M/S Trinity Reinsurance vs Central Bureau Of Investigation
2024 Latest Caselaw 336 j&K/2

Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench

M/S Trinity Reinsurance vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 27 March, 2024

Author: Rajnesh Oswal

Bench: Rajnesh Oswal

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND
                  LADAKHAT SRINAGAR

                                                 Reserved on: 15.03.2024
                                                 Pronounced on:27.03.2024

                            WP(C) No.295/2024

M/S TRINITY REINSURANCE
BROKERS LTD.                                       ...PETITIONER(S)
Through: - Mr. Jahangir Iqbal Ganai, Sr. Adv.
           With M/S Shams Tabrez & Mir Kamil Nazir, Advocates
Vs.

CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AND OTHERS                   ...RESPONDENT(S)
Through: -      Mr. Tahir Majid Shamsi, DSGI,
                With Ms. Yasmeena Jan, Adv-for R1&R2
                Mr. Mohsin Qadiri, Sr. AAG, with
                Ms. Maha Majeed, Adv.-for R3.

CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNESH OSWAL, JUDGE

                                   JUDGMENT

1) The petitioner-company has sought the quashing of FIR bearing

No.RC1232022A0004 dated 19.04.2022 registered by the respondent

No1 at the instance of respondent No.3 under Section 120-B r/w

Section 420 of J&K Penal Code (Ranbir Penal Code) and under Section

5(2) r/w Section 5(1)(d) of the J&K PC Act, inter-alia, on the following

grounds:

i) That the Anti-Corruption Bureau, J&K, has already

investigated into the allegations raised by the General

Administration Department, Government of J&K and in its

report has concluded that no irregularity in the execution and

implementation of the health scheme for J&K Government

employees was found, as such, the respondent No.1 cannot

continue with the investigation in the FIR on the basis of same

set of allegations;

ii) That the contents of FIR do not disclose the commission of

any of the offences as alleged qua the petitioner-company, as

such, the FIR could not have been registered against the

petitioner, more particularly when the petitioner-company has

suffered a heavy loss to the tune of Rs.2.31 crores

(approximately) in the contract which was subsequently

cancelled by the Government;

iii) That the FIR was registered by the respondent No.1 on

19.04.2022 and notices dated 14.12.2022 and 15.06.2023

were served upon the petitioner-company for submitting

some documents. Though the petitioner-company provided

all the requisite documents yet again notice dated 16.01.2024

was served upon the petitioner asking for similar set of

documents and along with personal details which have been

duly replied and almost all the available documents have been

provided to the respondents;

2) It is stated that after being successful in the tendering process,

the petitioner was appointed as Insurance Broker to design and

implement the Group Mediclaim Healthcare Insurance Policy for all

the State Government employees including the employees of

PSUs/Autonomous Bodies/Local Bodies/Universities, pensioners etc.

