Ahmed Khan vs State By Traffic Police
2021 Latest Caselaw 346 Kant

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU

  DATED THIS THE 7TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2021

                     BEFORE

    THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE V.SRISHANANDA

              CRL.RP. NO. 167/2015

BETWEEN:

AHMED KHAN,
S/O. KHADER MOHIDDIN KHAN,
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
R/O. NEAR GULLAMMA TEMPLE,
NEHRU NAGAR,
CHIKKAMAGALURU-573 331.
                                  ... PETITIONER

(BY SRI. GIRISH B. BALADARE, ADVOCATE)

AND

STATE BY TRAFFIC POLICE,
CHIKKAMAGALUR,
REPRESENTED BY
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT BUILDING,
BANGALORE - 560 001
                                  ... RESPONDENT

(BY SRI. RENUKARADHYA, HCGP )

     THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED U/S.
397 R/W 401 CR.P.C. PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT DATED 07.02.2015 PSSED BY THE LEARNED
PRINCIPAL SESSIONS JUDGE AT CHIKMAGALUR IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.255/2013 AND THE JUDGMENT
DATED 30.07.2013 PASSED BY THE LEARNED I-
ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, AT CHIKMAGALUR
IN C.C. NO.1101/2012 AND THE PETITIONER TO BE
ACQUITTED FOR THE OFFENCE ALLEDGED AGAINST HIM.
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     THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION COMING ON
FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:

                         ORDER

This Revision Petition is filed by the accused in C.C.

No.1101/2012, wherein the learned I-Additional Civil

Judge and JMFC, Chikkamagalur, has convicted the

accused for the offence punishable under Sections 279

and 304-A of IPC and awarded sentence of Simple

Imprisonment for six months for the offence punishable

under Section 279 of IPC and fine of Rs.1,000/- with

default sentence of Simple Imprisonment for one month

and for the offence punishable under Section 304-A of

IPC, awarded Simple Imprisonment two years and fine

of Rs.2000/- with default sentence of Simple for one

month, and the sentences were ordered to run

concurrently, by judgment dated 30.07.2013. The said

judgment was challenged by the accused in Criminal

Appeal No.255/2013 on the file of the Principal District

and Sessions Judge, Chikkamagaluru. The learned

Sessions Judge has confirmed the judgment of the trial

Court and maintained the conviction order, but reduced

the sentence of imprisonment to one year for the offence

under Section 304-A of IPC while retaining the fine of

Rs.2000/-, and for the offence under Section 279 of IPC,

ordered only fine of Rs.1,000/- by modifying the

conviction order and set aside the sentence of

imprisonment for the offence under Section 279 of IPC.

Those, judgments are the subject matter of this revision

petition.

2. The brief facts which are necessary for the

disposal of this revision petition are as under:-

2.1 The Circle Inspector of police,

Chikkamagaluru Town Police Station, has filed a charge

sheet against the revision petitioner for the offence

punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of IPC in

respect of the Road Traffic Accident that occurred on

21.08.2012 at about 8.00 p.m., wherein one Sri. Manu,

who was crossing the road near Akshaya Bar, lost his life.

After lodging the FIR, the police conducted a detailed

investigation resulting in filing of charge sheet as

aforesaid. After the charge sheet came to be filed, the

presence of the accused was secured and his plea was

recorded. Since the accused did not plead guilty, the

trial was held. The prosecution examined 7 witnesses as

PWs. 1 to 7 and relied on documentary evidence, which

are accepted and marked as Exs. P1 to P11. On

conclusion of recording of prosecution evidence, the

statement of the accused as contemplated under Section

313 of Cr.P.C. came to be recorded. The accused has

denied all the incriminating circumstances, which were

put to him while recording his statement. However,

there was no evidence placed by the accused as defence

evidence.

2.2 The learned Magistrate on cumulative

consideration of the oral and documentary evidence on

record, came to the conclusion that the prosecution was

successful in establishing culpability of the accused for

which he was chargesheeted and passed an order of

conviction and sentence referred to supra.

