Jharkhand High Court
R.S. Education Foundation Pvt. Ltd. ... vs State Of Jharkhand Through Its ... on 14 November, 2025
Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
2025:JHHC:34064
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (C) No. 4130 of 2021
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1. R.S. Education Foundation Pvt. Ltd. having its office at
29/1A, Ground floor, registered Chandranath Chaterjee Street,
P.O- GPO, PS-Bhawanipore, District- Kolkata, State- West
Bengal, through its authorised signatory Pankaj Banka, aged
about 43 years, S/O- Sri Ramesh Banka, R/O- Ratu Road,
P.O- GPO & PS- Kotwali, District-Ranchi.
2. R.S Foundation, having its registered office at "Radha
Gouri", Goushala Chowk, North Market Road, Uppar Bazar,
P.O-GPO, PS- Kotwali, District-Ranchi through its authorised
signatory Prashant Kumar, aged about 42 years, S/O- Shri
P.C. Prasad, R/O- Singh More, P.O- Hatia, P. S.-
Jagganathpur, District- Ranchi.
3. Sharda Global School, run by RS Foundation, situated and
having its office at Bukru, PO- Kanke, PS- Kanke, District-
Ranchi through its authorised signatory Bipin Kumar, aged
about 32 years, S/0-Late Mahendra Ram, Near B.A.U Gate,
Kanke, PO-Kanke, PS- Kanke, District- Ranchi.
....Petitioners
Versus
1. State of Jharkhand through its Principal Secretary, Urban
Development & Housing Department, Government of
Jharkhand having its office at Project Bhavan, PO- Dhurwa,
PS- Jagannathpur, District- Ranchi.
2. Vice Chairman, Ranchi Regional Development Authority,
having its office at Kutchery road, Deputy Para, Ahirtoli, PO-
G.P.O, PS- Kotwali, District- Ranchi
3. Secretary cum State Officer, Ranchi Regional at
Development Authority, having its office Kutchery road,
Deputy Para, Ahirtoli, P.O- G.P.O, PS- Kotwali, District-
Ranchi. ....Respondents
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With
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Premlata Agarwal, aged about 70 years, wife of Prakash Chand
Agarwal, resident of Cozy Corner, Burdwan Compound, P.O.
Lalpur, P.S. Lalpur, District Ranchi. ....Petitioner
Versus
1. Ranchi Regional Development Authority, having its office at
1st Floor, Pragati Sadan, Kutchery Road, P.O. G.P.O., Ranchi,
P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi.
2. Vice-Chairman, Ranchi Regional Development Authority
having its office at 1st Floor, Pragati Sadan, Kutchery Road,
P.S. Kotwali, P.O. G.P.O., Ranchi District Ranchi.
3. State of Jharkhand through Secretary, Department of Urban
Development & Housing, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. &
P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi. ....Respondents
With
---------
Premlata Agarwal, aged about 70 years, wife of Prakash Chand
Agarwal, resident of Cozy Corner, Burdwan Compound, P.O.
Lalpur, P.S. Lalpur, District Ranchi. ....Petitioner
Versus
1. Ranchi Regional Development Authority, having its office at
1st Floor, Pragati Sadan, Kutchery Road, P.O. G.P.O., Ranchi,
P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi.
2. Vice-Chairman, Ranchi Regional Development Authority
having its office at 1st Floor, Pragati Sadan, Kutchery Road,
P.S. Kotwali, P.O. G.P.O., Ranchi District Ranchi.
....Respondents
With
---------
Lovelin Kumar, aged about 47 years, son of Late Shyam Bihari
Tiwary, resident of Tiwary Niwas, Tripathy Colony, Behind
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Hotel Yuvraj Palace, P.O.- Doranda, P.S.-Doranda, District
Ranchi. ....Petitioner
Versus
1. Ranchi Regional Development Authority, having its office at
1st Floor, Pragati Sadan, Kutchery Road, P.O. G.P.O., Ranchi,
P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi.
2. Vice-Chairman, Ranchi Regional Development Authority
having its office at 1st Floor, Pragati Sadan, Kutchery Road,
P.S. Kotwali, P.O. G.P.O., Ranchi District Ranchi.
....Respondents
With
---------
1. Minu Trivedi, aged about 65 years, wife of Late Bharat
Nath Trivedi, presently residing at Flat No. 4C, Vijaya Homes,
Amethiya Nagar, Namkum, P.O. Namkum and P.S. Namkum,
District- Ranchi, permanent resident of Tripathi Colony,
Tiwary Niwas, Behind Hotel Yuvraj Palace, P.O. Doranda, P.S.
Doranda, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
2. Sheo Narayan Prasad, aged about 64 years, son of Late
Harikesh Vishwakarma, resident of Qtr. No. ME/28-B Area V,
Maithon Dam, P.O. Dhanbad, P.S. Dhanbad, District
Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
3 Meena Singh, aged about 58 years, wife of Dilip Singh,
resident of Makan-250, Bina Niketan, Near Sarkari Kuwa,
Mani Tola, Hinoo, P.O. Doranda, P.S. Doranda, District
Ranchi, Jharkhand.
4. Seetu Singh Chhetry, aged about 45 years, wife of Devesh
Singh Chhetry, resident of Near Sarkari Kuan, Bina Niketan,
Mani Tola, Hinoo, P.O. Doranda, P.S. Doranda, District
Ranchi, Jharkhand.
