Jharkhand High Court

Mr. Sahadeo Choudhary vs Mr. Ashutosh Anand on 18 August, 2025

Author: Ananda Sen

Bench: Ananda Sen

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             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                           W.P.(S) No. 4879 of 2022
Jaibind Kumar son of late Kishori Singh, presently residing at C/o Shri Madan
Sahu, Chhatar Bagicha, PO & PS Lohardaga, District Lohardaga Jharkhand
Pin 835302.
                                     Versus
   1. The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Department of
      Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha, Government of
      Jharkhand, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, PO Dhurwa, PS
      Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi.
   2. The Principal District & Sessions Judge, Civil Courts Lohardaga, having
      office at PO PS & District Lohardaga.
   3. The Enquiry Officer-cum-District Judge I, Civil Courts Lohardaga, having
      Office at PO PS & District Lohardaga.
                                       ----
                                   PRESENT
                             SRI ANANDA SEN, J.
                                       ----
             For the Petitioner :     Mr. Sahadeo Choudhary, Advocate
                                      Mr. Manoj Kumar, Advocate
             For the Respondents: Mr. Ashutosh Anand, AAG
                                      Mr. Shahbaj Akhtar, AC to AAG
                                       ----
                               JUDGMENT

Dated : 18th August, 2025

By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner herein has prayed for the reliefs, which is quoted hereunder: -

(i) Issue a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ for setting aside/ quashing of the entire departmental proceedings (Annexure 1) conducted by respondent No.3 (the enquiry officer) in D.P. No.05/12 against the petitioner.

(ii) For setting aside/quashing of Memo No.26/22 (c) dated 18.07.22 issued by Principal District Judge Lohardaga (Annexure-20) whereby and where under the petitioner's representation dated 07.07.2022 in D.P. No.05/12 for remitting the matter back to the enquiry officer for conducting further enquiry against the petitioner at the stage where defect is crept in and conclude the same by taking a fresh decision has been rejected.

(iii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order or direction to respondent No.2 to remit the matter back to respondent no.3 to hold Denovo enquiry/ afresh enquiry or further enquiry against the petitioner in D.P. no.05/12 from the stage where it stood vitiated.

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2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was not being allowed to participate in the Departmental Proceeding, thus, there is a gross violation of principles of natural justice. He contends that the petitioner was suffering from ailments as a result of which he could not participate in the proceeding and even his lawyer was not allowed to attend the Departmental Proceeding. Learned counsel also contends that only after obtaining the certified copies of the order sheets of the Departmental Proceeding, he could come to know about the illegality in conducting the Departmental Proceeding. He further contends that the essential documents were also not supplied to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention on the point of violation of principles of natural justice has relied upon various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court, which shall be dealt at a later part of this judgment including their relevancy considering the facts of this case.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents-State argued that the plea, which the petitioner is taking in this writ petition has already been considered in earlier rounds of litigation up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, inasmuch as the petitioner had approached this Court in the Writ Petition, Letters Patent Appeal and Civil Review Application as also before the Hon'ble Supreme Court twice taking the same grounds each and every time. Learned counsel for the respondent-State, by relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Nagabhushana versus State of Karnataka and Others reported in (2011) 3 SCC 408, submits that it is not only a case of res judicata and constructive res judicata, but the petitioner has also made himself liable for exemplary cost for willful abuse of the process of the Court and law.

4. From a simple perusal of the prayers made in the writ petition and from the submissions made on behalf of the parties, it gives an impression that the prayer is simple and is of some substance, but from the facts of this case and the facts, which led to filing of this writ petition will clearly suggest that how the process of law has been misused, rather abused by the petitioner.

FACTS LEADING TO THIS WRIT PETITION

5. It is not necessary to give details about the the Departmental Proceeding, but the facts, which would suffice for deciding this writ petition are as follows.

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(A) The petitioner was appointed on the post of Clerk on 16.03.2000. At the relevant time, when the Departmental Proceeding was initiated, petitioner was posted as Bench Clerk in the District Judgeship at Lohardaga, Jharkhand. As Bench Clerk (Peshkar), he was incharge of the judicial records, which were fixed for hearing and brought to the Court.

