Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 8794 Kant
Judgement Date : 15 June, 2022
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
KALABURAGI BENCH
DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF JUNE 2022
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR
AND
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S. RACHAIAH
WRIT APPEAL No.200304/2017
C/w
WRIT APPEAL No.200298/2017 (APMC)
IN W.A.NO.200304/2017:
Between:
1. Sri Ramanagaouda S/o Late Hampanagouda
Occ: Advocate, Aged about 43 Years
R/o Marchatal Village
Tq. & Dist. Raichur-584103
2. Sri Anajeyya S/o Bhimayya
Occ: Agriculture, Aged about 45 Years
R/o Kurubadoddi village
Post Chandrabanda
Tq. & Dist. Raichur-584 103
...Appellants
(By Sri Arunkumar Amargundappa, Advocate)
And:
1. The State of Karnataka
Department of Co-operation
Dr. Ambedkar Veedhi
Bengaluru-560 001
2
Represented by its
Under Secretary to Government
2. The Director
Agricultural Marketing Department
No.16, 2nd Rajabhavana Road
Bengaluru-560 001
3. The Deputy Director
Agricultural Marketing Department
Raichur-584 101
4. The Deputy Commissioner
Raichur, Dist. Raichur-584 101
5. The Secretary
Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee
Devadurga-584 121
6. The Secretary
Agricultural Produce Marketting Committee
Raichur-584 101
...Respondents
(By Sri Vijaykumar Y.H., Addl. Advocate General &
Sri Viranagouda M. Biradar, AGA for R1 to R4;
Sri Mallikarjun C. Basareddy, Advocate for R5 & R6)
This writ appeal is filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka
High Courts Act, 1961, praying to allow the appeal and set aside
the final order dated 20.09.2017 passed by the learned Single
Judge in W.P.Nos.21556/2017 and 21988/2017 C/w
W.P.No.202391/2017(APMC) by allowing writ petition and pass
any other appropriate orders.
IN W.A.NO.200298/2017:
Between:
Taluka Cotton Merchants
Association, Devadurg,
3
Dist. Raichur by its President
A. Suresh S/o A. Linganna
Age: 56 Years, Occ: Business
R/o S.B. Cotton, Ginning & Pressing Factory
Shahapur Road, Devadurg
...Appellant
(By Sri Amit Kumar Deshpande, Senior Counsel &
Sri Deshpande Ganesh, Advocate)
And:
1. The State of Karnataka
Represented by its Prl. Secretary
Department of Co-operation
M.S. Building
Bengaluru-1
2. The Under Secretary
Department of Co-operation
State of Karnataka
M.S. Building
Bengaluru-01
3. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee
Raichur, represented by its
Administrative Officer/
Deputy Commissioner
Raichur-584 101
4. The Agricultural Produce
Market Committee
Devadurg Taluka
Represented by its Secretary,
Devadurg, District: Raichur-584 111
...Respondents
(By Sri Vijaykumar Y.H., Addl. Advocate General &
Sri Viranagouda M. Biradar, AGA for R1 and R2;
Sri Mallikarjun C. Basareddy, Advocate for R3 & R4)
4
This writ appeal is filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka
High Courts Act, 1961, praying to allow the appeal and set aside
the final order dated 20.09.2017 passed in
W.P.No.202391/2017 (APMC) and to pass any other appropriate
orders that may be necessary.
These writ appeals having been heard & reserved on
01.06.2022 coming on for pronouncement this day,
SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR J., delivered the following:
JUDGMENT
These two writ appeals are disposed of by common
judgment. The appellants are the writ petitioners in
W.P.Nos.21556/2017, 21988/2017 and
W.P.No.202391/2017. As the learned single judge, by
her order dated 20.09.2017, dismissed the writ
petitions, these appeals have been preferred. The
appellants in W.A.No.200304/2017 owned agricultural
lands and are interested in contesting in the elections to
be held for the marketing committee of APMC. The
appellant in W.A.No.200298/2017 is an association of
cotton merchants of Devadurga taluk.