and their dependant family members for a period of three years. An

agreement was entered into between petitioner-company and the

Government on 27.11.2017. A tender was floated by the Finance

Department through petitioner-company for appointment of insurance

company for its Group Mediclaim Healthcare Insurance Policy but due

to poor response, no one could be selected and fresh tenders were

floated by the Finance Department for the aforesaid purpose on

01.06.2018. It is further stated that seven bids were received from the

tenderers out of which Reliance General Insurance Company Limited

(for short "RGICL") was declared as lowest bidder as its bid was 40%

less than the other bidders and finally was recommended for issuance

of Letter of Award. A tripartite agreement dated 15.10.2018 was

executed between petitioner-company, Government of J&K and

RGICL. It is pleaded by the petitioner that the petitioner-company has

not received any amount from the J&K Government but has received

remuneration from RGICL only for a brief period of three months as

brokerage charges in terms of the agreement. The aforesaid agreement

was terminated abruptly vide notice dated 30.11.2018 by the Finance

Department of the J&K Government without assigning any justification

and thereafter an investigation was carried out by the Anti-Corruption

Bureau (for short "the ACB") in respect of alleged malpractices in

awarding the aforesaid contract to RGICL but after thorough

investigation, the ACB concluded that no irregularity was found in the

matter. Further, the communication was made to RGICL for recovery

of balance amount as per the relevant clause of the contract. In the

reports of the ACB dated 27.11.2019 and 08.02.2022 submitted to the

Government it was specifically stated that no irregularity has been

found during the course of verification by ACB. Thereafter, Deputy

Secretary to Government of J&K, vide communication dated

23.03.2022 referred the matter to the CBI along with its report and in

pursuance to the aforesaid reference, FIR bearing

No.RC1232022A0004 dated 19.04.2022 was registered at Srinagar by

the respondents No.1 and 2. It is further averred that the allegations

made in the FIR by the CBI are based on the written communication

alleging the connivance and conspiracy between unknown public

officials of the Government of J&K, petitioner-company and M/S

RGICL to allegedly commit the offences of conspiracy and criminal

misconduct to cause pecuniary advantage to themselves and wrongful

loss to the sate exchequer during the period 2017-18. It is urged that the

petitioner-company and its officials fully participated and cooperated

during the course of aforesaid investigation and when the petitioner

appeared before the respondents, the respondent No.2 conducted

thorough investigation and put several questions to the petitioner's

Director - Mr. Harshit Jain, which were duly replied by him.

3) The respondents No.1 and 2 have filed the response stating

therein that a Regular Case No.RC1232022A0004 was registered by

CBI, ACB, Srinagar, on 19.04.2022 against the petitioner, RGICL and

other underknown public servants and private persons under Section

120-B r/w Section 420 of J&K Penal Code (Ranbir Penal Code) and

under Section 5(2) r/w Section 5(1)(d) of the J&K PC Act, on the basis

of written complaint dated 23.03.2022 submitted by the Deputy

Secretary to the Govt. of J&K, General Administration Department. It

is further stated that unknown officials/officers of the Government of

J&K in conspiracy with M/S Trinity Reinsurance Brokers Limited and

M/S RGICL committed criminal misconduct by hiring M/S Trinity

Reinsurance Brokers Limited as consultant/intermediary to guide the

department in tendering process. M/S RGICL was selected as Insurer

for Group Mediclaim Insurance of employees and pensioners of J&K

Govt. in the year 2018 by violating the Financial Rules and an amount

of Rs.61,43,78,800/ was released in favour of M/S RGICL before

signing of agreement. M/S RGICL was allowed to misappropriate the

funds of J&K Government by allowing insurance policy to continue for

one quarter, wherein the notice for foreclosure of the contract with

effect from 31.12.2018 was served upon M/S RGICL on 30.11.2018. It

is further averred that after registration of FIR, investigation is being

carried out and during investigation, Shri Harshit Jain, Director and

Principal Officer of the petitioner-Company was requested to produce

the documents including communications with insurance companies,

TPAs and Government of J&K, eligibility of M/S Trinity Reinsurance

Brokers Limited, documents regarding expenses incurred, payments

received etc. and to give his statement regarding allegations of

malpractices. He attended the CBI, ACB, Srinagar, office on

20.07.2022 and 21.07.2022 and produced photocopies of the

documents. On 21.07.2022, his statement was recorded but before

completion of his statement, he requested to defer the statement due to

ill health and as he wanted to refer to his office records before making

further statement and accordingly Shri Harshit Jain was directed to

attend the CBI, ACB, Srinagar office after one week along with all

original/certified documents and he was relieved from CBI office.

Thereafter, despite telephonic calls and notices issued to Shri Harshit

Jain, he did not participate in the investigation and levelled false

allegations of harassment without any basis, with ulterior motive to stall

the smooth investigation of the case. M/S RGICL has paid any amount

of Rs.4,36,07,033/ to the petitioner as brokerage out of the premium

received from the Government. The Government of J&K had deducted

the premium amount from the salaries of lacs of Government

employees and received premium amount from the pensioners as well.

The petitioner and RGICL are duty bound to cooperate during the

investigation. It is also stated that the ACB, J&K, has not investigated

the matter, rather has only conducted limited preliminary

enquiry/verification and at present, the CBI is conducting thorough

investigation of the allegations made in the FIR. During search of the

premises of the petitioner, certain incriminating documents were seized

and the said documents are being examined.