5. Kabita Pradhan, aged about 50 years, wife of Tej Kumar
Pradhan, resident of Flat No.4B, Vijaya Homes, Amethia
Nagar, Near Vinayaka Hospital, Khijri Block, P.O. Namkum,
P.S. Namkum, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
6. Tej Kumar Pradhan, aged about 55 years, son of Sukman
Pradhan resident of Flat No. 4B, Vijaya Homes, Amethia
Nagar, Near Vinayaka Hospital, Khijri Block, P.O.Namkum,
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P.S.Namkum, District Ranchi, Jharkhand
7. Shibendu Majumdar, aged about 58 years, son of Purnendu
Bhuson, resident of Majumdar, Vijaya Homes Flat No. 2C,
Amethia Nagar, Namkum, P.O. Namkum, P.S. Namkum,
District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
8. Purnendu Kumar Singh, aged about 62 years, son of Ram
Prawesh Singh, resident of Flat No. 4A, Shree Prakash
Apartment, Bariatu Road, Near Agrawal Nursing Home,
Karamtoli, Ranchi, P.O. Ranchi University, P.S. Morabadi,
District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
9. Chandra Chur Chakraborty, aged about 54 years, son of
Late Nityanand Chakraborty,
10. Samapati Chakraborty, aged about 39 years, wife of
Chandra Chur Chakraborty,
Sl. No.9 & 10 both resident of Bishop Westcott Boy's School,
Namkum, P.O. Namkum, P.S. Namkum, District Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
11. Chandra Sekhar Chakraborty, aged about 60 years, son of
Late Nityanand Chakraborty,
12. Smt. Banashree Chakraborty, aged about 51 years, wife of
Sri Chandra Sekhar Chakraborty, Sl. No.11 & 12 resident of
Bishop Westcott Boy's School, Namkum, P.O. Namkum, P.S.
Namkum, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. ....Petitioners
Versus
1. Ranchi Regional Development Authority, having its office at
1st Floor, Pragati Sadan, Kutchery Road, P.O. G.P.O., Ranchi,
P.S. Kotwali, District Ranchi.
2. Vice-Chairman, Ranchi Regional Development Authority
having its office at 1st Floor, Pragati Sadan, Kutchery Road,
P.S. Kotwali, P.O. G.P.O., Ranchi District Ranchi.
....Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
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For the Petitioners : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Ankit Vishal, Adv
Mr. Arpan Mishra, Adv
Mr. Bhaskar Trivedi, Adv
[in W.P.S. Nos. 1595 of 2022, 4678 of 2023
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and 6039 of 2023]
Mr. Kumar Harsh, Adv
[in W.P.S No. 4130 of 201]
For the Resp.-RRDA : Mr. Prashant Kr. Singh, Adv
Mr. Karbir, Adv.
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C.A.V. ON: 19.08.2025 PRONOUNCED ON:14/11/2025
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. In the batch of matters, common questions of Law based
on similar factual foundation are involved and hence can be
disposed of by a common order.
3. WPC no. 1592 of 2022 Prem Lata Agarwal versus
Ranchi Regional Development Authority and others was
treated as the lead case and the facts of the petition are being
taken of note for the purposes of adjudication of the petitions.
Before proceeding further, it would be pertinent to
mention that in all these writ petitions, the respective
petitioners, inter alia, have challenged the original orders
passed by the Vice Chairman, Ranchi Regional Development
Authority, and the appellate orders passed by the Appellate
Authority, RRDA cum RMC, Ranchi by which original orders
have been upheld by which the buildings have been ordered
to be demolished.
4. The writ petition filed by Premlata Agarwal, it has been
stated that by registered deed of sale dated 3 October 2008
(Annexure 01), the petitioner purchased a land and a
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structure standing thereon which is situated in village Sidroll,
under Thana Namkum, Revenue Thana no. 218 appertaining
to Khata no. 27, plot nos. 1145 and 1146 in the district of
Ranchi. After purchasing the land, the petitioner got her
name mutated in the office of the Circle Officer and has been
paying rent to the State Government. The petitioner intended
to construct a new building on the land and as per the extant
law and practice, the petitioner applied for and was granted
permission by the Mukhiya of the Gram Panchayat on 12
January 2011 to construct the building, and the said
permission has been placed on record by way of Annexure 18
to the writ petition. Thereafter, the petitioner constructed a
structure (godown) with GCI sheets and after completion of
the construction applied for and was granted electricity
connection in the year 2014.
In the year 2021, a proceeding being UC Case no. 169 of
2021 was initiated against the petitioner questioning the
legality of the construction of the godown by the petitioner
over the land in question on the ground that no permission/
approval was obtained from the RRDA prior to the
construction of the building. The petitioner contended before
this Court that she was not aware of the above proceedings in
UC Case No. 169 of 2021 as no notice was served on her,
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however, she came to know about the initiation and pendency
of the said proceeding from another proceeding being UC
Case No. 178 of 2021 and thereafter the petitioner appeared
and filed her show cause/reply, inter alia, questioning the
maintainability of the proceedings apart from raising other
grounds. A copy of the reply has been brought on record by
way of Annexure 4 to the writ petition.
5. The Vice-Chairman, Ranchi Regional Development
Authority, Ranchi by an order dated 19 January 2022,
directed the petitioner to demolish the godown situated over
the land which was located in village Sidroll within a period of
30 days, failing which it was mentioned that the structure
would be forcibly demolished at the cost of the petitioner.
Further, the direction to seal the structure within a period of
15 days was issued and the planning section, town planner
and executive engineer were directed to ensure such sealing.
Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 19
January 2022, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the
Appellate Tribunal, Ranchi Regional Development Authority
cum Ranchi Municipal Corporation, Ranchi and the
petitioner's appeal was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal
Case No. 07 of 2022.
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6. An application was filed on 31 January 2022 before the
Tribunal seeking stay of the order dated 19 January 2022,
and consequently, vide an order dated 4 February 2022, the
order dated 19 January 2022 was ordered to be remain
stayed by the appellate authority, but only to the extent of the
order directing demolition, whereas the part of the order by
which sealing of the building/structure was ordered was not
stayed. The petitioner resultantly filed a petition under Art
226 of the Constitution of India before this Court and the
Writ Petition was numbered as WPC no. 691 of 2022.
The said writ petition was disposed of by an order dated
21 February 2022, giving liberty to the petitioner to prefer a
fresh application in the pending appeal seeking
amendment/clarification of the interim order dated 4
February 2022.
