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M/S.National Agricultural Co- Op vs M/S.Disha Impex (Pvt) Ltd
2021 Latest Caselaw 201 Kant

Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 201 Kant
Judgement Date : 6 January, 2021

Karnataka High Court
M/S.National Agricultural Co- Op vs M/S.Disha Impex (Pvt) Ltd on 6 January, 2021
Author: H.P.Sandesh
                              1



       IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU         R
          DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2021

                           BEFORE

            THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P. SANDESH

               CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1145/2011
        C/w CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.1135/2011, 1146/2011

IN CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1145/2011:

BETWEEN:

M/S. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL CO- OP.
MARKETING FEDERATION OF INDIA LTD. (NAFED)
BRANCH OFFICE, NO.8,
CUNNINGHAM ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560 052.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
BENGALURU BRANCH MANAGER.                         ... APPELLANT

               (BY SRI GIRIDHAR H., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1.     M/S. DISHA IMPEX (PVT.) LTD.,
       HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT Z-17,
       BASEMENT HAUSKHAS,
       NEW DELHI - 110 016,
       REPRESENTED BY SRI NIRANJAN JAYANTHILAL.

2.     SRI NIRANJAN JAYANTHILAL,
       DIRECTOR,
       M/S. DISHA IMPEX (PVT.) LTD.,
       HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT Z-17,
       BASEMENT HAUSKHAS,
       NEW DELHI - 110 016.                  ... RESPONDENTS

               (BY SRI TRIDEEP PAIS, ADVOCATE FOR
       SRI B.S. RADHANANDAN, ADVOCATE FOR R-1 AND R-2)
                              2



      THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 378(4) OF
CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE JUDGMENT IN CRIMINAL CASE
BEARING NO.14692/2007 DATED 20.08.2011 IMPUGNED IN THIS
APPEAL PASSED BY THE XX ADDITIONAL CHIEF METROPOLITAN
MAGISTRATE, BENGALURU CITY, ACQUITTING THE RESPONDENT/
ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 138 OF
N.I. ACT.

IN CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1135/2011:

BETWEEN:

M/S. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL CO-OP.
MARKETING FEDERATION OF INDIA LTD. (NAFED),
BRANCH OFFICE,
NO.8, CUNNINGHAM ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 052.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
BANGALORE BRANCH MANAGER
SRI N. KADHRIVELU.                          ... APPELLANT

               (BY SRI GIRIDHAR H., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1.     ADITHYA MINERALS,
       NO.403, 15TH WARD,
       NEAR CHIRANJEEVI HOSPITAL,
       AMARAVATHI,
       HOSPET - 583 201.
       REPRESENTED BY ITS
       AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY.

2.     M/S. DISHA IMPEX (PVT.) LTD.,
       HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT Z-17,
       BASEMENT HAUSKHAS,
       NEW DLEHI - 110 016.
       REPRESENTED BY
       SRI NIRANJAN JAYANTHILAL.             ... RESPONDENTS

               (BY SRI TRIDEEP PAIS, ADVOCATE FOR
       SRI B.S. RADHANANDAN, ADVOCATE FOR R-1 AND R-2)
                               3



      THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 378(4) OF
CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE JUDGMENT IN CRL. COMPLAINT
BEARING NO.17140/2007, DATED 20.08.2011 PASSED BY THE XX
ADDL. CMM., BENGALURU, ACQUITTING THE RESPONDENTS/
ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 138
OF N.I. ACT.

IN CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1146/2011:

BETWEEN:

M/S. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL CO-OP
MARKETING FEDERATION OF INDIA LTD. (NAFED),
BRANCH OFFICE, NO.8,
CUNNINGHAM ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560 052.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
BENGALURU BRANCH MANAGER
SRI N. KADRIVELU.                           ... APPELLANT

               (BY SRI GIRIDHAR H., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1.     M/S. DISHA IMPEX (PVT.) LTD.,
       HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT Z-17,
       BASEMENT HAUSKHAS,
       NEW DELHI - 110 016,
       REPRESENTED BY SRI. NIRANJAN JAYANTHILAL.

2.     SRI NIRANJAN JAYANTHILAL,
       DIRECTOR,
       M/S. DISHA IMPEX (PVT.) LTD.
       HAVING ITS REGD OFFICE AT Z-17,
       BASEMENT HAUSKHAS,
       NEW DELHI - 110 016.                 ... RESPONDENTS

               (BY SRI TRIDEEP PAIS, ADVOCATE FOR
       SRI B.S. RADHANANDAN, ADVOCATE FOR R-1 AND R-2)

      THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 378(4) OF
CR.P.C PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT IN CRIMINAL CASE
BEARING NO.14691/2007 DATED 20.08.2011 IMPUGNED IN THIS
APPEAL PASSED BY THE XX ADDITIONAL CHIEF METROPOLITAN
                                4



MAGISTRATE, BENGALURU CITY ACQUITTING THE RESPONDENTS/
ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 138
OF N.I.ACT.

     THESE CRIMINAL APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 23.12.2020, THIS DAY, THE COURT
PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

                           JUDGMENT

These appeals are filed challenging the judgment of

acquittal dated 20.08.2011 passed in C.C.Nos.14692/2007,

17140/2007 and 14691/2007 respectively, on the file of the XX

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru.