3. Being aggrieved by the conviction order, the

accused preferred an appeal before the Sessions Court in

Criminal Appeal No.255/2013. The learned Sessions

Judge heard the parties and re-appreciated the entire

materials on record and passed an order on 07.02.2015,

wherein the learned Sessions Judge came to the

conclusion that the finding recorded by the learned

Magistrate holding that the accused is responsible for the

accidental death of Sri. Manu, on 21.08.2012 because of

the rash and negligent driving of the lorry by the

accused, but took into consideration that the sentence

passed by the learned Trial Judge in so far as the offence

under Sections 279 and 304-A of IPC is excessive and

thus modified the sentence by setting aside the sentence

of imprisonment for the offence under Section 279 of IPC

and reducing the sentence of imprisonment from two

years to one year for the offence under Section 304-A of

IPC with default sentence.

4. Being aggrieved by these orders the accused

is before this Court in this revision petition.

5. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner

Sri. Girish B. Baldare vehemently contended that, both

the Courts have misdirected themselves in not properly

appreciating the case on hand. He further contends that

the incident has occurred around 8.00 p.m. on

21.08.2012 and the accused was driving the lorry with

moderate speed, and it is the deceased who came across

the road all of a sudden and despite best efforts made

by the accused, he could not avoid the accident and

therefore, the finding recorded by the Trial Court as well

as the First Appellate Court needs to be interfered.

6. Alternatively, the learned counsel submitted

that, in the event of this Court maintaining the order of

conviction, this Court has to interfere in so far as the

sentence portion is concerned, inasmuch as the sentence

passed by the trial Court as well as the First Appellate

Court is excessive, having regard to the attendant

circumstances of the case. In this regard, he relies on

the judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 2002 SC

1529 in the case of State of Karnataka Vs.

Sharanappa Basnagouda Aregoudar and sought for

reducing the sentence appropriately.

7. Per contra, the learned HCGP supported the

impugned judgments and prayed that the offence under

Section 304-A of IPC need not be dealt casually by the

Courts and many innocent people are losing life in the

Road Traffic Accidents in the recent past and that should

not be lost sight while passing the appropriate sentence.

He has also contended that, taking any liberal view in so

far as the sentence of imprisonment in the case of Road

Traffic Accidents, would send a wrong signal to the

Society and therefore, the sentence ordered by the First

Appellate Court to be maintained by dismissing the

revision petition.

8. In view of the rival contentions, the following

points would arise for consideration:-

(i) Whether the finding recorded by the Trial Court that the accused is responsible for the accidental death of Manu on account of a road traffic accident on 21.08.2012 at 8.00 p.m., near Akshaya Bar, which is confirmed by the First Appellate Court is erroneous?

(ii) Whether the sentence which is modified by the First Appellate Court as excessive, is erroneous?"

9. These points are answered in the Negative

for the following reasons:-

9.1 In the case on hand, Sri.Manu having lost his

life in the a Road Traffic Accident on 21.08.2012 at 8.00

p.m near Akshaya Bar is not seriously disputed. The only

question that was to be decided by the Trial Magistrate

was, to find-out whether the accidental death of Sri.

Manu is caused by the negligence of the accused. In

order to appreciate the same, the Trial Court relied upon

the documentary evidence at Exs.P1 to P11. It is also

pertinent to note that the accused was provided an

opportunity to explain his version about the incident at

the time of recording the his statement. But accused

for the reasons best known to him, did not utilize that

opportunity to explain the incident or at least to file

written explanation of his version as to the incident. No

effort has been made by the accused to lead defence

evidence. Under such circumstances, the Trial

Magistrate, on cumulative consideration of the oral and

documentary evidence on record, recorded the finding

that the accidental death of the deceased victim-Sri.Manu

is established as it is due to the sheer negligence on the

part of the accused and thus, convicted the accused

(revision petitioner) for the offence under Sections 279

and 304-A of IPC.