(B) A Title Suit No.7 of 2001, was heard by the Court. When the record was in custody of the petitioner, several important documents went missing from the record. A Departmental Proceeding was initiated against the petitioner, being Departmental Proceeding No.5 of 2012, which is the subject matter of this writ petitioner.

(C) In the Departmental Proceeding, opportunity was given to the petitioner, but on one pretext or the other, i.e., on health grounds etc. etc., petitioner did not appear in the Departmental Proceeding, which resulted in an exparte enquiry against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report and after completion of all the formalities and the procedure prescribed under law, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the petitioner from service.

(D) Be it noted that before dismissal of the petitioner, petitioner approached the High Court by filing a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 3219 of 2013 wherein, he sought recall of the ex-parte enquiry, change of Disciplinary Authority and restraining any decision on the enquiry report. Since during pendency of the writ petition, petitioner was dismissed, the writ petition was dismissed as infructuous with the liberty to take all the points in appeal. (E) Petitioner, thereafter filed a departmental appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Departmental Appeal was also dismissed after considering all the points raised by the petitioner. Challenging the order of dismissal passed in the Disciplinary Proceeding No.5 of 2012 and also the appellate order communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 28.07.2015, the petitioner then filed a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3872 of 2015. In the said writ petition, petitioner had taken all the available grounds including the ground of violation of principles of natural

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justice. It was his case that since he was ill and was under

treatment in Delhi, he could not appear. Further, he also took a ground that even his lawyer was not allowed to appear in the Departmental Proceeding to defend him. His plea that he could not defend his case, for whatever reasons it may be, was urged by the petitioner in the writ petition. The Writ Court, after hearing all the arguments of the petitioner and considering the facts of this case and the scope of the writ petition, dismissed the same by order dated 03.08.2016.

(F) Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed a Letters Patent Appeal, being L.P.A. No. 374 of 2016. In the Letters Patent Appeal also, same grounds of non-compliance of principles of natural justice was raised. The Letters Patent Court considered the same and dismissed the appeal by an order dated 21.08.2018. (G) The petitioner, thereafter, moved the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal being Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.33719 of 2018. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, by order dated 02.01.2019, dismissed the same after considering the arguments. Be it noted that no liberty was granted to the petitioner to file any other application far less a Review Application before the Hon'ble High Court.

(H) Petitioner, after dismissal of the Special Leave to Appeal, again approached the Hon'ble High Court by filing a Civil Review being Civil Review No. 15 of 2019. In the Civil Review, he had again taken the point of violation of principles of natural justice during the Departmental Proceeding. The Review Application was also dismissed by judgment dated 3rd September, 2021. (I) Challenging the order passed in the Review Application, the petitioner again moved before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by preferring Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.16590 of 2021, which was also dismissed by order dated 25.10.2021, observing that the substantive order cannot be challenged again by the petitioner as the SLP already stands dismissed without any liberty. (J) It is necessary to give timelines for the purpose of deciding this writ petition, to show as to how and when the petitioner has

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knocked the door of this Court, raising the same points time and again: -

Date Event 2012 The misconduct 31.05.2012 Suspension Order 12.06.2012 Chargesheet issued 17.05.2013 W.P.(S) No.3219 of 2013 filed 16.08.2013 Punishment of Dismissal 23.04.2014 W.P.(S) No.3219 of 2013 disposed as infructuous 28.07.2015 Departmental Appeal dismissed 18.08.2015 W.P.(S) No.3872 of 2015 filed 03.08.2016 W.P.(S) No.3872 of 2015 dismissed 20.08.2016 L.P.A. No.374 of 2016 filed 21.08.2018 L.P.A. No.374 of 2016 dismissed 02.01.2019 Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 33719 of 2018 dismissed 01.02.2019 Civil Review No.15 of 2019 filed 03.09.2021 Civil Review No.15 of 2019 dismissed 25.10.2021 Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 16590 of 2021 [filed against the dismissal of civil review] dismissed 22.09.2022 Present writ petition filed.

FINDINGS

6. From the aforesaid timeline, it is clear that the petitioner has approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court twice, challenging the same order and taking all similar points. He has also approached this Court in the Writ Petition, Letters Patent Appeal and Civil Review Application taking the same grounds, each and every time. His main and only ground in this writ petition is that he was not being allowed to participate in the Departmental Proceeding and there is a gross violation of principles of natural justice. His case is that he was ill and that is the reason he could not attend and even his lawyer was not allowed to attend the Departmental Proceeding. His further ground is that only after obtaining the certified copies of the order sheet of the Departmental Proceeding, he could come to know about the illegality. He also submitted that the essential documents were also not supplied to him.

