[Cites 34, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
Santosh Pathak vs Sarika Kumari Aged About 40 Years on 15 January, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2026:JHHC:1146-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
First Appeal No. 66 of 2021
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Santosh Pathak, aged about 43 years, son of Shri Bhagwat
Pathak, resident of Barabazar, Subhash Marg, P.O.
Barabazar, P.S. Sadar, Hazaribag, District Hazaribag, in the
State of Jharkhand, presently residing at 05-35 BLK 731,
Street No. 72, Jurong West, Singapore
........... Appellant
Versus
1. Sarika Kumari Aged about 40 years, daughter of Shri
Nawal Kishore Trigunait, resident of Village Lohari, P.O.
Dewhara, District Aurangabad, and also at Nutan Nagar
Road No. 3, Civil Line, Gaya, District Gaya, in the State of
Bihar, at present residing at C/o Pradeep Obrohee, 19
Punjabi Society, Opposite SONI MONI, Near Sports
Complex, J.P. Road, Andheri West, P.S. Andheri, Mumbai
400058, in the State of Maharashtra..
... Respondent
2. Arup Trigunait @ Dablu
3. Swaroop Trigunait @ Tulla
...Performa Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Appellant : Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate,
Mr. Amit Kumar, Advocate,
Mr. M.K. Sinha, Advocate,
For the Respondents : Mr. Prabhat Kr. Sinha, Advocate,
Mr. Bankim Prasad, Advocate
C.A.V. on 17.12.2025 Pronounced on 15/01/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J
Prayer:
1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family
Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment dated
08.10.2021 and decree dated 20.10.2021 passed by the
learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Hazaribag in
Original Suit No. 70 of 2014, whereby and whereunder, the
suit filed by the plaintiff (appellant herein) seeking a decree
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of divorce against his wife (respondent herein), has been
dismissed.
Factual Aspect:
2. The brief facts of the case, leading to filing of the
divorce petition by the appellant-petitioner, as taken note
in the impugned order as emanated from the plaint, needs
to be referred herein, which reads as under:
3. The marriage between the appellant and respondent
was solemnized on 12.02.2013 at Katras according to
Hindu Rites and Customs. After the marriage, both the
petitioner and the respondent came to Hazaribag and live
together as husband and wife. The marriage was registered
on 18.02.2013 at District Sub-Registrar, Hazaribag. The
couple has no children.
4. It is further stated that was an arrange marriage. The
father of the respondent approached the parents of the
petitioner through the maternal Uncle Swarup Trigunait
@Tulla and gave the Photographs, Bio-data and Kundli of
the respondent for marriage with the petitioner. They also
impressed upon the petitioner parents that the respondent
is qualified upto MBA from FMS Banaras Hindu University
and was employed as Manager in Citi Bank at Mumbai.
5. It is further stated that on 22.06.2012 parents of both
the parties met at Dhanbad where the respondent was
interviewed by the petitioner and his parents in presence of
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her parents and they all repeated that she did MBA from
BHU and she is serving as Manager in Citi Bank at
Mumbai. Further the respondent and her parents
submitted that after the marriage she will get herself
transferred to CITI Bank, Singapore where the petitioner is
working. In August, 2012 on the day of Raksha Bandhan,
the father of the respondent Nawal Kishore Trigunait came
to Hazaribag alongwith Sri Arup Trigunait @ Dablu and
Swarup Trigunait @ Tulla for final settlement of marriage of
respondent with the petitioner which after discussion
settled for 12.02.2013 and the engagement of which was
performed on 06.02.2013 and Tilak Ceremony on
07.02.2013 and accordingly the marriage was performed on
12.02.2013 at Rajasthani Dharamshala, Katras, District
Dhanbad.
6. It is further stated that at the time of registration of
marriage at District Sub-Registrar, Hazaribag the
respondent said that her Passport is lost somewhere. The
petitioner was scheduled to go to his work in Singapore on
24.02.2013 and accordingly on 22.02.2013 the petitioner
left for Mumbai and from there on 24.02.2013 he left for
Singapore. It was arranged that the petitioner would send
money in the account of the respondent held with Bank of
India and she will hand over some money to her father-in-
law to avoid unnecessary double transaction and cost,
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however, she never transferred any money to her father-in-
law.
7. It is alleged that on 07.03.2013 the respondent
informed the petitioner through email that she has
obtained the Passport and she would get the Employment
Pass on Tuesday ie. 19.03.2013. But suddenly the
respondent informed that she cannot go to Singapore
before 13th May, 2013 as per the orders of her superior
authority. On 11th May, 2013 she said that her authorities
will not relieve her before 16th August, 2013. On
04.07.2013 the respondent asked some money from the
petitioner and gave her account number of Gaya Bank by
email but she did not give her account number of CITI
Bank where she was working. On 14.08.2013 she said that
she had a very prospective project in her hand which she
does not want to lose since it will build her career and she
would be awarded Rs. 30,00,000/- (Rupees thirty lacs)
only. She further informed that the project would be
completed by 25th October. On 24.10.2013 the respondent
informed the petitioner that she had purchased flight ticket
for 10.11.2013 for herself and her husband for Singapore
where she had to report for joining on 12.11.2013. On
25.10.2013 the respondent informed the petitioner that she
has been asked to execute a Bond for three years and only
then the tickets would be handed over to her. By this time,
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the petitioner got suspicion on her changing version from
time to time
8. On 26.10.2013 the petitioner/appellant returned to
Mumbai and in the Airport his brother Raunak Pathak from
Pune and the respondent were present. Petitioner
expressed his desire to meet the immediate Boss of the
respondent to know why he was putting such blockage in
the way of her going to Singapore. At 4.00 P.M. she took
him to the Bank premises where she had been working but
there was no Bank in function. In enquiry from the Security
man, it revealed that there is no Bank there, but the
respondent insisted that she had been attending her job
every day in the Bank at the same place. She could not get
to meet any of the Bank staff. They together reached
Hazaribag on 27.10.2013. Father and brother of the
respondent also reached Hazaribag on 30.10.2013.
