Rajeev Singh Dugal @ Rajeev Duggal vs The State Of Jharkhand
2021 Latest Caselaw 1382 Jhar

                                               1                       Cr. M.P. No. 388 of 2021


                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                              Cr. M.P. No. 388 of 2021
             Rajeev Singh Dugal @ Rajeev Duggal, aged about 63 years, son of
             Purushottam Singh Dugal, resident of House No.-04, Jubilee Road, Near
             Beldih Triangle, Bistupur, P.O. & P.S. Bistupur, Jamshedpur, District- East
             Singhbhum                                            ... Petitioner
                                          -Versus-
             The State of Jharkhand                               ... Opposite Party
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             CORAM:      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
                                            -----

             For the Petitioner             : Mr. Jitendra Shankar Singh, Advocate

For the Opposite Party-State : Mr. Deepankar, A.C. to A.G.

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02/18.03.2021. Heard Mr. Jitendra Shankar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner

and Mr. Deepankar, learned counsel for the opposite party-State.

2. This criminal miscellaneous petition has been heard through Video

Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account

the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have

complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent

this matter has been heard.

3. The petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the order

taking cognizance dated 27.10.2020 passed in Bistupur P.S. Case No.88 of

2020 corresponding to G.R. Case No. 960 of 2020 by the learned Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur. The prayer for quashing the entire criminal

proceeding in connection with the said P.S. case has also been made.

4. The factum of the case in narrow compass is that the Officer-in-

Charge of Bistupur Police Station has lodged the F.I.R. alleging therein that

during the investigation of Bistupur P.S. Case No.87 of 2020, rooms of Hotel

Alcor were inspected through CCTV footage. On going through the CCTV

footage, it was detected by the informant that Sharad Poddar was a regular

visitor of that hotel. The manager of the hotel, namely, Dhananjay Kumar

Singh had disclosed that Sharad Poddar had kept one Aishwarya Tarak

Singh in room no. 402 since 23.03.2020. It has further been stated that

from the CCTV footage, it transpires that Sharad Poddar used to go to the

hotel everyday for a few hours and then leave. When the informant

inspected room no. 402 where Aishwarya Tarak Singh was found and

thereafter she disclosed that she had a relationship with co-accused Sharad

Poddar since last six months and she was made to stay in the hotel since

23.03.2020. She further disclosed that the entire bills of the hotel were

being paid by Sharad Poddar. She also disclosed that Rahul Kumar Agrawal

who was a friend of Sharad Poddar used to visit her in the hotel as well as

in Kolkata along with Sharad Poddar. On the investigation of the mobile

phone of the said girl, several suspicious images of currency notes were

found in her whatsapp messages along with one image of her finger

wearing a ring in which it was written 1 Kg and 2 KG. On interrogation, it

was disclosed that 1 Kg means Rs.1 Lakh and 2KG means Rs.2 Lakhs and

the picture of the finger was found to be that of Aishwarya Tarak Singh. On

investigation, it was also found that since one month Aishwarya Tarak Singh

was being kept in hotel by Sharad Poddar and prostitution work was going

on during the lockdown and the indulgence of Rahul Kumar Agrawal,

manager of the hotel namely Dhananjay Kumar Singh and owner of the

hotel namely Rajeev Singh Dugal @ Rajeev Duggal (petitioner) cannot be

ruled out. On the aforesaid backgrounds, the police officer after

investigation has submitted a charge-sheet bearing no.154 of 2020 dated

24.06.2020 under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention)

Act, 1956. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur took

cognizance vide order dated 24.06.2020, which was challenged by the

petitioner in Cr.M.P. No.2118 of 2020. The said Cr.M.P. was allowed by this

Court vide order dated 21.10.2020 and cognizance order was set aside with

direction to the court below to pass a fresh order, in accordance with law.

After remand of the matter by this Court, the learned Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Jamshedpur has again taken cognizance vide order dated

27.10.2020 against the petitioner and others under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of

the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 read with Section 34 of the

Indian Penal Code. Aggrieved with this, the petitioner has approached this

Court.