7. A fresh application, in the light of the liberty granted by
the High Court, was filed by the petitioner before the
Appellate tribunal on 22 February 2022 seeking
modification/ clarification of the order dated 4 February
2022. Said application came to be rejected by an order dated
3 March 2022.
Thereafter, the Vice-Chairman, RRDA, i.e. the original
Authority, which had passed the order dated 19 January
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2022, directed the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Ranchi to
depute police force on 14 March 2022, so as to ensure that
the godown/structure constructed by the petitioner be
sealed. The building was consequently sealed and still
remains sealed.
8. On 21 March 2022, the petitioner filed an application in
the pending appeal, raising an objection with respect to the
jurisdiction of the respondents RRDA in respect of the subject
matter that is the building located in village Sidroll which was
a part of a village Panchayat cannot be subjected to the
provisions of the Jharkhand Regional Development Authority
Act and hence the RRDA lacked jurisdiction to regulate the
area.
On 28 March 2022 the Appellate Tribunal, not only
dismissed the objection raised by the petition date, 21 March
2022, with respect to the jurisdiction of RRDA and held that
the respondents have jurisdiction to decide the question of
sanction of map of the godown, but on the very same day
dismissed the appeal without giving any further opportunity
to petitioner to argue the case on merits.
9. The validity and legality of the orders passed by the
original Authority that is the Vice Chairman, RRDA dated 19
January 2022 (annexure 05), and the appellate tribunal's
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orders both dated 28 March 2022 (Annexures 16 and 17)
have been questioned in the present petition along with
consequential prayers for a direction to unseal the godown
and also to pay adequate compensation computed on the
basis of ₹7000 per day along with interest at the rate of 18%.
Another prayer has been made in the present petition,
which is to hold and declare that the village- Sidroll, which is
a part of a village Panchayat has ceased to be under the
jurisdiction of Ranchi Regional Development Authority after
the Jharkhand Panchayat Raj Act came into force with effect
from 10 May 2001. At this juncture, it would be important to
note that village- Sidroll was brought under the jurisdiction of
Ranchi Regional Development Authority for the operation of
the provisions of Chapter VI, by virtue of a notification, no.
124-RRDA dated 7 February 1976, a copy of which has been
placed as Annexure 19 to the petition.
10. In the writ petition being W.P.C No. 1595 of 2022, the
property which is also a godown situated at Plot No 203/AA
Khata No 182 being situated in village Bargawa, under Thana
- Namkum, Revenue Thana No 216 District-Ranchi.
11. In the writ petitions being W.P.C No. 4678 of 2023 and
W.P.C No. 6039 of 2023, the property is the multi-storied
building namely Vijaya Homes situated at Mouza Khijari,
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Thana No. 219, Plot No. 80 Namkum, Ranchi. The petitioner
in W.P.C No. 4678 of 2023 is the builder whereas the
petitioners in W.P.C No. 6039 of 2023 are the purchasers of
the respective flats in Vijaya Homes have also challenged the
demolition order passed in relation to the multi-storied
building situated at Mouza Khijari, Thana No. 219, Plot No.
80 Namkum, Ranchi.
12. On the other hand, the respondents have appeared and
filed their counter affidavit in which they have maintained
that the respondent-RRDA has the jurisdiction in respect of
the subject matter, as well as over the area in question and
have supported the orders passed by the original as well as
the appellate authority on the ground that the construction
carried out by the petitioner was without any sanction of map
from the competent Authority that is the RRDA and hence
was illegal and therefore rightly ordered to be demolished.
The sealing of the property was done in order to ensure
that no gain is made by the petitioner till the structure is
demolished. The Respondents have submitted that even after
the coming to force of the Jharkhand Panchayat Raj Act the
notification dated 07.02.1976 continues to hold the field and
the same is still in force.
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It has been further submitted by the respondents that
the village in question as well as the villages which form the
subject matter of other petitions are included in the Master
Plan of 2037; hence the respondents have rightly exercised
jurisdiction over the various villages, which form the subject
matter of the batch of petitions.
13. Both the sides, especially the petitioner has extensively
taken the court through the provisions of Part IX and IX A of
the Constitution of India. The petitioners have contended that
after the constitutional amendments, the Regional
Development Authorities have been denuded of the power
which are now exercisable by the local self-government
organisations such as the Panchayat and the Municipalities.
Reference has been made to the provisions of Article 243 N to
show that any law which is inconsistent with the provisions
of the Part IX would only continue to be in force for a
maximum period of one year from the coming into force of the
73rd Constitutional Amendment, 1992.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner in order to buttress
his submission has also referred to and relied upon the
notification published by the Department of Rural
Development, Government of Jharkhand dated 12 August
2017 (Annexure 20) published in the extraordinary gazette
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no. 575 dated 12 August 2017 by which the Jharkhand
Panchayat Land Development (Map and Building
Development) Rules, 2017 have been brought into force. The
said Rules have been framed by the State Government in
exercise of its powers under section 131 of the Jharkhand
Panchayat Raj Act and seek to provide for the procedure of a
sanction of a building plan/map in respect to a building,
which is to be constructed over an area covered by the
operation of the Jharkhand Panchayat Raj Act, 2001.
The Respondents have not disputed the above position.
It was therefore contended that the legislative field with
respect to sanctioning of a building plan/map in respect of a
building to be constructed in an area falling under a
Panchayat stands occupied under the Jharkhand Panchayat
Raj Act and thus any provision or statute providing anything
inconsistent thereto, would be inoperative and void to that
extent.
15. Based on the above pleadings and submissions made at
the bar, it appears that the main issue which needs to be
decided by this Court is with respect to the jurisdiction of the
Ranchi Regional Development Authority in respect of areas
which are now governed and covered by the Jharkhand
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Panchayati Raj Act after coming into force of the same with
effect from 10 May 2001.
The Jharkhand Panchayat Raj Act, 2001 was enacted by
the State of Jharkhand to give effect to the Constitutional
mandate as provided by Part IX and section 1 thereof, which
provides for the short title, extent and commencement vide
clause (ii) provides that the Act extends to the whole of the
State of Jharkhand, except the areas to which the provisions
of the Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951, the Bihar and
Orissa Municipal Act, 1922 or the Cantonment Act, 1924
apply.