Respondent could not show her employment ID. On asking
for email ID, she said that she did not remember her ID.
About her salary she stated that presently she is getting Rs.
1.25 lacs per month which was previously Rs. 80,000/-.
When questioned, she said that she is not willing to go to
Singapore and will remain in Bombay where she has to
build her career. When the petitioner asked her to show her
education certificate and the appointment posting papers,
she in the presence of her father and brother went inside
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the room and bolted from inside and consumed Vermillion
(Sindur) in her mouth. The matter was reported to Female
Police Station and she was admitted in the hospital after
release from hospital, her father and brother took her to
Gaya.
9. It has further been stated that the father of the
petitioner then called Panchayati two times in the village
Malkera. Neither the respondent nor her parents were able
to produce any documentary evidence of her educational
qualification or appointment letter before the Panchayat.
10. It has further been alleged that the respondent and
her parents knowingly and deliberately misrepresented the
fact about her qualification and appointment and
impressed falsely to get married with the petitioner by
playing fraud and thereby cheated the petitioner else he
would not have married the respondent. She has also been
fraudulently befooling the petitioner about her going to
Singapore and now finally refused to go with the petitioner.
11. The petitioner/appellant on the ground that the
respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty and
deserted him from her company and also due to fraudulent
conduct of the respondent it was not possible for the
petitioner to live with the respondent and therefore has filed
Matrimonial Title Suit before the Court of the Principal
Judge, Family Court, Hazaribag which was registered as
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Matrimonial Title Suit No. 70 of 2014 with a prayer to
annul or dissolve their marriage by a decree of divorce.
12. Respondent appeared and contested the suit by filing
a written statement and stated that due to desertion and
cruelty by husband and in-laws, she has been living in her
parental home and all the allegations as levelled against the
respondent are false, frivolous and baseless allegations. It
is further submitted that she had filed one Complaint Case
No. 1250/2014 u/s 498-A, 379, 323 & 504 of the I.P.C.
and 3/4 of D.P. Act before the learned Court of Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Gaya (Bihar) and one Maintenance
Case vide M. No. 80/2014 has also been filed by her.
13. The issues were framed by the Family Court which are
as follows:
(I) Whether the suit as framed is maintainable
in its present form?
(II) Whether the parties are legally married
husband and wife?
(III) Whether the petitioner was treated with
cruelty after marriage by the respondent?
(IV) Whether the respondent deserted the
petitioner and left the matrimonial home
voluntarily without any sufficient cause with an
intention to abandon the relationship forever?
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(V) Whether the petitioner is entitled for the
relief of divorce as prayed for on the grounds of
cruelty and desertion as contained u/s 13(1-a)
and (1-b) of the Hindu Marriage act, 1955?
(VI) Whether the respondent gave false
information regarding her bio-data before her
marriage?
(VII) Whether the opposite party after the
marriage furnished false information to the
petitioner for her transfer from Singapore to
Mumbai?
(VIII) Whether the petitioner is entitled for any
other relief/reliefs?
(IX) Whether the petitioner-husband is entitled
for relief of annulment of marriage u/s 12(i) (c) of
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
14. Accordingly, evidences were adduced on behalf of the
parties.
15. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, after
appreciating the evidence adduced on behalf of parties,
came to the conclusion that the petitioner-appellant has
not been able to prove his case against the respondent even
to the extent of preponderance of probabilities. Accordingly,
find and hold that he is not entitled to get the decree of
dissolution of the marriage. Accordingly, the suit for decree
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of divorce was dismissed, against which the instant appeal
has been filed.
Submission on behalf of appellant-husband
16. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that
the factual aspect which was available before the learned
family court supported by the evidences adduced on behalf
of the appellant has not properly been considered and as
such, the judgment impugned is perverse, hence, not
sustainable in the eyes of law.
17. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that
there is sufficient evidence available on the record to show
that the respondent and her family members have deceived
the appellant not only once but twice and thrice, first when
the father of the respondent approached the parents of the
petitioner through the maternal uncle Swarup Trigunait
and gave the photographs, Bio-Data and Kundli of the
respondent for marriage with the petitioner and they also
impressed upon the petitioner's parents that the
respondent is qualified up to MBA from Banaras Hindu
University and employed as Manager in CITI Bank at
Mumbai and again on 22.06.2012 when the parents of both
the parties met at Dhanbad and the respondent was
interviewed by the petitioner and his parents and in
presence of her parents they all repeated that she did MBA
from BHU and serving as Manager in CITI Bank at Mumbai
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and that after marriage she would get her transfer to CITI
Bank, Singapore where the petitioner is working and thirdly
in August, 2012 when the father of the respondent came to
Hazaribag along with his other relatives for final settlement
of marriage of the respondent with the petitioner which
after discussion settled for 12.02.2013 as the date of
marriage and these all evidences although available on
record to establish that the appellant was deceived at the
hands of the respondent but not taken into consideration
by the learned Family Court.
18. It has further been contended that the petitioner and
his family have been subjected to mental pain and suffering
from the last eight years due to which it is not possible for
the appellant to live with the respondent and in these
circumstances, it was expedient and justified to have
granted a decree of divorce.
19. It is submitted that it is apparent from the evidence of
both parties that the appellant and respondent are residing
separately since the year 2013 and thereby deserting the
appellant for more than eight years which is a valid ground
for dissolution of their marriage.