2. All the three appeals are taken up together since the

complainant and the accused are common in

C.C.Nos.14692/2007 and 14691/2007. The very same accused is

accused No.2 in C.C.No.17140/2007 and accused No.1 is Aditya

Minerals represented by the same accused. Though the

independent witnesses of P.W.1 are examined, all the witnesses

are one and the same and documents in C.C.Nos.14692/2007

and 14691/2007 are similar both in respect of the complainant

and the accused. The documents in C.C.No.17140/2007 are also

similar, but there are slight changes. The judgments are also

independently delivered by the Trial Court by the very same

Presiding Officer, hence all these appeals are taken up together

for common disposal.

3. The parties are referred to as per their original

rankings before the Trial Court as complainant and accused in

order to avoid the confusion and for the convenience of the

Court.

4. The factual matrix of the case is that the

complainant is a Central Government undertaking and had

entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ('MOU' for short)

on 10.03.2004 with accused No.2 to finance accused No.1

Company for procurement of Iron Ore to the tune of Rs.11.86

Crores and the complainant would fund 80% of the estimated

cost subject to actuals and accused No.2 would pay the

remaining 20% simultaneously proportionate to the draw down.

5. In connection with this transaction pertaining to the

MOU dated 10.03.2004, the accused had issued a cheque for

Rs.1 Crore dated 28.08.2006 in C.C.No.14691/2007, cheque

dated 28.08.2006 for Rs.1.5 Crores in C.C.No.14692/2007 and

cheque for Rs.1 Crore dated 28.11.2006 in C.C.No.17140/2007.

When these cheques were presented, they were dishonoured

with an endorsement "funds insufficient". Hence legal notice

was issued on 21.02.2007 in respect of C.C.Nos.14691/2007 and

14692/2007 and legal notice dated 11.01.2007 was issued in

respect of C.C.No.17140/2007. All these notices were served

against the accused. Inspite of service of notice, the accused did

not comply the demand and hence the complainant was forced

to file separate independent complaints against the accused

persons.

6. The complainant in order to substantiate the case in

C.C.Nos.14691/2007, 14692/2007, examined one witness Sri R.

Sundararajan as P.W.1 and got marked the documents at

Exs.P.1 to 8. The accused though not led any defence evidence,

confronted the documents and got marked the documents at

Exs.D.1 to 9. In C.C.No.17140/2007, the complainant got

examined one witness Sri R. Sundararajan as P.W.1 and got

marked the documents at Exs.P.1 to 13. The accused though

not led any defence evidence, confronted the documents and got

marked the documents at Exs.D.1 to 10. The Trial Court

recorded the statement of the accused under Section 313 of

Cr.P.C. and the accused did not choose to lead any evidence.

The Trial Court after considering both oral and documentary

evidence placed on record, acquitted the accused and hence the

present appeals are filed before this Court.

7. The complainant/appellant in Crl.A.Nos.1145/2011,

1135/2011 and 1146/2011 has urged the common grounds in

the appeal contending that the Trial Judge without properly

appreciating the evidence of P.W.1, committed an error in

acquitting the accused. The Trial Judge also failed to appreciate

the law laid down in the judgment reported in 1996 (1) Crimes

454 and 2010 (1) KCCR 176, since the accused utterly failed to

rebut the presumptions available in favour of the complainant.

8. The Trial Judge also erred in not considering that

accused Nos.1 and 2 have not entered into the witness box and

are not entitled to take advantage of the case of the complainant

without placing any evidence by entering into the witness box.

As such the complainant was denied the opportunity of cross-

examining the accused. The Trial Court also erred in relying on

the complaints preferred by the complainant Company in the

arbitration petition preferred at New Delhi with regard to many

other transactions that had taken place between the complainant

and accused No.1 and the Trial Judge ought not to have taken

into consideration the arbitration proceedings. The present

proceedings was initiated only in respect of return of the cheque

issued in favour of the complainant which were dishonoured.

The Trial Judge also erred in holding that the complainant

himself was due money to accused No.1 based on a cheque

issued in favour of accused No.1 by the complainant Company.

The said cheque was issued to the accused with regard to other

transactions under which the complainant Company has issued

the cheques out of the exports proceeds realized as per the

terms of the MOU dated 10.03.2004.

9. The complainant apart from these grounds urged in

the above appeals, in Crl.A.No.1135/2011 urged two other

additional grounds contending that the Trial Court failed to

appreciate the additional affidavit filed by the complainant

rectifying the mistakes of the original complaint. The Trial Judge

has not considered the evidence of the complainant wherein he

has categorically stated that accused No.2 had written a letter

dated 08.12.2006 not to present the cheque even though the

cheque was supposed to have been cleared immediately after

06.12.2006.

10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant in all

the appeals would submit that there was a MOU between the

parties to procure the minerals and export the same. In terms

of the MOU dated 10.03.2004, which is marked as Ex.P.8, it was

agreed to pay 80% by the complainant and remaining 20% by

the accused. As per Clause No.19 of the MOU, that in case of

breach of any terms and conditions of this agreement by the

accused, the complainant shall be at liberty to terminate the

agreement forthwith and deal with or dispose of the goods lying

in its custody and realize the money for the same and that in the

process if the complainant suffers any loss of their investment or

returns thereon, the same shall be payable by the accused.

11. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this

Court Clause No.2 of the MOU with regard to expected cost of

the proposed procurement of Iron Ore in Crores detailed in the

MOU to the tune of Rs.14.82 Crores. The learned counsel also

brought to the notice of this Court Clause No.9 of the MOU with

regard to the ready stock disbursement of the funds will be at

site and before actual disbursement the accused shall submit

invoice in favour of the complainant, certificate of SGS in respect

of quality and quantity of material, physical inspection of

material, insurance cover, security arrangement of material and

lease of yard duly transferred in the name of the complainant.

