Karnataka High Court
Sri A Muthyalappa vs The State Of Karnataka on 6 December, 2021
Bench: Ashok S.Kinagi
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE ASHOK S. KINAGI
WRIT PETITION NO.27798 OF 2019 (SC/ST)
BETWEEN:
SRI. A. MUTHYALAPPA
S/O LATE ADINARYANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
R/A MALLEPALLI VILLAGE,
SOMENAHALLI HOBLI,
GUDIBANDE TALUK-561 209
CHIKKABALLAPURA DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. B K CHANDRASHEKAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
M.S.BUILDING, DR. AMBEDKAR ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 001.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
CHIKKABALLAPURA DISTRICT,
CHIKKABALLAPURA -562 101.
3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
CHIKKABALLAPURA DISTRICT,
CHIKKABALLAPURA -562 101.
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4. SRI. VENKATESH
S/O VENKATAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
5. SRI. SRINIVASA
S/O VENKATAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
6. SRI. VENKATAPPA
S/O YERRAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
RESPONDENTS No.4 TO 6 ARE R/AT
CHIKKATHIMMANAHALLI VILLAGE,
YELLAMPALLI MAJARA,
KASABA HOBLI,
BAGEPALLI TALUK,
CHIKKABALLAPURA DISTRICT-562 101.
7. SRI. P N NANJUNDAPPA
S/O GORLA NARAYANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
R/AT PEDDATHUMIKEPALLI VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, BAGEPALLI TALUK,
CHIKKABALLAPURA DISTRICT-562 101.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. M. SANDESH KUMAR, HCGP FOR R-1 TO R-3
SRI. S. SRINIVAS MURTHY, ADVOCATE FOR
R-4 TO R-6
R-7 SERVED UNREPRESENTED)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
SET-ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE R-2 DATED
26.10.2015 VIDE ANNX-B AND ETC.
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THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 12.11.2021, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
ORDER
The petitioner being aggrieved by the order
dated 04.03.2011, passed by respondent No.3 and
order dated 26.10.2015, passed by respondent No.2,
has filed this writ petition.
2. Brief facts leading rise to filing of this petition
are as under:
The land in question is a granted land. The
alienation of land in question is contrary to Section
4(1) of the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act,
1978 (for short 'the PTCL Act'). The said land was
sold by respondent No.6 in favour of respondent No.7
under registered sale deed dated 11.07.1983. The
respondent No.7 in turn has sold the land in question
in favour of the petitioner under registered sale deed
claiming to be the children of respondent No.6 filed an
application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act before
respondent No.3. The respondent No.3 vide order
dated 04.03.2011, allowed the application and
declared the registered sale deeds dated 11.07.1983
and 26.10.2006, as null and void and ordered for
resumption of land. The petitioner being aggrieved by
the order passed by respondent No.3, preferred an
appeal before respondent No.2. The respondent No.2
vide order dated 26.10.2015, confirmed the order
passed by respondent No.3 and consequently
dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. The
petitioner was not aware about the order passed by
the respondent No.2. The petitioner came to know
about the order passed by respondent No.2 when he
went to the office of respondent No.3 to secure the
revenue records. But the respondent No.2 did not
provide any intimation regarding passing of the
impugned order dated 26.10.2015. On 09.07.2018,
the petitioner came to know about the impugned
order only when the petitioner went to the office of
respondent No.2 to enquire about the status of
appeal. The petitioner came to know about the
passing of order by respondent No.2. Thereafter, the
petitioner filed an application for issue of certified
copy of impugned order. After receiving the certified
copy of the impugned order, the petitioner
approached the advocate to file the writ petition.
Thus there is a delay in filing the writ petition and the
delay so caused is not an intentional one, but a bona
fide one. Hence the petitioner being aggrieved by the
order passed by respondent No.2, has filed this writ
petition.
3. Respondent Nos.4 to 6 filed statement of
objections contending that the writ petition is liable to
be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The
writ petition is filed after 3 years 8 months 6 days
from the date of impugned order. It is contended that
the land was granted in the year 1972 in favour of
respondent No.6 and respondent No.6 executed a
registered sale deed in favour of respondent No.7 and
the registered sale deed executed by respondent No.6
in favour of respondent No.7 is hit by Section 4(1) of
the PTCL Act. Hence prayed to dismiss the writ
petition.
4. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and
learned counsel for respondent Nos.4 to 6.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that the petitioner was not aware about the passing of
impugned order by the respondent No.2 as the
respondent No.2 has not notified about the passing of
impugned order. Further copy of impugned order was
not sent to the petitioner and the said order was
passed behind the back of the petitioner. The
petitioner came to know about the passing of
impugned order on 09.07.2018, and thereafter applied
for certified copy of the impugned order. Thus there
was a delay in filing the writ petition. He further
submits that the respondent Nos.6 and 7 have filed an
application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act after a
lapse of more than 23 years from the date of
execution of registered sale deed dated 11.07.1983.
He further submits that the respondent No.2 has not
considered the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI VS.
STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. [(2020) 14 SCC 232]
and in case of VIVEK M. HINDUJA & ORS. VS.
