Jharkhand High Court

Dr. Bishnudeo Lal Dass vs The Union Of India on 17 June, 2021

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   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                  W.P.(PIL) No.1128 of 2021
                               ----

Dr. Bishnudeo Lal Dass, aged about 67 year, S/o Late Mahabir Dass, R/o Plot No.496, Road No.6, Ashok Nagar, PO

- Doranda, PS - Argora, District - Ranchi, Jharkhand -

834002.                               ...   ...       Petitioner
                            Versus
1. The Union of India.
2. The State of Jharkhand.

3. The Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, Room No. 348, 'A' Wing, Nirman Bhavan, P.O. + P.S. New Delhi, New Delhi - 110011.

4. The Registrar-cum-Secretary Pharmacy Council of India, Ma Anandmayee Marg, Pocket - A, Okhla Phase - 1, Okhla Industrial Area, New Delhi, Pin : 110044.

5. The Secretary, Department of Health, Medical Education and Family Welfare, Government of Jharkhand, Nepal House, PO - Doranda, PS - Doranda, District - Ranchi, Jharkhand Pin - 834002.

6. The Member Secretary, Diploma-in-Pharmacy Examination Authority, Department of Health, Medical Education and Family Welfare (Government of Jharkhand), Jharkhand State Pharmacy Council, PO - Bariatu, PS - Bariatu, District - Ranchi, Jharkhand, Pin

- 834009.

                                          ...      ... Respondents
                             -------
CORAM :           HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
                              ------

For the Petitioner : Mr. Abhishek Krishna Gupta, Advocate For the UOI : Mr. Rajiv Sinha, A.S.G.I.

For the State : Mr. Piyush Chitresh, A.C. to A.G.

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ORAL JUDGMENT Order No. 04 : Dated 17th June, 2021

With the consent of the parties, hearing of the matter

has been done through video conferencing and there is no

complaint whatsoever regarding the visual/audio

connectivity.

2. Heard parties.

3. The instant writ petition has been filed by way of public

interest litigation seeking following directions :-

"a. To direct the Pharmacy Council of India (hereinafter referred to as PCI), a statutory body constituted under Section - 3 of the Pharmacy Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as Act), to ensure the observance of the provisions of the Act as well as "Education Regulations for Diploma Course in Pharmacy" (in short Education Regulations), contained in (Annexure-2), made by it in exercise of power under Section - 10 of the Act in letter and spirit;

AND b. To set aside the "Examination Authority" re- constituted vide Letter No.176(10) dated 25/07/2019 (Annexure-6) issued under the signature of Respondent No.5 for being absolute want of mandatory approval by the PCI as mandated by Section - 12(2) and Section - 15 of the Act as well as under Regulation

- 18 of the "Education Regulations" (Annexure-2);

AND c. To set aside the Office Order contained in Letter No.D.Pharm./31/2021 dated 08/02/2021 (Annexure-

8) issued by Respondent No.6 whereby and where under 2nd Part of Diploma-in-Pharmacy (hereinafter referred to as D.Pharm.) Practical Examination got conducted in violation of mandatory provisions contained in Section 12(2), Section - 15 & Section - 16 of the Act as well as Points - 2, 3 & 6 of Appendix - C relating to Regulation - 18 of the "Education Regulations" (Annexure-2);

AND d. To set aside the 1st Part of D. Pharm. Practical Examination conducted on 01/03/2021 as per Office Order contained in Letter No. D.Pharm./78/2021 dated 20/02/2021 (Annexure-10) issued by Respondent No.6 in violation of mandatory provisions contained in Section 12(2), Section - 15 & Section - 16 of the Act as well as Points - 2, 3 & 6 of Appendix - C relating to Regulation - 18 of the "Education Regulations" (Annexure-2);

AND e. To stay the operation of the Office Order, during the pendency of this Petition, contained in Letter No.

