Jharkhand High Court

Pintu Paswan vs The State Of Jharkhand Through The ... on 31 August, 2021

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       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                 W.P.(C) No. 6626 of 2019

Pintu Paswan                                   ...     ...       Petitioner
                                       Versus
1.   The   State of Jharkhand through the Deputy Commissioner, Latehar
2.   The   District Supply Officer, Latehar
3.   The   Sub-Divisional Officer, Latehar
4.   The   Sub-Divisional Supply Officer, Latehar
5.   The   Block Development Officer, Barwadih, Latehar
6.   The   Block Supply Officer, Barwadih, Latehar...  ...    Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Mukesh Kumar Mehta, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Amritanshu Singh, AC to GP-II

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Order No. 05 Dated: 31.08.2021

The present writ petition is taken up today through Video conferencing.

At the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the remaining defect as pointed out by the office is ignored.

The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 18.01.2019 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 1 - the Deputy Commissioner, Latehar in Licence Restoration Appeal Case No. 10/2017, whereby the said appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order as contained in memo no. 482 dated 13.05.2017 issued by the respondent no. 2 - the District Supply Officer, Latehar cancelling the PDS licence of the petitioner, has been rejected without entering into the merit of the case.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the content of the writ petition. It appears that the petitioner's PDS Licence No. 22/07 issued for Village-Murgidih, Panchayat- Mangra, Block- Barwadih, District-Latehar was cancelled by the respondent no. 2 vide order as contained in memo no. 482 dated 13.05.2017. Aggrieved with the said order, the petitioner preferred Licence Restoration Appeal Case No. 10/2017 in the court of the respondent no. 1, which was taken up on 28.07.2017 and on the said date, notice was issued to both the parties as well as an enquiry report was called from the respondent no. 5 - the Block Development Officer-cum-Circle Officer, Barwadih, Latehar. Subsequently, the said appeal was again taken up on 08.09.2017 and on

the said date, the respondent no. 1 directed the Additional Collector to make spot verification on the basis of report of the Circle Officer, Barwadih. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the said appeal was thereafter taken up by the respondent no. 1 on several dates, however, the same was not taken up on merit. On making enquiry, he was told by the officials of the respondent no. 1 that the said appeal would not be taken up on merit till the report of the Additional Collector, as per the order dated 08.09.2017, is received.

3. Be that as it may. On perusal of the entire order-sheet of the Licence Restoration Appeal Case No. 10/2017 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition), it appears that except on 02.02.2018 (the petitioner was present on the said date), no one appeared on behalf of the parties on several dates from 08.09.2017 till 18.01.2019 i.e., the day on which the impugned order has been passed by the respondent no. 1. It further appears that on 18.01.2019, after recording in the order-sheet that nobody appeared for both the sides, subsequently it was written in the order that since the first party (the petitioner) did not appear on several dates, he seemed to have lost interest in the said appeal. Accordingly, the order dated 13.05.2017 passed by the respondent no. 2 was upheld and the said appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed.

4. The manner in which the respondent no. 1 has dismissed the said appeal cannot be said to be proper and justified. The order-sheets of Licence Restoration Appeal Case No. 10/2017 itself indicate that no one appeared on behalf of both the sides on several dates from 08.09.2017 till 18.01.2019 except 02.02.2018 as indicated hereinabove. It is not the case where the second party i.e., the representative of the department appeared on different dates and the petitioner was unrepresented. In fact, in the aforesaid dates, nobody had appeared on behalf of both the sides and hence, it was completely unwarranted for the respondent no. 1 to dismiss the said appeal only on the ground that no one represented the petitioner on different dates that too without entering into the merit of the case. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has asserted that he himself had appeared on several dates before the respondent no. 1, yet the said factual assertion cannot be examined under the writ jurisdiction of this Court as the order-sheets

suggest that no one appeared on behalf of both the sides before the respondent no. 1 on the aforesaid dates. Nevertheless, if according to the respondent no. 1, the petitioner remained unrepresented on various dates, he should have at least issued a fresh notice to the petitioner to ensure his presence on the given date and should have proceeded thereafter in the matter.

5. In the case of "Kranti Associates Private Limited & Anr. Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors." reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.

(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both

judicial accountability and transparency.

(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37].)

(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision- making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions".

(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process".

6. In the case of "Asha Sharma Vs. Chandigarh Administration & Ors." reported in (2011) 10 SCC 86, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

14. Action by the State, whether administrative or executive, has to be fair and in consonance with the statutory provisions and rules. Even if no rules are in force to govern executive action still such action, especially if it could potentially affect the rights of the parties, should be just, fair and transparent. Arbitrariness in State action, even where the rules vest discretion in an authority, has to be impermissible. The exercise of discretion, in line with principles of fairness and good governance, is an implied obligation upon the authorities, when vested with the powers to pass orders of determinative nature. The standard of fairness is also dependent upon certainty in State action, that is, the

class of persons, subject to regulation by the Allotment Rules, must be able to reasonably anticipate the order for the action that the State is likely to take in a given situation. Arbitrariness and discrimination have inbuilt elements of uncertainty as the decisions of the State would then differ from person to person and from situation to situation, even if the determinative factors of the situations in question were identical. This uncertainty must be avoided.

7. Thus, the quasi-judicial authority is bound to give reasons while passing order. The purpose of giving reason is to operate as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. It also facilitates the superior authority to determine the soundness of the decision while hearing appeal/revision. Even if there is no rule to govern administrative decision, the authority is bound to act fairly and in transparent manner. The standard of fairness is also dependent upon certainty in State action.

8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated 18.01.2019 passed by the respondent no. 1 cannot be sustained in law and the same is accordingly quashed and set-aside. The Licence Restoration Appeal Case No. 10/2017 is remanded to the respondent no. 1 to pass a fresh order after providing due opportunity of hearing to the representative of the petitioner as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order.