On these grounds, petitioner wants that the Departmental Enquiry in Departmental Proceeding No.5 of 2012 should be reopened and a fresh enquiry be made and he be given a chance to participate.

7. The ground, which the petitioner is arguing before this Court has already been argued by him and has been considered by the Writ Court,

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Letters Patent Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court twice and also by the Division Bench in the Civil Review.

8. After going through the judgment of the Writ Court in W.P.(S) No. 3872 of 2015, I find that the petitioner's contention about his illness and treatment by doctors at Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, New Delhi and the opportunity of hearing in the Departmental Proceeding and the exparte proceeding has been noted by the Writ Court in paragraph 2 at page 3 of the judgment. In paragraph 3 of the judgment, petitioner's contention about violation of principles of natural justice has been noted by the Court. In paragraph 4 also the Writ Court had taken note of the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and also taken note of the pleas on the point of violation of principles of natural justice. Considering the aforesaid issue of violation of principles of natural justice, the Writ Court had dealt with the same in paragraphs 6(ii) (iii) and ultimately held that the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the order of punishment needs no interference. The Writ Court also in paragraph 6(ii) had held that at any stage of Departmental Proceeding there is no violation of principles of natural justice. Plea of illness was also taken note of and negated by the Court and the fact that the petitioner also refused his medical check-up by a duly constituted medical board was also taken note of. It is necessary to quote paragraph 6(ii), (iii) and (v) of the judgment, which is the findings of the Coordinate Bench on this issue in W.P.(S) No.3872 of 2015:-

6. ...

(i) ...

(ii) From perusal of the record, it further appears that in the departmental proceeding, petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity to defend his case but the petitioner for the one pretext and the other evaded notice and tried to linger the proceeding. At every stage of proceeding, i.e. from the initiation of departmental proceeding till its culmination, the disciplinary authority sent notices by post and by process server but the petitioner did not accept that notices and the notices were returned unserved and further complaints are there against the petitioner and his wife that they threatened the process server of dire consequences. Hence, there is no shadow of doubt that at any stage of departmental proceeding, there is violation of principles of natural justice.

(iii) Furthermore, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner was unable to participate in the departmental proceeding and when he took the pretext of his illness, the

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respondents-authority constituted a Medical Board for his examination and notice to that effect was sent to him, but, the petitioner refused to accept the same and time and again only tried to defer the matter by writing various letters.

(iv) ...

(v) In the case at hand, having considered the gravity of proved charges, the quantum of punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority, basing on the elaborate findings of enquiry officer, being affirmed by the appellate authority, does not require interference by this Court and is in commensurate with the proved charges.

9. The Letters Patent Court also took into consideration the submission of the petitioner on the point of violation of natural justice. In paragraph 6 of the said judgment, the Letters Patent Court considered the arguments of the petitioner on the point of denial of sufficient opportunity in the Departmental Proceeding to defend himself. The Letters Patent Court, while addressing the aforesaid issue at the appellate stage, in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment, had given reasons and had negated the submission of the petitioner. The Letters Patent Court had also held that inspite of show cause notices issued to him when he did not appear, a notice was published in the newspaper and subsequently second show-cause notice was also published in the newspaper. It is necessary to quote paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment dated 21st August, 2018, which read as under: -

10. To support the plea that he was not afforded sufficient opportunity to defend himself, the appellant has pleaded that on 18.06.2012 he submitted an application seeking leave from 19.06.2012 to 28.06.2012, and applications dated 29.06.2012, 02.07.2012 and 11.07.2012 for leave on the ground that he was advised bed rest by the doctors. His application dated 18.06.2012 was for leave from 19.06.2012 to 28.06.2012 for attending Tilak and marriage ceremony and thereafter for attending Dashkarm and Shradh of his mother- in-law who had died on 15.06.2016. Again on 24.07.2012 he submitted an application to the Judge-in-Charge, Lohardaga informing him about his inability to remain present on duty till 05.08.2012 on the ground that he has been advised bed rest by the doctor. For his treatment at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, New Delhi, he has submitted application on 14.08.2012.