5. Mr. Jitendra Shankar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner assailed

the cognizance order dated 27.10.2020 on the ground that without applying

his judicial mind, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur has

taken cognizance under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic

(Prevention) Act, 1956 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. He

further submits that the petitioner has been made accused only on the

ground that he is the owner of the Alcor Hotel from where the girl has been

found from room no.402. By way of referring F.I.R., he submits that there is

no evidence as to how guest Aishwarya Tarak Singh was involved in

prostitution. He also submits that even in the confessional statement, she

has not disclosed that she had stayed in the hotel for the purpose of

prostitution. He further submits that the girl came to Jamshedpur on

22.03.2020 on invitation of co-accused Sharad Poddar. He also submits that

even taking into account the entire confessional statement of the girl, no

offence under the alleged sections of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,

1956 is made out. He further submits that physical relation between two

major persons with their consent cannot be said to be an illicit act. He

refers to Section 3 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and

submits that such section is not attracted in the case in hand. He further

submits that Section 3 will attract only if from the premises, brothel work is

going on. By way of referring Section (2)(a) of the said Act, 1956, wherein,

brothel has been defined, he submits that two persons were not found from

the hotel and that is why in light of Section (2)(a) of the Act, 1956, brothel

work was not there. He further submits that due to COVID-19 lockdown,

which was announced by the Government on 24.03.2020 and as per the

guidelines the hospitality services to remain suspended except the hotels,

home stays, lodges and motels which are accommodating tourists and

persons stranded due to lockdown. He further submits that Aishwarya Tarak

Singh has checked in the hotel on 22.03.2020 and in the meantime the

lockdown was announced and in light of the guidelines of the Government,

the management of the hotel allowed the said girl to stay in hotel. He also

submits that the learned court below without applying its judicial mind has

taken cognizance for the offence under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 read with Section 34 of the Indian

Penal Code in a mechanical manner. On these backgrounds, he submits that

this quashing application is fit to be allowed, so far as the petitioner is

concerned.

6. Per contra, Mr. Deepankar, learned A.C. to A.G. appearing for the

opposite party-State by way of referring F.I.R. submits that there is

sufficient material on the record to suggest that the petitioner was also

involved in that crime. He further submits that at the time of taking

cognizance, the Magistrate is only required to look into the F.I.R. and after

going through the F.I.R., the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur

came to a conclusion that prima facie case was there. The learned Chief

Judicial Magistrate is well within his jurisdiction to take cognizance in the

premises of ingredients disclosed in the said sections of the Act. He draws

attention of the Court to order taking cognizance dated 27.10.2020 and

submits that in the cognizance order, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate

has considered the entire aspect of the matter and after fully applying his

mind, he has taken cognizance. He also submits that the learned Chief

Judicial Magistrate has looked into the F.I.R., charge-sheet, case diary and

entire case records and, thereafter, he has taken cognizance. He further

submits that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has also referred several

paragraphs of the case diary in the order taking cognizance. He also

submits that the lockdown was already enforced and the girl has moved to

Jamshedpur in late hours on 24.03.2020 and reached Jamshedpur on

25.03.2020. He also submits that this aspect of the matter has been

considered by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in the order taking

cognizance. He further submits that the statement of the girl was falsified

that she was staying in the hotel before the lockdown. On these grounds,

he submits that there is material on the record and the learned Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur has rightly taken the cognizance. There is

no illegality in the impugned order and, hence, this quashing application is

fit to be dismissed.

7. On the premises of the above facts and the submissions of the

learned counsel for the parties, the Court is required to examine the scope

of Section 482 Cr.P.C. as to whether at this stage, the High Court can

exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or not. For the sake of brevity,

Section 482 Cr.P.C. is quoted herein below:

"482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

8. On a mere perusal of Section 482 Cr.P.C., it is crystal clear that

inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be invoked to make such

orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Cr.P.C. or

to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the

ends of justice. The power is required to be used judiciously, consciously

and sparingly. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has examined Chapter XIV,

Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the case of

the State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC

335, whereby, guidelines for exercising such power has been laid down in

paragraph 102 of the said judgment, which is quoted herein below:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate

within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court again in the case of Gian Singh v.