D.Pharm./78/2021 dated 20/02/2021 (Annexure-10) issued by Respondent No.6 whereby and where under the remaining 1st Part Practical D.Pharm. Examination as well as the entire 1st Part & 2nd Part D. Pharm. Theory Examination is to be conducted in violation of mandatory provisions contained in Section 12(2), Section - 15 & Section - 16 of the Act as well as Points

- 2, 3 & 6 of Appendix - C relating to Regulation - 18 of the "Education Regulations" (Annexure-2);"

4. Mr. Abhishek Krishna Gupta, learned counsel appearing

for the writ petitioner has submitted that the instant writ

petition has been filed by way of Public Interest Litigation for

the reason that even though the Pharmacy Council of India,

hereinafter referred as PCI, a statutory body constituted

under Section - 3 of the Pharmacy Act, 1948 (hereinafter

referred to as Act, 1948), to ensure the observance of the

provisions of the Act as well as "Education Regulations for

Diploma Course in Pharmacy" enacted in exercise of power

under Section - 10 of the Act to be followed in its letter and

spirit but the examination of 2nd Part of Diploma-in-

Pharmacy (D.Pharm.) has been conducted in violation of

mandatory provisions as contained in Section 12(2), Section

- 15 & Section - 16 of the Act, 1948 as well as Points - 2, 3

and 6 of Appendix - C relating to Regulation - 18 of the

"Education Regulations" since the "Examination Authority"

which has been re-constituted vide letter dated 25/07/2019

which is due to want of mandatory approval by the Pharmacy

Council of India as required under Section - 12(2) and

Section - 15 of the Act, 1948 as also under Regulation - 18 of

the "Education Regulations" and hence, prayer has been

made to set aside the 1st Part of D. Pharm. Practical

Examination conducted on 01/03/2021 on the ground of

violation of mandatory provisions contained in Section 12(2),

Section - 15 & Section - 16 of the Act, 1948 as well as Points

- 2, 3 & 6 of Appendix - C relating to Regulation - 18 of the

"Education Regulations".

5. Mr. Piyush Chitresh, learned A.C. to learned Advocate

General, appearing for the respondent State of Jharkhand as

also Mr. Rajiv Sinha, learned Assistant Solicitor General of

India has raised a preliminary issue about maintainability of

the instant Public Interest Litigation as, according to

them, there is no involvement of any public element in the

instant writ petition since the writ petitioner, who is claiming

to be Lecturer in a Pharmacy College, is raising the issue of

invalidity of 1st Part of Examination of D.Pharma on the

ground of violation of some statutory provisions as contained

under the Act, 1948 as well as the Regulation made

thereunder and, as such, even if the said prayer will be

allowed it will not be in the interest of the public at large

rather it will be only for the benefit of a class of people who

are students of the 1st Part of D.Pharma.

6. In response to such argument, Mr. Abhishek Krishna

Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, by

refuting the aforesaid submission has submitted that it is

incorrect to say that there is no public element involved in

this case as because the said examination since has been

conducted in violation of the statutory provision as contained

under the Act, 1948 and the Regulations made thereunder

which involves 70 Pharmacy institutions within the State of

Jharkhand and, therefore, so many people are involved in

this case and hence there is a public element and accordingly

the instant writ petition is maintainable.

7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties on

preliminary objection regarding maintainability of writ

petition.

8. This Court having heard learned counsel for the parties

and before delving with the issue, deems it fit and proper to

refer to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the

case of Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B., reported in

(2004) 3 SCC 349 , wherein, at paragraph nos. 5 to 16 it has

been held as under:

"5. It is necessary to take note of the meaning of the expression "public interest litigation". In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 4, 4th Edn., "public interest" is defined thus:

"Public interest.--(1) A matter of public or general interest does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement; but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."

6. In Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn., "public interest" is defined as follows:

"Public interest.--Something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest

shared by citizens generally in affairs of local, State or national Government."

7. In Janata Dal case [(1992) 4 SCC 305] this Court considered the scope of public interest litigation. In para 53 of the said judgment, after considering what is public interest, the Court has laid down as follows: (SCC p. 331) "53. The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein, initiated in a court of law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression 'PIL' means a legal action initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."

8. In paras 60, 61 and 62 of the said judgment, it was pointed out as follows: (SCC p. 334) "62. Be that as it may, it is needless to emphasise that the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory, because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold."

9. In para 98 of the said judgment, it has further been pointed out as follows: (SCC pp. 345-46) "98. While this Court has laid down a chain of notable decisions with all emphasis at their command about the importance and significance of this newly developed doctrine of PIL, it has also hastened to sound a red alert and a note of severe warning that courts should not allow its process to be abused by a mere busybody or a meddlesome interloper or wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern except for personal gain or private profit or other oblique consideration."

