Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 155 Kant
Judgement Date : 5 January, 2021
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 05TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2021
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE S.SUJATHA
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
RFA.NO.667 OF 2011 (SP)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI. M. MUNISWAMY
S/O MUNIAN
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS
2. SRI M. VELLAIDEVAN
S/O MUNIAN
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS
THE APPELLANT NOS.1 & 2
RESIDING AT NO.48
CKC GARDEN, II CROSS
LALBAGH ROAD
BANGALORE-560 027.
3. SRI MADHURAI SWAMY
S/O MARI
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
4. SRI VENKATESH
S/O PONNURANGAM
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
2
5. SRI PALINI
S/O PONNURANGAM
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
APPELLANTS 3 TO 5
ARE RESIDING AT NO.14
"B" STREET, SHANTHINAGAR
BANGALORE-560 027
6. SMT. KANNAMAL
W/O CHANNAIAH
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
7. SRI RAJA
S/O CHANNAIAH
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS
8. SMT. JAYAMMA
W/O RAMU
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
9. SRI R. SHANKAR
S/O RAMU
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
10. SRI. NATARAJ
S/O MUNISWAMY
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS
APPELLANT NOS.6 TO 10
ARE RESIDING AT
CHALLAGHATTA VILLAGE
YAMLUR POST
BANGALORE-560 037.
....APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. K. SUMAN, ADVOCATE)
3
AND:
M/S. GMS CONSTRUCTION PVT. LTD.
NO.35 D, OFF LINKING ROAD
SANTA CRUZ WEST
MUMBAI-400 054
BY ITS AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE
....RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. AMIT MANDGI, ADVOCATE)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER ORDER-XLI, RULE-1 READ WITH
SECTION 96 OF CPC, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE
DATED:17.02.2011 PASSED IN O.S.15132/2005 ON THE FILE OF
THE XXVIII-ADDL. CITY CIVIL JUDGE, MAYO HALL, BANGALORE,
DECREEING THE SUIT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 20.10.2020, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT THIS DAY, SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM J.,
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
The captioned appeal is filed by the defendant Nos.1 to
6, 8 to 10 and 14 challenging the judgment and decree passed
in O.S.No.15132/2005 wherein the suit filed by the plaintiff for
specific performance is decreed directing the defendants to
execute sale deed in respect of suit schedule property by
receiving the balance sale consideration.
2. The facts leading to the case are as under:
The respondent/plaintiff filed suit for specific
performance seeking relief of specific performance of contract
in respect of suit schedule property bearing Sy.No.74 situated
at Challaghatta Village, Varthur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk
measuring 13 guntas (about 14,000 sq.ft.) bearing HASB
Katha Nos.157/A, 158/A and 159/A. The respondent/plaintiff
entered into an agreement on 22.09.2001 with the
appellants/defendants who are the absolute owners of the
property in question. The appellants/defendants proposed to
sell the suit schedule property as they were in need of money
for their legal and family necessities. The sale consideration
was fixed at Rs.18,20,000/- and the said proposal was
accepted by the respondent/plaintiff.
It is also stated in the plaint that prior to the suit
agreement dated 22.09.2001, the appellants/defendants had
entered into a sale agreement with one Syed Tameezuddin in
respect of suit schedule property for a sale consideration of
Rs.18,20,000/-. The respondent/plaintiff further averred in
the plaint that appellants/defendants have jointly received a
sum of Rs.3,00,000/- under three different cheques drawn on
Indus Ind Bank Limited. It is also stated that
appellants/defendants have further received a sum of
Rs.1,00,000/- under cheque No.234368 and a sum of
Rs.50,000/- under cheque No.234369 both drawn on Indus
Ind Bank Limited. The respondent/plaintiff has stated that it
has paid in all Rs.4,50,000/- towards sale consideration. The
respondent/plaintiff has further stated that it was agreed
between the parties at the time of entering into sale
agreement that the said Syed Tameezuddin would assign his
interest in favour of respondent/plaintiff at the time of
executing the registered sale deed. At para 8 of the plaint,
the respondent/plaintiff has specifically stated in view of
entering into sale agreement on 22.09.2001 with the present
appellants/defendants, they have cancelled the earlier
agreement in favour of Syed Tameezuddin. In view of
cancellation, the respondent/plaintiff has paid a sum of
Rs.4,50,000/- to the said Syed Tameezuddin and he has
executed 'No objection' enabling the appellants/defendants to
enter into a fresh agreement with the respondent/plaintiff and
thereby has cancelled the earlier agreement dated
08.07.1998.