4) Mr. Jahangir Iqbal Ganai, learned senior counsel appearing for

the petitioner, vehemently argued that mere perusal of the impugned

FIR would reveal that there are no specific allegations against the

petitioner in respect of any undue benefit earned by the petitioner from

the contract and the ACB has already come to the conclusion that there

is no irregularity in the allotment of contract to RGICL. He also urged

that there is delay in registration of the FIR as the same was registered

in the month of April, 2022 whereas the allegation pertain to the year

2018. He also strenuously argued that the respondent No.1 has no

jurisdiction to investigate the FIR within the territory of J&K. The

learned senior counsel pointed also drew the attention of this Court to

various findings returned by the ACB.

5) Per contra, Mr. T. M. Shamsi, learned counsel for respondents

No.1 and 2 argued that the ACB had simply conducted the preliminary

verification and the ACB did not enquire into the aspect of engaging

the petitioner-company as insurance broker whereas the CBI is

investigating not only the mode and manner in which the contract was

allotted to RGICL but also the eligibility of the petitioner for allotment

of contract as insurance broker and the role of various officials in

allotting the contract of insurance broker to the petitioner-company. He

has submitted that in view of the judgments passed by the Coordinate

Bench of this Court, the learned senior counsel cannot argue that the

CBI has no jurisdiction to investigate the matter. He further argued that

there is no delay in the registration of FIR and otherwise also, solely on

the ground of delay, the FIR cannot be quashed.

6) Mr. Mohsin Qadiri, Sr. AAG, appearing for the newly impleaded

respondent No.3 submitted that earlier the matter was only enquired

into by the ACB and the mere reference of the case to the CBI clearly

demonstrates that the respondent No.3 wanted to get the matter

investigated independently and thoroughly, more particularly when the

Director General Codes, Finance Department, had flagged certain

issues including that e-tendering process was not followed. He further

argued that the report submitted by the ACB was examined by the

respondent No.3 and on consideration of the report only, the matter was

referred to respondent No.1 for investigation.

7) Heard and perused the record produced by the CBI, which, after

perusal, was returned back.

8) Before proceeding ahead to consider the grounds urged by the

petitioner in the present petition, this Court deems it appropriate to

take note of the pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

respect of the scope and power of the High Court in interfering with

the investigation which has not reached at final stage.

9) The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India after taking note of its

earlier decision in "State of Haryana versus Bhajan Lal", 1992 Supp.

(1) 335 in State of A.P. v. Aravapally Venkanna, (2009) 13 SCC 443, has

held as under:

5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties

imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in [the] course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.

In exercise of [these] powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866] this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings :

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where

there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal . A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:

'(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that

there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.'

8. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. ... It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint/FIR has to be read as a whole. If it appears that

on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant or disclosed in the FIR that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/FIR is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by [itself] be the basis for quashing the proceeding."

10) In Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra,

(2021) 19 SCC 401, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has further

clarified the scope of section 482 Cr.P.C for the purpose of

interference with the investigation and has held as under:

13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, the following principles of law emerge:

13.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences.

13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences.

13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on. 13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the "rarest of rare cases". (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482CrPC is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court.) 13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.

13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage.

13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule.

13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482CrPC.

13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping.

13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences.

13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice.

13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.

13.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the Court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court.

13.14. However, at the same time, the Court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-

restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur and Bhajan Lal , has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint.

13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the Court when it exercises the power under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits

whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.

11) Thus from the above principles laid down by the Apex Court it

is clear that the High Courts should refrain from interfering with the

investigation when the facts are hazy and not clear. The investigation

should not be scuttled at the initial stage and quashing of

FIR/compliant is not a rule but an exception.

12) Now the contentions raised by the petitioner shall be considered

on the parameters laid down by the Apex Court as mentioned above.