Reference to Bihar Regional Development Authority Act
(as applicable to the State of Jharkhand in the name of
Jharkhand regional development Authority act) is
conspicuously absent and hence the Jharkhand Panchayat
Raj Act would apply even to those areas where the Regional
Development Authority Act applies. It would not be out of
place to mention that after the coming to force of the
Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011, the reference to the
provisions of Patna Municipal Corporation act, 1951 and the
Bihar and Orissa Municipal act, 1922 have to be construed
accordingly.
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In short, the provisions of Jharkhand Panchayati Raj
Act, 2001 would extent to the whole of the State of
Jharkhand, except where the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011
applies.
The changes brought by the 73rd Constitutional
Amendment the Panchayats were conferred with greater
duties and functions was to ensure that the Panchayat not
only perform the role of executing the programmes and policy
evolved by political executive of the State, but have been
empowered to formulate and implement their own
programmes of economic development and social justice in
tune with their status as a third tier of the government,
which is mandated to represent the interest of the people
living within its jurisdiction.
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of
Bondu Ramaswami and others v. Bangalore Development
Authority and others,1 has observed as under-
"21. Parts IX and IX-A of the Constitution, relating to panchayats
and municipalities were inserted by the Constitution (Seventy-third
Amendment) Act, 1992 and Constitution (Seventy-fourth
Amendment) Act, 1992. Parts IX and IX-A came into force on 24-4-
1993 and 1-6-1993 respectively. The object of Part IX was to
introduce the panchayat system at grass root level. As panchayat
systems were based on State legislations and their functioning
was unsatisfactory, the amendment to the Constitution sought to
strengthen the panchayat system by giving a uniform constitutional
base so that the panchayats become vibrant units of administration
(2010) 7 SCC 129
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in the rural area by establishing strong, effective and democratic
local administration so that there can be rapid implementation of
rural development programmes. The object of Part IX as stated in
the Statement of Objects and Reasons is extracted below:
"In many States, local bodies have become weak and ineffective on
account of a variety of reasons, including the failure to hold regular
elections, prolonged supersessions and inadequate devolution of
powers and functions. As a result, urban local bodies are not able
to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-
government.
2. Having regard to these inadequacies, it is considered necessary
that provisions relating to urban local bodies are incorporated in
the Constitution particularly for--
(i) putting on a firmer footing the relationship between the State
Government and the urban local bodies with respect to--
(a) the functions and taxation powers; and
(b) arrangements for revenue sharing;
(ii) ensuring regular conduct of elections;
(iii) ensuring timely elections in the case of supersession; and
(iv) providing adequate representation for the weaker sections like
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women."
22. We may first refer to the provisions of Part IX in brief. Clauses
(d) and (e) of Article 243 define "panchayat" and "panchayat area".
Article 243-B deals with constitution of panchayats, Article 243-C
deals with composition of panchayats. Article 243-D relates to
reservation of seats. Article 243-E stipulates the duration of
panchayats. Article 243-F prescribes the disqualification for
membership. 243-G refers to powers, authorities and
responsibilities of panchayats. Article 243-H refers to power to
impose taxes by panchayats and funds of the panchayats.
41. Article 243-ZF is a provision enabling continuance of any
provision of a law relating to municipalities in spite of such
provision being inconsistent with the provisions of Part IX-A of the
Constitution for a specified period of one year. It does not extend
the benefit of continuance to any law other than laws relating to
municipalities; it also does not provide for continuance of a law for
one year, if the violation is in respect of any constitutional provision
other than Part IX-A; and it does not declare any provision of a
statute to be inconsistent with it nor declare any statute to be
invalid. The invalidity of a statute is declared by a court when it
finds a statute or its provision to be inconsistent with a
constitutional provision.
45. Part IX-A seeks to strengthen the democratic political
governance at grass root level in urban areas by providing
constitutional status to municipalities, and by laying down
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minimum uniform norms and by ensuring regular and fair conduct
of elections. When Part IX-A came into force, the provisions of the
existing laws relating to municipalities which were inconsistent
with or contrary to the provisions of Part IX-A would have ceased to
apply. To provide continuity for some time and an opportunity to
the State Governments concerned to bring the respective
enactments relating to municipalities in consonance with the
provisions of Part IX-A in the meanwhile, Article 243-ZF was
inserted. The object was not to invalidate any law relating to city
improvement trusts or Development Authorities which operate with
reference to specific and specialised field of planned development
of cities by forming layouts and making available
plots/houses/apartments to the members of the public."
17. In the case of Rajendra Shankar Shukla v. State of
Chhattisgarh,2 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as
under:-
"9. The 73rd and 74th Amendments were inserted in the
Constitution of India with the avowed object and intention of
strengthening the local self-governance both at the village and
district level. It was argued by the learned Senior Counsel Mr
Gopal Subramanium that self-governance was very much a part of
the Indian society historically. In support of his contention, he
relied upon the words of Sir Charles Metcalfe, the Acting Governor
General of India from 1835 to 1836, on the functioning of the
village panchayats made during the 19th century which are
recorded as under:
"The village communities are little republics, having nearly
everything they can want within themselves, and most
independent of any foreign relations. They seem to last where
nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution
succeeds after revolution; but the village community remains the
same. The union of the village communities, each one forming a
separate little State, in itself, has I conceive, contributed more than
any other cause to the preservation of the people of India, through
all the revolutions and changes which they have suffered, and is in
a high degree conducive to their enjoyment of a great portion of
freedom and independence." [ Report of the Select Committee of the
House of Commons, 1832, Vol. III, p. 331 as quoted in T.N.
Srivastava, Local 'Self' Governance and the Constitution, EPW 27-
7-2002 at pp. 3190-91]
12. It is further to be noted that Schedule VII List II Entry 5 of the
Constitution enables the State Legislature to make laws pertaining
to local government which also include the powers to be vested on
(2015) 10 SCC 400
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the municipal corporations, improvement trusts, authorities, mining
settlement authorities, district boards and other local authorities for
the purpose of village administration and the local self-governance.