At para 9 of the plaint, the respondent/plaintiff has
stated that Rs.5,00,000/- was paid on the date of agreement
and subsequently, a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- was also paid
through cheque. In the said paragraph, the
respondent/plaintiff has further averred that a sum of
Rs.50,000/- was paid to the appellants/defendants in the year
2002 through demand draft dated 17.04.2002. The
respondent/plaintiff has contended that appellants/defendants
have received a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- towards sale
consideration and balance sale consideration of Rs.9,20,000/-
was agreed to be paid at the time of registration after
appellants/defendants furnishing the clear and marketable title
to the respondent/plaintiff.
The grievance of the respondent/plaintiff is that as per
the terms of agreement, the appellants/defendants were
required to furnish all title deeds and other municipal
documents to enable the respondent/plaintiff to secure the
legal opinion and thereafter register the document in its
favour. It is specifically averred at para 10 of the plaint that
inspite of repeated requests and payment, the
appellants/defendants have not come forward to comply the
terms of the agreement and this compelled the
respondent/plaintiff to issue the legal notice on 15.10.2004. It
is also stated at para 12 that appellants/defendants have
issued a reply notice on 04.11.2004 stating that they have
forfeited Rs.3,00,000/- alleging that respondent/plaintiff has
committed breach in not paying the balance sale consideration
and get the sale deed executed in its favour. The
respondent/plaintiff alleging that appellants/defendants have
failed to perform their part of contract though
respondent/plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform
its part of contract, has filed the present suit.
The appellants/defendants, on receipt of summons,
tendered appearance and contested the proceedings by filing
written statement. The appellants/defendants have stoutly
denied the entire averments made in the plaint. The
appellants/defendants specifically contended that suit is
barred by time. The appellants/defendants at para 2 have
specifically contended that the suit agreement stipulates that
the registration of sale deed has to be completed within three
months from the date of agreement and time being the
essence of contract, the respondent/plaintiff has failed to
perform its part of contract. It is also stated at para 2 that
since there is a breach on the part of respondent/plaintiff, they
have forfeited a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- out of the total advance
amount received by them. The appellants/defendants have
also contended that even for recovery of advance amount, the
suit ought to have been filed within three years from the date
fixed for performance of contract i.e., on or before
21.12.2004. The appellants/defendants have further
contended that since admittedly suit is filed on 13.01.2005,
the same is expressly barred by time. The
appellants/defendants also stoutly denied the averments made
at para 4 of the plaint, wherein the respondent/plaintiff has
contended that appellants/defendants were required to furnish
the consolidated katha in the name of any one of the vendors
at the time of executing the sale deed.
The appellants/defendants at para 5 of the written
statement have admitted the contention of the
respondent/plaintiff that appellants/defendants offered to sell
the suit schedule property as they were in need of money.
Reiterating the said pleadings made by the
respondent/plaintiff, the appellants/defendants have further
contended that they were in need of money and that
compelled them to sell the property and respondent/plaintiff
Company was well aware of this fact and as such, defendants
had emphasized that time would be the essence of contract
and thereby stipulated three months time to pay the balance
sale consideration and failing which, the sum of Rs.3,00,000/-
out of the earnest money would stand forfeited in favour of
the appellants/defendants. The appellants/defendants have
also stoutly denied the averments relating to the assignment
by Syed Tameezuddin. At para 8 of the written statement, the
appellants/defendants have stoutly denied the payment of
Rs.5,50,000/- on the date of agreement. The
appellants/defendants have also seriously disputed the alleged
payment of Rs.50,000/- in the year 2002. The
appellants/defendants have contended that insofar as alleged
payment of Rs.50,000/- in the year 2002 is concerned, the
appellants/defendants have stated that it is a deliberate
attempt on the part of the respondent/plaintiff to overcome
limitation. To counter the allegations, the
appellants/defendants have also contended that in legal notice
dated 15.10.2004, the alleged payment of Rs.50,000/- is not
at all reflected. The respondent/plaintiff in legal notice has
contended that a sum of Rs.8,50,000/- was paid and the
balance sale consideration of Rs.9,70,000/- was due. Relying
on the contents of the legal notice, the appellants/defendants
have specifically contended at para 8 of the written statement
that there is absolutely no whisper of payment of Rs.50,000/-
in the year 2002 and the same is sought to be mischievously
introduced by the respondent/plaintiff in the above case. The
further allegation of the respondent/plaintiff that
appellants/defendants were required to furnish the clear and
marketable title is also seriously disputed. The
appellants/defendants have specifically contended that all the
documents were made available to the respondent/plaintiff
long before and the said allegations run contrary to the
recitals in the suit agreement dated 22.09.2001.