State of Punjab, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 discussed about the

cases where criminal proceeding may be quashed while exercising inherent

power in paragraph 61 of the said judgment, which is quoted herein below:

"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental

depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

10. While considering the case in Central Bureau of Investigation v.

Ravi Shankar Srivastava, I.A.S., reported in (2006) 7 SCC 188, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the power requires great caution in its

exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of

this power is based on sound principles. The same was held in paragraph 10

of the said judgment, which is quoted herein below:

"10. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The

inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in the court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings."

11. While considering the case in State of Karnataka v. M.

Devendrappa, reported in (2002) 3 SCC 89, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

has come to the conclusion that it would not be proper for the High Court to

analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order

to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such

premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed and

it would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the

complaint cannot be proceeded with. In paragraph 6 of the said judgment,

it has been held that the exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in a

case of this nature is exception and not the rule. Paragraph 6 of the said

judgment is quoted herein below:

"6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed,

it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto."

12. The case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra) was again

considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Soundaram v.

P.K. Pounraj, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 616. Paragraph 13 of the said

judgment is quoted herein below:

"13. It is well settled by this Court in a catena of cases that the power under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any court and to secure the ends of justice. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie decision unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. Taking the allegations and the complaint as they were, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence was made out, only then the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings in the exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC."

13. The scope and ambit while exercising power under Section 482

Cr.P.C. has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. , reported in

(2000) 3 SCC 269 in paragraph 2 of the judgment, which is quoted herein

below:

"2. Exercise of jurisdiction under the inherent power as envisaged in Section 482 of the Code to have the complaint or the charge-sheet quashed is an exception rather than a rule and the case for quashing at the initial stage must have to be treated as rarest of rare so as not to scuttle the prosecution. With the lodgement of first information report the ball is set to roll and thenceforth the law takes its own course and the investigation ensues in accordance with the provisions of law. The jurisdiction as such is rather limited and restricted and its undue expansion is neither practicable nor warranted. In the event, however, the court on a perusal of the complaint comes to a conclusion that the allegations levelled in the complaint or charge-sheet on the face of it does not constitute or disclose any offence as alleged, there ought not to be any hesitation to rise up to the expectation of the people and deal with the situation as is required under the law. Frustrated litigants ought not to be indulged to give vent to their vindictiveness through a

legal process and such an investigation ought not to be allowed to be continued since the same is opposed to the concept of justice, which is paramount."

14. On going through the above judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court, it is crystal clear that the object of exercise of power under Section

482 Cr.P.C. is to prevent abuse of process of Court and to secure ends of

justice. The exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction is an exception, but not a

rule of law. There is no straitjacket formula nor defined parameters to

enable a Court to invoke or exercise its inherent powers. It will always

depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court requires

to be very cautious while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Section 190 Cr.P.C. provides power to a Magistrate for taking cognizance.

The expression 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Code. Cognizance

merely means 'become aware of' and when used with reference to Court or

a Judge, it cannot 'to take notice of judicially'. In the case of Nupur

Talwar v. C.B.I., reported in (2012) 2 SCC 188, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court held that the Court should exercise utmost restrain and caution before

interfering with an order of taking cognizance by the Magistrate, otherwise

the holding of a trial will be stalled. Paragraph 21 of the said judgment is

quoted herein below:

"21. We feel constrained to observe that at this stage, this Court should exercise utmost restrain and caution before interfering with an order of taking cognizance by the Magistrate, otherwise the holding of a trial will be stalled. The superior Courts should maintain this restrain to uphold the rule of law and sustain the faith of the common man in the administration of justice."

15. An offence will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each

case. The expression 'police report' has been defined in Section 2(r) to

mean a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under Section

173(2) of the Code meaning thereby the Magistrate can take cognizance

under Section 190(1)(b) upon a police report submitted by the police officer

under Section 173(2). At this stage, the Magistrate is required to only

specify whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding or not or whether

there is sufficient ground for conviction or whether the evidence is adequate

for supporting the conviction and that can be determined only at the time of

trial and not at the stage of enquiry. In the case of S.K. Sinha, Chief

Enforcement Officer v. Videocon Internatinal Ltd. , reported in

(2008) 2 SCC 492, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 19 held as

follows:

"19. The expression "cognizance" has not been defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means "become aware of" and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes "to take notice of judicially". It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone."