9.2 The First Appellate Court also revisited these

aspects of the matter and after re-appreciation of the

entire material on record, recorded a finding that there is

no perversity or capriciousness in the finding reached by

the Trial Court in holding that the negligence of the

accused is the sole reason for the accidental death of

Manu.

10. Even after hearing the parties and re-

appreciating the materials on record, this Court is unable

to accept arguments addressed on behalf of the accused

(revision petitioner) that there is an error apparent on

record in reaching a finding that the accidental death of

Sri. Manu is on account of the negligent driving of the

lorry by the accused. Therefore, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the finding needs no

interference. In this regard, it is just and proper for this

Court to refer and rely on the judgment of the Hon'ble

Apex Court in the case of Ravi Kapoor Vs. State of

Rajasthan (Swatanter Kumar) reported in [(2012)

9 SCC 284], wherein at paragraph 35 of the judgment,

it has held as under:

"35. It is true that the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt but the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. are not a mere formality or purposeless. They have a dual purpose to discharge, firstly, that the entire material parts of the incriminating evidence should be put to the accused in accordance with law and, secondly, to provide an opportunity to the accused to explain his conduct or his version of the case. To provide this opportunity to the accused is the mandatory duty of the Court. If the accused deliberately fails to avail this opportunity, then the consequences in law have to follow, particularly, when it would be expected of the accused in the normal course of conduct to disclose certain facts which may be within his personal knowledge and have a bearing on the case".

11. Applying the legal principles enunciated in

the above decisions to the facts of this case, the court

finds that there is no illegality or perversity in the order

of the learned Magistrate in reaching a finding that the

negligence of the accused (revision petitioner) is the

sole cause for the accidental death of Sri. Manu.

Accordingly, in view of the forgoing reasons, Point No.1 is

answered.

12. In so far as the impugned sentence is

concerned, the trial Court awarded the punishment of

Simple Imprisonment for one year for the offence under

Section 279 of IPC with fine of Rs.1,000/-, with default

sentence of Simple Imprisonment for one month. In so

far as the offence under Section 304-A of IPC is

concerned, the trial Court has awarded the sentence of

Simple Imprisonment for two years with fine of

Rs.2,000/-, with default sentence of Simple

Imprisonment for one month. The First Appellate Court,

on careful consideration of the entire materials on record,

using the discretionary power vested in it, modified the

sentence passed by the trial Court by setting aside the

sentence of one year for the offence under Section 279 of

IPC and also scaled down the imprisonment period from

two years to one year for the offence under Section 304-

A of IPC, while maintaining the fine amount and default

sentence.

13. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner

Sri. Girish B. Baladare, vehemently contended that the

discretion used by the First Appellate Court in reducing

the sentence of imprisonment for the offence under

Section 304-A of IPC from two years to one year is also

excessive, in view of the decision relied upon by him in

Sharanappa's case cited supra, wherein it is held as

under:

"Penal Code (45 of 1860),S. 304-A- Sentence-Inadequacy-Accident scase- Accused found guilty of rash and negligent driving which resulted in death of four persons and injury to one person-Trial Court and appellate Court found accused driver of mini lorry guilty of offence punishable under sec. 279,337,338,304-A, IPC on basis of evidence adduced by prosecution-In revision by accused driver, High Court reduced sentence under sec 304 into fine for reasons that collision took place because of bursting of front tyre of complainant's car on account of which car dashed with - lorry- plea as to possibility of collision because of bursting of tyre of car not accepted by trial court, appellate court - Evidence of motor vehicle Inspector also ruled out possibility of

collision because of bursting of front tyre of car-Observation of revisional Court not based on evidence on record- Having regard to serious nature of accident - Interference with sentence by revisional Court - Held not proper-May set unhealthy precedent to subordinate Courts - Accused Sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for offence under Sec. 304."

