[Cites 2, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
State Of Jharkhand vs Samuel Dungdung on 29 January, 2026
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2026:JHHC:2226-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.295 of 2024
With
I.A. No.7376 of 2025
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1. State of Jharkhand.
2. Senior Superintendent of Police, Ranchi having its office at
Collectorate Building, P.O. G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali, District-Ranchi.
.......... Appellants.
-Versus-
1. Samuel Dungdung, son of Serophinus Dungdung, resident of
village Jurkella Kisan Toli, P.O. Agharma, P.S. Kolebira, District-
Simdega.
2. The Director General of Police, Ranchi, having its office at Project
Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
3. The Deputy Director General of Police, South Chhotanagpur
Division, Ranchi, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa,
P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
.......... Respondents.
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CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
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For the Appellants : Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr. S.C.-I
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Order No.09 Date: 29.01.2026
1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants.
2. I.A. No.7376 of 2025 seeks condonation of delay of 486 days to
appeal against the learned Single Judge's judgment and order
dated 8th February, 2023 by which the learned Single Judge, after
setting aside the order dismissing the 1st respondent for 22 days
of absence, directed his reinstatement without any back wages.
3. This appeal was instituted after 486 days and in the meanwhile,
on the ground of pendency of this appeal or on the ground that
filing of this appeal was in contemplation, the appellant-State
refused to comply with the direction for reinstatement issued by
the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. This was despite
the fact that there was no interim relief or ad interim relief
granted by this Court and the fact that for about 486 days from
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the expiry of the limitation period for filing this appeal, no appeal
was filed. The I.A., time and again, asserts that there was no
wilful omission on the part of the appellants, and the delay was
caused "due to the procedural formalities". Paragraph 5 of the
I.A. acknowledges that the counsel for the appellants
"immediately informed the appellant-department" about the
learned Single Judge's order dated 8th February, 2023. There is
also an acknowledgement that this order was received in the
department's office on 31st March, 2023.
4. The I.A. then says that the file was placed before the Senior
Superintendent of Police but without disclosing when the same
was placed. There is a statement that on 3rd April, 2023, the
Senior Superintendent of Police "immediately directed for
necessary action in terms of the direction given by the Hon'ble
Court". This means that the Senior Superintendent of Police did
not consider it necessary to appeal the learned Single Judge's
order but opined that it should be obeyed.
5. After that, an opinion was sought from the learned Advocate
General only on 6th June, 2023, and the opinion was obtained on
25th August, 2023. At a minimum, the appeal should have been
filed immediately thereafter. Still, there are statements that the
file allegedly moved from table to table and that the appeal was
filed after an inordinate delay of 486 days.
6. The delay, apart from being inordinate, is not explained. The so-
called explanation offered does not constitute any sufficient
cause. Routine bureaucratic procedures are cited simply to create
2026:JHHC:2226-DB
a facade of sufficient cause. There is a bold statement that
"necessary steps have been taken for filing the appeal vigorously
from the very date of receiving the information of pronouncement
of the impugned judgment dated 8th February, 2023". This
statement is completely belied by the other statements in the I.A.
7. The affidavit that accompanies the I.A. is also grossly defective.
Paragraph 3, which is the verification clause, is completely blank
in a context of paragraphs that are said to be true to the affiant's
knowledge or true to his information derived from the records.
There is utmost casualness in filing this application for
condonation of delay and expecting the Court to condone the
inordinate delay.
8. This is also a case where the appellants have attempted to draw
mileage from their own delay. A police constable, who was
dismissed for absence of 22 days, was ordered to be reinstated
by the judgment and order dated 8th February, 2023. This was
after noting that the said constable was receiving treatment
during this period, and in fact, it is the appellants who had
themselves referred the constable for such treatment. Still, for
over one and a half years, neither was any appeal filed, nor was
the learned Single Judge's order complied with on the pretext that
an appeal was under contemplation. To condone the inordinate
delay in such circumstances would be harsh and inequitable to
the respondent-constable. As it is, the learned Single Judge's
order has not directed payment of any back wages to the
respondent-constable.
2026:JHHC:2226-DB
9. In the case of Postmaster General and Others Vs. Living
Media India Limited and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Government cannot, on
account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notings, attempt to explain
inordinate delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court noted that, in view
of modern technologies, such a process must be expedited, as
the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the
Government.
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it was right time to
inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and
acceptable explanation for the delay and there was a bona fide
effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that a file
was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable
degree of procedural red tape in the process. Government
departments are under a special obligation to perform their duties
diligently and with commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for
the government departments. The law shelters everyone under
the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
11. The explanation in the present case is not materially different
from the explanation offered before the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Postmaster General (supra). In the case before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, the delay was of 427 days, which was regarded
as enormous and inordinate. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
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considered its previous decisions, which observed that a certain
degree of latitude must be afforded to the Government due to its
impersonal bureaucratic structure and red tape. However, after
distinguishing those decisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
observed that there is a limit to extending a liberal construction
when it comes to the Government and Government agencies.
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to its earlier decisions in
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay Vs. Amateur Riders
Club, Bombay, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603 and Pundlik Jalam
Patil (Dead) By Lrs. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon
Medium Project & Anr., (2008) 17 SCC 448 and held that
despite showing all latitude to the Government, the explanation
offered for the delay merely serves to aggravate the attitude of
indifference of the revenue in protecting its common interest. The
Court also held that the evidence on record suggests a long-term
neglect of its own right to prefer appeals. The Court held that it
does not inquire into belated or stale claims on equitable grounds.
Delay defeats equity. The Court helps those who are vigilant and
do not slumber over their rights.
13. The Court also reiterated that the object of fixing a time limit for
litigation is based on public policy, the fixing of a life span for
legal remedy, and the general welfare. They are meant to see
that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail themselves
of their legal remedies promptly. The Court noted that public
interest is undoubtedly a paramount consideration in exercising
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discretion. However, pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of
proceedings in no manner serves public interest.
14. In Union of India v. Jahangir Jeejebhoy 2024, SCC Online
Sc 489, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to a plethora of
cases holding that delay should not be excused as a matter of
generosity. Substantial justice must not prejudice the opposite
party. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound
public policy and equity. The 'sword of Damocles' must not be
kept hanging over the respondent's head for an indefinite period
to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
15. Therefore, considering the facts of the present case and the law
on the subject, we see no good ground to condone the inordinate
delay of 486 days in instituting the appeal. Since no sufficient
cause is shown, we dismiss the I.A. No.7376 of 2025.
16. As a consequence, the accompanying appeal also stands
dismissed. No costs.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
29th January, 2026
Sanjay/Rohit
Uploaded on 30.01.2026