12. The learned counsel for the complainant would also

submit that the procurement of iron was not exported and the

stock was missing. The learned counsel would submit that in

order to substantiate the case of the complainant, the

complainant examined one witness as P.W.1 and also filed the

additional affidavit. The evidence of P.W.1 would substantiate

the case of the complainant. The Trial Judge has committed an

error in shifting the burden on the complainant. Inspite several

documents are produced and the accused has admitted the

cheque, the Trial Judge ought to have drawn the presumption

under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act ('N.I. Act'

for short). The reasoning given by the Trial Court with regard to

the existence of the liability is erroneous. The defence taken by

the accused is that the cheques were given as security and not

for any liability. In order to substantiate the said contention, the

accused failed to step into the witness box and not led any

evidence. The learned counsel would submit that in terms of the

MOU, there was no terms or conditions to furnish the cheque as

security and what made to issue the cheque as security, nothing

is placed on record. More than 10 cheques are issued and

notices were also issued against the accused and the accused did

not give any reply.

13. The defence relies upon the documents Exs.D.2 to 4

i.e., the complaint filed at Delhi and the same is in respect of

different transactions. The accused also relied upon Ex.D.5,

evidence adduced before Delhi. Ex.D.9 is the document of

initiation of the arbitration proceedings. The Trial Judge after

considering both oral and documentary evidence placed on

record has not held that the preponderance of probabilities has

been made out by the accused and instead of relied upon Ex.D.6

erroneously. The actual documents which have been placed

before the Trial Court supports the case of the complainant.

Inspite the complainant proved the case beyond reasonable

doubt, the Trial Judge committed an error. The judgments

which the accused relies upon are prior to amendment to Section

138 of the N.I. Act and even though the accused has not

probalised the case and in the MOU there is no any averment

with regard to furnishing of the security, the Trial Judge has

committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the defence

of the accused is probable.

14. The other contention of the learned counsel is that

the Trial Court has observed that the very presentation of the

cheques are premature and contend that the Trial Judge has

committed an error that unless the accounts are finalized, the

complainant ought not to have presented the cheques. Inspite

of service of notice, the accused has not given any reply and also

no payment has been made subsequent to the receipt of notice

also. When such being the case, the Trial Judge ought to have

drawn the presumption mandated under Section 139 of the N.I.

Act.

15. The learned counsel for the complainant in support

of his contentions, he relies upon the judgment of the Apex

Court in the case of ROHITBHAI JIVANLAL PATEL v. STATE

OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER reported in AIR 2019 SC 1876.

Referring paragraph No.17 of the judgment, the learned counsel

would submit that once presumption of existence of legally

enforceable debt drawn in favour of the complainant, onus is

shifted on the accused. Unless onus is discharged by the

accused that preponderance of probabilities are tilting in his

favour, doubt on case of complainant cannot be raised for want

of evidence regarding source of funds for advancing loan to the

accused. The learned counsel referring paragraph No.18 would

submit that failure of the accused to show reasonable probability

of existence of no transaction has been made out. The accused

not denied his signatures on cheques but attempting to suggest

availability of his signatures and contending that the cheques are

taken as security, cannot be accepted unless the accused makes

out the preponderance of probabilities in his favour.

16. The learned counsel for the complainant also relied

upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of BIR SINGH

v. MUKESH KUMAR reported in (2019) 4 SCC 197. The

learned counsel referring this judgment would submit that

Section 139 of the N.I. Act raises presumption of law that

cheque duly drawn was in discharge of debt or liability. However,

the said presumption is rebuttable and the onus lies on drawer

to rebut it by adducing cogent evidence to the contrary. The

learned counsel referring this judgment would submit that the

accused did not step into the witness box and not rebutted the

presumption by adducing any cogent evidence.

17. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of

the Apex Court in the case of UTTAM RAM v. DEVINDER

SINGH HUDAN AND ANOTHER reported in (2019) 10 SCC

287. The learned counsel referring this judgment would submit

that in this judgment, the Apex Court held that matters to be

established by the accused and bare denial of the passing of the

consideration and existence of a debt, is not enough to rebut the

presumption. To rebut the statutory presumptions, accused is

not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is

expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. Rather,

something which is probable has to be brought on record for

getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. The

learned counsel referring this judgment would submit that the

accused did not choose to enter into the witness box and adduce

any evidence and also not brought out any case shifting the

burden of proof on the complainant.

18. The learned counsel for the complainant also relied

upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M/S.

SHREE DANESHWARI TRADERS v. SANJAY JAIN AND

ANOTHER passed in Criminal Appeal Nos.61-62/2011 and

brought to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.18 and 19 of

the judgment, wherein the Apex Court has held that the courts

below erred in not raising the statutory presumption under

Section 139 of the N.I. Act that the complainant received the

cheques to discharge the debt or other liability in whole or in

part. It is further observed that it is for the accused to adduce

evidence to prove that the cheques were not supported by

consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be

discharged by him. The oral and the documentary evidence

adduced by the complainant are sufficient to prove that it was a

legally enforceable debt and the cheques were issued to

discharge the legally enforceable debt. With the evidence

adduced by the complainant, the courts below ought to have

raised the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. The

evidence adduced by the accused is not sufficient to rebut the

presumption raised under Section 139 of the Act. The learned

counsel referring this judgment would submit that the Trial

Judge has committed an error in not drawing the presumption

and also failed to take note of the fact that the material placed

by the accused is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. Inspite

of the accused has not placed the material to prove his case with

preponderance of probabilities, the Trial Judge has committed an

error.

19. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the

accused would submit that there is no dispute with regard to

procurement of Iron Ore in terms of the MOU. It was agreed

that the complainant has to fund 80% and the accused has to

fund 20%. It is also agreed that after exporting the Iron Ore, the

complainant has to deduct 80% interest cost of transportation,

demurrages and if it exceeds, the accused to get the benefit of

20%. The learned counsel appearing for the accused brought to

the notice of the Court the averments made in paragraph No.2 of

the complaint and the complainant has not produced any

documents except legal notice, but while adducing the additional

evidence referred the document MOU. The learned counsel

would submit that audited account statement was not produced

and vessel is not nominated by China. The complainant

recovered Rs.4-5 Crores and Ex.D.7 clearly discloses that part

payment was made in favour of the accused and no documents

is placed for having repaid the balance amount after sending the

letter Ex.D.7. The accused relied upon documents Exs.D.1 to 9.

The complainant sold the goods. The complainant relies upon the

evidence of P.W.1 claiming the transaction is for

Rs.11,50,57,488/- and in this regard also not produced the

statement of accounts. But in Ex.P.8 - MOU, it is mentioned

that the transaction is to the tune of Rs.14 Crores. When the

statement of account has not been produced and the accounts

are not finalized, the question of issuing the subject matter of

cheques does not arise.

20. The learned counsel also relies upon Ex.D.5, the

answers elicited from the mouth of the witness at Delhi in

criminal case and would submit that the very admission takes

away the case of the complainant. Ex.D.6 is also clear with

regard to the transaction not restricted to only in terms of MOU

and more than Rs.30 Crores business was done. The learned

counsel relying upon Ex.D.7 would submit that while making the

payment of Rs.1.10 Crores, the liability of the complainant was

admitted. The witness who has been examined before the Court

would categorically admit that the averments made in paragraph

No.2 of the complaint are false. When such admissions was

elicited from the mouth of the witness, the very claim made by

the complainant based on the averment made in paragraph No.2

would become fatal. It is also contended that before finalizing

the accounts, the complainant had presented the cheques, which

was issued for security. The complainant would also submit that

in C.C.No.17140/2007, in the cross-examination, the witness

has categorically admitted with regard to the payment of Rs.1

Crore by Aditya Minerals.

21. The learned counsel for the accused in support of his

contentions mainly relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court

in the case of M.S. NARAYANA MENON v. STATE OF KERALA

AND OTHERS reported in MANU/SC/2881/2006 and brought

to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.17, 19, 20, 21 and 23

of the judgment. For rebutting the presumption, what is needed

is to raise a probable defence. Even for the said purpose, the

evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant could be relied

upon. The learned counsel would submit that the standard of

proof evidently is preponderance of probabilities. Inference of

preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the

materials on records but also by reference to the circumstances

upon which he relies. It is not in dispute that transactions

comprising purchases and sales of shares by investors is a

matter of confidence. Both parties would have to rely upon one

another. For the said purpose, the courts of law may also take

judicial notice of the practice prevailing in such business. For

proving the said transactions, books of accounts maintained by

respondent No.2 were found to be not reflecting the correct state

of affairs. It was for the complainant only to discharge initial

onus of proof. He was not necessarily required to disprove the

prosecution case. The learned counsel referring this judgment

would submit that the accused had made out a ground for

preponderance of probabilities and the complainant has not

placed any statement of account with regard to business

transactions. Hence, this judgment is aptly applicable to the

case on hand.

22. The learned counsel for the accused also relied upon

the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of PINE PRODUCT

INDUSTRIES AND OTHERS v. R.P. GUPTA AND SONS AND

OTHERS reported in MANU/DE/9749/2006. Relying upon

paragraph No.6 of the judgment, the learned counsel would

contend that no details whatsoever have been indicated as to

what the liabilities were, what were the amounts for which the

said cheque was issued for part payments, on which dates the

amounts were taken by the petitioner. Nor were the exact

amounts taken by the petitioner mentioned. The complaint was

completely vague and bereft of any details.

23. The learned counsel referring paragraph No.12 of the

judgment would contend that if the petitioner is yet able to show

from the evidence on record that the presumption is rebutted

then the complainant must be able to establish from the

evidence on record itself that a case under Section 138 is clearly

made out. If the complaint is vague and bereft of any details

regarding discharge, liability of repayment of the amounts, there

cannot be any conviction in the criminal proceedings. The

complaint is also silent with regard to what was the rate of

interest, what was the extent of goods which were supplied and

adjusted against the payment. When all these details are

conspicuously absent, the accused cannot be convicted.

24. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of

the Apex Court in the case of NATIONAL SMALL INDUSTRIES

CORPORATION LTD. v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) AND

OTHERS reported in MANU/SC/4845/2008 and brought to

the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.12 and 13 with regard to

relying upon the evidence of the employees of the Government

Company working in Public Limited Companies.

25. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of

the Apex Court in the case of BASANT SINGH v. JANKI SINGH

AND OTHERS reported in MANU/SC/0284/1966 and brought

to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.4 to 6, wherein the

Apex Court made an observation that they are unable to accept

the line of reasoning with regard to correctness of the statement

that she had surrendered her estate and was entitled to

maintenance only. All the statements in the plaint are,

therefore, admissible as evidence. However, the Court is not

bound to accept all the statements as correct. The Court may

accept some of the statements and reject the rest. The High

Court also observed that an admission in a pleading can be used

only for the purpose of suit in which the pleading was filed and

also distinction between and admission made by a party in a

pleading and other admissions. Under the Indian law, an

admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him

may be used as evidence against him in other suits. In other

suits, this admission cannot be regarded as conclusive, and it is

open to the party to show that it is not true. The learned counsel

referring this judgment would submit that Sections 17 to 21 of

the Evidence Act comes to the rescue of the accused in view of

the admission given by P.W.1 in the cross-examination and also

the answers elicited from the mouth of the witnesses of the

Company in Delhi proceedings which has been marked as

Ex.D.5.

26. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of

this Court in the case of SHREYAS AGRO SERVICES PVT. LTD.

v. CHANDRAKUMAR S.B. reported in MANU/KA/8224/2006

and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.3, wherein

it is held that the words "for discharge of any debt or other

liability" in Section 138 of N.I. Act should be interpreted to mean

current existing or past ascertained liabilities. Referring this

judgment, the learned counsel would submit that in the case on

hand, there is no material with regard to current existing or past

ascertained liabilities and first of all there is no statement of

accounts before this Court. Under the circumstances, it cannot

be contended that the cheques are issued in respect of discharge

of any debt or any liability.

27. The learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the

Allahabad High Court in the case of AJODHYA PRASAD

BHARGAVA v. BHAWANI SHANKER BHARGAVA AND

OTHERS reported in MANU/UP/0001/1957 and brought to

the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.9, 18 and 83, wherein the

Full Bench discussed with regard to the admissions under

Section 21 of the Evidence Act. The party making the admission

may give evidence to rebut this presumption, but unless and

until that is satisfactorily done, the fact admitted must be taken

to be established. The learned counsel referring paragraph

No.83 of the judgment would submit that the admissions being

substantive piece of evidence, there admissibility is not

depending on the appearance or non-appearance of the party as

witness.

28. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of the

Apex Court in the case of BISHWANATH PRASAD AND

OTHERS v. DWARKA PRASAD AND OTHERS reported in

MANU/SC/0006/1973. Referring this judgment the learned

counsel brought to the notice of this Court the observation made

by the Apex Court with regard to Section 21 and 145 of the

Evidence Act with regard to cardinal distinction between party

who is author of prior statement and witness who is examined

and sought to be discredited by use of his prior statement.

Admission by party in former case is substantive evidence if

fulfills requirements of Section 21.

29. The learned counsel relied upon the judgment of

Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of SWASTIK COATERS

PVT. LTD., v. DEEPAK BROTHERS AND OTHERS reported in

MANU/AP/0124/1996 and brought to the notice of this Court

paragraph No.3 of the judgment, wherein the High Court has

made an observation that at any rate, the cheque was a post

dated cheque and as on the date of issuing of the cheque there

was no existing enforceable debt or liability and having regard to

these circumstances no offence is constituted under Section 138

of the N.I. Act.

30. The learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the

Apex Court in the case of THIRU JOHN AND OTHERS v.

RETURNING OFFICER AND OTHERS reported in

MANU/SC/0211/1977 and brought to the notice of this Court

paragraph Nos.14 to 16. Referring paragraph No.15 the learned

counsel would submit that the Apex Court has made an

observation that it is well settled that, a party's admission as

defined in Sections 17 to 20 fulfilling the requirements of Section

21, Evidence Act, is substantive evidence. An admission, if

clearly and unequivocally made, is the best evidence against the

party making it and though not conclusive, shifts the onus on to

the maker on the principle that "what a party himself admits to

be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the

presumption was rebutted the fact admitted must be taken to be

established.

31. The learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the

Apex Court in the case of UNION OF INDIA v. MOKSH

BUILDERS AND FINANCIERS LTD. AND OTHERS reported in

MANU/SC/0057/1976 and brought to the notice of this Court

paragraph Nos.16 and 22 to 24 of the judgment. In paragraph

No.16 it is held that the burden of proof is, however not static,

any may shift during the course of the evidence. Thus while the

burden initially rests on the party who would fail if no evidence is

led at all after the evidence is recorded, it rests upon the party

against whom judgment would be given if no further evidence

were adduced by either side. It is therefore necessary to weigh

the evidence in this case and to decide whether, even if it were

assumed that there was no conclusive evidence to establish or

rebut the allegation. The learned counsel would submit that an

admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted and that

admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of

whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or

not and whether that party when appearing as witness was

confronted with those statements in case it made a statement

contrary to those admissions.

32. The learned counsel for the accused relied upon the

judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of JOSEPH SARTHO

v. G. GOPINATHAN AND ANOTHER reported in

MANU/KE/0342/2008 and brought to the notice of this Court

paragraph Nos.13 and 16. The learned counsel referring this

judgment would contend that it is one of the fundamental

principles of law that penal law should not be vague. A law fails

to meet the requirements of the due process clause if it so vague

and standard less that it leaves the public uncertain as to the

conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide.

The observation made in the judgments that for the bouncing of

a cheque, which did not represent the amount or part of the

amount due to the appellant, the accused cannot be made liable.

33. The learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the

Apex Court in the case of RAHUL BUILDERS v. ARIHANT

FERTILIZERS AND CHEMICAL AND ANOTHER reported in

MANU/SC/4139/2007 and brought to the notice of this Court

paragraph No.8 of the judgment with regard to giving of the

notice within a stipulated time and not giving any reply by the

accused.

34. The learned counsel in support of his contentions

relied upon several judgments before this Court and would

submit that under Sections 17 to 21 of the Evidence Act, the

admissions takes away the case of the complainant insofar as to

gain tradings and admission given by Sri K.K. Mathur when he

was subjected to cross-examination in terms of Ex.D.5. The

witness who has been examined before the Court Sri R.

Sundararajan also admitted the defence of the accused so also in

respect of Aditya Minerals. The very document Ex.D.7 admission

takes away the case of the complainant.