20. It has been contended that the learned Principal
Judge only on the evidence of P.W.3 who have deposed that
before marriage his family members did not put any
condition precedent of educational qualification decided the
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entire suit against the appellant/petitioner, because had
this been the case the respondent and her family members
would have stated that the respondent has passed only
Intermediate and is doing nothing, the marriage between
the appellant and the respondent would not have taken
place and the present marriage has taken place only on the
oral version as well on the basis of bio-data of the
respondent which the respondent's parent provided and
this entirely proves that the appellant has been frauded at
the hands of the respondent and her family by giving false
/ misinformation regarding the educational qualification
and employment of the respondent and thus the judgment
and decree as passed against the appellant is fit to be set
aside.
21. The learned Family Court has not appreciated the
proceedings of the Panchayati taken place in village
Malkera on 22.12.2013 and 05.01.2014 where relatives of
both parties were present alongwith respected persons of
the village and there also on demand of educational
qualification and employment proof of the respondent,
nothing was produced before the Panchayat.
22. It has been contended that respondents have
repeatedly made false statement to the appellant that she
would be coming to Singapore right from 07.03.2013 and
further on 24.10.2013 when the respondent informed that
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she had purchased flight ticket for herself and her husband
for Singapore and when the petitioner came to Mumbai
and met with the respondent at the Airport itself and
alongwith her went to meet her immediate boss to know
why he was putting blockade in the way of her going to
Singapore but there was no Bank in function and on
enquiry from the security man it revealed that there is no
Bank in function and this type of making false statement
one after another just to suppress the fact she is neither
M.B.A. and not working in any CITI Bank at Mumbai,
which led to lose of faith of the appellant in the respondent
and therefore he had filed the suit for dissolution of his
marriage.
23. It has been submitted that the learned Principal
Judge has failed to consider that the respondent and her
parents knowingly and deliberately misrepresented the fact
about her qualification and appointment and impressed
falsely to get married to the appellant by playing fraud.
24. The learned Principal Judge has failed to appreciate
the fact which has been deposed by the prosecution
witnesses that the respondent in front of her brother and
father when asked to show her educational certificates and
appointment letter she went to her room and locked inside
and consumed "Sindoor" whereupon this case was
immediately brought to the knowledge of Mahila Thana,
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Hazaribag and thereafter she was taken to Sadar Hospital,
Hazaribag and from there she went to her parental house at
Gaya from the hospital itself because had this been true
that she administered chemical, the petitioner and his
parents would have been arrested immediately and thus
the finding arrived by the learned Principal Judge is not
correct.
25. It has further been submitted that the Matrimonial
Title Suit No.70 of 2014 as preferred by the appellant was
filed on 31.03.2014 and after much delay the two cases
were filed by the respondent i.e Misc. Case No.80/14 and
Complaint Case No.1250/2014 on dated 02.08.2014 and
24.07.2014 respectively. Thus, it has further been
contended that learned Family Court has completely
ignored the documentary evidence and has dismissed the
case of the appellant on erroneous and extraneous
consideration.
26. It has been submitted that the finding of the learned
Principal Judge that the husband-petitioner could not
prove any kind of cruelty committed upon him by the
respondent-wife is not correct because the respondent and
her relatives repeatedly given false information regarding
educational qualification and working in CITI Bank at
Mumbai and also leaving matrimonial house without any
cogent reason and these all constituted mental cruelty to
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the petitioner since last eight years and thus on this
ground the judgment and decree passed is bad and fit to be
set aside.
27. Learned counsel for the appellant, based on the
aforesaid grounds has submitted that the impugned order
is perverse and is not sustainable under the law as also on
the facts of the case.
Submission on behalf of respondent-wife:
28. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted
that since the learned Family court after considering the
entire material available on record and after due
appreciation has passed the order, which requires no
interference on the following ground.
29. It has been contended that due to desertion and
cruelty by husband and in-laws, she has been living in her
parental home and in this regard, she had file one
complaint case No. 1250/2014 u/s 498-A, 379, 323 & 504
of I.P.C. and 3/4 of D.P.Act, pending before the learned
court of C.J.M., Gaya (Bihar).
30. It has further been submitted that the
respondent/wife did not attempt to eat vermilion, rather
she was administered chemical. She was treated at Sadar
Hospital, Hazaribag and from Hospital she was taken back
to her parental house at Gaya and her belongings remained
at her matrimonial house and no case was lodged for this
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incident and after one week, he informed the matter to
police who did not lodge a case and asked for compromise,
therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the
appellant that the respondent herself put vermillion in her
mouth, is totally fallacious and not acceptable.
31. It has further been contended that as per the
testimony of R.W.2, no Bio-data was provided in this
marriage, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel
for the appellant that wrong information about the
educational background of the respondent has been
furnished to the appellant by way of the Bio-data is not fit
to be accepted.
32. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the basis of
aforesaid ground has submitted that the impugned
judgment passed by the learned family court requires no
interference by this Court.
Analysis:
33. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and
gone through the pleading available on record as also the
finding recorded by learned family court.
34. Before learned family court, the parties have adduced
evidence, both oral and documentary, in support of their
case. Therefore, this Court before entering into the legality
and propriety of the impugned order needs to appreciate
the evidence on behalf of parties.
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35. In order to prove and substantiate the petitioner has
produced and examined altogether four witnesses.