At para 9 of the written statement, the appellants/defendants have specifically contended that
respondent/plaintiff's Chairman Sri G.B. Singh left for Mumbai
and thereafter nothing was heard from him till the issuance of
legal notice dated 15.10.2004. At para 10 of the written
statement, the appellants/defendants have specifically
contended that on account of default committed by the
respondent/plaintiff, the agreement stood automatically
cancelled and the appellants/defendants are entitled to forfeit
a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- out of total sum of Rs.8,50,000/-
received by them as an earnest money. On these set of
defences, the appellants/defendants sought for dismissal of
the suit.
Based on the rival pleadings, the Trial Court formulated
the following issues:
"1) Whether the plaintiff proves that they have paid a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- to defendants out of total sale consideration of Rs.18,20,200/- in respect of the agreement of sale dated 22.09.2001?
2) Whether the plaintiff proves that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract?
3) Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of specific performance?
5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent injunction as sought for?
6) What Order or Decree?"
The respondent/plaintiff to substantiate its case,
examined its authorized official as PW.1 and to corroborate the
pleadings and ocular evidence relied on documentary evidence
vide Exs.P-1 to P-11. The appellants/defendants in support of
their contention and defence set up in the written statement
examined defendant No.3 as DW.1 and did not chose to lead
any rebuttal documentary evidence.
The Court below having assessed the oral and
documentary evidence held that the respondent/plaintiff has
proved the payment of Rs.9,00,000/- to the
appellants/defendants out of total consideration of
Rs.18,20,000/-. The Court below also held that
respondent/plaintiff has established its readiness and
willingness to perform their part of contract. The Court below
while dealing with issue No.3 has also held that the suit is not
barred by limitation. The Court below taking note of Exs.P-5
to P-11 has come to conclusion that appellants/defendants
and respondent/plaintiff came to an understanding to continue
the sale transaction and has received a sum of Rs.50,000/-
through Demand Draft and the same is encashed by the
appellants/defendants. The Court below held that payment of
disputed amount of Rs.50,000/- is proved by the
respondent/plaintiff and that goes to show that the parties to
the agreement intended to keep the contract subsisting. The
Court below was also of the view that the above said conduct
of the parties would clearly go to show that time was not the
essence of contract. On these set of reasonings, the Court
below has come to conclusion that respondent/plaintiff has
established due execution of agreement and also the payment
under the agreement as an advance amount and has also
established its readiness and willingness to perform its part of
contract and as such, is entitled for relief of specific
performance of contract. Accordingly, suit was decreed
directing the appellants/defendants to execute the sale deed
in respect of suit schedule property by receiving balance sale
consideration within two months from the date of decree.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the
appellants/defendants would vehemently argue and contend
before this Court that the very suit filed by the
respondent/plaintiff is not through a valid plaint signed by the
competent authorized representative of the
respondent/plaintiff Company. He would also contend and
submit to this Court that the suit agreement is not signed by
all the appellants/defendants and also does not bear any
witness to the suit agreement. Learned counsel further would
argue and contend before us that there are material
inconsistencies in the legal notice and the plaint in regard to
payment of further advance amount. He would vehemently
argue and contend that in the legal notice dated 15.10.2004,
it is stated that appellants/defendants had received a sum of
Rs.8,50,000/- towards part sale consideration and there is
absolutely no whisper in regard to alleged payment of
Rs.50,000/- in the legal notice. This alleged payment of
Rs.50,000/- in the year 2002 is pleaded for the first time in
the plaint. Learned counsel would further vehemently argue
and contend before this Court that since suit is abated on
account of death of defendant Nos.7, 11, 12 and 13, it is to be
deemed that suit against all the contesting defendants stood
abated. He would submit to this Court that this material
aspect is not taken into consideration and thereby the Court
below has committed a grave error of law. He would also
submit to this Court that there is a categorical admission by
PW.1 examined by the respondent/plaintiff who has admitted
in unequivocal terms that all the parties to the agreement
have not signed the suit agreement.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants
further by relying on Ex.P-1, which is an agreement executed
by the appellants/defendants in favour of one Syed
Tameezuddin would submit to this Court that in the suit
agreement, there is a recital that the said Syed Tameezuddin
has received the advance amount paid by him from the
respondent/plaintiff and the further part of the recital indicates
that he has affixed his signature as a consenting witness.