The constitutional amendment in 1992-1993 through the 73rd and
74th Amendment Act provided for uniformity in the structure in
terms of three-tier local governments at the District (Zila Parishads-
ZPs), Block (Panchayat Samitis-PS) and Village levels (Gram
Panchayats-GPs). With the constitutional amendment, the
panchayats are constitutionally expected to move away from their
traditional role of simply executing the programmes handed down
to them by higher levels of Government. They are on the other
hand, expected to implement their own programmes of economic
development and social justice. The amendments further confer
power upon the States in the form of Schedule XI to enlarge the
domain of panchayats and to include functions with distributional
consequences. This Schedule includes key functions such as
agriculture, drinking water, education, irrigation, poverty
alleviation, primary, secondary and adult education, roads and
rural electrification and maintenance of community assets."
18. In the case of Village Panchayat, Calangute v.
Director of Panchayat,3 the Supreme Court of India while
dealing with the power of the Panchayat to regulate erection
of buildings within the Panchayat areas and to take action
against unauthorised building constructions held as under:-
"21. The Preamble, Part IV and Part IX of the Constitution must
guide our understanding of the Panchayati Raj institutions and the
role they play in the lives of the people in rural parts of the country.
The conceptualisation of the village panchayat as a unit of self-
government having the responsibility to promote social justice and
economic development and as a representative of the people within
its jurisdiction must be borne in mind while interpreting the laws
enacted by the State which seek to define the ambit and scope of
the powers and the functions of panchayats at various levels.
22. An analysis of Article 40 and Articles 243 to 243-O shows that
the Framers of the Constitution had envisaged the village
panchayat to be the foundation of the country's political
democracy--a decentralised form of government where each village
was to be responsible for its own affairs. By enacting the
Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, Parliament has
attempted to remedy the defects and remove the deficiencies of the
Panchayati Raj system evolved after Independence, which failed to
(2012) 7 SCC 550
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live up to the expectation of the people in rural India. The provisions
contained in Part IX provide firm basis for self-governance by the
people at the grass root through the institution of panchayats at
different levels.
23. For achieving the objectives enshrined in Part IX of the
Constitution, the State Legislatures have enacted laws and made
provision for devolution of powers upon and assigned various
functions listed in the Eleventh Schedule to the panchayats. The
primary focus of the subjects enumerated in the Eleventh Schedule
is on social and economic development of the rural parts of the
country by conferring upon the panchayat the status of a
constitutional body. Parliament has ensured that the panchayats
would no longer perform the role of simply executing the programs
and policies evolved by the political executive of the State. By virtue
of the provisions contained in Part IX, the panchayats have been
empowered to formulate and implement their own programs of
economic development and social justice in tune with their status
as the third tier of the Government which is mandated to represent
the interests of the people living within its jurisdiction. The system
of panchayats envisaged in this part aims at establishing strong
and accountable systems of governance that will in turn ensure
more equitable distribution of resources in a manner beneficial to
all.
24. In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether the appellant
has the locus to challenge the orders passed by Respondent 1 in
the appeals filed by the Company. A conjoint reading of the
provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act shows that a
panchayat is generally required to perform the functions specified
in Schedule I and also make provision for carrying out any other
work or measures likely to promote the health, safety, education,
comfort or convenience or social or economic well-being of the
inhabitants of the panchayat area. It also has the power to do all
acts necessary for or incidental to carrying out the functions
entrusted, assigned or delegated to it. The Sarpanch is not only
entrusted with the duty to implement the programme of welfare
schemes and other development works, but also stop any
unauthorised construction erected in the panchayat area. Section
66 which regulates erection of buildings within the panchayat area
empowers it and/or the Sarpanch to take action against erection of
building without obtaining permission from the competent authority
or any violation of the conditions imposed at the time of grant of
such permission. The panchayat is also empowered to issue
direction for upkeep and maintenance of sources of water supply
which are in private hands."
19. There is no cavil that Part IX of the Constitution of India
was enacted to strengthen the Panchayat system by giving a
uniform constitutional base across the country, and so that
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Panchayat becomes vibrant units of administration in the
rural area by establishing strong, effective and democratic
local administration.
The uniformity on the subject is throughout the territory
of India and therefore in respect of the field of construction of
building in an area falling within the jurisdiction of
Panchayat, the legislation governing the Panchayat system in
the particular state is authorised to make provisions in this
regard. The field therefore in respect a matter relating to the
construction buildings and sanctioning of building plans
must therefore be held to be covered and reserved for the
legislation relating to panchayats.
20. Entry 5 of List II in the Seventh schedule authorise a
State Legislature to enact law with respect to local
government, that is to say, the Constitution and powers of
local authorities for the purpose of local self-government or
village administration.
The 11th schedule read with Article 243G delineate the
power and authority, as maybe necessary to enable the
Panchayats to function as the institutions of self-government,
and enables the State legislature to make a law in this
respect. However, the said list is not an exhaustive list.
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"Rural Housing" is reflected as Entry 10 as a part of the 11th
schedule.
It is well settled that an entry in a schedule must be
given the widest possible interpretation, and therefore having
regard to such legal position, the term Rural Housing must
be interpreted to include the power of sanctioning of building
plans in terms of the applicable building bye laws.
21. Section 75 (10) of Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2001
deals with Rural Housing in the following fashion: -
" (10) Rural Housing-
(i) Implementation of rural housing schemes;
(ii) Distribution of house-sites within its jurisdiction;
(iii) Maintenance of records relating to building sites and other
private and public properties."
Thus, from the above, especially the mention of
maintenance of records relating to building sites and other
Private and public properties indicate that the records must
be authorised by the Panchayat and such records must
include building sanction plans/maps.
22. The conflict between the provisions of the Jharkhand
Regional Development Authority Act, particularly that of
section 30 mandating the obtaining of permission of the
authorities under the Regional Development Authority Act
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before any development of land is undertaken by the owner
and those relating to Rural Housing under the Jharkhand
Panchayati Raj Act with the relevant constitutional provisions
empowering the Panchayat to govern the field relating to
sanction of building maps and plans for construction is writ
large.
