[Cites 18, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
Pooja Singhal vs Directorate Of Enforcement on 22 December, 2025
Author: Ambuj Nath
Bench: Ambuj Nath
( 2025:JHHC:38481 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (Cr.) No. 1043 of 2024
Pooja Singhal, aged about 45 years, wife of Shri Abhishek Jha, resident of Flat
No. 3, IAS Officers Bungalow, Governor House, Morabadi, P.O. Morabadi, P.S.
Bariatu, District Ranchi --- --- Petitioner
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement, Union of India represented through its Assistant
Director (PMLA) --- --- Respondent
--
CORAM: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ambuj Nath
---
For the Petitioner(s) : M/s Indrajit Sinha, Sneh Singh,
Akhouri Awinash Kumar, Ashwini Priya, Advocates
For the Respondent-ED : M/s Zoheb Hossain, Amit Kumar Das,
Sourav Kumar, Varun Girdhar,
Pranjal Tripathi, Advocates
---
Reserved on: 13.10.2025 Pronounced on: 22.12.2025
---
Ambuj Nath, J: Petitioner has filed this writ application for quashing of the cognizance
order dated 19.07.2022 (Annexure-2) qua the petitioner, passed by Shri Prabhat
Kumar Sharma, learned Special Judge, Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
Ranchi in connection with ECIR Case No. 03 of 2018, in which cognizance of
the offences under sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering
Act, 2002 was taken without adhering to the mandatory requirement of sanction
under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 corresponding to
Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
2. Case of the Respondent Directorate of Enforcement, Union of India is
that the prosecution complaint being Complaint Case No. 03 of 2018 dated
12.12.2018 numbered as 03 before the Special Court was filed against one Ram
Vinod Prasad Sinha. It is further case of the Respondent that 13 FIRs were
registered by the Jharkhand Police at Khunti, number of each case has been
mentioned at para-1.2 of the prosecution complaint. During the investigation of
all the FIRs, it transpired that defalcation of huge amount of Government
money running into crores was found to be true against the named accused
persons, as per the audit report. It has also come to light that the petitioner
Pooja Singhal who was officiating as the Deputy Commissioner, Khunti
defalcated Government money in many projects. The Audit Committee
suggested that defalcation to the tune of Rs. 18.06 crore was committed during
the period from 16.02.2009 to 19.07.2010, when she was the Principal
Authority for sanctioning the funds for different development projects in
connivance with the engineers who are the named accused persons. During the
course of investigation, various premises including that of the petitioner and her
associates were raided and searched and huge cash amounting to Rs. 19.76
crores were recovered apart from cash and documents/records/digital devices,
etc. related to the investigation were also found. The list of money seized from
the various associates of this petitioner has been mentioned at page-27 of the
prosecution report. The petitioner was confronted with the aforesaid recovery,
but she failed to provide any legal source of income. As such, she was arrested
on 11.05.2022. Ill gotten money was also invested by the petitioner through her
husband, who is also accused in this case.
3. It is also the case of the Respondent that during the investigation, the
petitioner was misguiding as well as frustrating the investigation by way of
evading question and becoming non-responsive to several questions. In light of
the evidence collected during the investigation, as per the Respondent, it is
clearly established that the source of such huge cash / ill-earned money was not
properly accounted by the petitioner Pooja Singhal. Learned Special Judge took
cognizance of the offences under 3 punishable under section 4 of P.M.L. Act,
2002.
4. Case of the petitioner is that the learned Court had taken cognizance
under the aforesaid section without obtaining prior sanction under section
197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
5. It was submitted that the petitioner is admittedly a public servant.
Therefore, additional safeguard in the form of sanction under section 197 (1) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be considered. It was submitted that
cognizance order was bad in law as the mandatory requirement under section
197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not adhered to. Learned counsel
has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Enforcement Directorate versus Bibhu Prasad Acharya reported in [2024
SCC Online SC 3181], wherein it was held as under:
"23. Section 65 makes the provisions of CrPC applicable to all
proceedings under PMLA, provided the same are not inconsistent
with the provisions contained in PMLA. The words "all other
proceedings" include a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) PMLA.
We have carefully perused the provisions of PMLA. We do not
find that there is any provision therein which is inconsistent with
the provisions of Section 197(1) CrPC. Considering the object of
Section 197(1) CrPC, its applicability cannot be excluded unless
there is any provision in PMLA which is inconsistent with
Section 197(1). No such provision has been pointed out to us.
Therefore, we hold that the provisions of Section 197(1) CrPC
are applicable to a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) PMLA.
24. Section 71 gives an overriding effect to the provisions of
PMLA notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained
in any other law for the time being in force. Section 65 is a prior
section which specifically makes the provisions of CrPC
applicable to PMLA, subject to the condition that only those
provisions of CrPC will apply which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of PMLA. Therefore, when a particular provision of
CrPC applies to proceedings under PMLA by virtue of Section 65
PMLA, Section 71(1) cannot override the provision of CrPC
which applies to PMLA.