Relying on this part of the suit agreement, learned counsel
appearing for the appellants/defendants would vehemently
argue and contend that though there is a recital that he has
affixed his signature but, however, the said Syed Tameezuddin
has not signed this document as a consenting witness. The
respondent/plaintiff has also not examined this relevant
witness to establish that the agreement under Ex.P-2 was
concluded.
5. Learned counsel would further vehemently argue
and contend before us that the witness who has signed the
agreement - Ex.P-2 on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff and is
also the Managing Director has not stepped into the witness
box. Learned counsel would further contend that he has also
not verified the pleadings. Learned counsel further would
contend that PW.1 who is examined on behalf of
respondent/plaintiff was not competent to depose and his
competency stands tested during cross-examination wherein
he has pleaded his ignorance in regard to several significant
details relating to transaction. On these set of grounds,
learned counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants would
submit to this Court that the judgment and decree passed by
the Court below is palpably erroneous and suffers from serious
infirmities and hence, is liable to be set aside.
6. Learned counsel would further contend that on a
plain reading of recital in Ex.P-2, it is clearly forthcoming that
time is the essence of contract. Under the agreement vide
Ex.P-2, both the parties have agreed in unequivocal terms and
it is clearly stipulated that the sale deed shall be registered
within three months from the date of agreement. Relying on
this relevant recital in the suit agreement, he would contend
that time, therefore, ended on 22.12.2001 and there is also
admission by PW.1 in regard to time being the essence of
contract and this material aspect would have a bearing on the
conclusion. Relying on this material aspect, he would submit
to this Court that the Court below erred in not dismissing the
suit on this count.
7. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel for the
appellants/defendants has relied on the following judgments:
1) Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and Another vs. Indusind Bank Ltd., and Others - (2205) 2 SCC 217
2) Sunkara Lakshminarasamma (D) by LRs. vs. Sagi Subba Raju and Others - ILR 2019 Kar 1291
3) Badni (Dead) by LRs. and Others vs. Siri Chand (Dead) by LRs. and Others - (1999) 2 SCC 448
4) Saradamani Kandappan vs. S.Rajalakshmi and others - (2011) 12 SCC 18
5) Sukhwinder Singh vs. Jagroop Singh & Another - 2020 (2) Supreme 171
6) P. Meenakshisundaram vs. P. Vijayakumar & Another - (2018) 3 Supreme
7) Dadarao and Another vs. Ramrao and Others - (1999) 8 SCC 4
8) Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet vs. Noor Ahmed Sheriff and Others - 2011 (5) Kar.L.J.
77 (SC)
9) Dr. S.K.Ghatak and Others vs. S.Prabir Roy and Another - ILR 2009 Kar 3533
8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/plaintiff repelling the arguments extended by the
learned counsel for the appellants/defendants would
vehemently argue and contend before this Court that the
judgment and decree passed by the Court below in granting
discretionary relief of specific performance is based on legal
evidence and in absence of rebuttal evidence adduced by the
appellants/defendants. Insofar as abatement is concerned, he
would submit to this Court that the death of defendant Nos.7,
11 and 12 was never reported to the Court and as such, the
said plea is not available to the appellants/defendants to raise
such a plea before this Court. He would further submit that if
the learned counsel appearing for the defendants did not
intimate the death of defendant Nos.7, 11 and 12 as
contemplated under Order 22 Rule 10(A) of CPC, the legal
representatives, if any, are bound the decree and the
proceedings would not abate. Insofar as death of defendant
No.13 is concerned, the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/plaintiff would submit to this Court that defendant
No.13 had not contested the proceedings and as such, under
the provisions of Order 22 Rule 4(4) of CPC, the
respondent/plaintiff was exempted from impleading the legal
representatives.