There cannot be any reconciliation in this respect and
therefore one legislation has to make a way for the other.
23. One of the principles of interpretation, in case of conflict
between two legislations, is to see which legislation is a later
legislation and a special legislation because it is a settled
principle of law that later special legislation will prevail over a
general legislation enacted at a prior point of time.
24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Harcharan
Dass Gupta v. Union of India,4 has observed that the
Special Law would prevail over the general law. Furthermore,
the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Govt of
NCT of Delhi5 has observed that the Special Law will prevail
over the general law and prior laws.
25. In the matter of interpretation of law, subsequent
legislation prevails over former legislation. The Latin legal
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1111
(2017) 2 SCC 18
2025:JHHC:34064
principle 'lex posterior derogat priori' means that 'a later law
repeals an earlier law'. It is a rule of statutory interpretation
that dictates if two laws conflict, the more recent one takes
precedence because it reflects the legislature's latest intent.
This is one of the tests / principles of interpretation, but not
the sole basis and is subject to application of other maxims.
The maxim has been referred and applied in the following
judgments by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.
26. In Chandra Prakash Tiwari & Ors v. Shakuntala
Shukla & Ors,6 the Hon'ble Supreme Court at Paras 12 and
14 has been pleased to hold as under:
Para 12 - "... It is on this context Broom's legal Maxim in
reference to two Latin Maxims stated as below:
'It is then, an elementary rule that an earlier Act must
give place to a later if the two cannot be reconciled - lex
posterior derogat priori - non et nonum ut priores leges ad
posteriores trahantur (Emphasis supplied) - and one Act may
repeal another by express words or by implication; for it is
enough if there be words which by necessary implication repeal
it. But a repeal by implication is never to be favoured, and must
not be imputed to the legislature without necessity, or strong
reason, to be shown by the party imputing it. It is only effected
where the provisions of the later enactment are so inconsistent
with, or repugnant to, those of the earlier that the two cannot
stand together; unless the two Acts are so plainly repugnant to
each other than effect cannot be given to both at the same time
a repeal cannot be implied; and special Acts are not repealed by
general Acts unless there be some express reference to the
previous legislation, or a necessary inconsistency in the two
Acts standing together, which prevents the maxim generalia
specialibus non derogant (Emphasis supplied) from being
applied. For where there are general words in a later Act
capable of reasonable application without being extended to
subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, then, in the
absence of an indication of a particular intention to that effect,
(2002) 6 SCC 127
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the presumption is that the general words were not intended to
repeal the earlier and special legislation, or to take-away a
particular privilege of a particular class of persons."
Para 14 - "... So far as the question of implied suppression of
the rules made under section 39 of the Act by the General
Recruitment Rules as amended in 1977, is concerned, it may be
pointed out that the basic principle, as set out in Maxwell's
Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edn. p. 168) is that:
"A general later law does not abrogate an earlier special
one by mere implication. Generalia specialibus non derogant, or,
in other words, 'where there are general words in a later Act
capable of reasonable and sensible application without
extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier
legislation, you are to hold that earlier and special legislation
indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of
such general words, without any indication of a particular
intention to do so'. In such cases, it is presumed to have only
general cases in view, and not particular cases which have
been already otherwise provided by the special act.""
27. Further in Solidaire India Ltd. v Fairgrowth
Financial Services Ltd. & Ors,7 wherein [Paras 9 and 10]
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold as
under:
Para 9 - "It is clear that both these Acts are special Acts. This
Court has laid down in no uncertain terms that in such an event
it is the later Act which must prevail. The decisions cited in the
above context are as follows: Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State
Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. &
Anr., [1993] 2 SCC 144; Sarwan Singh & Anr. v. Kasturi Lal,
[1977] 2 SCR 421; Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank & Anr.,
[2000] 4 SCC 406 and Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking
Industrial Co. Limited, [1956] SCR 603."
Para 10 - "We may notice that the Special Court had in another
case dealt with a similar contention. In Bhoruka Steel Ltd. v.
Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. [1997] v. 89 Company Cases
547, it had been contended that recovery proceedings under
the Special Court Act should be stayed in view of the provisions
of the 1985 Act. Rejecting this contention, the Special Court had
come to the conclusion that the Special Court Act being a later
(2001) 3 SCC 71
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enactment would prevail. The headnote which brings out
succinctly the ratio of the said decision is as follows:
"Where there are two special statutes which contain non-
obstante clauses the later statute must prevail. This is because
at the time of enactment of the later statute, the Legislature was
aware of the earlier legislation and its non-obstante clause. If
the Legislature still confers the later enactment with a non-
obstante clause it means that the Legislature wanted that
enactment to prevail. If the Legislature does not want the later
enactment to prevail then it could and would provide in the later
enactment that the provisions of the earlier enactment continue
to apply.
The Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to
Transactions and Securities) Act, 1992, provides in Section 13,
that its provisions are to prevail over any other Act. Being a
later enactment, it would prevail over the Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Had the Legislature
wanted to exclude the provisions of the Sick Companies Act
from the ambit of the said Act, the Legislature would have
specifically so provided. The fact that the Legislature did not
specifically so provide necessarily means that the Legislature
intended that the provisions of the said Act were to prevail even
over the provisions of the Sick Companies Act. ..."
28. Reference has also been made in CCI v Bharti Airtel
Limited & Ors,8.
29. In the case Ashoka Marketing Ltd. & Anr v. PNB &
Ors,9 wherein Paras 50 - 53 Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
as under:
Para 50 - "One such principle of statutory interpretation which
is applied is contained in the latin maxim: leges posteriores
priores conterarias abrogant, (later laws abrogate earlier
contrary laws). This principle is subject to the exception
embodied in the maxim: generalia specialibus non derogant, (a
general provision does not derogate from a special one). This
means that where the literal meaning of the general enactment
covers a situation for which specific provision is made by
another enactment contained in an earlier Act, it is presumed
that the situation was intended to continue to be dealt with by
the specific provision rather than the later general one (Benion:
Statutory Interpretation p. 433-34)."