14. Per contra, it is the argument of the learned

HCGP that, the facts and circumstances in the above

referred case relied upon by the learned counsel for the

revision petitioner/accused is altogether different from

the facts and circumstances of the case on hand and

therefore, even though there cannot be any dispute as

to the principles of law enunciated in the judgment relied

on and cited supra by the revision petitioner/accused, the

case on hand does not require any interference by this

Court.

15. In the case of State of Punjab v. Saurabh

Bakshi, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 182 it has been

held as under:

"8. It is submitted by Mr Madhukar that when the prosecution had been able to establish the charges levelled against the respondent and both the trial court and the appellate court had maintained the sentence there was no justification on the part of the High Court to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone solely on the basis that the respondent had paid some compensation. It is his further submission that keeping in view the gravity of the offence that two deaths had occurred the High Court should have kept itself alive to the nature of the crime and should have been well advised not to interfere with the quantum of sentence. He has commended us to the decisions in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh [State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 :

(2012)    1   SCC     (Cri)  706]    and Guru
Basavaraj v. State     of     Karnataka [Guru

Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 734 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 594 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 972] .

9. Ms Meenakshi, learned Senior Counsel, per contra, has contended that the respondent was quite young at the time the accident took place and it may be an act of negligence, but the contributory facet by the Maruti car driver cannot be ruled out. That apart, there are mitigating circumstances for reduction of the sentence and in the obtaining factual matrix the High Court has appositely adopted corrective machinery which also reflects the concept of proportionality. The learned Senior

Counsel would also submit that when the High Court has exercised the discretion which is permissible under Section 304-A IPC this Court should be slow to interfere. It is urged by her that when the compensation had been paid, the High Court has kept in view the aspect of rehabilitation of the victim and when that purpose have been subserved the reduction of sentence should not be interfered with. The learned Senior Counsel has drawn inspiration from Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand [Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 608] and a recent judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 290 of 2015 titled State of M.P. v. Mehtaab [State of M.P. v. Mehtaab, (2015) 5 SCC 197 : (2015) 2 Scale 386] .

10. At the outset, it is essential to note that the respondent stood convicted by the trial court as well as by the appellate court. The findings recorded by the said two courts are neither perverse nor did they call for interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. The High Court as we notice has been persuaded by the factum of payment of compensation by the respondent herein, amounting to Rs 85,000 to the legal representatives of deceased Jagdish Ram and his nephew and the said compensation had been directed to be paid by virtue of the order dated 19-9-2013 [Saurabh Bakshi v. State of Punjab, Criminal Revision No. 2955 of 2013, order dated 19-9-2013 (P&H)] passed by the High Court. It is submitted by Ms Arora that

apart from the young age of the respondent at the time of occurrence the aforesaid aspect would constitute the mitigating factor.

11. In Mehtaab case [State of M.P. v. Mehtaab, (2015) 5 SCC 197 : (2015) 2 Scale 386] a two-Judge Bench was dealing with the case under Section 304-A IPC wherein the respondent was convicted under Sections 304-A and 337 IPC and sentenced to undergo one year's and three months' rigorous imprisonment, respectively. The High Court had reduced the sentence to 10 days. It is apt to note here that in that case the deceased had received injuries due to shock of electric current. The Court took note of the submission of the learned counsel for the State and proceeded to opine as follows: (SCC p. 199, paras 6-7)

"6. The learned counsel for the State submitted that the respondent-accused had installed a transformer in his field and left the electric wires naked which was a negligent act. The deceased Sushila Bai died on account of the said naked wire which had high voltage and was not visible in the dark. The offence having been fully proved by the evidence on record, the High Court was not justified in reducing the sentence to 10 days which was not just and fair. Even if liberal view on sentence of imprisonment was to be taken, the High Court ought to have enhanced the sentence of fine and awarded a reasonable compensation as a condition for reduction of sentence.