9. In regard to time being the essence of contract,
learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would vehemently
argue and contend before this Court that there are catena of
judgments of this Court and Hon'ble Apex Court relating to
agreement for sale of immovable properties and the general
presumption is that time is not the essence of contract.
Relying on the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of
this Court in E.S. Rajan vs. R.Mohan reported in 1994 (5)
Kar.L.J. 357 (DB), he would submit to this Court that
intention to make time as essence must be clear and
unmistakable. To buttress his argument, he would further
submit to this Court that the appellants/defendants have
received an amount of Rs.50,000/- in the year 2002 through a
demand draft and the respondent/plaintiff has succeeded in
establishing this payment in the year 2002 and when the said
fact is established, the question as to whether time was
essence of contract would lose its significance in view of
acceptance of further advance payment in the year 2002.
10. Learned counsel further would rely on a recital in
the suit agreement wherein there is an obligation on the
vendors to produce documents of title to enable the purchaser
to seek legal clearance by his Advocate before registration of
sale deed. Relying on this clause, he would contend before
this Court that there were certain obligations cast on the
appellants/defendants and on a plain perusal of this clause of
the suit agreement, it would clearly establish that time was
not to be treated as essence of contract and it was never the
intention of the parties. Learned counsel would further
contend that the respondent/plaintiff have paid an amount of
Rs.8,50,000/- on the date of suit agreement i.e., 22.09.2001
and the appellants/defendants have further received a sum of
Rs.50,000/- through a demand draft dated 17.04.2002 which
was duly acknowledged and encashed by appellant
No.3/defendant No.3. This would clearly establish the
respondent/plaintiff company's readiness and willingness to
perform its part of contract. He would submit to this Court
that the material on record would clearly establish the
readiness and willingness and since the suit agreement is not
in dispute, the Trial Court has rightly exercising its discretion
has granted relief of specific performance. Since the Court
below has examined equities, the conduct of parties and by
over all appreciation of oral and documentary evidence has
granted discretionary relief of specific performance, he would
submit to this Court that the appellants/defendants have not
at all made out any valid grounds so as to displace the
reasons and conclusions arrived at by the Court below. On
these set of grounds, he would submit to this Court that the
appeal is devoid of merits and the same is liable to the
dismissed.
11. Heard learned counsel appearing for the
appellants/defendants and learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/plaintiff. We have perused the pleadings of the
rival parties and have gone through the entire trial Court
records. The following points would arise for consideration:
1) Whether the Court below was justified in granting discretionary relief of specific performance by holding that respondent/plaintiff company has proved its readiness and willingness to perform its part of contract?
2) Whether the Court below was justified in holding that time is not the essence of contract?
3) Whether the judgment and decree of the Court below is a nullity on account of death of defendant Nos.7, 11, 12 and 13?
Re: Point No.1:
12. The appellants/defendants are resisting the claim of
the respondent/plaintiff on the ground that time is the essence
of contract since three months time was specified in the
agreement. The contention of the appellants/defendants
before the Court below was that agreement was executed on
22.09.2001 and the legal notice as per Ex.P-3 is issued by the
respondent/plaintiff company on 15.10.2004. The
appellants/defendants admit that they have executed
agreement for sale in favour of the respondent/plaintiff as per
Ex.P-2. The said fact is not in dispute. However, the
appellants/defendants are disputing the payment of
Rs.50,000/- by way of demand draft drawn in favour of the
appellant No.3/defendant No.3 on 17.04.2002.
13. Before we proceed to examine the readiness and
willingness and the discretion exercised by the Court below in
granting relief of specific performance, it is borne out from the
records that appellants/defendants had executed an
agreement in favour of one Syed Tameezuddin on 08.07.1998.