36. P.W.1 Bhagwat Pathak: He is father-cum-Attorney
Holder of the petitioner. He has deposed that at the time of
marriage talk, maternal uncle and aunt of the respondent
Sarika Kumari had assured him that Sarika Kumari has
passed MBA from Banaras University and presently she is
working in Citi Bank at Mumbai and this information has
been ratified/confirmed by parents of respondent Sarika
Kumari on 22.06.2012 and on getting such assurance that
Sarika Kumari is qualified, the marriage between his son
Santosh Pathak and Sarika Kumari was solemnized on
12.02.2013. He further deposed that after marriage both
the couple went to Mumbai on 22.02.2013 and on
24.02.2013 his son went to Singapore and Sarika Kumari
did not accompany him on the plea that her transfer is in
process and she will join him at Singapore when the entire
process of her transfer completes and on one pretext or
other she went on fooling and refusing to go to Singapore.
He further deposed that on 27.10.2013 his son brought her
to Hazaribag and on 30.10.2013 in presence of her father
and brother she explicitly stated that she would not go to
Singapore as she is having bright career in Mumbai and on
demand of educational certificates and appointment letter
she went inside the room and eaten Sindoor, which case is
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immediately reported to Mahila Police Station, Hazaribag
and thereupon she was taken to Hospital and on discharge
her father and brother taken her to Gaya (Bihar). This
witness has further deposed that a Panchayati took place
on 22.12.2013 and 05.01.2014 at his village Malkera where
people from both sides were present and there her
educational certificates and appointment letters were asked
to be produced but the relatives of Sarika Kumari failed to
produce any paper. He further deposed that the relatives
and parents of Sarika Kumari have cheated the family of
this witness by giving such misinformation that she has
passed MBA and she is working in CITI Bank at Mumbai
because had they told the real fact, the marriage of his son
and Sarika Kumari would not have taken place. He further
deposed that Sarika Kumari has given wrong information
with regard to her age in the Bio-Data and the opposite
parties have tortured his son.
37. In his cross-examination he deposed that before
marriage he had talk with bridal party and after their
confirmation that the bride Sarika Kumar is MBA he agreed
for the marriage of his son. The marriage talk continued for
about eight months. At the time of first meeting even the
bride had confirmed that she is MBA and is Manager in Citi
Bank at Mumbai. He further deposed that on being
satisfied with her Kundali and bio-data as well as the words
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of her father as her father is a respected family of the
society he agreed for marriage of his son with his daughter.
This witness has further asserted that although the bridal
party has given her Bio-data but he could neither verify her
bio-data nor he could verify the place where the bride was
working and he kept on believing their words and the bio-
data. Even after marriage, the bride had told this witness
that there is a branch of Citi Bank in Singapore also and
once she had been to Singapore and within one month, she
would get transfer and would go to Singapore.
38. P.W.2 Santosh Pathak the petitioner/appellant -
husband himself In his deposition, he has reiterated the
entire statements what he has written in his Matrimonial
Suit for decree of divorce. In para 4 of his deposition, he
has reiterated that on being assured from the words of her
parents and relatives as well as from her bio-data that
bride Sarika Kumari is an Engineering Graduate and did
her M.B.A. from BHU, this marriage was solemnized and
this information was ratified on 20.06.2012 also by her
parents and on being asked by this witness she had
assured that she would come to Singapore after transfer
from Citi Bank where she had already visited twice. On
24.02.2013 when this witness was going to Singapore for
joining his duty, it was fixed that he would transfer money
to the account of Sarika Kumari held with Bank of India
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and Sarika Kumari in turn would give the money to his
father, but she never transfer any money to the father of
the petitioner. On 07.03.2012 he was informed by Sarika
Kumari through email that she has obtained Passport and
on 14.03.2013 she informed that she would get the
employment pass on next Tuesday but all of a sudden she
informed that as per the orders of her higher authority she
would now go to Singapore on 13.05.2013 and thereafter
on one ground or other she continued to pretend for going
to Singapore. This witness returned to Mumbai and met
Sarika Kumari and shown his interest to meet her boss and
she took him to the premises where she is working but
there was no Bank functioning in the said premises. On
27.10.2013 this witness and Sarika Kumari came to
Hazaribag where her father and brother also came and in
their presence she flatly denied to go to Singapore as she
has bright career in Mumbai itself. On demand of
educational certificates and appointment letter she
consumed Sindoor and the said incident was immediately
reported to Mahila Thana, Hazaribag and thereafter she
was taken to hospital and from there she went to Gaya
after discharge. This witness further deposed that on
22.02.2013 and 05.01.2014 Panchayati took place in his
village Malkera where besides respected members of the
village both parties including her father were present and
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there also on demand of educational certificates and
appointment letter nothing was produced. He further
deposed that in order to prove that he has been cheated at
the hands of the opposite parties, he recorded some talk
between Sarika Kumari and her father/ brother on
26.10.2013 and 30.10.2013 which he has produced in the
Court and which will prove that on one hand she tells that
she is working in Citi Bank whereas in Case No. 80/14 as
filed by Sarika Kumar, her father stated before the Court
that she is neither Graduate nor she is working in Citi
Bank. On 21.11.2013 when this witness had telephonic
conversation with Sarika Kumar, she had threatened him
with dire consequences. Due to her deceitful behaviour, it
is very difficult for him to live with her and as such he filed
the present case for dissolution of their marriage. In his
cross-examination, he deposed that when the marriage talk
was going on, he was in Singapore and that her family had
sent her Kundali and Bio-data to his home address at
Hazaribag which was emailed to him by his brother and
when he met the girl at Dhanbad he enquired about her
education and employment and neither he nor his father
had put any condition before her that unless educational
certificate and appointment letter are put before him, he
would not agree for marriage, rather they believed the oral
version of the girl and her parents. There is one dowry-
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cruelty case as well as Maintenance Case against him and
his family members. If the respondent thinks to resume
conjugal life, he would not agree. It is absolutely absurd
that there was any demand of dowry from his side and the
allegation of torture for demand of dowry and filing of this
case is absolutely false and concocted.