2. The notification dated 27.04.2017, produced
as Annexure-E in the writ petitions and issued by the
third respondent namely, the Deputy Director of
Agricultural Marketing Department, Raichur, for
amalgamating Agricultural Produce Marketing
Committee ('APMC', for short), Devadurg with APMC,
Raichur was challenged in the writ petitions. In the
impugned order the learned single judge has held that
there are no reasons to quash the notification. The
learned single judge has assigned the reasons that
conjoint reading of sections 4, 5, 9 and 144 of the
Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation
and Development) Act, 1966 (Act, for short) makes it
very clear that for every market area, there shall be a
market and the market area has to be notified in terms
of section 4 of the Act. For effecting amalgamation of
the market committees according to section 144, the
essential factors required are, i) satisfaction of the
Government that for securing efficient regulation of
marketing of any agricultural produce in any market
area, amalgamation is necessary and ii) consultation
with the concerned marketing committees. The
materials available on record indicate these two
conditions being satisfied. Then with regard to
compliance under section 4, it is held that the judgment
in Parvathareddy (ILR 1995 KAR 1856) is not helpful
to the appellants and that section 5 is also not
applicable, for it deals with alteration of the market area
which aspect is altogether different from amalgamation
of the market committees.
3. Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned senior
counsel arguing on behalf of Sri Deshapnde Ganesh,
learned counsel for the appellant in
W.A.No.200298/2017 submitted that the learned single
judge has misconstrued the scope of section 144 of the
Act. His argument was that proviso to section 4 clearly
states that the market area shall not be less than a taluk
and more than a district, and in this view, as has been
observed in the case of Paravathareddy, there shall be
a marketing committee for every taluk and in case
amalgamation of marketing committees is required,
notification under section 5 of the Act must be first
issued and only thereafter two marketing committees
can be amalgamated. It was his argument that
amalgamation of APMC, Devadurg with APMC, Raichur
would amount to alteration of market area and therefore
issuance of notification under section 5 has to precede
the action under section 144.
4. Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande also submitted
that the amalgamation process affects the appellants in
such a way that they have to travel a long distance even
to make payments or to obtain receipts for their
transactions. Though amalgamation is a legislative
function, since the interest of the appellants is affected
materially, they have got their say in the process of
amalgamation. Therefore, he argues for allowing the
writ appeals.
5. Sri Arun Kumar Amargundappa appearing
for the appellants in W.A.No.200304/2017 argued on
lines with the points urged by Sri Ameet Kumar
Deshpande.
6. Sri Vijaykumar Y.H., learned Additional
Advocate General appearing for respondents 1 to 4
submitted that the process of amalgamation is a
legislative function and the principles of natural justice
would not apply and in this view the appellants cannot
have any say in this process. He further argued that
section 144 is a stand alone code for amalgamation of
the marketing committees; there are no restrictions for
amalgamation of the marketing committees unlike the
restrictions found in section 145. The marketing
committee of APMC, Devadurg passed a resolution and
gave consent for amalgamation with marketing
committee of APMC, Raichur and thereby requirement of
section 144 is forthcoming. Section 144 is not
controlled by section 4 or 5 of the Act. Moreover section
5 deals with alteration of the marketing area which is a
different aspect as has been rightly observed by the
learned single judge and therefore the writ appeals are
devoid of merits and they are to be dismissed.
7. Sri Mallikarjun C. Basareddy appearing for
respondents 5 and 6 submitted that when the two
marketing committees consented for amalgamation,
appellants cannot object to it. He also submitted that a
sub-market yard has been established at Devadurg and
in this view the appellants are not at all affected.
8. Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande submitted that
in order to interpret whether section 144 is a stand
alone section or a code by itself, all the provisions of the
Act must be read and that a particular section cannot be
read in isolation to take that view. On this point he
placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of Municipal Corporation of City of Hubli
vs. Shuba Rao Hanumantharao Prayag and others
(AIR 1976 SC 1398).
9. We have considered the points of arguments
contended by learned counsel.
10. We may first refer to some of the definitions
before giving findings. Section 2(19) of the Act defines
Market Area as any area declared to be market area
under section 4. Section 2(18) of the Act states that
market means any notified area declared to be a market
under the Act. Section 2(20) of the Act states that
Market Committee or Committee means a market
committee constituted for a market area under this Act.
11. For better understanding of the meanings of
the above expressions, reference to sections 3 and 4 is
required. Section 3 states that the Government may
issue notification for regulating the agricultural produce
in such areas as may be specified in the notification.
There is a rider in sub-section 2 that the Government
has to consider any objections or suggestions received
within a specified time before issuing notification for
regulating the marketing of agricultural produce.