The said agreement for sale is placed on record by the
respondent/plaintiff and the same is marked as Ex.P-1. In the
said agreement, it is forthcoming that the
appellants/defendants received a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- as an
advance amount. On perusal of this document, it is
forthcoming that appellants/defendants had an intention to
sell the suit schedule property. On perusal of Ex.P-2, which is
the agreement for sale in favour of the respondent/plaintiff,
there is a recital that the said earlier agreement holder namely
Syed Tameezuddin has received an advance amount paid by
him and this payment is made by the respondent/plaintiff.
The appellants/defendants at para 7 of the written statement
have also stated in unequivocal terms that earlier agreement
as per Ex.P-1 in favour of Syed Tameezuddin stood cancelled
and that they have executed a fresh agreement for sale on
22.09.2001 as per Ex.P-2. At para 7, the appellants/
defendants have stated in unequivocal terms that a sum of
Rs.4,50,000/- was paid to Syed Tameezuddin. On reading the
recitals in Ex.P-2 coupled with the averments made at para 7,
we would find that the earlier agreement for sale in favour of
Syed Tameezuddin stood cancelled and the respondent/
plaintiff has not only paid the advance amount of
Rs.3,00,000/- but it appears that towards full and final
settlement, the respondent/plaintiff has paid a sum of
Rs.4,50,000/- which is evident from para 7 of the written
statement.
14. The question as to whether time was the essence of
contract and as to whether the respondent/plaintiff had an
intention to keep the contract subsisting and was ever ready
and willing to perform its part of contract has to be gathered
from the subsequent conduct. The respondent/plaintiff has
specifically averred in the plaint that a sum of Rs.50,000/- was
paid to appellant No.3/defendant No.3 on 17.04.2002 by way
of demand draft drawn in favour of appellant No.3 and the
said amount stood credited to the account of appellant
No.3/defendant No.3. At this juncture, we would also deem it
fit to refer to the recitals in the suit agreement wherein there
is a recital in the suit agreement that the vendors have no
objection for payment of further advance amount in favour of
appellant No.3/defendant No.3. This recital clearly goes to
show that the other family members have authorized appellant
No.3 to make further negotiation and also to receive the
balance sale consideration. In view of authorization in favour
of appellant No.3/defendant No.3, it appears that
respondent/plaintiff company has paid further amount of
Rs.50,000/- on 17.04.2002 and the same is accepted. To
corroborate this payment, the respondent/plaintiff has relied
on Ex.P-10 which is the statement extract of appellant No.3.
15. The respondent/plaintiff has also produced the
endorsement issued by the Manager of Canara Bank as per
Ex.P-11 to prove that he has taken the demand draft from his
bank for a sum of Rs.50,000/- drawn in favour of Madurai
Swamy who is appellant No.3/defendant No.3. If Exs.P-10
and P-11 coupled with ocular evidence of PW.1 is meticulously
examined, we are of the view that the respondent/plaintiff was
not only ready but also willing to perform its part of contract
and had an intention to keep the agreement for sale
subsisting. In fact, the conduct of the appellants/defendants
in denying this payment made in the year 2002 by way of
demand draft drawn in favour of appellant No.3 appears to be
unfair and unreasonable. They have gone to the extent of
denying the credit of Rs.50,000/- in the account of appellant
No.3. The defence that it was not credited to the account of
appellant No.3 is not at all substantiated by producing
clinching evidence to refute the contention in regard to
subsequent payment of Rs.50,000/- by the
respondent/plaintiff. Under the agreement for sale as per
Ex.P-2, the appellants/ defendants were required to make out
good and marketable title in respect of the suit schedule
property by producing relevant title documents so as to enable
the respondent/plaintiff to seek a legal opinion for registration
of sale deed. The appellants/defendants have taken a
contention at paragraphs 8 and 9 of the written statement
that all the documents were made available to the
respondent/plaintiff and the same were handed over long
before is not at all substantiated during trial. If at all, all the
documents were handed over to the respondent/plaintiff, then
the parties to the agreement for sale would not have
contemplated a clause in the suit agreement vide Ex.P-2
contemplating obligation on appellants/defendants to furnish
title documents. The averments made in paragraphs 8 and 9
runs contrary to the recitals in the suit agreement obligating
the appellants/defendants to furnish title documents. The
pleadings in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the written statement
being contrary to the recital are inadmissible.