35. Having heard the arguments of the respective

learned counsel and also on perusal of the grounds urged in the

appeals, the points that would arise for the consideration of this

Court are:

(i) Whether the Trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act?

      (ii)    What order?


Point Nos.(i) and (ii):


      36.     Having     heard          learned       counsel     for     the

appellant/complainant and learned counsel appearing for the

respondents/accused, this Court has to re-appreciate the

material available on record since these appeals are filed against

the order of acquittal. I have also given my conscious

consideration in respect of the judgments referred to by both the

learned counsel on behalf of the complainant as well as the

accused. Having gone through the principles laid down in the

judgments referred supra, it is clear that when once the issuance

of cheque has been admitted, the presumption has to be drawn

in favour of the complainant under Section 139 of N.I. Act. It is

also pertinent to note that in view of the recent judgments,

which have been quoted by the learned counsel for the

complainant, it is settled law that the presumption under the N.I.

Act is rebuttable presumption and the Court has to look into the

evidence available on record whether the accused has rebutted

the evidence of complainant. If the complainant is able to draw

the presumption at the first instance, the burden shifts on the

accused with regard to rebutting the evidence of the

complainant. If the accused rebuts the evidence of the

complainant, then the onus shifts on the complainant to further

prove his case meeting the case of the accused to substantiate

the claim before the Court. Hence, it is settled law that the

presumption is rebuttable presumption and once if it is rebutted,

the onus shifts on the complainant to meet the case of the

accused. Now this Court has to examine whether it is a case for

drawing the presumption and whether the said presumption has

been rebutted and also whether the burden shifts on the

complainant to prove his case after rebuttal.

37. In order to consider the appeals which are pending,

this Court has to first look into the averments of the complaint.

In para No.2 of all these complaints, it is the averment of the

complainant that the complainant had entered into the business

transaction with accused No.1 Company and accused No.2 is the

Director of accused No.1 Company. The accused had raised two

invoices for about 6000 mts for shipment of the business

transaction. It is the further averment of the complainant that

when the complainant pressed for payment, M/s DIPL issued the

cheque dated 28.08.2006 for an amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/-

and an amount of Rs.1.5 Crores vide cheque dated 28.08.2006.

In respect of other complaint in C.C.No.17140/2007, the accused

No.1 is M/s. Aditya Minerals and accused No.2 is the M/s. DIPL,

who issued the cheque for Rs.1,00,00,000/- dated 28.11.2006

and the legal notices are issued against M/s DIPL in respect of

two complaints in PCR Nos.5303/2007 and 5427/2007 on

21.02.2007 and in respect of complaint in PCR No.3832/2007,

legal notice was issued on 11.01.2007. When the said cheques

were presented for encashment, those cheques returned with an

endorsements "funds insufficient" and "referred to drawer".

38. Having taken note of the pleadings of the

complaints, it is the specific case of the complainant that notices

issued against the accused were served on the accused and the

accused had not replied to the said notices. It is also important

to note that there is no dispute with regard to issuance of

cheques, legal notices and also no reply to the said notices so

also the complaints were filed, cognizance was taken and the

accused persons were secured. It is important to note that in all

the complaints, the pleadings is that the accused had raised two

invoices for about 6000 mts for shipment of the business

transaction.

39. The complainant in C.C.No.14691/2007, in order to

prove the case, examined one witness as PW.1 and PW.1 has

filed the affidavit dated 30.10.2009 at the first instance and got

marked documents Exs.P1 to P7 and thereafter, again he filed an

additional affidavit dated 12.01.2010 before the Trial Court and

got marked the document Ex.P8 - the memorandum of

understanding. PW.1 was subjected to cross-examination. In

the cross-examination, he admits that in terms of MOU - Ex.P8,

it was agreed to fund 80% by the complainant and 20% by the

accused for procurement of iron ore. PW.1 also admits that the

Iron Ore under the MOU, would be procured in the name of the

complainant and that the letter of credit would be opened in the

name of the complainant. He also admits that the amount thus

received, the share of the complainant would be first recovered

and thereafter the balance would be paid to the accused. P.W.1

further admits that irrespective of profit or loss, the dues of the

complainant would be adjusted first. It is elicited that

complainant had filed the Arbitration Petition No.15/2006 against

Gains Trading Limited for a claim of Rs.11,50,57,488/- in terms

of Ex.D.1.

40. In the further cross-examination of P.W.1, it is

elicited that he has not produced nor exhibited any account

statement in respect of the transaction of the complainant with

the accused. It is further elicited that Sri. K. K. Mathur filed the

account extract in Arbitration Proceedings in Delhi and the same

was exhibited in criminal proceedings at Delhi as per Ex.D6 in

respect of three complaints which are filed at Delhi Court. The

complaints are got marked as Exs.D2 to D4. It is elicited that

serial Nos.1 to 14 of the account extract as per Ex.D6 may

exceed Rs.20 Crores. It is further elicited that the transactions of

Gains Trading Limited with the complainant are related to MOU

marked at Ex.P8 dated 10.03.2004 and that Ex.D9 is the Arbitral

Tribunal Petition. It is elicited that invoices referred to in the

complaint as well as at para No.2 of his evidence affidavit has

not been produced and also not furnished the details of the

referred invoices. It is also elicited that there were no invoices as

mentioned at para No.2 of his additional affidavit and he further

admits that the contents of para No.2 of the complaint is not

correct. It is elicited that there was running account between the

complainant Company and the accused and the letter dated

12.07.2005 was addressed to accused in terms of Ex.D7

admitting the payment being made to accused towards part

payment of 20% of the share of investment out of the export

proceeds realized. It is elicited that as on 23.06.2005, the

complainant Company has received more than 20 Crores from

the accused and in terms of Ex.P8, the same is restricted to

Rs.14.82 Crores. It is elicited that he is unable to say that

Rs.4.45 Crores recovered during the year 2005-2006 by the

complainant company under the MOU has not been shown in the

accounts of the accused. It is elicited that in case, if any amount

is received from the Gains Trading Limited through Arbitration or

otherwise, the same can be credited to the accused. It is elicited

that after 12.07.2005, the complainant Company has not placed

any documents to show the liability claimed under the cheques.

