Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand vs Ratneshwar Das on 6 May, 2024
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.16 of 2023
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1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. The Secretary, Road Construction Department, Govt. of
Jharkhand at Project Building, P.O. & P.S.: Dhurwa,
District-Ranchi, State-Jharkhand.
3. The Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department,
Govt. of Jharkhand at Project Building, P.O. & P.S.:
Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, State-Jharkhand.
4. The Under Secretary, Road Construction Department,
Govt. of Jharkhand at Project Building, P.O. & P.S.:
Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, State-Jharkhand.
5. The Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department,
Govt. of Jharkhand at Project Building, P.O. & P.S.:
Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, State-Jharkhand.
6. The Executive Engineer, Building Division, Bokaro, P.O. &
P.S.: Bokaro, District: Bokaro, Jharkhand.
.... .... Respondents-Appellants
Versus
Ratneshwar Das, aged about 55 years, son of Late Batoran
Das, Resident of: Professor colony, Gali No. 3, Chiragora,
Hirapur, P.O., P.S. & District-Dhanbad.
.... Petitioner/Respondent
with
L.P.A. No.18 of 2023
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1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. The Secretary, Road Construction Department, Govt. of
Jharkhand at Project Building, P.O. & P.S.: Dhurwa,
District-Ranchi, State-Jharkhand.
3. The Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department,
Govt. of Jharkhand at Project Building, P.O. & P.S.:
Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, State-Jharkhand.
4. The Under Secretary, Road Construction Department,
Govt. of Jharkhand at Project Building, P.O. & P.S.:
Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, State-Jharkhand.
1
5. The Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department,
Govt. of Jharkhand at Project Building, P.O. & P.S.:
Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, State-Jharkhand.
6. The Executive Engineer, Building Division, Dhanbad, P.O.
& P.S.: Dhanbad, District: Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
.... .... Respondents-Appellant.
Versus
Mritunjay Kumar, aged about 61 years, son of Late deo
Narayan Prasad, Resident of Road No.4, Kesharinagar,
P.O. & P.S. Kesharinagar, P.O. & P.S.: Kesharinagar,
District-Patna, Bihar. ... ...Petitioner/ Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Appellants : Mr. Sachin Kumar, AAG-II
Mrs. Surabhi, AC to AAG-II
For the Respondent:
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08/Dated: 06.05.2024
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. Both the intra-court appeals, filed under Clause 10 of the
Letters Patent arises out of common order dated
08.03.2022, hence they are taken up together.
2. The instant intra-court appeals, under Clause-10 of Letters
Patent, are directed against the order/judgment dated
08.03.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of this
Court in W.P. (S) No. 2290 of 2020 and W.P.(S) No. 2257 of
2020 respectively, whereby and whereunder, the writ
petition was allowed setting aside order dated 22.08.2019
and directed the State to extend all consequential benefits
with back wages to the petitioners.
I.A. No. 2077 of 2024 in LPA No. 16 of 2023 &
I.A. No. 2076 of 2024 in LPA. No. 18 of 2023:
3. Both the appeals are barred by inordinate delay of 285
days, therefore, the instant Interlocutory Applications has
been filed for condoning the aforesaid delay.
4. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that
the instant intra-court appeals have been filed after inordinate
delay of 285 days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the
delay condonation application before going into the legality
and propriety of the impugned order on merit.
Grounds taken in the Interlocutory Application:
5. The ground for condonation of delay has been taken, as
per the pleading made in the instant interlocutory application
that after the order was uploaded online, the same was
communicated to the Department by the office of Executive
Engineer vide letter dated 16.07.2022 and the same was
circulated in the Department for further action on the same
and preparation of Grounds of Appeal by the Legal Retainer of
the Department. After preparation of Grounds of Appeal on
22.08.2022 by the Legal Retainer of the Department, the same
was sent to the authorities for discussion and
recommendation. Thereafter, the file was forwarded to the
Department of Law for their opinion as to whether the order of
Hon‟ble High Court be complied with or the same should be
appealed by way of filing intra-court appeal. The Principal
Secretary-cum-L.R., Department of Law, after deliberation
sent the file to learned Advocate General who gave opinion
that LPA be filed through learned AAG-II. Pursuant thereto,
the file was sent back by the Law Department to the Road
Construction Department with the opinion of the learned
Advocate General. As soon as the file was marked to learned
AAG-II, the LPA was drafted and prepared for filing, which
took time causing delay in filing the appeal.
