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Sri Ramanagouda And Anr vs The State Of Karnataka And Ors
2022 Latest Caselaw 8794 Kant

Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 8794 Kant
Judgement Date : 15 June, 2022

Karnataka High Court
Sri Ramanagouda And Anr vs The State Of Karnataka And Ors on 15 June, 2022
Bench: Sreenivas Harish Kumar, S Rachaiah
                                1

           IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
                  KALABURAGI BENCH

        DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF JUNE 2022

                           PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR

                              AND

         THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S. RACHAIAH

            WRIT APPEAL No.200304/2017
                        C/w
         WRIT APPEAL No.200298/2017 (APMC)

IN W.A.NO.200304/2017:

Between:

1.      Sri Ramanagaouda S/o Late Hampanagouda
        Occ: Advocate, Aged about 43 Years
        R/o Marchatal Village
        Tq. & Dist. Raichur-584103

2.      Sri Anajeyya S/o Bhimayya
        Occ: Agriculture, Aged about 45 Years
        R/o Kurubadoddi village
        Post Chandrabanda
        Tq. & Dist. Raichur-584 103
                                                 ...Appellants

(By Sri Arunkumar Amargundappa, Advocate)

And:

1.     The State of Karnataka
       Department of Co-operation
       Dr. Ambedkar Veedhi
       Bengaluru-560 001
                                2

     Represented by its
     Under Secretary to Government

2.   The Director
     Agricultural Marketing Department
     No.16, 2nd Rajabhavana Road
     Bengaluru-560 001

3.   The Deputy Director
     Agricultural Marketing Department
     Raichur-584 101

4.   The Deputy Commissioner
     Raichur, Dist. Raichur-584 101

5.   The Secretary
     Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee
     Devadurga-584 121

6.   The Secretary
     Agricultural Produce Marketting Committee
     Raichur-584 101

                                                ...Respondents

(By Sri Vijaykumar Y.H., Addl. Advocate General &
    Sri Viranagouda M. Biradar, AGA for R1 to R4;
    Sri Mallikarjun C. Basareddy, Advocate for R5 & R6)


       This writ appeal is filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka
High Courts Act, 1961, praying to allow the appeal and set aside
the final order dated 20.09.2017 passed by the learned Single
Judge     in  W.P.Nos.21556/2017        and    21988/2017     C/w
W.P.No.202391/2017(APMC) by allowing writ petition and pass
any other appropriate orders.

IN W.A.NO.200298/2017:

Between:

Taluka Cotton Merchants
Association, Devadurg,
                                  3

Dist. Raichur by its President
A. Suresh S/o A. Linganna
Age: 56 Years, Occ: Business
R/o S.B. Cotton, Ginning & Pressing Factory
Shahapur Road, Devadurg
                                                   ...Appellant

(By Sri Amit Kumar Deshpande, Senior Counsel &
    Sri Deshpande Ganesh, Advocate)

And:

1.     The State of Karnataka
       Represented by its Prl. Secretary
       Department of Co-operation
       M.S. Building
       Bengaluru-1

2.     The Under Secretary
       Department of Co-operation
       State of Karnataka
       M.S. Building
       Bengaluru-01

3.     The Agricultural Produce Market Committee
       Raichur, represented by its
       Administrative Officer/
       Deputy Commissioner
       Raichur-584 101

4.     The Agricultural Produce
       Market Committee
       Devadurg Taluka
       Represented by its Secretary,
       Devadurg, District: Raichur-584 111
                                               ...Respondents

(By Sri Vijaykumar Y.H., Addl. Advocate General &
    Sri Viranagouda M. Biradar, AGA for R1 and R2;
    Sri Mallikarjun C. Basareddy, Advocate for R3 & R4)
                                4

      This writ appeal is filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka
High Courts Act, 1961, praying to allow the appeal and set aside
the     final   order     dated     20.09.2017      passed     in
W.P.No.202391/2017 (APMC) and to pass any other appropriate
orders that may be necessary.

      These writ appeals having been heard & reserved on
01.06.2022 coming on for pronouncement this day,
SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR J., delivered the following:


                         JUDGMENT

These two writ appeals are disposed of by common

judgment. The appellants are the writ petitioners in

W.P.Nos.21556/2017, 21988/2017 and

W.P.No.202391/2017. As the learned single judge, by

her order dated 20.09.2017, dismissed the writ

petitions, these appeals have been preferred. The

appellants in W.A.No.200304/2017 owned agricultural

lands and are interested in contesting in the elections to

be held for the marketing committee of APMC. The

appellant in W.A.No.200298/2017 is an association of

cotton merchants of Devadurga taluk.