It is suggested that the cheques were given only as a security

and the same is denied. It is also suggested that the complaints

are false since there was no liability on the date of presentation

of the cheque and filing of the complaint and the same is denied.

41. In respect of complaint in C.C.No.17140/2007, which

is filed against M/s Aditya Minerals, the complainant examined

one witness as P.W.1 to prove his case and got marked

documents Exs.P1 to P13. P.W.1 filed affidavit evidence in lieu

of his chief examination and was subjected to cross-examination.

In the cross-examination, Exs.D1 to D9 were confronted. It is

elicited that the evidence and additional affidavit in respect of

evidence are identical to other two complaints. In this case also,

he admits that the referred invoices at para No.2 of the

complaint are not placed on record as exhibits. It is further

elicited that two invoices are not in existence. He further admits

that in para No.2 of the complaint is false, but witness

volunteers that the contents of the additional affidavit is true. It

is elicited that accused No.2 Disha Impex Private Limited is not

the signatory to the cheque. It is elicited that accused No.1 is

not the party to the MOU produced as per Ex.P13. He further

admits that referred transaction is at the behest of Disha Impex

Private Limited. It is further elicited that if there was no dues on

the part of accused No.2, accused No.1 being acted at the

behest of accused No.2 is also not liable to clear any dues.

42. Having perused the evidence of the complainant, this

Court has to examine as to whether the accused has rebutted

the case of the complainant. It is also important to note that the

evidence of the complainant can be rebutted in two modes, one

by effective cross-examination and another mode by leading

evidence before the trail Court. In the case on hand, the accused

has not led any evidence . The matter remains before the Court

is whether the accused had rebutted the evidence of the

complainant.

43. Having perused all the complaints, in para No.2, it is

the specific case of the complainant that the accused had raised

two invoices and in pursuance of the said two invoices, the

subject matter of the cheques are issued. It is the defence of the

accused that he gave the cheques as a security and those

cheques are presented and hence, there is no liability on the part

of the accused. It is important to note that in the cross-

examination of PW.1, it is categorically elicited that the contents

of para No.2 of the complaint are false. It is further important to

note that the complainant claims the amount based on the

invoices and the said two invoices are not placed before the

Court. It is pertinent to note that in the cross-examination, it is

categorically elicited that no such invoices are in existence. It is

also important to note that no invoice bills are furnished.

44. Having perused all these pleadings and the answers

elicited from the mouth of the witness - PW.1, it is clear that the

very foundation of the case of the complainant goes to the very

root of the case of the defence. It is important to note that no

where in the complaint, the complainant has stated with regard

to MOU entered into between the complainant and accused,

which is marked as Ex.P8 and Ex.P13 in another complaint.

There is no dispute with regard to the agreement entered into

with the accused M/s. DIPL. It is also important to note that

M/s.Aditya Minerals is not a party to Ex.P13 - MOU. It is also

important to note that there is no any pleadings in the complaint

with regard to MOU dated 10.03.2004 and it is important to note

that document MOU is marked through additional affidavit. I

have already pointed out that there is no reference of the same

in the complaint. It is pertinent to note that when the

complainant claims the amount based on the said invoices and

when those invoices are not in existence, the question of

issuance of cheques towards legally recoverable debt or liability

does not arise.

45. It is pertinent to note that in the cross-examination

of P.W.1, the accused elicited the answer with regard to filing of

three complaints at Delhi Court and also filing of an Arbitration

Proceedings and the documents pertaining to the said cases are

also furnished and marked through P.W.1. Hence, there is no

dispute with regard to filing of case at Delhi Court and also filing

of Arbitration Proceedings. It is also important to note that Ex.D6

statement, which is confronted to the witness has been

categorically admitted by PW.1. It is also important to note that

it is elicited from the mouth of PW.1 that from serial Nos.1 to 14

in terms of Ex.D6, it is categorically admitted that the

transactions that was taken place exceeds Rs.20 Crores. In

terms of MOU - Ex.P8, the transaction is only for Rs.11.86

Crores and there is no answer elicited from the mouth of

complainant exceeding the business limit.

46. It is also important to note that the complainant has

not produced the statement of accounts in respect of transaction

of the complainant with the accused. It is also elicited that this

agreement is concerned only for an amount of Rs.14.82 Crores.

It is pertinent to note that when the complainant makes a claim

based on the two invoices, in an ingenious method he has filed

an additional affidavit claiming the MOU entered into between

the complainant and the accused. I have already pointed out

that there is no averment in the complaint with regard to the

MOU. The complainant has changed his version subsequently

stating that the transaction between the complainant and the

accused is based on the MOU entered into between them. It is

also pertinent to note that though PW.1 says that he is unable to

say that an amount of Rs.4.45 Crores recovered from the Gains

Trading Limited, but categorically admits that if any amount is

received through Arbitration or otherwise, the same can be

credited to the accounts. On perusal of Ex.D6, it is clear that

more than an amount of Rs.30 Crores transaction was taken

place between the complainant and the accused including the

receipt of amount from M/s. Aditya Minerals Private Limited in

respect of other complaint.

