[Cites 2, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
Om Prakash Pandey vs The State Of Jharkhand on 24 March, 2026
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2026:JHHC:8244-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 1741 of 2026
Om Prakash Pandey, S/o Adya Shanker Pandey, R/o Pandeypur,
Varanasi Cantt, P.O. & P.S.-Varanasi Cantt, Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh
..... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through its Chief Secretary, Ranchi
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative
Reforms & Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
3. The High Court of Jharkhand, through its Registrar General, Ranchi
4. The Registrar General, High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi
5. The Accountant General (A&E), Jharkhand, Ranchi
..... Respondents
-----
CORAM
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
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For the Petitioner: Mr. Alok Anand, Advocate
For the Res.-State: Mr. Manish Mishra, G.P.-V
For the Res. No. 5: Mr. Arvind Kumar Mehta, Advocate
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02/24.03.2026
1. Heard Mr. Alok Anand, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.
Manish Mishra, learned G.P.-V appearing on behalf of the
Respondent-State.
2. The petitioner by instituting this writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution, seeks the following substantive reliefs:
"(i) For issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus directing the
respondent authorities to revise the pension of the petitioner
after granting him the promotion in District Judge super time
scale of pay with effect from 6.11.2011, the date his
immediate junior was promoted in terms with Notification
dated 27.10.2012 issued by the High Court of Jharkhand,
Ranchi along with arrears, interest and penal interest
thereon.
(ii) For issuance of further writ in the nature of mandamus
directing the respondent authorities and in particular the
respondent No. 3 for expunging the adverse remark made in
2026:JHHC:8244-DB
his ACR in the year 2020 for the year 2012 without following
the principles of natural justice."
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner is unclear whether the two reliefs
are connected. On one hand, he suggested that the adverse
remark made in the petitioner's ACR in the year 2020 for the year
2012 was the cause for the denial of the super time scale to him.
However, in the same breath, he submitted that, since there were
no adverse entries in the petitioner's ACR in 2011, there was no
reason to deny him the super time scale, as his junior was granted
such super time scale w.e.f. 06.11.2011.
4. Apart from the contradictory submissions, we find that if it was the
petitioner's case that there was nothing adverse in his ACR or that
he was otherwise eligible for super time scale in the year 2011,
nothing prevented him from challenging the denial of super time
scale within some reasonable period from the date of denial in the
year 2011-12.
5. This writ petition has been filed in December, 2025 i.e., after a
delay of almost more than 13 years. There is no explanation for
this inordinate delay. In the meantime, it is possible that several
officers might have secured a super time scale for which some
limited slots were provided. Thus, on the ground of inordinate
delay and laches itself, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
6. As regards the adverse remark, we note that the petitioner, who
was the Presiding Officer of Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal
at Gumla, passed an order dated 19.03.2012 in which he directed
that a sum of Rs.2,13,270/- must be deducted from the
compensation amount of Rs.10,66,352/- payable to the claimants
and be paid to the advocate for the claimants, pursuant to an
agreement executed between the claimants and the said advocate.
2026:JHHC:8244-DB
7. Being shocked by such an order, the Learned Single Judge of this
Court, while hearing Misc. Appeal. No. 104 of 2012, directed the
petitioner to submit an explanation under what provision of law the
compensation amount awarded in favour of the claimants was
distributed among the claimants and their advocate.
8. The petitioner filed his explanation on 27.01.2014. However, upon
considering the same, the learned Single Judge of this Court vide
order dated 13.01.2015, held that such explanation was not in
consonance with the law. After that, an adverse entry was entered
into the petitioner's ACR to the effect that his knowledge of law
was poor. Before such adverse entry was entered, the petitioner
was given a full opportunity to submit his explanation.
9. The petitioner once again represented against the adverse remark
and sought for its expungement. In the said representation, the
petitioner reiterated the same explanation he had offered to the
learned Single Judge, and which had already been rejected by the
said Court. This representation for expungement was also rejected,
and the petitioner was notified of the rejection.
10. In order to create a base for instituting this writ petition belatedly,
the petitioner, after his retirement on 31.12.2021, once again
addressed the representation. The petitioner was once again
informed that his representation against the adverse remark had
already been rejected.
11. Apart from the issue of delay and laches in seeking the
expungement of the adverse remark, even on the merits, we do
not think this is a fit case to order its expungement. The order
apportioning the compensation amount between the claimants and
their advocate under a champertous agreement was grossly
improper. The explanation offered by the petitioner was already
2026:JHHC:8244-DB
rejected by the learned Single Judge on judicial review vide order
dated 13.01.2015.
12. No steps were taken by the petitioner to challenge the order dated
13.01.2015. In this writ petition, it would not be certainly
appropriate for us to pass any order, which would interfere with the
portion of the order dated 13.01.2015, passed by the learned
Single Judge. A relief that the petitioner now belatedly seeks is
virtually to invite us to disagree with the learned Single Judge's
order dated 13.01.2015 rejecting the petitioner's explanation.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a judgment rendered
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India
(UOI) & Ors. vs. Sangram Keshari Nayak reported in (2007)
6 SCC 704 wherein it has been held that in the absence of any
material requiring the DPC to take recourse to the sealed cover
procedure, promotion could not have been denied to a government
officer. This issue has nothing to do with the controversy now
raised in this writ petition. In any event, if this decision is pressed
in the context of the denial of super time scale to the petitioner in
2011-12, as noted by us earlier, the present writ petition instituted
in 2025 is barred by inordinate delay and laches, for which no
explanation is offered.
14. For all the above reasons, we see no merit in the present writ
petition and dismiss the same without any order for costs.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(RAJESH SHANKAR, J.)
24.03.2026
Satish/Vikas/