6. It has been submitted that delay in filing the appeal is
neither intentional nor deliberate but due to various reasons
beyond the control of the appellants and if the delay is not
condoned the appellant will suffer irreparable loss and injury.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on
delay condonation applications, however, before considering
the same, this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain
legal proposition, as has been propounded by the Hon‟ble
Apex Court with respect to the approach of the Court in
condoning the inordinate delay.
8. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is
not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but
certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay,
then the duty of the Court is to consider the application to
condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis.
9. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is
enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy
must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as
has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana &
Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.
10. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim,
(1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in
Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that:
"A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to
operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if
the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even
at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge
cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by
the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not
recognized by law."
11. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7
SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering a case of
condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation
much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for
condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as
under:
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds."
12. While considering the similar issue, the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as
under:
"21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors
to be taken into consideration. It is so as the
fundamental principle is that the courts are required to
weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both
parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-
by in the name of liberal approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a
non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity
can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be
curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
13. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not
act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to
inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for
filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide motive and
gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which
should be taken into consideration while considering the
question of condonation of delay. Reference in this regard may
be made to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of
Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat through Secretary
& Anr. Vrs. Kanubhai Kantilal Rana, 2013 SCC Online
Guj. 4202, wherein, at pargraph-17, it has been held that
"Law having prescribed a fixed period of limitation of 30 days
for preferring the appeal, the Government cannot ignore the
provisions of the period of limitation as it was never the
intention of the legislature that there should be a different
period of limitation when the Government is the appellant."
14. In the case of Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living
Media India Limited & Anr., [(2012) 3 SCC 563], it has
been held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court at paragraphs 27 to 29
as under:
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were
well aware or conversant with the issues involved
including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up
the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this
Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period
of limitation when the Department was possessed with
competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the
absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are
posing a question why the delay is to be condoned
mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of
the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence
or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal
concession has to be adopted to advance substantial
justice, we are of the view that in the facts and
circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of
various earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted
in view of the modern technologies being used and
available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities
that unless they have reasonable and acceptable
explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort,
there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the
file was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process.
The government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with
diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit
for the government departments. The law shelters
everyone under the same light and should not be swirled
for the benefit of a few."
15. Likewise, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh & Anr. Vrs. Chaitram Maywade, [(2020) 10 SCC
667], after referring to the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble
Apex Court in Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living
Media India Limited & Anr., (supra) has held at paragraphs
1 to 5 as hereunder:
"1.The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same
thing again and again and the conduct seems to be
incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after
a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with
such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State
of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of
M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our order
dated 15-10-2020.
2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and
we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again
except to record what are stated to be the facts on which
the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is
stated that the Government Advocate was approached in
respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram
Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and
the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the
impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department
took almost about 17 months' time to decide whether the
SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of
incompetence would there be for the Legal Department.
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary
of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of
revamping the Legal Department as it appears that the
Department is unable to file appeals within any
reasonable period of time much less within limitation.
These kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the
aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view of the
judgment in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.,
(2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC
(Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
4. We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of
the cases are only "certificate cases" to obtain a certificate
of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the
issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be
in default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation
where no action is taken against the officers who sit on
these files and do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in
which the application has been worded, the wastage of
judicial time involved, we impose costs on the petitioner
State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation and
Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited
within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the
officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on
the files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be
also filed in this Court within the said period of time. We
have put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for
any successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on
going up."
16. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and
Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762,
has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made
out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the
appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has
been held as hereunder:-
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to
the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right.
The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for
the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the
court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing
further has to be done; the application for condoning delay
has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause
is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its
discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the
matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant
facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its
bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the
enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after
sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to
such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot
justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle
during all the time available to it. In this connection we may
point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence
are always material and relevant when the court is dealing
with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation
Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called
upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of
Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations
which have been expressly made material and relevant by
the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and
in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications
which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without
reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no
difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised
in favour of the appellant because apart from the general
criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence
during the period of limitation no other fact had been
adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out,
the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's
application for condonation of delay only on the ground that
it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as
possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our
opinion, is not a valid ground.
17. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay
condonation application, the Court of Law is required to
consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also
the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not
as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is
accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is
necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and
at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.
18. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning
of „sufficient cause‟. The consideration of meaning of
„sufficient cause‟ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs.
Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein,
it has been held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to
15 hereunder:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant
could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the
word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as
may be necessary to answer the purpose intended.
Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than
that which provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts
and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from
the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man.
In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was
a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the
party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive".
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by
any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and
unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court
should not allow the application for condonation of delay.
The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide
or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.
(See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath
Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953]
, Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ)
1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj
Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC
157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993]
this Court explained the difference between a "good
cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every
"sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa.