11. In the departmental proceeding inspite of show-cause notices issued to him when he dd not appear a notice was published in the newspaper on 18.08.2012. The second show-cause notice was also published in the newspaper. The

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appellant has produced reports of Angiography dated 14.08.2012 and Angioplasty dated 05.09.2012. However, he has not produced any evidence which may indicate that during this period he was admitted in the hospital. Assuming that he was admitted in the hospital during this period, still he has failed to explain his absence in the departmental proceeding till enquiry report was submitted on 10.01.2013 and thereafter till when the second show-cause notice was issued to him. The order passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate order, both are well-reasoned order.

10. Thus, from the aforesaid facts and the recording made by the Writ Court and the Letters Patent Court, issue of violation of principles of natural justice as claimed by the petitioner has been set at rest against the petitioner. The Special Leave to Appeal, which was filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid order was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 02.01.2019. A Review Application was also filed. In the Review Application, which was being argued by the petitioner in person, at paragraph 9, the Division Bench of this Court has taken into consideration the points raised by the petitioner, which relates to irregularity in the proceeding and the plea of not permitting the petitioner to engage a legal practitioner and non-supply of documents. After considering all these aspects, the Review Application also stood dismissed. The Special Leave to Appeal arising out of the said review was dismissed, holding that the substantive order of dismissal cannot be challenged again by the petitioner as the Special Leave to Appeal also stands dismissed without any liberty. In the aforesaid order, it has also been held that a Special Leave to Appeal would not be maintainable against an order of review. It is necessary to quote the entire order dated 25.10.2021, which reads as under: -

"Upon hearing the counsel the Court made the following ORDER The substantive order was sustained by the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition vide order dated 06.04.2018 in Writ Petition [C] No.247/2018 [Jaibind Kumar v. High Court of Jharkhand & Ors]. Thereafter, a review petition was filed before the High Court which has been dismissed by the impugned order. A Special Leave Petition would not be maintainable only against the review petition in view of the judgment of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Yashwant Singh Negi - 2013 (2) SCR 550.

The substantive order cannot be challenged again by the petitioner as the SLP already stands dismissed without any liberty.

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In view of the aforesaid, the SLP is accordingly dismissed."

11. From the aforesaid orders, it is clear that the entire issues including the issue, which the petitioner has raised in this writ petition are not worth to be heard far less to be considered.

CASE LAWS AND ANALYSIS OF FACTS OF THIS CASE

12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ishwar Dutt versus Collector (LA) reported in (2005) 7 SCC 190 by relying upon the judgment in the case of Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh versus State of Gujarat [(1965) 2 SCR 547 : AIR 1965 SC 1153] has discussed the principles of res-judicata in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

In the case of Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh versus State of Gujarat [(1965) 2 SCR 547] which has been relied upon by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ishwar Dutt (supra), the principles of res- judicata has been summarized at paragraph 53. Paragraph 53 of Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh (supra) reads as under: -

53. In Daryao's case 1962-1 SCR 574: this Court had again dealt with the question of the applicability of the principle of res judicata in writ proceedings. The matter was gone through very exhaustively and the final conclusions are to be found at p. 592 (of SCR): We may summarise them thus:

1. If a petition under Art. 226 is considered on the merits as a contested matter and is dismissed, the decision would continue to bind the parties unless it is otherwise modified or reversed by appeal or other appropriate proceedings permissible under the Constitution.

2. It would not be open to a party to ignore the said judgment and move this Court under Art. 32 by an original petition made on the same facts and for obtaining the same or similar orders or writs.

3. If the petition under Art. 226 in High Court is dismissed not on the merits but because of the laches of the party applying for the writ or because it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it, the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a subsequent petition under Art. 32.

4. Such a dismissal may, however, constitute a bar to a subsequent application under Art. 32 where and if the facts thus found by the High Court be themselves relevant even under Art. 32.

5. If a writ petition is dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in that behalf, whether or not the dismissal

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would constitute a bar would depend on the nature of the order. If the order is on the merits, it would a bar.

6. If the petition is dismissed in limine without a speaking order, such dismissed cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata.