25. Once we hold that in view of Section 65 PMLA, Section
197(1) will apply to the provisions of PMLA, Section 71 cannot
be invoked to say that the provision of Section 197(1) CrPC will
not apply to PMLA. A provision of CrPC, made applicable to
PMLA by Section 65, will not be overridden by Section 71.
Those provisions of CrPC which apply to PMLA by virtue of
Section 65 will continue to apply to PMLA, notwithstanding
Section 71. If Section 71 is held applicable to such provisions of
CrPC, which apply to PMLA by virtue of Section 65, such
interpretation will render Section 65 otiose. No law can be
interpreted in a manner which will render any of its provisions
redundant.
26. In this case, the cognizance of the offence under Section 3,
punishable under Section 4 PMLA, has been taken against the
respondent-accused without obtaining previous sanction under
Section 197(1) CrPC. Therefore, the view taken by the High
Court is correct. We must clarify that the effect of the impugned
judgment [Bibhu Prasad Acharya v. Enforcement Directorate,
2019 SCC OnLine TS 287] is that the orders of the Special Court
taking cognizance only as against the accused B.P. Acharya and
Adityanath Das stand set aside. The order of cognizance against
the other accused will remain unaffected.
27. However, it will be open for the appellant to move the Special
Court to take cognizance of the offence against the two
respondents if a sanction under Section 197(1) CrPC is granted in
future. This liberty will be subject to legal and factual objections
available to the respondents. Hence, the appeals must fail and are
dismissed subject to what is observed above."
6. Learned lawyer appearing on behalf of the Respondent submitted that
the requirement of sanction under section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is to protect the responsible public servants against institution of
vexatious criminal proceedings against them while they are acting as public
servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to them
in order to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them in the
discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause and if sanction is
granted, to confer on the Government, if they choose to exercise it, complete
control of the prosecution. It was further submitted that this protection has
certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public
servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is
not merely a cloak for doing the objectional act. It was further submitted that if
in official duty, any public servant acts in excess of his duty, but there is a
reasonable connection between the act and the performance of his official duty,
the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the
protection. Reliance has been placed upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court rendered in the case of State of Orissa versus Ganesh Chandra Jew
[(2004) 8 SCC 40], wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court at para-7, 8, 9 and 10
has held as under:
"7. The protection given under Section 197 is to protect
responsible public servants against the institution of possibly
vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been
committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as
public servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate
protection to public servants to ensure that they are not
prosecuted for anything done by them in the discharge of their
official duties without reasonable cause, and if sanction is
granted, to confer on the Government, if they choose to exercise
it, complete control of the prosecution. This protection has certain
limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the
public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his
official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable
act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but
there is a reasonable connection between the act and the
performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a
sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection.
The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether
the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent
upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was
committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such
in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can
be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned was
accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him
while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duties. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as
the act, because the official act can be performed both in the
discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The
act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of
the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is
important and the protection of this section is available if the act
falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot
be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable
connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it
possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this
regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part
of the public servant to commit the act complained of could have
made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official
duty. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, it may be
said that such act was committed by the public servant while
acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every
connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the
public servant. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of
Section 197 does not get immediately attracted on institution of
the complaint case.
8. At this juncture, we may refer to P. Arulswami v. State of
Madras [AIR 1967 SC 776: 1967 Cri LJ 665] wherein this Court
held as under: (AIR p. 778, para 6)
"It is not therefore every offence committed by a public servant
that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the
Criminal Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him while
he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties;
but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official
duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been
done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. It
is the quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the
scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated
by Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted.
An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as
such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty.
Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no
protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the
official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable."
9. Prior to examining if the courts below committed any error of
law in discharging the accused, it may not be out of place to
examine the nature of power exercised by the court under Section
197 of the Code and the extent of protection it affords to public
servants, who apart from various hazards in discharge of their
duties, in absence of a provision like the one may be exposed to
vexatious prosecutions. Sections 197(1) and (2) of the Code read
as under:
"197. (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate
or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with
the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged
to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act
in the discharge of his official duty, no court shall take
cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction--
(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may
be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence
employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the
Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may
be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence
employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State
Government:
***
(2) No court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have
been committed by any member of the armed forces of the Union
while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central
Government."
The section falls in the chapter dealing with conditions requisite
for initiation of proceedings. That is, if the conditions mentioned
are not made out or are absent then no prosecution can be set in
motion. For instance, no prosecution can be initiated in a Court of
Session under Section 193, as it cannot take cognizance, as a
court of original jurisdiction, of any offence unless the case has
been committed to it by a Magistrate or the Code expressly
provides for it. And the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take
cognizance of any offence is provided by Section 190 of the
Code, either on receipt of a complaint, or upon a police report or
upon information received from any person other than a police
officer, or upon his knowledge that such offence has been
committed. So far as public servants are concerned, the
cognizance of any offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197
of the Code unless sanction is obtained from the appropriate
authority, if the offence, alleged to have been committed, was in
discharge of the official duty. The section not only specifies the
persons to whom the protection is afforded but it also specifies
the conditions and circumstances in which it shall be available
and the effect in law if the conditions are satisfied. The
mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant
is brought out by the expression "no court shall take cognizance
of such offence except with the previous sanction". Use of the
words "no" and "shall" makes it abundantly clear that the bar on
the exercise of power by the court to take cognizance of any
offence is absolute and complete. The very cognizance is barred.