47. It is pertinent to note that according to the complaint

the cheques in question are issued in the year 2006, in respect

of two invoices, but transaction has been continued as per Ex.D6

till 30.04.2008. It is pertinent to note that in terms of clause

No.19 of MOU it is clear that in case of breach of any terms and

conditions of the agreement by the accused, the complainant

shall be at liberty to terminate the agreement forthwith and deal

with or dispose off the goods lying in its custody and realize the

money for the same and if the complainant suffers any loss of

their investment or returns thereon, the same shall be payable

by M/s. DIPL. Even though there is a clause for terminating the

agreement, there is no material before the Court to show that

the agreement was terminated and in terms of Ex.D6 the

business is continued till 2008. Hence, it creates doubt in respect

of the claim of the complainant. First of all it is the claim of the

complainant that these two cheques are issued in respect of two

invoices and no such invoices are in existence. It is also

categorically elicited that para No.2 of the complaint averments

are false. When such being the case, the very claim of the

complainant has not been substantiated. It is also pertinent to

note that in Ex.D9 copy of the Arbitration Petition, which was

filed before the Arbitration Tribunal at para No.11, a specific

averment has been made in respect of the complaint against

M/s.Aditya Minerals for having received the payment from the

drawer of the cheque and steps have been taken for withdrawal

of the case in respect of amount of Rs.59 lakhs as well as Rs.1

Crore, but the complaints are continued.

48. It is pertinent to note that the accused relied upon

the document Ex.D7 dated 12.07.2005 and the said letter is

written by the complainant and the complainant does not dispute

those documents. In terms of Ex.D7 complainant made the

payment in favour of the accused for an amount of

Rs.1,10,00,000/-, which is being part payment of 20% of

accused share of investment, out of the export proceeds

realized. The accused mainly bank upon the said document and

contend that the said payment is towards the part payment. No

document placed before the Court for having paid the remaining

amount in favour of the accused. The complainant also not

placed any documentary proof before the Court with regard to

the transaction between the complainant and the accused

specifically with regard to Ex.D7. But Ex.D6, is confronted to the

witness and whereby elicited the answer that the transaction has

been continued till 2008 April.

49. Having taken note of the answers elicited from the

mouth of P.W.1, it is clear that the complainant failed to

substantiate the claim made against the accused persons. It is

the main contention of the accused that the cheques which were

secured by the complainant for security are utilized for filing

these complaints. I have already pointed out that though the

complainant makes a claim based on the invoices, those invoices

are not in existence and the averment of the complaint is also

false. That apart, Ex.D7 substantiate the case of the accused.

The complainant has also not produced any documentary proof

with regard to the liability of the accused and the statement of

accounts in this transaction between the complainant and the

accused has also not been produced. Apart from that, the

complainant has received the amount from M/s. Aditya Minerals

to the tune of Rs.1 Crore and also an amount of Rs.4.45 Crores

from the Gains Trading Limited. It is also an admitted fact that

the same can be credited to the account of the accused. The

complainant being the National Level Co-operative Society

registered under the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act,

1984 having registered office at Nafed House, Siddhartha

Enclave, Ashram Chowk, Ring Road, New Dlehi, ought to have

maintained the account in respect of the transaction. Being the

Central Government undertaking, it ought to have maintained

the account and not placed any statement of accounts. The

accused has relied upon the document - Ex.D6, which has been

filed at Delhi Court and when the same was confronted, the

complainant admitted that the transaction between the accused

and the complainant exceeds the business limit as specified in

the MOU dated 10.03.2004. When such being the case, the

accused has rebutted the case of the complainant by adducing

the cogent evidence and produced several documents before the

Trial Court, confronted the same and elicited the answers from

the mouth of P.W.1.

50. I have already pointed out that the complainant has

not stated anything in the complaint about the transaction taken

place between the complainant and the accused for more than

the credit limit as envisaged in MOU dated 10.03.2004. When

the accused has rebutted the evidence of the complainant by the

effective cross-examination of PW.1 and elicited important

answers from the mouth of P.W.1, the complainant ought to

have produced the statement of accounts and the same has not

been done. Instead, the counsel appearing for the complainant

would submit vehemently that the accused also not disputed the

business transaction that had been taken place between the

complainant and the accused. Learned counsel would further

contend that the reason given by the Trial Court that the

complainant has not proved its case is erroneous. As to the

furnishing of the cheques as security is concerned, there is no

averment in the MOU. Learned counsel would submit that no

reply was given. When such being the case, the Trial Judge

ought to have drawn the presumption. The said contention of the

complainant's counsel cannot be accepted in view of the answers

elicited from the mouth of P.W.1. The complainant has not

approached the Court with clean hands. He pleaded in the

complaint that those cheques are issued towards the invoices

raised by the accused, but no such invoices are in existence and

those bills of invoices are also not furnished. Hence, the very

contention that the Trial Judge has committed an error in

acquitting the accused also cannot be accepted.

51. I have already pointed out that the accused had

rebutted the case of the complainant by making effective cross-

examination and even in the absence of any evidence adduced

by the accused, the case of the complainant has been rebutted

through effective cross-examination. Hence, I do not find any

merit in the appeals to reverse the findings of the Trial Court. It

is settled law that the Court can reverse the order of acquittal, if

the judgment of the Trial Court is perverse and has not

considered the material on record. I do not find any such

material to reverse the findings of the Trial Court.

52. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the

following:

ORDER

The appeals are dismissed.

Sd/-

JUDGE

MD/PYR

 
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