7. If the petition is dismissed as withdrawn, it cannot be a bar to a subsequent petition under Art. 32 because; in such a case, there had been no decision on the merits by the Court.

13. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Nagabhushana versus State of Karnataka and Others reported in (2011) 3 SCC 408 at paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 has held as under: -

11. We find that disregarding the aforesaid clear finding of this Court, the appellant, on identical issues, further filed a new writ petition out of which the present appeal arises. That writ petition, as noted above, was rejected both by the learned Single Judge and by the Division Bench in clear terms. It is obvious that such a litigative adventure by the present appellant is clearly against the principles of res judicata as well as principles of constructive res judicata and principles analogous thereto.

12. The principles of res judicata are of universal application as they are based on two age-old principles, namely, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is nemo debet bis vexari, si constant curiae quod sit pro una et eademn causa meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the court that it is for one and the same cause.

This doctrine of res judicata is common to all civilized system of jurisprudence to the extent that a judgment after a proper trial by a court of competent jurisdiction should be regarded as final and conclusive determination of the question litigated and should for ever set the controversy at rest.

13. That principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might result under the colour and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitive suits and actions. This may compel the weaker party to relinquish his right. The doctrine of res judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived that the plea of res judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation. This

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principle seeks to promote honestly and a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse in the matter of accessing court for agitating on issues which have become final between the parties.

14. In this case, I find that the writ petition filed by the petitioner was contested and considered on merits and the same was dismissed. Dismissal was upheld up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thus, the said decision binds the parties. In the instant case, parties are also same. In the instant case, admittedly, neither the writ petition nor the LPA or even the Civil Review was dismissed in limine, but the cases were dismissed after hearing all the points raised by the petitioner. In this instant case, at the time of hearing, counsel for the petitioner continuously harped on the point that since the petitioner was unaware of the details of the Departmental Proceeding, he could not take these points. He submitted that only when the petitioner could obtain the certified copies of the order sheets of the Departmental Proceeding in the year 2022, he could come to know the details and thus, is praying for a denovo enquiry. Denovo enquiry in this case means reopening the enquiry proceeding, which has come to an end by dismissal order. Indirectly, it will mean and lead to not only setting aside the punishment order, but also the order passed by the Writ Court, the Letters Patent Court, the Division Bench in Civil Review and the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Doing the same will not only be a grave illegality and will amount to judicial impropriety and also will be a mockery of the judicial hierarchy of the Courts. The petitioner, time and again, indirectly tried to impress upon this Court to do the same, which is absolutely impermissible and is a most egregious prayer of the petitioner. Petitioner can make whatever prayer he likes, but the same has to be scrutinized with caution by a Court and a Court must not fall prey to the jugglery of words of the petitioner's counsel.

15. The grounds, which the petitioner has taken in this writ petition that only after obtaining the certified copies of the Departmental Proceeding, he could come to know about the illegality is nothing but an attempt to create a shield of illusion. Admittedly, the Departmental Proceeding was exparte, that means that the petitioner did not participate in the proceeding. His claim of illness was taken earlier and the same was rejected and so was his other plea in support of violation of principles of natural justice. Whether a proceeding against the petitioner was in violation of principles of natural justice on the ground of not allowing him to appear need not be deciphered for the first time by the petitioner on receipt of the order sheet of the Departmental Proceeding.

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Non-appearance of the petitioner before the Departmental Enquiry Officer is a fact and the person who had the very first knowledge about the same, is the petitioner himself. To acquire those facts, which lead to violation of principles of natural justice, on the facts of this case, does not require any certified copy of a proceeding. Obtaining certified copies of the proceeding and then building up the plea of violation of principles of natural justice though it was taken in each and every earlier round of litigation, is nothing but an unholy act resorted to by the petitioner, which cannot be allowed and should not be encouraged at this stage.