16. Thus at the time of taking cognizance, the learned Magistrate is only

required to come to the finding as to whether prima facie case is made out

or not.

17. On perusal of the F.I.R., it is crystal clear that Aishwarya Tarak Singh

was staying in room no. 402 in Alcor Hotel. In the CCTV footage also, the

persons have been found to visit the said hotel during lockdown. In the

investigation, it has also been transpired that some symbol was made for

taking money, which was found in the whatsapp messages of the mobile of

the said lady. The F.I.R. is not the encyclopedia of the entire case. The

petitioner being the owner of the hotel in question was found to be

interlinked with the said illegality. Thus, the prima facie case is found to be

there. For violation of the guidelines of the lockdown, another F.I.R. bearing

Bistupur P.S. Case No. 87 of 2020 was registered on 25.04.2020, wherein,

the petitioner has also been made accused. However, that F.I.R. is with

regard to another offence for the non-compliance of the order of the

Government during lockdown.

18. The argument made by the learned counsel for the petitioner with

regard to Section (2)(a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 is

required to be considered after the entire evidences collected in the trial. At

this stage, the Court is not required to go through the different documents

as to whether the case is made out or not. At this stage, prima facie

satisfaction is required.

19. After quashing of the order taking cognizance dated 24.06.2020 vide

order dated 21.10.2020 in Cr.M.P. No. 2118 of 2020, whereby, the matter

was remanded back to the court below to pass a fresh order, the learned

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur has passed the cognizance order

dated 27.10.2020, which is impugned order herein. On perusal of the

cognizance order, it transpires that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Jamshedpur has perused the F.I.R., charge-sheet, case diary, call details as

well as entire case records and thereafter he came to the conclusion that

prima facie case under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic

(Prevention) Act, 1956 against the accused persons including the petitioner

is made out. While passing the order taking cognizance, the learned Chief

Judicial Magistrate has considered that the evidence has come on the record

that the accused were in telephonic contact with each other also. There is

false statement of Aishwarya Tarak Singh regarding her coming to

Jamshedpur on 22.03.2020, whereas, the allegation shows that she moves

to Jamshedpur in late hours on 24.03.2020 and reached Jamshedpur on

25.03.2020. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner

that Aishwarya Tarak Singh was living in the hotel prior to lockdown is also

falsified. This aspect of the matter has also been considered in the order

taking cognizance. The order taking cognizance is a well speaking order.

The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur took cognizance of the

alleged offence against the accused persons after perusal of the case diary,

charge-sheet and other materials place before that Court. The cognizance

was taken as a prima facie case was made out against the accused persons.

It is well settled that at the stage of order taking cognizance, the Court

should not get into the merits of the case made out by the police, in the

charge-sheet filed by them with a view to calculate the success rate of

prosecution in that particular case. At this stage, the duty of the Court is

limited to the extent of finding out whether the material placed before it

and the offence alleged therein against the accused is made out or not with

a view to proceed further in the case. The requirement of Section 190

Cr.P.C. is application of mind and in the case in hand, the learned Chief

Judicial Magistrate after remand of the first order taking cognizance, has

perused the material on record and, thereafter, has taken the cognizance. It

would not be proper for this Court to analyse the case of the petitioner in

the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction

would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the

proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the

material before it and conclude that on the basis of F.I.R., trial cannot be

proceeded with. This is not a case of abuse of process of the Court. When

lockdown was under operation, the aforesaid things were happened in the

said hotel and for that two F.I.Rs. have been lodged. This is not a case of

exercising jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. particularly in

the fact that the order taking cognizance is speaking one. The learned Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur has rightly applied his mind.

20. In view of the aforesaid facts, no relief can be extended to the

petitioner in this quashing application. Accordingly, this petition stands

dismissed.

(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Ajay/