7. We find force in the submission. It is the duty of the Court to award just sentence to a convict against whom charge is proved. While every mitigating or aggravating circumstance may be given due weight, mechanical reduction of sentence to the period already undergone cannot be appreciated. Sentence has to be fair not only to the accused but also to the victim and the society. It is also the duty of the court to duly consider the aspect of rehabilitating the victim. Unfortunately, these factors are missing in the impugned order. No cogent reason has been assigned for imposing only 10 days' sentence when an innocent life has been lost."

12. After so stating the Court referred to the decision in Suresh v. State of Haryana [(2015) 2 SCC 227 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 45] and enhanced the compensation taking note of the financial capacity of the accused-respondent therein, and directed as follows: (Mehtaab case [State of M.P. v. Mehtaab, (2015) 5 SCC 197 : (2015) 2 Scale 386] SCC p. 200, paras 10-11)

"10. As already observed, the respondent having been found guilty of causing death by his negligence, the High Court was not justified in reducing the sentence of imprisonment to 10 days without awarding any compensation to the heirs of the deceased. We are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of the High Court can be upheld only with the modification that the accused will pay compensation of Rs 2 lakhs to the heirs of the

deceased within six months. In default, he will undergo RI for six months. The compensation of Rs 2 lakhs is being fixed having regard to the limited financial resources of the accused but the said compensation may not be adequate for the heirs of the deceased. In such a situation, in addition to the compensation to be paid by the accused, the State can be required to pay compensation under Section 357-A CrPC.

11. As per the judgment of this Court in Suresh [(2015) 2 SCC 227 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 45] , the scheme adopted by the State of Kerala is applicable to all the States and the said scheme provides for compensation up to Rs 5 lakhs in the case of death. In the present case, it will be appropriate, in the interests of justice, to award interim compensation of Rs 3 lakhs under Section 357-A CrPC payable out of the funds available/to be made available by the State of Madhya Pradesh with the District Legal Services Authority, Guna. In case the accused does not pay the compensation awarded as above, the State of Madhya Pradesh will pay the entire amount of compensation of Rs 5 lakhs within three months after expiry of the time granted to the accused."

13. In our considered view the decision in the said case has to be confined to the facts of that case. It cannot be said as a proposition of law that whenever an accused offers acceptable compensation for rehabilitation of a victim, regardless of the gravity of the crime

under Section 304-A IPC, there can be reduction of sentence.

14. In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision in Balwinder Singh [State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 706] wherein the High Court had allowed the revision and reduced the quantum of sentence awarded by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, for the offences punishable under Sections 304-A, 337, 279 IPC by reducing the sentence of imprisonment already undergone, that is, 15 days. The Court referred to the decision in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana [Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208] and reproduced two paragraphs which we feel extremely necessary for reproduction: (Balwinder Singh case [State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 706] , SCC pp. 186- 87, para 12)

"12. ... '1. When automobiles have become death traps any leniency shown to drivers who are found guilty of rash driving would be at the risk of further escalation of road accidents. All those who are manning the steering of automobiles, particularly professional drivers, must be kept under constant reminders of their duty to adopt utmost care and also of the consequences befalling them in cases of dereliction. One of the most effective ways of keeping such drivers under mental vigil is to maintain a deterrent element in the sentencing sphere. Any latitude shown to them in that

sphere would tempt them to make driving frivolous and a frolic.

13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence; and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of the vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for

lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles.' (Dalbir Singh case [Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208] , SCC pp. 84-85 & 87, paras 1 & 13)"

15. In B. Nagabhushanam v. State of Karnataka [(2008) 5 SCC 730 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 61] the appellant was directed to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the offence punishable under Section 304-A IPC. The two-Judge Bench referred to Dalbir Singh [Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208] and declined to interfere with the quantum of sentence. Be it stated, in the said case a passage from Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab [(1979) 4 SCC 719 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 17] was quoted: (B. Nagabhushanam case [(2008) 5 SCC 730 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 61] , SCC p. 735, para 16)