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of H.N. Jagannath versus State of Karnataka reported in (2018) 11 SCC 104 has deprecated the acts of unscrupulous litigants where they knock the doors of the Courts time and again for the same reliefs after loosing legal battles on number of occasions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that filing of writ petition after writ petition is nothing but abuse of the process of law as well as of the Court. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering an application where same relief was sought for and was negated time and again. Similar was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.K. Modi versus K.N. Modi reported in (1998) 3 SCC 573 wherein at paragraph 46 and 53 it was held as under: -

46. In Mcllkenny versus Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force [(1980) 2 All ER 227] the court of appeal in England struck out the pleading on the ground that the action was an abuse of the process of the court since it raised an issue identical to that which had been finally determined at the plaintiffs' earlier criminal trial. The Court said even when it is not possible to strike out the plaint on the ground of issue estoppel, the action can be struck out as an abuse of the process of the court because it is an abuse for a party to relitigate a question or issue which has already been decided against him even though the other party cannot satisfy the strict rule of res judicata or the requirement of issue estoppel.

53. The appeal of the appellants from the judgment of the learned Judge striking out the plaint is, therefore, partly allowed and the suit, to the extent that it challenges independently the decision of the Chairman and Managing Director, IFCI as a decision and not as an award, is maintainable in the sense that it is not an abuse of the process of the court. We make it clear that we are not examining the merits of the claim nor whether the plaint in

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the suit discloses a cause of action in this regard. The plaint leaves much to be desired and it is for the trial court to decide these and allied questions. The plaint insofar as it challenges the decision as an award and on the same grounds as an award; or seeks to prevent the enforcement of that award by the Chairman, Modipon Ltd. or in any other way has been rightly considered as an abuse of the process of the court since the same reliefs have already been asked for in the arbitration petition. Transfer Case No.13 of 1997 is, therefore, partly allowed.

17. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments:-

(i) Civil Appeal Nos. 2049-2050 of 2022 [The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. Versus Rajit Singh]

(ii) K.R. Deb versus The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong [1971 INSC 112 (Apr 7 1971)]

(iii) Ministry of Finance & Anr. Versus S.B. Ramesh [judgment dated 02.02.1998]

(iv) Special Appeal Defective No.199 of 2018 [Dinesh Kumar Sharma versus State of U.P. and 2 Others - judgment dated 29.10.2018]

(v) W.P.(S) No. 2201 of 2013 [Shyam Sunder Singh versus The State of Jharkhand & Others - order dated 17.01.2014]

(vi) Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay versus Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni Band Others - judgment dated 17.11.1982]

These judgments were on the point of violation of principles of natural justice and what would be the consequence if it is found that there is violation of principles of natural justice in departmental proceeding. It is true that a proceeding should be allowed to resume from the stage where the natural justice has been violated, but these judgments do not fit in the facts of this case. These judgments could have helped the petitioner (if at all) at the very initial stage and not at this stage where the dismissal has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court twice. In this case the issue of violation of principles of natural justice has been set at rest by the Writ Court in W.P.(S)

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No. 3872 of 2015, by the Letters Patent Court in L.P.A. No. 374 of 2016 and by the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 33719 of 2018 and then again by the Division Bench of this Court in Review Application being Civil Review No.15 of 2019 and finally by the Supreme Court while dismissing the Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 16590 of 2021. Thus, the effort of the writ petitioner in trying to reopen the said issue has got no merits nor these judgments are applicable at this stage.

18. In the case of M. Nagabhushana (supra) at paragraph 23 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the attempt to reargue the case which has been finally decided by the court of last resort is a clear abuse of process of the court, regardless of the principles of res judicata. It is necessary to quote paragraph 23, which reads as under: -

23. Thus, the attempt to re-argue the case which has been finally decided by the court of last resort is a clear abuse of process of the court, regardless of the principles of res judicata, as has been held by this Court in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi. In SCC para 44 of the Report, this principle has been very lucidly discussed by this Court and the relevant portions whereof are extracted below: (SCC p. 592) "44. One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of the court is relitigation. It is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to relitigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The reagitation may or may not be barred as res judicata."

19. In the case of M. Nagabhushana versus State of Karnataka and Others reported in (2011) 3 SCC 408, while discussing the principles of res judicata and the constructive res judicata and also considering the abuse of the process of the Court and law, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dismissed the Civil Appeal by imposing exemplary cost of Rs.10 lakh to be paid by the appellant in the said case.

20. On the facts of this case, as narrated in the judgment, I find that this is one of the classic case of re-litigation, which is an example as to how a litigant has taken the Court and entire process for a ride. Thus, this writ petition is dismissed with a cost of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh) to be paid by the petitioner in favour of Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority, within six weeks from today, failing which the same shall be recoverable from the

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petitioner under the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.