39. P.W.3 Raunak Pathak - brother of the petitioner -
This witness has also stated the same version what is
written in the matrimonial suit. In cross-examination also
he corroborated the statement what he has stated in his
deposition. He has stated that before marriage his family
members did not put any condition precedent of
educational qualification. He has stated that the bio-data
given by the parents of Sarika Kumari has never been
verified by his family as her maternal uncle and aunt are
their neighbors and as such they believed on their oral
version. There is a 498A case as well as maintenance case
against them. The petitioner and his family members did
attempt to bring back the respondent but she never agreed.
No case for restitution of conjugal right was lodged.
40. P.W.4 Ajit Kumar Pathak - Cousin of the petitioner -
He has stated that applicant's family was cheated on the
false and fraudulent information that Sarika Kumari is
educationally qualified and is a working lady and had the
bride party told the truth about Sarika's educational
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qualification and job, this marriage would not have taken
place. A Panchayati took place on 22.12.2013 and
05.01.2014 at village Malkera, District Dhanbad where
both groom party and bride party were present consisting
of almost 30-40 members and along with respected
members of the village and proceedings were prepared
where all the members present in the panchayat signed on
both days. In cross-examination he stated that at the time
of seeing the girl there was no demand of any educational
certificates and the groom party did not put any condition
precedent of educational qualification, rather the bride
party themselves have stated about the educational
qualification of the bride.
41. The following documents were exhibited as evidence
on the part of the petitioner:
(a) Ext.1 is Power of Attorney executed by
the petitioner in favour of his father -
P.W.1. It was duly attested by the High
Commission of India at Singapore. Said
attorney -the PW1-signed the main
petition, affidavit etc. for the petitioner,
but the husband as P.W.2 did come in the
Court to support his case. Nothing wrong
is found.
(b) Ext.2 is in four sheets. It is Bio-data
containing academic background and
work experience of the bride.
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(c) Ext.3 is Kundli of bride. Both are either
computer printed documents or photo
copies.
(d) Ext-5 & 5/1 are two signatures over one
panchayati document.
(e) Ext 4, 6 series are audio and video
transcripts & their certificates as per 65A
Evidence Act.
42. R.W.1 Nawal Kishore Trigunait father of respondent
Sarika Kumari. In his cross-examination he deposed that
his daughter is I.S.C. pass but could not complete bachelor
degree. The respondent was working in a packaging
company on contract basis. After marriage she did not
pursue any job. She did not work in CITI Bank at Mumbai.
Daughter never went to Singapore. At the instance of the
petitioner, the respondent obtained her passport. The
respondent did not eat vermillion, rather she was
administered chemical. She was treated at Sadar Hospital,
Hazaribag and from hospital she was taken back to her
parental house at Gaya and her belongings remained at her
matrimonial house. No case was lodged for this incident
and after one week, he informed the matter to Police who
did not lodge a case and asked for compromise and efforts
for reconciliation took place.
43. R.W.2 Abhishek Trigunait brother of respondent
Sarika Kumari. In his cross-examination he deposed that
he was negotiator of this marriage and no bio-data was
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provided. She did not get educated from Mumbai. Prior to
marriage, she was working in an educational packaging
work at Mumbai and after marriage she left the job. The
respondent never worked in CITI Bank at Mumbai. The
respondent lived at her matrimonial house for only 15 days.
44. R.W.3 Sarika Parthak Respondent herself, in her
cross-examination she deposed that she could not complete
her graduation. She worked in Mumbai as material
developer for some time. She was living as a paying guest at
Mumbai. She left Mumbai after marriage. Her brother and
sister were negotiators of this marriage. Bio-data and
Kundli were not provided to petitioner party at the time of
marriage. She went to her matrimonial house at Hazaribag
after marriage. Since she was not having passport, she did
not go to Singapore. She was paid with Rs. 1,40,000/- by
the petitioner but it was not meant to her. She went to
Mahila Aayog twice and lodged a written complaint also.
45. R.W.4-Subham Trigunait another brother of the
respondent - In his cross-examination he deposed that he
was not a participant in the marriage talk and he was not
present on 04.11.2013 at matrimonial house of the
respondent at the time of assault. He heard about demand
of dowry.
46. The documents were also exhibited on the respondent
side i.e. Ext.1 is C.C. of 125 of Cr.P.C. application filed by
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respondent Sarika Pathak against Santosh Pathak, before
the Principal Judge, Family Court, Gaya while Ext.A/1 is
C.C. of complaint petition of Complaint Case No. 1250/14
filed before the Court of C.J.M., Gaya.
47. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff has
argued that the evidence laid by him has not properly been
considered and as such, the judgment suffers from
perversity, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
48. While on the other hand, argument has been
advanced on behalf of the respondent-defendant that the
judgment is well considered.
49. This Court while appreciating the argument advanced
on behalf of the parties on the issue of perversity needs to
refer herein the interpretation of the word "perverse" as has
been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means
that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the
evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs.
State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr.,
(2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word
perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding
of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant
material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material
or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer
from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being
perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.
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Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the
said judgment reads as under:
"24. The expression "perverse" has been dealt with
in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman
Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that
the expression "perverse" means that the findings of
the subordinate authority are not supported by the
evidence brought on record or they are against the
law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry &
Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that
"perverse finding" means a finding which is not only
against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber &
Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994
SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case
where it can be said that the findings of the
authorities are based on no evidence or that they are
so perverse that no reasonable person would have
arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977
Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in
conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse
order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the
Court observed that a "perverse verdict" may
probably be defined as one that is not only against
the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the
Court defined "perverse" as turned the wrong way,
not right; distorted from the right; turned away or
deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by
various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current
English, 6th Edn.
"Perverse.--Showing deliberate determination to
behave in a way that most people think is wrong,
unacceptable or unreasonable."
