Jharkhand High Court
State Of Jharkhand Through I.G. Of ... vs Pruan Prasad Guria S/O Late Albis Guria on 25 April, 2025
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
[2025:JHHC:12529]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
M.A. No. 57 of 2025
State of Jharkhand through I.G. of Police
(Modernization & Provision) Jharkhand, Ranchi office
at Jharkhand Police Head Quarter, DPRD Building,
P.Q. & PS.-Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi. (Owner of Boleró
Jeep bearing Engine No. GHDA624 and Chesis No.
MAIXA2GHKD2A53592).
..... ... Appellant
Versus
1. Pruan Prasad Guria S/o Late Albis Guria
2. Bahalen Guria W/o Sri Pruan Prasad Guria All
are residents of village Simgara, P.O.-Bikwadag,
P.S.-Karra, Dist. Khunti.
..... ... Respondents
with
M.A. No. 28 of 2022
I.G. OF Police (Modernization & Provision)
Jharkhand, Ranchi office at Jharkhand Police Head
Quarter, DPRD Building, P.O. & P.S.- Dhurwa, Dist.-
Ranchi. (Owner of Bolero Jeep bearing Engine No.
GHDA624 and Chesis No.MAIXA2GHKD2A53592).
..... ... Appellant
Versus
1. Etwa Aind S/o Late Chamru Aind
2. Bibiana Aind @ Mundian W/o Etwa Aind
All are residents of village Simgara, P.O.-
Bikwadag, P.S.-Karra, Dist.- Khunti.
..... ... Respondents
--------
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
------
For the Appellant-State : Mr. Sanjay Kumar Tiwari, S.C.-I.
------
06/ 25.04.2025 Heard Mr. Sanjay Kumar Tiwari, learned S.C.-I appearing
for the appellant-State.
2. Since both these appeals, arising of the same accident, in
view of that both these appeals have been taken up together.
[2025:JHHC:12529]
3. M.A. No. 57 of 2025 is barred by time of 851 days and for
condoning the said delay, I.A. No. 1997 of 2025 has been filed.
4. So far as M.A. No. 28 of 2022 is concerned, in view of the
Covid-19 Pandemic and the order of the Hon'ble supreme Court, it
appears that the said appeal is within time.
5. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Tiwari, learned S.C.-I appearing for the
appellant by way of referring para-6 of the aforementioned I.A.,
submits that against the award dated 19.02.2020, passed in Motor
Accident Claim Case Nos. 277 of 2013 and 278 of 2013, a common
M.A. No. 28 of 2022 was filed. He submits that in view of the defect,
pointed out by the office to file the different appeal, separate M.A. has
been preferred in view of that the delay of 851 days has occurred.
6. Further in view of the statements made in para-7 of the said
I.A., the court finds that sufficient explanation is there to condone the
said delay. As such, the delay of 851 days in filing M.A. No. 57 of 2025
is hereby, condoned and the aforesaid I.A. is allowed and disposed of.
7. M.A. No. 57 of 2025 has been preferred against the
judgment dated 19.02.2020, passed in Motor Accident Claim Case No.
278 of 2013, by the learned Presiding Officer, Motor Vehicles Accident
Claims Tribunal, Ranchi, whereby, he has been pleased to allow the
claim application and directed the appellant to pay compensation
amount of Rs. 3,48,880/- to the claimants within thirty days from the
date of award along with interest @ 7.5% per annum till its realization.
8. M.A. No. 28 of 2022 has also been preferred against the
judgment dated 19.02.2020, passed in Motor Accident Claim Case No.
277 of 2013, by the learned Presiding Officer, Motor Vehicles Accident
Claims Tribunal, Ranchi, whereby, he has been pleased to allow the
claim application and directed the appellant to pay compensation
amount of Rs. 3,48,880/- to the claimants within thirty days from the
[2025:JHHC:12529]
date of award along with interest @ 7.5% per annum fill its realization.
9. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant in both the appeals submits that both these appeals are arising
out of the same accident and two claim cases have been filed by the
relatives of the deceased and by the common judgment, the said two
claims cases are allowed. He submits that the claim application was
filed alleging therein that on 11.07.2013, the informant a Chowkidar
namely Neophil Bengra, after attending duty from the police station at
about 07.30 was returning home and at about 18.00 hours, when he
reached near Churgi Pool, he observed two motorcycles in front of him
coming from the side of Khunti. He further submits that both the
motorcycles were driven in zig-zag manner, as a result of which, both
collided with each other and all the three persons were thrown on the
road and they were unconscious and at the same time, Bolero Jeep was
also coming from the side of Khunti, crushed the victims and the said
victims were identified by local persons therein as Amit Aind, Roshan
Guria and Prince Kundulna. It has been pointed out that Amit Aind and
Roshan Guria succumbed to injuries.
10. It has further been pointed that the accident took place
between the Motorcycle, bearing registration No. JH-01-AV-8516 and
unregistered Bolero vehicle. The driver of the Bolero was escaped and
informant went to the police station and gave his fardbeyan and on the
said fardbeyan, an FIR, being Torpa P.S. Case No. 43 of 2013 dated
11.07.2013 under Sections 279, 337, 338, 427 and 304-A of the Indian
Penal Code was registered. Post-mortem was done at Sadar Hospital,
Khunti on 12.07.2013, wherein the doctor has assessed the age of Amit
Aind as 18 years male. The post-mortem of Roshan Guria was
performed at RIMS, Ranchi vide P.M. Report No. 144/13 dated
12.07.2013 wherein the doctors have assessed his aged about 22 years.
[2025:JHHC:12529]
He submits that after investigation, the I.O. submitted chargesheet
against the driver namely Sushil Soy, as driver of the offending vehicle
namely Bolero without registration number.
11. He further submits that the I.O. identified the vehicle, as
police vehicle in the name of I.G. of Police (Modernisation and
Provisions, Jharkhand). He then submits that the I.O. submitted
chargesheet No. 32/13 dated 31.07.2013 for the offences punishable
under Sections 279, 337, 338, 427 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code.
In these backgrounds, learned counsel appearing for the appellants
submits that the claim cases were instituted. He fairly submits that the
vehicle, which was purchased in the name of the I.G. of Police
(Modernisation and Provisions, Jharkhand) was not insured. He then
submits that the compensation cases, filed before the learned tribunal
are not maintainable. He submits that the Bolero Jeep in question was
not being driven rashly and negligently. On these grounds, he submits
that the award is not in accordance with law and the motorcycle was
also involved and in view of the contributory negligence, the appellants
herein cannot be fasten the liability.
12. The court has gone through the materials available on
record including the award dated 19.02.2020, by which, the M.A.C.
Case Nos. 277 of 2013 and 278 of 2013 were allowed by the learned
tribunal. For deciding the said claim of the claimants, the learned
tribunal framed five issues. The issue Nos. 3 and 4 were with regard to
rash and negligent driving of the Bolero vehicle and entitlement
respectively. The learned tribunal has taken up issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3
jointly, as all these issues were interlinked and has considered that
A.W.-1 Etwa Aind has deposed that she is the mother of deceased Amit
Aind, who died in a vehicular accident, when his motorcycle was
dashed by a police Bolero vehicle, being driven in rash and negligent
[2025:JHHC:12529]
manner. The speeding vehicle dashed the motorcycle of her son by
going to wrong side and her son was grievously injured and he was
taken to Torpa Hospital, wherein the doctors declared her son dead. The
engine number and chasis number were also disclosed and the FIR was
instituted and further postmortem was also done and these things have
been stated by A.W.-1.