10. In subsequent paras of the said judgment, it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 348, para 109) "109. It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly, a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before the court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold."

11. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of genuine litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievances go unnoticed, unrepresented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death and facing the gallows under untold agony, persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters -- government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenus expecting their release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the courts and having their grievances redressed, the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for the glare of publicity break the queue muffling their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the court never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of genuine litigants and resultantly, they lose faith in the administration of our judicial system.

12. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity-oriented or founded

on personal vendetta. As indicated above, court must be careful to see that a body of persons or a member of the public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases, with exemplary costs.

13. The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation in USA defined "public interest litigation" in its Report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows: "Public interest law is the name that has recently been given to efforts that provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary marketplace for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others."

14. The court has to be satisfied about: (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; and (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between two conflicting interests: (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the executive and the legislature. The court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busybodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.

15. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu [(1994) 2 SCC 481] and A.P. State Financial Corpn. v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills [(1994) 2 SCC 647]. No litigant has a right to unlimited draught on the court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. [See Buddhi Kota Subbarao (Dr) v. K. Parasaran [(1996) 5 SCC 530]. Today people rush to courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public interest. They must inspire confidence in courts and among the public.

16. As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that courts are flooded with a large number of so-called public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in a large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Duryodhan Sahu (Dr) v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra [(1998) 7 SCC 273] this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so-called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the courts should do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be desirable for the courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as aforestated so that the message goes in the right

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direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the courts."

[Emphasis supplied]

9. This Court, after having gone through the aforesaid

judgment, found therefrom that the "public interest" as has

been defined by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ashok Kumar

Pandey v. State of W.B. (Supra) means that the matter of

public or general interest does not mean that which is

interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or

amusement; but that in which a class of the community have

a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal

rights or liabilities are affected.

It is further evident from the aforesaid judgment that

the reference of the Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition has

been made which defines "public interest" to the effect that

something in which the public, the community at large, has

some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal

rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so

narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interests of the particular

localities, which may be affected by the matters in question.

Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local, State

or national Government.

10. The Hon'ble Apex Court further in State of

Uttaranchal vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Ors. (2010)

3 SCC 402, has been pleased to lay down the guidelines as

under paragraph 181, extract of which read as hereunder:

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"181. We have carefully considered the facts of the present case. We have also examined the law declared by this Court and other courts in a number of judgments. In order to preserve the purity and sanctity of the PIL, it has become imperative to issue the following directions: (1) The Courts must encourage genuine and bona fide PIL and effectively discourage and curb the PIL filed for extraneous considerations.

(2) Instead of every individual Judge devising his own procedure for dealing with the public interest litigation, it would be appropriate for each High Court to properly formulate rules for encouraging the genuine PIL and discouraging the PIL filed with oblique motives. Consequently, we request that the High Courts who have not yet framed the rules, should frame the rules within three months. The Registrar General of each High Court is directed to ensure that a copy of the rules prepared by the High Court is sent to the Secretary General of this Court immediately thereafter.

(3) The Courts should prima facie verify the credentials of the petitioner before entertaining a PIL. (4) The Courts should be prima facie satisfied regarding the correctness of the contents of the petition before entertaining a PIL.

(5) The Courts should be fully satisfied that substantial public interest is involved before entertaining the petition. (6) The Courts should ensure that the petition which involves larger public interest, gravity and urgency must be given priority over other petitions. (7) The Courts before entertaining the PIL should ensure that the PIL is aimed at redressal of genuine public harm or public injury. The Court should also ensure that there is no personal gain, private motive or oblique motive behind filing the public interest litigation. (8) The Courts should also ensure that the petitions filed by busybodies for extraneous and ulterior motives must be discouraged by imposing exemplary costs or by adopting similar novel methods to curb frivolous petitions and the petitions filed for extraneous considerations."

11. This Court has considered the factual aspects involved

in this case on the basis of the aforesaid proposition laid

down by Hon'ble Apex Court wherefrom it is evident that the

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writ petitioner, who is claiming to be imparting teaching in

one of the Pharmacy College, is seeking a direction for

quashing and setting aside the examination pertaining to

D.Pharma on the ground of violation of some statutory

provision as contained under the Act, 1948 and the

Education Regulations made thereunder.

As has been interpreted by Hon'ble Apex Court in the

aforesaid judgments, the very meaning of the "Public Interest