13) The first contention raised by the petitioner is that there are no

allegations against the petitioner in FIR in respect of the commission

of any offence whatsoever. This is an undisputed fact that the premium

paid to the RGICL was, in fact, deducted from the salaries of the

Government employees and an amount of Rs.61.44 crores was paid to

M/S RGICL as first instalment of premium and out of that premium,

an amount of Rs.4,36,07,033/ has been admittedly received by M/S

Trinity Reinsurance Brokers Limited, the petitioner herein, as

brokerage. The FIR was registered by the respondent No.1 pursuant

to the communication dated 23.03.2022 and the office memoranda

dated 10.02.2022 of the Finance Department, Codes Division,

Government of J&K, Civil Secretariat, Jammu, forms part of the said

communication. The perusal of the communication dated 10.02.2022

reveals certain allegations in respect of award of contract to RGICL

without e-tendering process and that changes were made in the

agreement with the petitioner after the agreement was signed, have

been levelled. It is settled law that FIR is not an encyclopaedia and the

purpose of registration of FIR is to only set the criminal law into

motion so as to come to final conclusion as to whether an offence has

been committed or not and if during the course of investigation, the

investigating agency comes to the conclusion that the offence is not

proved, then the closure report can be filed by it. So far as the present

case is concerned, there are allegations levelled against the petitioner

and other government officials as well as against RGICL which are

required to be probed in detail and at this stage when investigation has

not reached at the final stage and the investigating agency is still in

the process of gathering evidence, the FIR cannot be quashed. The

facts are still hazy and not clear as such the contention raised by the

petitioner-company is mis-conceived.

14) The second contention raised by the petitioner is that once the

ACB had enquired in detail the similar allegations, the impugned FIR

could not have been registered by the respondent No.1 at the instance

of respondent No.3. The perusal of the communication dated

23.03.2022 addressed by respondent No.2 to respondent No.1 reveals

that the respondent No.1 was requested to investigate the matter only

after the reported submitted by the ACB was considered and the

learned Senior AAG appearing for respondent No.3 is right in his

submission that in order to get fair, independent and transparent

investigation, it was thought proper by the respondent No.3 to get the

matter regarding allotment of contract investigated independently as

huge public money was involved. This Court has examined the record

produced by the CBI and has found that the CBI is not only

investigating the allotment of contract to M/S RGICL but also the

engagement of petitioner-company as insurance broker. This Court

would not like to comment in respect of the mode and manner in which

the petitioner was engaged as insurance broker at this stage because

the matter is still being investigated by the respondent No.1. This

aspect of the case was never enquired into by the ACB, J&K.

Therefore, the contention of the petitioner in this regard too is not

sufficient for quashing of the impugned FIR.

15) The third contention raised by the learned senior counsel,

though not pleaded in the petition, is that there is delay of four years

in registration of FIR. Simply on the ground that the FIR has been

registered after a huge delay, the same cannot be quashed as earlier

the matter was being enquired into by the ACB which submitted its

reports on 27.11.2019 and 08.02.2022. After considering the report

submitted by the ACB, the matter was referred to the respondent No.1

for investigation by the respondent No.3 vide communication dated

23.03.2022. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a huge and

unexplained delay on the part of respondents in registration of FIR.

This contention of the petitioner too is rejected.

16) The last ground, though not pleaded in the petition but urged by

learned senior counsel during the course of arguments, that the CBI

has no jurisdiction to investigate the cases pertaining to the erstwhile

State of J&K is also misconceived in view of judgments passed by the

Coordinate Bench of this Court in cases titled "Kumar Avinav vs.

Union of India", 2023(1) Crimes J&K 455 and "Major. General

V.K Sharma & Anr. vs. C.B.I" CRMC No. 248/2016 decided on

07.02.2024.

17) In view of above, this Court does not find any reason to show

indulgence for the purpose of quashing the impugned FIR. However,

the present petition is disposed of by directing the respondents No.1

and 2 to conclude the investigation of the case as expeditiously as

possible and the petitioner-company is directed to participate in the

investigation so as to enable the respondent No.1 to conclude the

investigation expeditiously.

18)     No order as to costs.



                                                    (Rajnesh Oswal)
                                                         Judge
SRINAGAR
27.03.2024
"Bhat Altaf-Secy"
                Whether the order is speaking:       Yes/No
                Whether the order is reportable:     Yes/No