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2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English,
International Edn.
Perverse.--Deliberately departing from what is
normal and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.--Law (of a verdict) against the weight of
evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of
law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the
English Language (Deluxe EncyclopedicEdn.)
Perverse.--Purposely deviating from accepted or
expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward;
stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases,
4th Edn.
"Perverse.--A perverse verdict may probably be
defined as one that is not only against the weight of
evidence but is altogether against the evidence.""
50. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect
seminal question arises for consideration herein is that
whether the appellant/husband has made out a case for an
order for dissolution of marriage under the Act, 1955.
51. Therefore, this Court before proceeding to deal with
the respective submissions of the counsel as also before
appreciating the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties,
as taken note of above, deems it appropriate to have a
glance to the relevant provisions which may assume some
importance in addressing the issue. Section 5 of the Hindu
Marriage Act contains the conditions for the valid marriage
solemnized between any two Hindus. The said section is
reproduced hereunder:
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"5. Conditions for a Hindu Marriage.- A marriage
may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the
following conditions are fulfilled, namely:
(i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of
the marriage;
(ii) at the time of the marriage, neither
party-
(a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in
consequence of unsoundness of mind; or
(b) though capable of giving a valid
consent, has been suffering from mental
disorder of such a kind or to such an
extent as to be unfit for marriage and the
procreation of children; or
(c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of
insantity
(iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of
twenty-one years and the bride, the age of
eighteen years at the time of the marriage;
(iv) the parties are not within the degree of
prohibited relationship, unless the custom or
usage governing each of them permits of a
marriage between the two;
(v) the parties are not sapindas of each other,
unless the custom or usage governing each of
them permits of a marriage between the two;"
52. Thus, the Section 5 of the Act 1955 provides that a
marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus if the
conditions specified in the section are fulfilled. On a plain
reading of the said provision, it is manifest that the
conditions prescribed in that section, if established,
disentitles the party to a valid marriage. Such conditions in
the very nature of things call for strict standard of proof.
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53. It needs to refer herein that the Section 7 of the Act
relates to the ceremonies for the Hindu Marriage to be
performed with Customary Rites of either party including
Saptapadi i.e. taking of seven steps by bridegroom and
bride jointly before the sacred fire to complete the marriage.
The marriage shall be declared null and void at the option
of either of the parties if it contravenes any of the
provisions specified in Clause (i), (iv) & (v) of Section 5 of
the said Act. Section 12 of the Act, which is pertinent in the
present case, can be resorted to either of the parties for
annulling the marriage as the grounds set fourth therein
are satisfied. Section 12 of the Act is quoted below:
"12. Voidable marriages. - (1) Any marriage
solemnized, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and
may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of
the following grounds, namely:
(a) that the marriage has not been consummated owing
to the impotence of the respondent; or
(b) that the marriage is in contravention of the condition
specified in clause (ii) of section 5; or
(c) that the consent of the petitioner, or where the
consent of the guardian in marriage of the petitioner
was required under section 5 as it stood immediately
before the commencement of the Child Marriage
Restraint (Amendment) Act 1978 (2 of 1978), the
consent of such guardian was obtained by force or by
fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or as to any
material fact or circumstance concerning the
respondent; or
(d) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage
pregnant by some person other than the petitioner.
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(2) Notwithstanding any thing contained in sub-section
(1), no petition for annulling a marriage:
(a) on the ground specified in clause (c) of sub-section
(1) shall be entertained if:
(i) the petition is presented more than one year after
the force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be,
the fraud had been discovered; or
(ii) the petitioner has, with his or her full consent, lived
with the other party to the marriage as husband or
wife after the force had ceased to operate or, as the
case may be, the fraud had been discovered;
(b) On the ground specified in clause (d) of sub-section
(1) shall be entertained unless the Court is satisfied:
(i) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage
ignorant of the facts alleged;
(ii) that proceedings have been instituted in the case of
a marriage solemnised before the commencement of
this Act within one year of such commencement and in
the case of marriages solemnised after such
commencement within one year from the date of the
marriage; and
(iii) that marital intercourse with the consent of the
petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by
the petitioner of the existence of the said ground."
54. Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act embodies
grounds on which a marriage can be declared void and
annulled by a decree of nullity. Clause (c) of sub-section (1)
of the said section provides for such annulment, when the
consent of the petitioner is obtained by force or fraud under
circumstances mentioned in the said Clause. It is settled
position of law that Section 12(1)(c) of the Hindu Marriage
Act does not deal with fraud in a general way, nor deals
with every misrepresentation or concealment, the object of
which may be fraudulent.
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55. Further it requires to refer herein the purport of the
Section 13 of the Act 1955 contains the provision under
which the marriage can be dissolved by a decree of divorce
provided the ground enumerated therein are proved before
the Court of competence jurisdiction.
56. Under the Hindu Law, a marriage is not a contract but
sacrament. The Hindu Marriage Act has no doubt made an
inroad into the close preserve of the ancient Hindu Law
strongly suggesting the marriage as sacrament and not
contract which still goes strong. The fraud contemplated by
Section 12 of the said Act is not required to be interpreted
in tune with the definition engrafted under Section 17 of
the Contract Act. Both the Hindu Marriage Act and
Contract Act are not pari materia as the former deals with
marriages and the other deals with contract and commerce.
Therefore, the definition of fraud given under the Contract
Act cannot be brought with lock, stock and barrel to a
marriage which is sacrament.
57. There are still strong reasons to hold that the Hindu
Marriage is not a contract but sacrament, as the contract
can at the will of the parties be dissolved but the parties
who contract a marriage cannot except, of course, divorce
by mutual consent as provided under Section 13B of the
said Act.