Section 4 states that after expiry of the period specified
in the notification issued under section 3 and upon
considering such objections and suggestions, the
Government may issue another notification declaring the
areas specified in section 3 or any portion thereof to be
a market area and that marketing of all or any of the
kinds of agricultural produce specified in the notification
issued under section 3 shall be regulated in that market
area. Proviso to section 4 states that market area shall
not be less than a taluk and more than a district. The
learned single judge has rightly held that the proviso per
se prescribes minimum and maximum limits of market
area. Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande's argument that if
section 4 is strictly construed in the background of
proviso, there shall be a market area for every taluk in a
district, cannot be accepted. The proviso to section 4
though states that there shall be a market area for a
taluk, it does not mean that there shall necessarily be a
market area for every taluk. It only gives a meaning
that minimum market area must be a taluk and there is
no impediment for formation of market area for more
than one taluk, but the maximum area should not
exceed a district. It can also be said that entire district
can be a market area. If this is the plausible
interpretation of the proviso to section 4, what has been
held in Parvatahreddy that the number of market
areas must be equal to member of taluk in a district,
cannot be accepted.
12. A market area may comprise of a taluk or
one or more taluks or a district as the case may be, and
for every market area, there must be a market. Market
may be a village or a town or a city where the marketing
takes place. Market yard or market sub-yard is a
specified place in the market for marketing purpose.
13. Now if section 9 of the Act is considered,
there shall be a marketing committee for every market
area and section 10 deals with constitution of the
market committee. Section 144 deals with
amalgamation of marketing committees for the purpose
of securing efficient regulation of marketing of any
agricultural produce in any market area. For effecting
amalgamation, the requirements are that the State
Government may consult the marketing committees
proposed to be amalgamated and the Government is to
be satisfied that amalgamation is necessitated for
securing the efficient regulation of any agricultural
produce in any market area. As rightly argued by Sri
Vijaykumar Y.H., amalgamation is a legislative action
and if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied, the
Government may issue notification for amalgamation of
the market committees. Section 144 stands
independently without any restrictions as found in
section 145. Since Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande has
argued that in order to decide whether section 144 is
stand alone code or not, the other sections of the Act
should also be read as has been held by the Supreme
Court in the case of Municipal Corporation City of
Hubli (supra), we may now refer to para-9 of the said
judgment where it is held as below:
"9. Then again considerable light on this question is thrown by the provision enacted in S. 82. It is a well-settled rule of interpretation that the Court is "entitled and indeed bound, when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute, to consider any other parts of the Act which throw light on the intention of the legislature, and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would be alone and apart from the rest of the Act. "The statute must be read as a whole and every provision in the statute must be construed with reference to the context and other clauses in the statute so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. ........"
14. Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande refers to
sections 3, 4, 5 and 144 of the Act, and he laid much
emphasis on section 5. We have already referred to
sections 3 and 4. If we refer to section 5 now, what we
notice is that it deals with alteration of market area.
The Government may issue notification at any time to
exclude any area from any market area and include any
additional area to a market area. Under section 5 the
Government may also declare that the regulation of the
marketing of any agricultural produce in any market
area shall cease and the marketing of any agricultural
produce not regulated hitherto shall be regulated. That
means section 5 is meant for a different purpose, and
this is what the learned single judge has rightly
observed. Section 144 deals with amalgamation of the
marketing committees. On a conjoint reading of sections
9 and 144, it is possible to interpret that since there
shall be a market committee for every market area, on
account of amalgamation of two or more market
committees, obviously the market areas will merge, or
otherwise even after amalgamation of the market
committees, market area will remain without a market
committee for its management. Section 9 does not
contemplate such a situation to happen. In no way
section 5 can be read into section 144. Therefore the
argument of the counsel for the appellants cannot be
accepted.
15. The Market Committee, APMC, Devadurg has
passed a resolution giving consent for amalgamation
with Market Committee, APMC, Raichur. In the
impugned notification, the reason which necessitated the
amalgamation is clearly mentioned. The Government is
satisfied about the requirement of amalgamation.
Conditions are satisfied. There is no dispute that
exercise of power under section 144 is a legislative
function and there is no need to adhere to the principles
of natural justice. As a market sub-yard has been
established at Devadurg, the interest of the appellants
cannot be said to have been affected. In this view we
do not find that there is need to interfere with the
impugned order. Hence appeals are dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE
BL
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