(2019) 2 SCC 521
(1990) 4 SCC 406
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Para 51 - The rationale of this rule is thus explained by this
Court in the J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, [1961] 3 SCR 185:
"The rule that general provisions should yield to specific
provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers Judges
but springs from the common understanding of man and women
that when the same person gives two directions one covering a
large number of matters in general and another to only some of
them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail
as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier
directions should have effect."
Para 52 - In U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. v. Hari Shankar
Jain & Ors., [1979] 1 SCR 355 this Court has observed:
"In passing a special Act, Parliament devotes its entire
consideration to a particular subject. When a General Act is
subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament
has not repealed or modified the former Special Act unless it
appears that the Special Act again received con- sideration from
Parliament."
Para 53 - In Life Insurance Corporation v. D.J. Bahadur,
[1981] 1 SCR 1083 Krishna Iyer, J. has pointed out:
"In determining whether a statute is a special or a
general one, the focus must be on the principal subject matter
plus the particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act
may be general and for certain other purposes it may be special
and we cannot blur distinctions when dealing with liner points
of law."
30. In Sarwan Singh & Ors. v. Kasturi Lal10 wherein at
Para 21, 22 & 23 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"21. For resolving such inter se conflicts, one other test may also
be applied though the persuasive force of such a test is but one
of the factors which combine to give a fair meaning to the
language of the law. That test is that the later enactment must
prevail over the earlier one. Section 14-A and Chapter III-A
having been enacted with effect from December 1, 1975 are
later enactments in reference to Section 19 of the Slum
Clearance Act which, in its present form, was placed on the
statute book with effect from February 28, 1965 and in
reference to Section 39 of the same Act, which came into force in
1956 when the Act itself was passed. The legislature gave
overriding effect to Section 14-A and Chapter III-A with the
knowledge that Sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act
contained non-obstante clauses of equal efficacy. Therefore the
later enactment must prevail over the former. The same test
(1977) 1 SCC 750
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was mentioned with approval by this Court in Shri Ram Narain
case at p. 615.
22. Relying strongly on the finding at p. 151 in Jyoti Pershad
case that "the provisions of the special enactment, as the Act is,
will in respect of the buildings in areas declared slum areas
operate in addition to the Rent Control Act", counsel for the
appellants argues that the question of precedence as between
the two Acts is concluded by that decision and we must
therefore hold that the conflicting provisions of the two Acts
must operate together with equal efficacy, with the result that
the previous permission of the competent authority under the
Slum Clearance Act must be obtained before instituting any
proceeding under Chapter III-A of the Delhi Rent Act. This
submission overlooks that in Jyoti Pershad case, which was
decided in 1961, the Court did not have before it the
amendments introduced into the Delhi Rent Act by the
amending Act of 1976, and therefore no question arose as to the
effect of the non-obstante clauses contained in Sections 14-A
and 25-A of the Delhi Rent Act. The decision is therefore not an
authority for the proposition for which the appellants contend
and the question arising before us cannot be held to be
concluded by that decision.
23. The argument of implied repeal has also no substance in it
because our reason for according priority to the provisions of the
Delhi Rent Act is not that the Slum Clearance Act stands
impliedly repealed pro tanto. Bearing in mind the language of
the two laws, their object and purpose, and the fact that one of
them is later in point of time and was enacted with the
knowledge of the non-obstante clauses in the earlier law we
have come to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 14-A
and Chapter III-A of the Rent Control Act must prevail over those
contained in Sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act."
31. Therefore, in view of the above position in law, it
can safely be inferred that after coming into force of the
Jharkhand Panchayati Raj and also having regard to objects
and purpose of Part IX of the Constitution of India, the
provisions of the Jharkhand Regional Development Authority
Act, which are in conflict with the provisions of the
Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act must be held to be imply
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repealed and to the extent it is inconsistent with the
provisions of Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act.
The encroachment by the Jharkhand Regional
Development Authority Act is not incidental; rather is direct
and therefore must yield to the provisions of the Jharkhand
Panchayati Raj Act. In respect of a particular function, there
can only be a single authority exercising the power. If under
the Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act and the Rules made under
a procedure has been laid down for getting a sanction in
respect of a proposed building to be constructed in an area
falling under a Panchayat, then the provisions of the
Jharkhand Regional Development Authority Act, especially
chapter VI which also provides obtaining permission before
land development is undertaken and also for the preparation
of master plan cannot be given effect to and the conflict must
be resolved by holding that the provisions of the Jharkhand
Panchayati Raj Act would have primacy and therefore prevail.
32. Even in the State of Jharkhand after the coming to force
of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011, denuded Ranchi
Regional Development Authority of its power to sanction
building plans, and the entire area of sanctioning of building
plans and maps has been handed over to the Municipal
Corporation.
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Similar interpretation has to be given to the Panchayat
under the Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act, else, the same shall
do violence to the constitutional mandate and run contrary to
the spirit of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, the
importance of which has been highlighted by the Supreme
Court in the cases of Bondu Ramaswamy (supra) and
Village Panchayat Calangute (supra).
33. One contention which was raised by the respondent is
with respect to the areas being covered by the Master Plan of
2037. This Court is of the considered opinion that this issue
should not detain the Court any further having regard to the
discussion made above and has to be answered in against the
Respondents for the simple reason that the master plan,
unless authorised by the Panchayat or the authorities
competent under Panchayati Raj Act must cease to exist in
an area over which Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act applies.
Reference may also be made to the provisions of Article
243ZD and Chapter XIII Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act,
which provides for District Planning Committee. Section 123
(ii) (d) provides that every committee shall in preparing the
draft development plan, have regard to the integrated
development of infrastructure and environment and its
conservation, and therefore the plan is something which is
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akin to a master plan which is governed by the provisions of
the Jharkhand Regional Development Authority Act.
34. In view of the above provisions, permitting the master
plan prepared by the RRDA in exercise of powers under the
Jharkhand Regional Development Authority act to operate,
would in pith and substance authorise a legislation to operate
which is deemed to have been repealed to the extent of it
being inconsistent to Part IX and the legislations referable
thereto.