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58. It needs to refer herein that Marriage should not be
allowed to be dissolved on grounds of less educational
qualification of the either of the spouse.
59. Now this court is adverting to the issue of cruelty. The
learned Family Judge has decided the said issue against
the petitioner/appellant.
60. It needs to refer herein that the "cruelty" has been
interpreted by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Dr.
N.G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastana, (1975) 2 SCC 326
wherein it has been laid down that the Court has to
enquire, as to whether, the conduct charge as cruelty, is of
such a character, as to cause in the mind of the petitioner,
a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or
injurious for him to live with the respondent.
61. This Court deems it fit and proper to take into
consideration the meaning of „cruelty‟ as has been held by
the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar
Reddi, (1988)1 SCC 105 wherein the wife alleged that the
husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon‟ble
Apex Court emphasized that "cruelty" can have no fixed
definition.
62. According to the Hon‟ble Apex Court, "cruelty" is the
"conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct
in respect of matrimonial obligations". It is the conduct
which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be
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either "mental" or "physical", intentional or unintentional.
For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the
middle of the night may be mental cruelty; intention is not
an essential element of cruelty but it may be present.
Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more "a question of
fact and degree."
63. The Hon‟ble Apex Court has further observed therein
that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty it is
important for the court to not search for a standard in life,
since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another
case. What must be considered include the kind of life the
parties are used to, "their economic and social conditions",
and the "culture and human values to which they attach
importance."
64. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal
conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations
against the spouse in the written statement filed before the
court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute
cruelty.
65. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337,
the wife alleged in her written statement that her husband
was suffering from "mental problems and paranoid
disorder". The wife‟s lawyer also levelled allegations of
"lunacy" and "insanity" against the husband and his family
while he was conducting a cross-examination. The
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Hon‟ble Apex Court held these allegations against the
husband to constitute "cruelty".
66. In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay
Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon'ble Apex Court
has observed by taking into consideration the allegations
levelled by the husband in his written statement that his
wife was "unchaste" and had indecent familiarity with a
person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an
extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context of
an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute
"cruelty" itself.
67. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v.
Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, has been
pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct
is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that
conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders
the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it
unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct
may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment,
causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse,
etc. The conduct complained of must be "grave" and
"weighty" and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of
marriage would not constitute mental cruelty as a ground
for divorce.
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68. Further in the case of Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla
Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288, the Hon‟ble
Apex Court has held as follows: --
"22. The expression "cruelty" has an inseparable
nexus with human conduct or human behaviour. It is
always dependent upon the social strata or the milieu
to which the parties belong, their ways of life,
relationship, temperaments and emotions that have
been conditioned by their social status.
25. After so stating, this Court observed in
Shobha Rani case about the marked change in life in
modern times and the sea change in matrimonial
duties and responsibilities. It has been observed that
: (SCC p. 108, para 5)
"5. ... when a spouse makes a complaint about the
treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations,
the court should not search for standard in life. A set
of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be
so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely
depend upon the type of life the parties are
accustomed to or their economic and social conditions.
It may also depend upon their culture and human
values to which they attach importance."
26. Their Lordships in Shobha Rani case referred
to the observations made in Sheldon v. Sheldon
wherein Lord Denning stated, "the categories of
cruelty are not closed". Thereafter, the Bench
proceeded to state thus: (Shobha Rani case, SCC p.
109, paras 5-6)
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"5. ... Each case may be different. We deal with the
conduct of human beings who are not generally
similar. Among the human beings there is no limit to
the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New
type of cruelty may crop up in any case depending
upon the human behaviour, capacity or
incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of.
Such is the wonderful (sic) realm of cruelty.
1. These preliminary observations are intended
to emphasise that the court in matrimonial cases is
not concerned with ideals in family life. The court has
only to understand the spouses concerned as nature
made them, and consider their particular
grievance. As Lord Reid observed in
Gollins v. Gollins : (All ER p. 972 G-H)
„... In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing with
objective standards, it is not a matrimonial offence to
fall below the standard of the reasonable man (or the
reasonable woman). We are dealing with this man or
this woman.‟"
69. In the case of Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh,
(2007) 4 SCC 511 it has been held by the Hon‟ble Apex
Court as follows:--
99. Human mind is extremely complex and
human behaviour is equally complicated. Similarly
human ingenuity has no bound, therefore, to
assimilate the entire human behaviour in one
definition is almost impossible. What is cruelty in one
case may not amount to cruelty in other case. The
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concept of cruelty differs from person to person
depending upon his upbringing, level of sensitivity,
educational, family and cultural background,
financial position, social status, customs, traditions,
religious beliefs, human values and their value
system.
100. Apart from this, the concept of mental
cruelty cannot remain static; it is bound to change
with the passage of time, impact of modern culture
through print and electronic media and value system,
etc. What may be mental cruelty now may not remain
a mental cruelty after a passage of time or vice versa.
There can never be any straitjacket formula or fixed
parameters for determining mental cruelty in
matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate
way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on
its peculiar facts and circumstances while taking
aforementioned factors in consideration.
70. Thus, from the aforesaid settled position of law it is
evident that "Cruelty" under matrimonial law consists of
conduct so grave and weighty as to lead one to the
conclusion that one of the spouse cannot reasonably be
expected to live with the other spouse. It must be more
serious than the ordinary wear and tear of married life.
71. Cruelty must be of such a type which will satisfy the
conscience of the Court that the relationship between the
parties has deteriorated to such an extent that it has
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become impossible for them to live together without mental
agony. The cruelty practiced may be in many forms and it
must be productive of an apprehension in the mind of the
other spouse that it is dangerous to live with the erring
party. Simple trivialities which can truly be described as a
reasonable wear and tear of married life cannot amount to
cruelty. In many marriages each party can, if it so wills,
discover many a cause for complaint but such grievances
arise mostly from temperamental disharmony. Such
disharmony or incompatibility is not cruelty and will not
furnish a cause for the dissolution of marriage.