13. A. W. 2 is Puran Prasad Guria, in his oral testimony, he has
deposed that the deceased Roshan Guria was his son. The accident took
place on 11.07.13 at about 6.00. P. M. at village-Patrabhus Jora Tiril
within the jurisdiction of Torpa Police station. His son had
accompanied his friend namely Amit Aind and returning home and their
Motorcycle was dashed by a Bolero Police Jeep. The police Jeep went
to the wrong side and dashed the Motorcycle of his son. His son was
grievously injured and taken to Torpa Hospital. After primary
treatment, he was referred to RIMS, Ranchi, wherein his son died
during course of treatment. The witness has disclosed the Engine and
Chasis number of the police Bolero engaged in the vehicular accident.
He has also deposed about the FIR and age of the deceased.
14. In these backgrounds, the learned tribunal has found that
the contents of the FIR, chargesheet, postmortem report goes on to
establish that on 11.07.2013, an accident took place when a motorcycle
with three occupants was dashed by a Bolero Jeep belonging to the
police, as a result of the aforesaid accident, two of the three occupants
of the motorcycle namely Amit Aind and Roshan Guria succumbed to
the multiple injuries. The act of the driver of the Bolero Jeep was rash
and negligent, which was established by the oral and documentary
evidence, as discussed therein and on these backgrounds, the learned
tribunal has decided the Issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in favour of the
claimants. Issue No. 4 was with regard to the compensation, that has
[2025:JHHC:12529]
been further considered and in course of argument, the perversity on the
compensation has not been shown by the learned counsel appearing for
the appellant herein, as such, the court finds that there is no illegality in
the impugned award, passed by the learned tribunal.
15. Undisputed principle of the law of torts is that the master is
answerable for every such wrong of his servant as is committed in the
course of his service, though no express command or privity of the
master be proved and the wrongful act may not be for the master's
benefit. In fact, there is a catena of authority even for the proposition
that although the particular act which gives the cause of action may not
be authorised, still, if the act is done in course of employment which is
authorised, the master is liable. It would suffice to refer in this
connection to Citizens' Life Assurance Co. versus Brown, reported in
(1904) AC 423, Machay versus Commercial Bank of New Brunswick,
reported in (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. 394 and Trading Corporation Ltd.
versus M. M. Sherazee, reported in (1878) I.I.A. 130. In Gah Choon
Seng v. Lee Kim Soo, reported in (1925) A.C. 550, it has been ruled
that when a servant does an act which he is authorised by his employer
to do under certain circumstances and under certain conditions and he
does them under circumstances or in a manner which is unauthorised
and improper, even in such cases the employer is liable for the wrongful
act.
16. This doctrine of liability of the master for the acts of his
servant is based on the maxim respondeat superior, which means 'let
the principle be liable' and it puts the master in the same position as if
he had done the act himself. It also derives validity from the maxim qui
facit per alium facit per se, which means 'he who does an act through
another is deemed in law to do it himself'. The true principle, as is
stated by Ratan Lal at page 79 of his book 'The Indian and English Law
[2025:JHHC:12529]
of Torts' 19th Edition, is as under:-
"A person who puts another in his place to
do a class of acts in his absence, necessarily
leaves him to determine according to the
circumstances that arise, when an act of that
class is to be done, and trusts him for the
manner in which it is done; consequently, he
is answerable for the wrong of the person so
entrusted either in the manner of doing such
an act, or in doing such an act under
circumstances in which it ought not to have
been done ; provided that what is done is not
done from any caprice of the servant, but- in
the course of the employment."