16. The appellants/defendants contention that payment
of a sum of Rs.50,000/- on 17.04.2002 by way of demand
draft in favour of appellant No.3/defendant No.3 does not find
a place in the legal notice issued by the respondent/plaintiff.
Relying on this omission on the part of the respondent/plaintiff
in not claiming payment of Rs.50,000/- in the legal notice as
per Ex.P-3, the appellants/defendants are contending before
this Court that the Court below erred in holding that the
payment of Rs.50,000/- in the year 2002 is also proved. We
find some force in the contention raised by the
appellants/defendants in regard to this material aspect but,
however, on perusal of Exs.P-10 and P-11 which is the
statement of account pertaining to appellant No.3/defendant
No.3, the controversy in regard to the subsequent payment of
Rs.50,000/- stands proved and the documents relied by the
respondent/plaintiff as per Exs.P-10 and P-11 would clinch the
issue.
17. In a suit for specific performance of contract, the
relief sought is equitable in nature. The Court is required to
take into account the conduct of parties, the fairness of the
deal and thereafter proceed to examine the entitlement of
plaintiff in seeking relief of specific performance of contract.
The agreement for sale as per Ex.P-2 does impose
corresponding obligation both on the vendor and vendee. The
appellants/defendants were required to furnish title documents
and all other relevant documents to enable the
respondent/plaintiff to secure legal opinion and thereafter
enable it to come forward to secure the sale deed by paying
the balance sale consideration. The agreement for sale was
executed by the appellants/defendants on 22.09.2001 and
admittedly, the time stipulated to complete the transaction
was three months but, appellants/defendants have received a
further sum of Rs.50,000/- on 17.04.2002. It can be
presumed that there was a further demand by
appellants/defendants and the fact that respondent/plaintiff
has paid further sum of Rs.50,000/- by way of demand draft
after expiry of three months would clearly establish the
readiness and willingness of respondent/plaintiff in performing
its part of contract. The clinching evidence on record would
clearly demonstrate that the respondent/plaintiff was ever
ready and willing to perform its part of contract continuously
from the date of contract as per Ex.P-2. The Court below has
exercised its discretion judiciously and the discretion exercised
is based on sound principles of law.
18. On re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record,
we are of the opinion that respondent/plaintiff has proved its
readiness and willingness by producing cogent and clinching
evidence. The Court below has dealt with issue No.2 in detail
and the finding and conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court
while examining issue No.2 is based on legal evidence. We do
not find any illegality or infirmities in the findings recorded by
the Court below while answering issue No.2. For the reasons
stated supra, point No.1 formulated above is answered in the
affirmative.
Re: Point No.2:
19. The agreement for sale as per Ex.P-2 was executed
by the appellants/defendants on 22.09.2001. It was agreed
by the parties that the transaction shall be completed within a
period of three months from the date of agreement. But there
is also obligation cast on the appellants/defendants to furnish
title documents and other municipal documents to enable the
respondent/plaintiff to seek legal opinion and thereafter come
forward for registration of sale deed. Except bald allegations
in the written statement that all the documents were
furnished, the appellants/defendants have not produced any
cogent and clinching evidence to demonstrate the same. The
subsequent payment made by the respondent/plaintiff to the
tune of Rs.50,000/- on 17.04.2002 which is in fact after expiry
of three months would clinch the issue and the same would
indicate that the appellants/defendants never intended that
time would be the essence of contract.
20. There are catena of judgments rendered by this
Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court and it has been held that
mere fixation of time frame does not by itself evidence
intention to make time the essence. The respondent/plaintiff
has proved the subsequent payment of Rs.50,000/- after
expiry of the time stipulated under the agreement which is
three months and Exs.P-10 and P-11 substantiates the
contention of the respondent/plaintiff that further payment
was made. It is also trite proposition of law that there is an
initial presumption against 'time being the essence of contract'
in transaction involving sale of immovable property. However,
this presumption can be displaced only if the intention of the
parties as gathered from the stipulations contained and
language employed in the agreement to sell to manifestly
suggest that the parties had intended to make 'time as the
essence of contract'. On perusal of the recital in the
agreement for sale as per Ex.P-2 and having regard to the
conduct of the parties subsequent to suit agreement, would
clearly establish that parties never intended to make time as
the essence of contract and the period fixed in the suit
agreement at the most can be inferred that parties to the suit
agreement intended to complete the sale transaction at the
earliest.