72. Since the appellant husband has also contended the
issue of desertion therefore, it would be apt to discuss
herein the element of "desertion". It needs to refer herein
that the word „desertion‟ has been given in Explanation to
Section 13 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 wherein it
has been stated that "the expression desertion means the
desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the
marriage without reasonable cause and without the
consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the
willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the
marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate
expressions shall be construed accordingly."
73. It is pertinent to note that the word „desertion‟, as
has been defined in Explanation part of Section 13 of the
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Act, 1955, means the desertion of the petitioner by the
other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and
without the consent or against the wishes of such party,
and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the
other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations
and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.
74. Rayden on Divorce, which is a standard work on
the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.), has summarised the case-
law on the subject in these terms:
"Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the
other, with an intention on the part of the deserting
spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an
end without reasonable cause and without the
consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of
departure by one spouse does not necessarily make
that spouse the deserting party."
75. The legal position has been admirably summarised in
paras-453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws
of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:
"In its essence desertion means the intentional
permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse
by the other without that other's consent, and without
reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the
obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of
circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court
has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there
being no general principle applicable to all cases."
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76. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from
a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the
recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the
married state; the state of things may usually be termed,
for short, „the home‟. There can be desertion without
previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the
marriage having been consummated. The person who
actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the
deserting party.
77. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which
exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for
divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or,
where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer.
78. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the
statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the
offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not
complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted,
desertion is a continuing offence.
79. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of
meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one
of the essential elements which differentiate desertion from
wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in
a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust,
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without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will
not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far
as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential
conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of
separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation
permanently to an end.
80. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the
deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent,
and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the
spouse leaving the matrimonial home to from the necessary
intention aforesaid.
81. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs.
Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the
definition of „desertion‟ on the basis of the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman
Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 which
has been consistently followed in several decisions of this
Court.
82. The law consistently has been laid down by the Court
that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one
spouse by the other without the consent of the other and
without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must
prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an
intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the
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cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there
should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting
spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of
the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse
should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse
to leave the matrimonial home.
83. Thus, from the aforesaid settled position of law, it is
evident from the interpretation of the word "cruelty" that
daily tear and wear is not construed to be the cruelty while
on the other hand desertion means parting away one
spouse from the other, but while deciding the issue of
desertion the factum of parting away is to be seen as to
whether the parting away is due to compulsion or with her
volition.
84. Bearing in mind the principles, which flow from a fair
reading of the statutory provisions as noted above, we
proceed to examine whether the appellant has succeeded in
establishing his case for dissolution of marriage and for
coming out such conclusion we again delve into the
testimonies of the witnesses as also the exhibits available
on record as also submissions advanced on behalf of
parties.
85. The case of husband-petitioner/appellant is that at
the time of marriage the wife-respondent and her family
members furnished false information that the wife-
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respondent is an MBA and was working in CITI Bank at
Mumbai. It was false information and had she be not an
MBA and working in CITI Bank, he could not have married.
86. The wife-respondent has denied this case of husband-
petitioner and as per testimony of the respondent witnesses
it is evident that respondent and her relations also
categorically admitted that she could not complete
graduation and she was never working in CITI Bank.
87. It is pertinent to mention here that from the testimony
of P.W.3 it is evident that the educational qualification for
bride was not a condition precedent of marriage. Further it
has come on record that the talk of the marriage
negotiation continued for about eight months, therefore
certainly the groom party had got opportunity to cross
check and verify the claim.
88. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid factual aspect it is
evident that claim of husband-petitioner that the wife-
respondent suppressed / misled her educational
qualification is not fit to be accepted, therefore no element
of Section 12(1) (c) is available herein.
89. The learned Family Court taking into the
consideration the aforesaid factual aspect has categorically
observed that the husband-petitioner could not prove that
there was fraud as to material fact or circumstance.
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90. Further case of the appellant/husband is that the
wife-respondent deliberately did not join him at Singapore
and was lying every now and then regarding her transfer
from Mumbai to Singapore.
91. Herein he respondent-wife herself and her other R.Ws.
in clear terms admitted that respondent-wife never worked
with CITI Bank.
92. Admittedly the suit for dissolution of marriage filed by
the husband-petitioner as such as per the settled position
of law it is his burden to prove his case/claim, however, in
this regard the husband-petitioner/appellant only made
oral claim and no cogent evidence has been laid by him.
93. It is evident from impugned order that the learned
Family Court has put specific question to the appellant that
did he ever arrange the air-ticket of wife-respondent and
still she did not go? But the said question has not been
answered by him. mere oral claim of husband-petitioner
that the wife-respondent was lying regarding her transfer to
Singapore, won't suffice.
94. Further there is admitted Dowry/cruelty criminal case
lodged by wife-respondent which is still sub-judice and
There is no concrete proof that the respondent-wife left the
matrimonial house without any cogent reason.
95. Further case of the husband-petitioner is that there
was cruelty upon him by the wife-respondent which the
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2026:JHHC:1146-DB
wife-respondent denied claimed contrary. After due
appreciation of all the evidences the learned Family Court
has specifically opined that the husband-petitioner did not
specify what cruelty was practiced upon him by the
respondent-wife.
96. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of
the view that the appellant/petitioner has failed to
establish the element of perversity in the impugned
judgment as per the discussion made hereinabove, as such,
this Court do not find any merit in the appeal.
97. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.
98. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also
stands disposed of.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
15th January, 2026
A.F.R.
Sudhir
Uploaded on 17.01.2026
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