17. The general principles of law of torts with regard to the
liability of the master for the acts of his servant are not in dispute and in
the case in hand, it is an admitted position that the vehicle in question
is of the police department, which has been driven by the driver of the
said department. This aspect of the matter was before the full Bench of
Punjab and Haryana High Court, in the case of Baxi Amrik Singh
Versus The Union of India [F.A. from Order No. 31 of 1969],
wherein the following propositions of law and rules of guidance for
determining the liability of the State for damages for the tortious acts of
its servants was ruled, which are as under:-
"(i) The Union of India and States are liable
for damages occasioned by the negligence of
servants in the service of the Government if
the negligence is such as would render an
ordinary employer liable ;
(ii) The State is not liable if the tortious act
complained of has been committed by its
servants in exercise of sovereign powers that
is powers which cannot be lawfully exercised
except by a sovereign or a person by virtue of
delegation of sovereign rights;
[2025:JHHC:12529]
(iii) The Government is vicariously liable for
the tortious acts of its servants or agents
which are not proved to have been committed
in the exercise of its sovereign functions or in
exercise of the sovereign powers delegated to
such public servants ;
(iv) The mere fact that the act complained of
is committed by a public servant in course of
his employment is not enough to absolve the
Government of the liability for damages for
injury caused by such act ;
(v) When the State pleads immunity against
claim for damages resulting from injury
caused by negligent act of its servants, the
area of employment referable to sovereign
powers must be strictly determined. Before
such a plea is upheld, the Court must always
find that the impugned act was committed in
the course of an undertaking or an
employment which is referable to the exercise
of the delegated sovereign powers ;
(vi) There is a real and marked distinction
between the sovereign functions of the
Government and those which are not
severeign, and some of the functions that fall
in the latter category are those connected
with trade, commerce, business and
industrial undertakings ;
(vii) Where the employment in the course of
which the tortious act is committed is such in
which even a private individual can, engage,
it cannot be considered to be a sovereign act
or an act committed in the course of
delegated sovereign functions of the State ;
(viii) The fact that the vehicle, which is
involved in an accident, is owned by the
Government and driven by its servant does
not render the Government immune from
liability for its rash and negligent driving. It
[2025:JHHC:12529]
must however be proved that at the time the
accident occurred, the person driving the
vehicle was acting in discharge of the
sovereign function of the State, or such
delegated authority ;
(ix) Though maintenance of Army is a
sovereign function of Union of India, it does
not follow that the Union is immune from all
liability for any tortious act committed by an
army personnel;
(x) In determining whether the claim of
immunity should or should not be allowed,
the nature of the act, the transaction in the
course of which it is committed, the nature of
the employment of the person committing it
and the occasion for it, have all to be
considered."
18. In view of the above guidelines-(viii) clearly speaks that the
Bolero vehicle, which is involved in the accident, is owned by the
Police Department and driven by its servant, does not render the
Government immune from liability for its rash and negligent driving
and what has been discussed hereinabove is proved before the learned
tribunal that rashly and negligently, the said Bolero vehicle in question
was being driven by the driver. In view of that the principle is clear that
a servant is acting within the scope of his employment and in so acting,
does something negligent or wrongful, the employer is liable even
though the acts done may be the very reverse of that which the servant
was actually directed to do. Thus, the accident is proved.
19. It is the law of tort to determine when the law will and will
not grant redress for damage suffered. It is a fact that the pillion rider
died in the motor vehicle accident. It is also a fact that while the
deceased was riding the vehicle, vehicle capsized and thereby the rider
of the bike caused the accident and in that accident the deceased
[2025:JHHC:12529]
sustained fatal injuries and succumbed to the injuries.
20. Now a days, it is an admitted fact that the motor vehicles
are basically dangerous in nature and that is the reason why restrictions
and conditions to use the same are introduced by an enactment. Old Act
concerning use of motor vehicles was changed by the introduction of
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. When such an article is brought by the
deceased, naturally a strict liability is also attached to it. Whenever an
accident occurs by such a vehicle, by strict liability principle, the owner
will be liable, over and above the vicarious liability, if any.
21. The Motor Vehicles Act now in force projects two other
provisions under which a claim for compensation can be made. That are
Sections 140, 163 A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the
Motor Vehicles Act is the only section founded on no fault theory, i.e.
there the claimant will be entitled for compensation irrespective of the
fact that his fault or not, caused the accident. The proviso to Section
168 of the Motor Vehicles Act enables claimant to file a composite
application under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act and under
Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
22. In a death claim, an affiction is therein that the person who
sustained injury and death who can put forward the claim if alive is
fusing with the claim of the other legal heirs of the deceased after
death, i.e. the claim for special damages that can be only put forward by
the deceased is also passing over to the legal heirs as if the claim is
made by the deceased himself.
23. Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act states as follows:-
"165. Claims Tribunals - (1) A State
Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, constitute one or more
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereafter
in this Chapter referred to as Claims
[2025:JHHC:12529]
Tribunal) for such area as may be specified
in the notification for the purpose of
adjudicating upon claims for compensation
in respect of accidents involving the death of,
or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the
use of motor vehicles or damages to any
property of a third party so arising, or both."
24. In light of the above Section, it reveals that a claim for
personal injury is not barred by the above said section even by the
owner of the vehicle. It is true that by virtue of Section 147 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, the statutory liability of the insurance company
pertains only to third party claim. But it cannot be said in the light of
the said section, the claim of the owner against the insurance company
or any other person in respect of death or bodily injury will not lie,
though the cause of action arose out of a motor vehicle accident.
25. As back as in the year 1977, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
sounded a warning in the case of Manjusri Raha & Ors. Versus B.L.
Gupta, reported in (1977) 2 SCR 944, stating therein that "With the
emergence of an ultra modern age which has led to strides of progress
in all spheres of life, we have switched from fast to faster vehicular
traffic which has come as a boon to many, though some times in the
case of some it has to be proved to be a misfortune---- The time is ripe
for serious consideration of creating nofault liability. Having regard to
the directive principles of State policy, the poverty of the ordinary run
of victims of automobile accidents, the compulsory nature of insurance
of motor vehicles, the nationalisation of general insurance companies
and the expanding trends towards nationalisation of bus transport, the
law of torts based on no-fault needs reform."
26. In the case of Motor Owners' Insurance Company Limited
v. Jadavji Keshavji Modi and Ors. reported in AIR 1981 (SC) 2059,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "There is a niggardly
[2025:JHHC:12529]
recognition of the State's obligation to its people particularly so when
the frequency of accidents involving the public transport system has
increased beyond believable limits."
27. In light of the above, it is an admitted fact that motor
vehicles are dangerous in nature by its speed as well as by its working
mechanism. Two wheelers cannot be considered as a luxury now a
days. Even small young families travelling upon two wheelers is a
common sight on the roads. This single track vehicles are highly pron
to accident. Its dynamics of motion is highly complicated. It is the
vehicle of the poor as well as the rich, but at the same time risk due to
accident attached to the same is very high. Roads are provided by the
Government to ply the vehicles. There are different kinds of motor
vehicles including the motor bikes, where the owner will be riding the
same on the public roads provided by the Government without any
personal insurance coverage. Use and allied aspects of a motor vehicle
are covered by the Motor Vehicles Act.
28. As per the provision, personal injury coverage is not
compulsory. Roads to ply the vehicles are provided and maintained by
the Government. Under such a circumstance, there will be a welfare
state liability for the Government, which will partially eclipse the
maxim volunti non fit injuria and fault liability theory. But the
Government cannot elude from its limited liability in a case of accident
occurring in a public road, where road tax is levied by the Government.
Government can either shoulder it by itself or can fasten upon the
authorised insurance company by statutorily making the company liable
over and above the liability of the insured when they indemnify i.e., at
the moment they are entering into an insurance contract as required
under Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, they should be made
statutorily liable for the welfare state liability. An appropriate change in
[2025:JHHC:12529]
the statute that will make the Government / the insurer liable for a fixed
sum, as in the case of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicle Act, payable to
the owner in case of injury / death is the need of the day. This aspect
needs due attention and the court fervently hope and this court wish that
it will gain deserving attention from the concerned department of the
Government and the court request to think it over as to how the citizen
on the road accident can be compensated being the welfare State.
29. In view of the above, particularly coming to the fact that
there is no illegality in the impugned award, both these appeals are
dismissed with the above observation.
30. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the Chief
Secretary, Government of Jharkhand for consideration in light of the
observation made therein.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)
Amitesh/-
[A.F.R.]
