Admittedly in the present case,

the parties have entered into compromise and

presented the same before the Trial Court. The Trial

Court accepted the compromise petition. The

petitioner is entitled for the benefit of refund of Court

fee as per Section 66 of the Act. The Trial Court

committed an error in declining to refund the Court

fee.

12. In view of the above discussion, I proceed

to pass the following:

ORDER

The writ petition is allowed.

            The     impugned          order    dated
       29.08.2020, is set aside.      The application
       filed by the petitioner is allowed.      Trial