2. The notification dated 27.04.2017, produced

as Annexure-E in the writ petitions and issued by the

third respondent namely, the Deputy Director of

Agricultural Marketing Department, Raichur, for

amalgamating Agricultural Produce Marketing

Committee ('APMC', for short), Devadurg with APMC,

Raichur was challenged in the writ petitions. In the

impugned order the learned single judge has held that

there are no reasons to quash the notification. The

learned single judge has assigned the reasons that

conjoint reading of sections 4, 5, 9 and 144 of the

Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation

and Development) Act, 1966 (Act, for short) makes it

very clear that for every market area, there shall be a

market and the market area has to be notified in terms

of section 4 of the Act. For effecting amalgamation of

the market committees according to section 144, the

essential factors required are, i) satisfaction of the

Government that for securing efficient regulation of

marketing of any agricultural produce in any market

area, amalgamation is necessary and ii) consultation

with the concerned marketing committees. The

materials available on record indicate these two

conditions being satisfied. Then with regard to

compliance under section 4, it is held that the judgment

in Parvathareddy (ILR 1995 KAR 1856) is not helpful

to the appellants and that section 5 is also not

applicable, for it deals with alteration of the market area

which aspect is altogether different from amalgamation

of the market committees.

3. Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned senior

counsel arguing on behalf of Sri Deshapnde Ganesh,

learned counsel for the appellant in

W.A.No.200298/2017 submitted that the learned single

judge has misconstrued the scope of section 144 of the

Act. His argument was that proviso to section 4 clearly

states that the market area shall not be less than a taluk

and more than a district, and in this view, as has been

observed in the case of Paravathareddy, there shall be

a marketing committee for every taluk and in case

amalgamation of marketing committees is required,

notification under section 5 of the Act must be first

issued and only thereafter two marketing committees

can be amalgamated. It was his argument that

amalgamation of APMC, Devadurg with APMC, Raichur

would amount to alteration of market area and therefore

issuance of notification under section 5 has to precede

the action under section 144.

4. Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande also submitted

that the amalgamation process affects the appellants in

such a way that they have to travel a long distance even

to make payments or to obtain receipts for their

transactions. Though amalgamation is a legislative

function, since the interest of the appellants is affected

materially, they have got their say in the process of

amalgamation. Therefore, he argues for allowing the

writ appeals.

5. Sri Arun Kumar Amargundappa appearing

for the appellants in W.A.No.200304/2017 argued on

lines with the points urged by Sri Ameet Kumar

Deshpande.

6. Sri Vijaykumar Y.H., learned Additional

Advocate General appearing for respondents 1 to 4

submitted that the process of amalgamation is a

legislative function and the principles of natural justice

would not apply and in this view the appellants cannot

have any say in this process. He further argued that

section 144 is a stand alone code for amalgamation of

the marketing committees; there are no restrictions for

amalgamation of the marketing committees unlike the

restrictions found in section 145. The marketing

committee of APMC, Devadurg passed a resolution and

gave consent for amalgamation with marketing

committee of APMC, Raichur and thereby requirement of

section 144 is forthcoming. Section 144 is not

controlled by section 4 or 5 of the Act. Moreover section

5 deals with alteration of the marketing area which is a

different aspect as has been rightly observed by the

learned single judge and therefore the writ appeals are

devoid of merits and they are to be dismissed.

7. Sri Mallikarjun C. Basareddy appearing for

respondents 5 and 6 submitted that when the two

marketing committees consented for amalgamation,

appellants cannot object to it. He also submitted that a

sub-market yard has been established at Devadurg and

in this view the appellants are not at all affected.

8. Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande submitted that

in order to interpret whether section 144 is a stand

alone section or a code by itself, all the provisions of the

Act must be read and that a particular section cannot be

read in isolation to take that view. On this point he

placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in

the case of Municipal Corporation of City of Hubli

vs. Shuba Rao Hanumantharao Prayag and others

(AIR 1976 SC 1398).

9. We have considered the points of arguments

contended by learned counsel.

10. We may first refer to some of the definitions

before giving findings. Section 2(19) of the Act defines

Market Area as any area declared to be market area

under section 4. Section 2(18) of the Act states that

market means any notified area declared to be a market

under the Act. Section 2(20) of the Act states that

Market Committee or Committee means a market

committee constituted for a market area under this Act.

11. For better understanding of the meanings of

the above expressions, reference to sections 3 and 4 is

required. Section 3 states that the Government may

issue notification for regulating the agricultural produce

in such areas as may be specified in the notification.