"16. ... '5. Nevertheless, sentencing must have a policy of correction. This driver, if he has to become a good driver, must have a better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Punishment in this area must, therefore, be accompanied by these components. The State, we hope, will attach a course for better driving together with a livelier sense of responsibility, when the punishment is for driving offences. Maybe, the State may consider, in case of men with poor families, occasional parole and reformatory courses on appropriate

application, without the rigour of the old rules which are subject to Government discretion.' (Rattan Singh case [(1979) 4 SCC 719 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 17] , SCC pp. 720-21, para 5)"

16. In Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 734 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 594 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 972] the appellant was found guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 337, 338, 279 and 304-A IPC and sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs 2000 and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 45 days. The two-Judge Bench after placing reliance on State of Karnataka v. Krishna [(1987) 1 SCC 538 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 198] , Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N. [(1991) 3 SCC 471 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 724] , JashubhaBharatsinh Gohil v. State of Gujarat [(1994) 4 SCC 353 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1193], State of Karnataka Vs. Sharanappa BasanagoudaAregoudar [(2002) 3 SCC 738 :

2002 SCC (Cri) 704] and State of M.P. v. Saleem [(2005) 5 SCC 554 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1329] opined that there is a constant concern of the Court on imposition of adequate sentence in respect of commission of offences regard being had to the nature of the offence and demand of the conscience of the society. There has been emphasis on the concern to impose adequate sentence for the offence punishable under Section 304-A IPC.

17. The Court has observed that: (Guru Basavaraj case [Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 734 : (2012) 4 SCC

(Civ) 594 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 972] , SCC p. 744, para 30)

"30. ... It is worthy to note that in certain circumstances, the mitigating factors have been taken into consideration but the said aspect is dependent on the facts of each case. As the trend of authorities would show, the proficiency in professional driving is emphasised upon and deviation therefrom that results in rash and negligent driving and causes accident has been condemned. In a motor accident, when a number of people sustain injuries and a death occurs, it creates a stir in the society; sense of fear prevails all around. The negligence of one shatters the tranquility of the collective. When such an accident occurs, it has the effect potentiality of making victims in many a layer and creating a concavity in the social fabric. The agony and anguish of the affected persons, both direct and vicarious, can have nightmarish effect. It has its impact on the society and the impact is felt more when accidents take place quite often because of rash driving by drunken, negligent or, for that matter, adventurous drivers who have, in a way, no concern for others. Be it noted, grant of compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is in a different sphere altogether. Grant of compensation under Section 357(3) CrPC with a direction that the same should be paid to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused has been sentenced has a different contour and the

same is not to be regarded as a substitute in all circumstances for adequate sentence."

Thereafter, the Court proceeded to observe: (SCC pp. 744-45, paras 32-33)

"32. We may note with profit that an appropriate punishment works as an eye- opener for the persons who are not careful while driving vehicles on the road and exhibit a careless attitude possibly harbouring the notion that they would be shown indulgence or lives of others are like 'flies to the wanton boys'. They totally forget that the lives of many are in their hands, and the sublimity of safety of a human being is given an indecent burial by their rash and negligent act.

33. There can hardly be any cavil that there has to be a proportion between the crime and the punishment. It is the duty of the court to see that appropriate sentence is imposed regard being had to the commission of the crime and its impact on the social order. The cry of the collective for justice which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly ignored."

Being of this view, the Court declined to interfere.

18. In Siriya v. State of M.P. [(2008) 8 SCC 72 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 422] it has been held as follows: (SCC pp. 75-76, para 13)

"13. '7. ... Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the

object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of 'order' should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: 'State of criminal law continues to be--as it should be--a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society.' Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be.' [Ed.: As observed in Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 2 SCC 359 at pp. 361-62, para 7 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri)

499.] "

19. In Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra [(2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 848 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953] while emphasising on the inherent danger the Court observed thus: (SCC p. 663, para 39)

"39. Like Section 304-A, Sections 279, 336, 337 and 338 IPC are attracted for only the negligent or rash act. The scheme of Sections 279, 304-A, 336, 337 and 338 leaves no manner of doubt that these offences are punished because of the inherent danger of the acts specified therein irrespective of knowledge or intention to produce the result and irrespective of the result. These sections make punishable the acts themselves which are likely to cause death or injury to human life."