21. For the reasons stated supra, the point No.2
formulated above in answered in the affirmative.
Re: Point No.3:
22. The appellants/defendants constitute a joint family
and the schedule property is an ancestral property of
appellants/defendants. On perusal of agreement for sale as
per Ex.P-2, it is forthcoming that all the family members
together have come forward to execute the agreement for sale
in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. There is a recital in the
agreement for sale as per Ex.P-2 authorizing appellant
No.3/defendant No.3 to collect further advance amount from
the respondent/plaintiff. The same is culled out as follows:
"WHEREAS the Vendor 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 herein have no objection to pay the further advance mentioned above to Vendor No.3 M.MADHURAI SWAMY, the said payment is herewith acknowledged by all the Vendors."
23. On perusal of this recital, it is clearly evident that it
is the appellant No.3/defendant No.3 who was negotiating on
behalf of the entire family. The same stands strengthened
from the fact that it is only appellant No.3/defendant No.3 who
has stepped into the witness box to give oral evidence. The
fact that further payment was made in favour of appellant
No.3/defendant No.3 is also proved by the respondent/plaintiff
as per Exs.P-10 and P-11. This material aspect would clinch
the issue. It is the appellant No.3/defendant No.3 who fought
the litigation on behalf of the family members.
24. The defendant No.13 died during the pendency of
the suit and the same is reflected in the order sheet. The
appellant/defendants never raised an objection that
respondent/plaintiff cannot proceed with the suit unless the
legal representatives of defendant No.13 are brought on
record. Defendant No.13 did not chose to contest the
proceedings. In that view of the matter, the
appellants/defendants for the first time before this Court have
come up with the objection by contending that since defendant
No.13 died and the same was within the knowledge of
respondent/plaintiff, the entire suit abates on account of death
of defendant No.13.
25. The next contention raised by the
appellants/defendants before this Court is that defendant
Nos.7, 11 and 12 died during the pendency of the suit and the
legal heirs of deceased defendants were also not brought on
record. It is not the case of the appellants/defendants that
the death of defendant Nos.7, 11 and 12 was reported and
inspite of the said fact, the respondent/plaintiff has not chosen
to bring the legal heirs of the above said defendants on
record. Under Order 22 Rule 10(A) of CPC, learned counsel
appearing for the defendants has a duty to communicate to
the Court the death of a party. The procedural law of Order
22 Rule 10(A) of CPC is not an empty formality, the
preeminent object of which is to expedite the administration of
justice and to see that the same would not defeat by intrusion
on technical procedural lapse.
26. Admittedly, respondent/plaintiff and appellants/
defendants are not related. In this background, the
appellants/defendants were required to report the death. This
is not done in the present case on hand. It is also trite law
that contract between the Advocate and client brought by
virtue of Order 3 Rule 4(1) of CPC would continue even after
the death of a party, only for the purpose mentioned in Rule
10(A) of CPC. The appellants/defendants cannot be permitted
to take advantage of their own mistake and inaction in not
informing the Court regarding death of defendant Nos.7, 11
and 12. All the defendants belong to a joint family and all the
defendants together have filed one written statement and are
represented by the same counsel. There is no conflict of
interest inter se between the parties. The appellants/
defendants together are resisting the claim of
respondent/plaintiff on the ground that time was the essence
of contract. Even otherwise, the appellants/defendants cannot
hold caveat for the deceased defendants. The legal heirs of
deceased defendants are not before this Court questioning the
decree on the ground that it is passed against a dead person.
Even otherwise, since there is no conflict of interest and there
was effective representation before the Court below and
before this Court, we are of the view that the death of
defendant Nos.7, 11 and 12 would not in any way invalidate
the decree passed by the Court below. The contention raised
by the appellants/defendants is not at all sustainable.
Accordingly, the point No.3 formulated above is answered in
the negative.
27. On re-appreciation of the entire oral and
documentary evidence on record, we do not find any legal
infirmities or perversity in the conclusion arrived at by the
Trial Court.
Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merits is
dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE
CA
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