There is a rider in sub-section 2 that the Government

has to consider any objections or suggestions received

within a specified time before issuing notification for

regulating the marketing of agricultural produce.

Section 4 states that after expiry of the period specified

in the notification issued under section 3 and upon

considering such objections and suggestions, the

Government may issue another notification declaring the

areas specified in section 3 or any portion thereof to be

a market area and that marketing of all or any of the

kinds of agricultural produce specified in the notification

issued under section 3 shall be regulated in that market

area. Proviso to section 4 states that market area shall

not be less than a taluk and more than a district. The

learned single judge has rightly held that the proviso per

se prescribes minimum and maximum limits of market

area. Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande's argument that if

section 4 is strictly construed in the background of

proviso, there shall be a market area for every taluk in a

district, cannot be accepted. The proviso to section 4

though states that there shall be a market area for a

taluk, it does not mean that there shall necessarily be a

market area for every taluk. It only gives a meaning

that minimum market area must be a taluk and there is

no impediment for formation of market area for more

than one taluk, but the maximum area should not

exceed a district. It can also be said that entire district

can be a market area. If this is the plausible

interpretation of the proviso to section 4, what has been

held in Parvatahreddy that the number of market

areas must be equal to member of taluk in a district,

cannot be accepted.

12. A market area may comprise of a taluk or

one or more taluks or a district as the case may be, and

for every market area, there must be a market. Market

may be a village or a town or a city where the marketing

takes place. Market yard or market sub-yard is a

specified place in the market for marketing purpose.

13. Now if section 9 of the Act is considered,

there shall be a marketing committee for every market

area and section 10 deals with constitution of the

market committee. Section 144 deals with

amalgamation of marketing committees for the purpose

of securing efficient regulation of marketing of any

agricultural produce in any market area. For effecting

amalgamation, the requirements are that the State

Government may consult the marketing committees

proposed to be amalgamated and the Government is to

be satisfied that amalgamation is necessitated for

securing the efficient regulation of any agricultural

produce in any market area. As rightly argued by Sri

Vijaykumar Y.H., amalgamation is a legislative action

and if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied, the

Government may issue notification for amalgamation of

the market committees. Section 144 stands

independently without any restrictions as found in

section 145. Since Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande has

argued that in order to decide whether section 144 is

stand alone code or not, the other sections of the Act

should also be read as has been held by the Supreme

Court in the case of Municipal Corporation City of

Hubli (supra), we may now refer to para-9 of the said

judgment where it is held as below:

"9. Then again considerable light on this question is thrown by the provision enacted in S. 82. It is a well-settled rule of interpretation that the Court is "entitled and indeed bound, when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute, to consider any other parts of the Act which throw light on the intention of the legislature, and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would be alone and apart from the rest of the Act. "The statute must be read as a whole and every provision in the statute must be construed with reference to the context and other clauses in the statute so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. ........"

14. Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande refers to

sections 3, 4, 5 and 144 of the Act, and he laid much

emphasis on section 5. We have already referred to

sections 3 and 4. If we refer to section 5 now, what we

notice is that it deals with alteration of market area.

The Government may issue notification at any time to

exclude any area from any market area and include any

additional area to a market area. Under section 5 the

Government may also declare that the regulation of the

marketing of any agricultural produce in any market

area shall cease and the marketing of any agricultural

produce not regulated hitherto shall be regulated. That

means section 5 is meant for a different purpose, and

this is what the learned single judge has rightly

observed. Section 144 deals with amalgamation of the

marketing committees. On a conjoint reading of sections

9 and 144, it is possible to interpret that since there

shall be a market committee for every market area, on

account of amalgamation of two or more market

committees, obviously the market areas will merge, or

otherwise even after amalgamation of the market

committees, market area will remain without a market

committee for its management. Section 9 does not

contemplate such a situation to happen. In no way

section 5 can be read into section 144. Therefore the

argument of the counsel for the appellants cannot be

accepted.

15. The Market Committee, APMC, Devadurg has

passed a resolution giving consent for amalgamation

with Market Committee, APMC, Raichur. In the

impugned notification, the reason which necessitated the

amalgamation is clearly mentioned. The Government is

satisfied about the requirement of amalgamation.

Conditions are satisfied. There is no dispute that

exercise of power under section 144 is a legislative

function and there is no need to adhere to the principles

of natural justice. As a market sub-yard has been

established at Devadurg, the interest of the appellants

cannot be said to have been affected. In this view we

do not find that there is need to interfere with the

impugned order. Hence appeals are dismissed.

Sd/-

JUDGE

Sd/-

JUDGE

BL

 
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