20. While dealing with the policy of sentencing in Gopal Singh [Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 608] the two-Judge Bench quoted a paragraph from Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat [Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 2 SCC 359 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 499] which is as follows: (Gopal Singh case [Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 608] , SCC p. 551, para 16)

"16. ... '7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross- cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of 'order' should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: 'State of criminal law continues to be--as it should be--a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society.' Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should

adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration.' (Shailesh Jasvantbhai case [Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 2 SCC 359 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 499] , SCC pp. 361- 62, para 7)"

21. In the said case it has been laid as follows: (Gopal Singh case [Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 608] , SCC pp. 551- 52, para 18)

"18. Just punishment is the collective cry of the society. While the collective cry has to be kept uppermost in the mind, simultaneously the principle of proportionality between the crime and punishment cannot be totally brushed aside. The principle of just punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal offence. A punishment should not be disproportionately excessive. The concept of proportionality allows a significant discretion to the Judge but the same has to be guided by certain principles. In certain cases, the nature of culpability, the

antecedents of the accused, the factum of age, the potentiality of the convict to become a criminal in future, capability of his reformation and to lead an acceptable life in the prevalent milieu, the effect--propensity to become a social threat or nuisance, and sometimes lapse of time in the commission of the crime and his conduct in the interregnum bearing in mind the nature of the offence, the relationship between the parties and attractability of the doctrine of bringing the convict to the value-based social mainstream may be the guiding factors. Needless to emphasise, these are certain illustrative aspects put forth in a condensed manner. We may hasten to add that there can neither be a straitjacket formula nor a solvable theory in mathematical exactitude. It would be dependent on the facts of the case and rationalised judicial discretion. Neither the personal perception of a Judge nor self- adhered moralistic vision nor hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed to have any play. For every offence, a drastic measure cannot be thought of. Similarly, an offender cannot be allowed to be treated with leniency solely on the ground of discretion vested in a court. The real requisite is to weigh the circumstances in which the crime has been committed and other concomitant factors which we have indicated hereinbefore and also have been stated in a number of pronouncements by this Court. On such touchstone, the sentences are to be imposed. The discretion should not be in the realm of

fancy. It should be embedded in the conceptual essence of just punishment."

17. In the light of the legal principles enunciated

by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sourab Bakshi's case as

to the mind set of the court while dealing with an offence

u/s.304A of IPC, this court carefully perused the

judgment in Sharanappa's case relied upon by the

learned counsel for the revision petitioner. As rightly

pointed-out by the learned High Court Government

Pleader, the facts involved in Sharanappa's case

referred to supra are little different from the facts

involved in the case on hand. In the case of

Sharanappa, there was a tyre burst, which was not in

the control of the accused, but in the case on hand, there

is no mechanical defect noticed in the offending vehicle.

In such circumstances, the decision relied upon by the

learned counsel for the revision petitioner/accused has

no application to the facts of the case on hand. On

contrary, the First Appellate Court has given a detailed

reasoning in the impugned judgment as to why it is

reducing the sentence from two years to one year. When

such being the factual situation and discretion has been

already exercised in favour of the accused by the first

Appellate Court which is not challenged by the State in

the revisional jurisdiction, this Court does not find any

good reasons to interfere with the well-reasoned order of

the First Appellate Court. Accordingly, Point No.2 is

answered and pass the following:

ORDER

(i) The Revision Petition sans merit and hereby dismissed.

(ii) The revision petitioner/accused, who is on bail, is directed to surrender before the trial Court and undergo the sentence as ordered by the First Appellate Court.

Sd/-

JUDGE

KGR/PL*