M. ASHWATHA & ORS. [(2020) 14 SCC 228]. Hence,
on these grounds, he prays to allow the writ petition.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the
respondent Nos.4 to 6 submits that the writ petition is
liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches. He further places reliance on the judgment of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of RUP DIAMONDS
& ORS. VS. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [AIR 1989 SC
674] and also CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY
SEWERAGE BOARD & ORS. VS. T. T. MURALI BABU [AIR
2014 SC 1141]. He also places reliance on the order
passed in Writ Appeal No.596-597/2016, disposed of
on 8th July 2019. Hence, on these grounds, he prayed
to dismiss the writ petition.
7. Perused the records and considered the
submissions made by learned counsel for the parties.
8. It is not in dispute that the said land was
granted in favour of respondent No.6 in the year
1972. The respondent No.6 has sold the said land in
favour of respondent No.7 under registered sale deed
dated 11.07.1983. The respondent No.7, in turn, has
sold the land in favour of the petitioner under
registered sale deed dated 26.10.2006. The
respondent Nos.4 and 5 filed an application under
Section 5 of the PTCL Act in the year 2006. The said
application was filed after 23 years from the date of
execution of registered sale deed. The said
application was not filed within reasonable time. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of NEKKANTI RAMA
LAKSHMI (SUPRA), has held as under:
"8. However, the question that arises is with
regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which
enables any interested person to make an
application for having the transfer annulled as
void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section
does not prescribe any period within which such
an application can be made. Neither does it
prescribe the period within which suo motu
action may be taken. This Court in the case of
CHHEDI LAL YADAV & ORS. VS. HARI KISHORE YADAV
(D) THR. LRS. & ORS., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and
also in the case of NINGAPPA VS. DY. COMMISSIONER
& ORS. (C.A.NO.3131 of 2007, decided on
14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law
that whether Statute provided for a period of
limitation, provisions of the Statute must be
invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that
action whether on an application of the parties,
or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable
time. That action arose under the provisions of a
similar Act which provided for restoration of
certain lands to farmers which were sold for
arrears of rent or from which they were ejected
for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st
December, 1950. This relief was granted to the
farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which
make agricultural operations impossible. An
application for restoration was made after 24
years and was allowed. It is in that background
that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable
to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding
that the present application for restoration of
land made by respondent-Rajappa was made
after an unreasonably long period and was liable
to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the
judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely,
R. RUDRAPPA VS. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, 2000 (1)
KARNATAKA LAW JOURNAL, 523, MADDURAPPA VS.
STATE OF KARNATAKA, 2006 (4) KARNATAKA LAW
JOURNAL, 303 AND G. MAREGOUDA VS. THE DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT, CHITRADURGA
AND ORS, 2000(2) KR.L.J.SH. N.4B holding that
there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of
the Act and, therefore, an application can be
made at any time, are overruled. Order
accordingly."
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of VIVEK M.
HINDUJA (SUPRA), has held as under:
"10. In PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION V. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA [(2007) 5 SCC 211] this court
reproduced the following observations with
regard to the declaration of orders beyond the
period of limitation as invalid:
"39. Setting aside the decree
passed by all the courts and
referring to several cases, this
court held that if the party
aggrieved by invalidity of the order
intends to approach the court for
declaration that the order against
him was inoperative, he must
come before the court within the
period prescribed by limitation. 'If
the statutory time of limitation
expires, the court cannot give the
declaration sought for'."
9. Thus, there is a delay of 23 years in filing the
application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act. The
respondent Nos.2 and 3 failed to consider the said
aspect and proceeded to pass the impugned orders.
The respondent Nos.4 and 5 have not offered any
explanation regarding delay caused in filing the
application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act.
10. The petitioner has offered an explanation for
delay of 3 years 8 months 6 days in filing the present
writ petition. The petitioner has stated that the
petitioner was not aware about the passing of the
impugned order by respondent No.2, as the
respondent No.2 has not posted the matter for
pronouncement of order. The respondent No.2 has
passed the impugned order on 26.10.2015, in the
absence of the petitioner and further copy of the said
order was not sent to the petitioner. The learned
HCGP submits that the revenue authorities sometimes
do not post the matter for pronouncement of order
and pass the order as per their convenience. The
respondent Nos.4 to 6 have failed to establish that the
petitioner had the knowledge regarding passing of the
impugned order by respondent No.2. The petitioner
has shown sufficient cause for filing the writ petition
at a belated stage. Having regard to the explanation
offered by the petitioner, I am of the considered
opinion that the delay of 3 years 8 months 6 days in
filing the writ petition, compared to the delay of 23
years caused by respondent Nos.4 and 5 in filing the
application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act for
resumption of land in question, is much reasonable.
The respondent No.3 has committed an error in
entertaining an application after lapse of 23 years
from the date of execution of registered sale deed.
The respondent No.2 has also committed an error in
confirming the order passed by respondent No.3.
11. In view of the above discussion, I proceed
to pass the following:
ORDER
The writ petition is allowed.
The impugned orders passed by
respondent Nos.2 and 3 are hereby
quashed and set aside.
SD/-
JUDGE
RD