However, if any difference exists it can only be that the
requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser
degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a
liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is
done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned,
whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be
decided on the facts of a particular case and no
straitjacket formula is possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002
SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3
SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation
may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.
The court has no power to extend the period of limitation
on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore
that provision to relieve what it considers a distress
resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but
the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means
"the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such
a situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered
while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its
aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress
fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent
oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have
not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of
time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of
England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the
existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long
dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them,
(2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to
disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good
causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable
diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation
prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have
been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or
what may have been lost by a party's own inaction,
negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha
Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC
2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002)
4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this
Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation
amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid
down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
that where a case has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what
was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent,
or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided
only within the parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court
on time condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
19. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that
the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or
there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the
party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive".
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any
"sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not
allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has
to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in
Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs.
Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala
Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal
Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben
Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
20. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that
the expression „sufficient cause‟ should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but
only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the
facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible, reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ram Nath
Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao &
Ors., (2002) 3 SC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been
held as hereunder:-
"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient
cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22
Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should
receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides
is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether
explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or
not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot
be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting
explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps.
But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with
the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject
the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal
drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule
and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or
inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the
defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the
matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not
taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has
accrued to the other party which should not be lightly
defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner.
However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of
the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected
when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and
law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and
irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis
terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating
valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit.
While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance
between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon
the parties either way."
21. This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition
and the explanation furnished in the delay condonation
application to condone the inordinate delay of 285 days in
filing the appeal, is proceeding to examine as to whether the
explanation furnished can be said to be sufficient explanation
for condoning the delay.
22. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove,
wherein, expression „sufficient cause‟ has been dealt with
which means that the party should not have acted in a
negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part
in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or
"remained inactive".
23. It is evident from the judgment impugned which was
passed on 08.03.2022 in presence of the learned counsel
appearing for the appellants and the intra-court appeal have
been filed after delay of 285 days, for which explanation has
been furnished in the Interlocutory Applications that for
taking opinion as to whether the appeals against the
impugned order is to be filed or not and later after the
decision was taken to file appeal and further to follow the
procedure to file appeals the file moved from one table to
another which ultimately caused delay of 285 days in filing
the appeals, which this Court finds not the sufficient reason
to condone the delay of 285 days in filing the appeals.
24. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that the
reason assigned for condoning the delay in filing the appeals,
cannot be said to be sufficient explanation to condone the
delay.
25. The coordinate Bench of this Court has passed an order
in L.P.A. No.86 of 2021 on 05.01.2022 rejecting the delay
condonation application since the appeal was filed after delay
of about 687 days without any sufficient cause to condone the
delay.
26. The reference of another case is required to be made
herein of an order passed by the coordinate Bench of this
Court in L.P.A. No.835 of 2019, wherein, the issue of
condoning the delay of 568 days was under consideration.
27. The coordinate Bench of this Court has not found the
reason furnished by the State appellants therein to be
sufficient cause on the ground of movement of file from one
table to another by putting reliance upon the judgment
rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex as referred hereinabove.
28. The State appellant has travelled to the Hon‟ble Apex
Court by filing the SLP being SLP No.7755 of 2022 and has
challenged the order passed in L.P.A. No.835 of 2019 but the
said SLP No.7755 of 2022 has been dismissed as would
appear from the order dated 13.05.2022.
29. The Hon‟ble Apex Court has dismissed one Special Leave
to Appeal (C) Nos.8378-8379/2023 on 28th April, 2023 filed by
the State of Jharkhand which was filed against the order
passed by this Court in L.P.A. No.99 of 2021, wherein the
coordinate Bench of this Court dismissed the said appeal on
the basis of delay of 534 days in filing of the appeal.
30. Recently, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has also dismissed
S.L.P.(C) Diary No.(S) No.3188 of 2024 on 02.02.2024 filed by
the State of Jharkhand against the order dated 14.08.2023
passed by this Court in L.P.A. No.401 of 2022, wherein, the
delay of 259 days was not condoned.
31. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the
Hon‟ble Apex Court as also considering the fact that the delay
has not sufficiently been explained and as such, both the
interlocutory applications are deserves to be dismissed.
32. Accordingly, the delay condonation application being I.A.
No. 2077 of 2024 [LPA No. 16 of 2023] and I.A. No. 2076 of
2024 [LPA No. 18 of 2023] are hereby, dismissed.
33. In consequence thereof, both the instant Letters Patent
Appeals also stand dismissed.
34. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed
of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Alankar/-
A.F.R.