35. In the light of the above discussion, it is concluded and
held as follows:-
I. After coming into force of Jharkhand Panchayat
Raj Act, 2001 with effect from 10 May 2001, the
authorities under the Jharkhand Regional
Development Authority Act such as the Ranchi
Regional Development Authority, cannot be allowed
to function with respect to an area governed and
covered by the Jharkhand Panchayat Raj Act, and
Part IX read with the 11th schedule of the
Constitution of India and must be held to have
been repealed to that extent.
II. As a result of the above, it is further held and
declared that in an area governed by the
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Jharkhand Panchayat Raj Act, the Ranchi Regional
Development Authority has no jurisdiction to
sanction a building plan and there is no
requirement of obtaining the permission of the
authorities under section 30 of the Jharkhand
Regional Development Authority Act from the
authorities of the Ranchi Regional Development
Authority.
III. The structures erected by the petitioner in village
Sidroll without the permission of the Ranchi
Regional Development Authority cannot be said to
be an unlawful construction and the said building
and its construction can only be regulated by the
provisions of the Jharkhand Panchayat Raj Act,
Rules framed thereunder and by the authorities
authorised by such law and not by the officials of
the Ranchi Regional Development Authority, who
completely lack jurisdiction.
IV. Accordingly, it is held that the orders passed by
the Vice Chairman, Ranchi Regional Development
Authority, directing demolition and sealing of the
petitioner's property is an order without
jurisdiction and therefore illegal and unlawful and
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thus is liable to be quashed and set aside.
Consequently, the appellate orders passed by the
Appellate Tribunal are also set aside. Resultantly,
the sealing of the property of the petitioner
pursuant to the order passed by the Vice
Chairman, RRDA is directed to be removed and the
structure be unsealed.
V. It is made clear that the building constructed by
the petitioner is subject to the provisions of the
Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act and Rules made
thereunder as applicable from time to time.
It is therefore ordered as follows:
A. The order dated 19 January 2022 passed in U. .C Case
No. 169/2021 by the Vice Chairman, RRDA, Ranchi is
quashed and set aside.
B. The order dated 28.03.2022 passed by the Appellate
Tribunal in Misc. Appeal Case No. 07 of 2022 rejecting
the objection of the petitioner with respect to
jurisdiction is set aside.
C. The order dated 28.03.2022 passed by the Appellate
Tribunal in Misc. Appeal Case No. 07 of 2022 stands
quashed.
2025:JHHC:34064
D. The respondents are directed to unseal the property of
the petitioner situated at village Sidroll, under Thana
Namkum, Revenue Thana No.218 appertaining to Khata
No. 27 being Plot Nos. 1145 and 1146, District Ranchi
forthwith and handover the same to the petitioner or her
representatives without any delay.
E. So far as compensation is concerned no order is being
passed in the present petition as alleged loss has to be
computed on the basis of evidence, which may involve
adjudication of complex questions of facts and hence if
the petitioner so advised, she may institute a civil suit
seeking compensation and damages from the authorities
who have acted without jurisdiction and the court of
competent jurisdiction may decide the same on the
basis of the materials brought before it and in
accordance with law.
F. However, having regard to the fact that the authorities
have acted without jurisdiction, a token cost of ₹1000 is
imposed, which is to be paid to the petitioner within a
period of four weeks.
36. In view of the discussion made above, the instant writ
petition being W.P.C No. 1595 of 2022 is allowed and
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disposed of in following terms:-
A. The order dated 19 January 2022 passed by the
Vice Chairman, RRDA, Ranchi is quashed and set aside.
B. The order dated 28.03.2022 passed by the
Appellate Tribunal in Misc. Appeal Case No. 06 of 2022
stands quashed.
C. The respondents are directed to unseal the
property of the petitioner situated at Plot No 203/AA
Khata No 182 being situated in village Barganwa, under
Thana - Namkum, Revenue Thana No 216 District-
Ranchi forthwith without any delay.
D. So far as compensation is concerned no order is
being passed in the present petition as the computation
of loss has to be computed on the basis of the evidence,
which may involve adjudication of complex questions of
facts and hence if the petitioner so advised, he may
institute a civil suit, seeking compensation and damages
from the authorities who have acted without jurisdiction
and the court of competent jurisdiction may decide the
same on the base of the materials brought before it.
E. However, having regard to the fact that the
authorities have acted without jurisdiction, a token cost
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of ₹1000 is imposed which is to be paid to the petitioner
within a period of four weeks.
37. In view of the discussion made above, the instant writ
petition is allowed and disposed of in following terms:-
A. The order dated 15 December 2022 passed by the
Vice Chairman, RRDA, Ranchi in U.C Case No. 32 of
2021 is quashed and set aside.
B. The order dated 07.06.2023 passed by the
Appellate Tribunal in Misc. Appeal Case No. 04 of 2023
stands quashed.
C. However, having regard to the fact that the
authorities have acted without jurisdiction, a token cost
of ₹1000 is imposed which is to be paid to the petitioner
within a period of four weeks.
38. In view of the discussion made above, the instant writ
petition is allowed and disposed of in the following terms: -
A. The order dated 15 December 2022 passed by the
Vice Chairman, RRDA, Ranchi in U.C Case No. 32 of
2021 is quashed and set aside.
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B. The order dated 07.06.2023 passed by the
Appellate Tribunal in Misc. Appeal Case No. 04 of 2023
stands quashed.
C. However, having regard to the fact that the authorities
have acted without jurisdiction, a token cost of ₹1000 is
imposed which is to be paid to the petitioner within a period
of four weeks.
39. In view of the findings given hereinabove, the instant
writ petition stands disposed of with the liberty to the
petitioner to proceed in accordance with law by making
proper application for the approval and sanction of the school
building situated at Mouza Bukru, District Ranchi before the
appropriate authority.
40. Pending I.A., if any also stands disposed of.
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
November 14, 2025
Amardeep/-
A.. F . R .
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