That is, the complaint cannot be taken notice of. According
to Black's Law Dictionary the word "cognizance" means
"jurisdiction" or "the exercise of jurisdiction" or "power to try
and determine causes". In common parlance it means taking
notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a
complaint or taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in
respect of a public servant who is accused of an offence alleged
to have been committed during discharge of his official duty.
10. Such being the nature of the provision the question is, how
should the expression, "any offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty", be understood? What does it
mean? "Official", according to the dictionary, means pertaining to
an office, and official act or official duty means an act or duty
done by an officer in his official capacity. In B. Saha v. M.S.
Kochar [(1979) 4 SCC 177 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 939] it was held :
(SCC pp. 184-85, para 17)
"17. The words 'any offence alleged to have been committed by
him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty' employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are
capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these
words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered
altogether sterile, for, 'it is no part of an official duty to commit
an offence, and never can be'. In the wider sense, these words
will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence,
committed in the course of the same transaction in which the
official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right
approach to the import of these words lies between these two
extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence
committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance
of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section
197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and
reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction
for prosecution under the said provision."
(emphasis in original)
Use of the expression "official duty" implies that the act or
omission must have been done by the public servant in the course
of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his
duty. The section does not extend its protective cover to every act
or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its
scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done
by a public servant in discharge of official duty."
Section 197(1)(a)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as
under:
"197.Prosecution of Judges and public servants. - (1) When any
person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not
removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the
Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of
such offence except with the previous sanction-
(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case
may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence
employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the
Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case
may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence
employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State
Government.
Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by
a person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a
Proclamation issued under cluse (1) of Article 356 of the
Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for
the expression "State Government" occurring therein, the
expression "Central Government" were substituted.
Explanation.- For the removal of doubts it is hereby
declared that no sanction shall be required in case of a public
servant accused of any offence alleged to have been committed
under section 166-A, section 166-B, section 354, section 354-B,
section 354-C, section 354-D, section - 370, section 375, section
376 [Section 376-A, 376-AB, section 376-C, section 376-D,
section-376DA, section 376-DB] or section 509 of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860)"
7. Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives protection to public
servants employed in the Central Government or the State Government,
protecting them from vexatious criminal proceeding while acting as public
servants. By various judicial pronouncements, protection has been extended to
any act which exceeds their official duty while officiating as a public servant. If
there is reasonable connection between the act and the performance of their
official duty any excess will not be sufficient ground to deprive the public
servants from protection conferred under section 197(1) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. However, accumulating ill-gotten wealth by siphoning
State funds cannot be said to be part of official duty of any public servant.
8. From the facts of the present case, it can be said that the petitioner Pooja
Singhal had sanctioned funds for different development projects which she was
not authorized to do so and in turn, she has accumulated ill-gotten money.
Prima facie, as per the case of the Respondents, she has not been able to
account for the money which has been recovered or attributed to have been
recovered from her or her associates.
Sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is only for
the acts reasonably connected to official duty, not personal illegal acts even if
done by the public servants. Sanction under section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is not for shielding corrupt officials.
In the case of Gurmeet Kaur versus Devendra Gupta reported in [2024
SCC OnLine SC 3761], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that guiding
principle governing the necessity of prior sanction stands well crystalized.
Pivotal inquiry is that whether the impugned act is reasonably connected to
discharge of official duty. If the act is wholly unconnected or manifestly devoid
of any nexus to official functions of the public servant, the requirement of
sanction obviate. Conversely, whether there exists any reasonable link between
the act complained of and the official duty of public servant, the protective
umbrella of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and section 170 of
the Police Act is attracted. In such cases, prior sanction assumes the character
of sine qua non regardless of, whether public servant exceeds the scope of
authority or acted improperly while discharging his duty.
9. Now, the question is, whether the learned Special Judge should have
taken cognizance after obtaining sanction for prosecution of the petitioner. It is
settled principle of law that the issue of sanction under section 197 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure can be taken up before the learned Trial Court at any
stage of the proceedings. It would depend on the nature of the evidence that the
prosecution may lead in course of the trial. In fact, sanction can be obtained at
any stage before the pronouncement of the judgment.
10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that taking of
cognizance in the present case by the Special Court without sanction will not
vitiate the cognizance order. Accordingly, this writ application is dismissed.
Pending I.A., if any, also stands disposed of.
(Ambuj Nath, J)
Ranjeet/
22.12.2025
