Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 1091 j&K
Judgement Date : 26 May, 2023
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
LPASW No. 63/2012
Reserved on 23.05.2023.
Pronounced on
26..05.2023.
Sandeep Singh ..... appellant (s)
Through :- Ms Surinder Kour Sr. Advocate
with
Mr. Michael Dogra Advocate
V/s
Union of India and others .....Respondent(s)
Through :- Mr. Vishal Sharma DSGI.
Coram: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PUNEET GUPTA, JUDGE
JUDGEMENT
Sanjeev Kumar, J.
1 This intra-Court Appeal is directed against judgment dated
08.06.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court [„the Writ
Court‟] in SWP No. 706/2004 titled „Sandeep Singh vs. Union of India and
others‟ whereby the Writ Court has dismissed the writ petition of the
appellant.
2 Briefly put, the facts, leading to filing of this appeal are that the
appellant came to be enrolled as Constable in Border Security Force [„BSF‟]
in April, 1986 and was subsequently promoted as Head Constable on
03.01.2003. He was, however, dismissed from service by the Deputy
Inspector General of BSF vide his order No. Estt/SS/DISM/04/186-386 dated
03.01.2004 on the charge of his unauthorized absence from duty for 39 days
w.e.f 02.10.2003 to 09.11.2003. Prior to his dismissal from service, the
appellant had been awarded three punishments; on two occasions under
Section 19 (a) and on one occasion under Section 19(b) of Border Security
Force Act, 1968 [„the Act of 1968‟]. The appellant was reprimanded for an
act punishable under Section 19(a) of the Act of 1968 for remaining absent
without leave w.e.f 01.10.1991 to 02.10.1991. He was administered severe
reprimand again for remaining absent without leave w.e.f 08.04.1999 to
06.06.1999. The appellant again overstayed his leave without any sufficient
cause by six days w.e.f 05.04.2001 to 24.04.2001 and was awarded severe
reprimand yet again.
3 On 02.10.2003, the appellant absented himself from the campus of
SHQ-CI OPS Rawalpora without any leave or authority and remained absent
for 39 days. He joined back his duty voluntarily on 09.11.2003. During his
absence without leave, the respondents vide letter dated 09.10.2003 intimated
to the appellant to join duty forthwith and was warned of disciplinary action,
should he fail to join forthwith. The appellant, however, joined his duty on
09.11.2003 thereby remaining unauthorisedly absent from duty for 39 days at
his own. On joining the duty, an explanation was sought from the appellant to
for remaining absent without leave or prior permission of the competent
Authority vide letter dated 10.11.2003. The appellant submitted his
explanation in writing and submitted that due to his brother‟s death, some
relatives had come to meet him and since he was urgently required at his
home to complete certain documentary work, as such, he left the campus
along with his relatives. The explanation offered by the appellant was not
found satisfactory by the competent Authority and, accordingly, a decision
was taken to initiate disciplinary action against the appellant under the
statutory provisions of the Act of 1968 and the rules framed thereunder.
4 The appellant was attached with 42nd Bn of BSF vide order No.
Estt/SHQ CI OPS-I 9798 dated 10.11.2003 issued by the Deputy Inspector
General, BSF for disciplinary purpose. The Commandant 42nd Bn., at whose
disposal the services of the appellant were placed, heard the petitioner under
Rule 45 of BSF Rules, 1969 on 15.11.2003 on the charge of "Absenting
Himself Without Leave" under Section 19(a) of the Act of 1968. After
hearing the charge, the Commandant ordered Record of Evidence (ROE) by
the Deputy Commandant of the Unit vide order dated 19.11.2003. During the
Record of Evidence, the appellant was afforded an opportunity to defend
himself. The Deputy Commandant Sh. Jai Ram Singh prepared the Record of
Evidence.
5 The Commandant 42nd Bn. BSF, after going through ROE under
Rule 51 of the BSF Rules, 1969, decided to try the appellant by the Summary
Security Force Court (SSFC). After due appreciation of the evidence adduced
against the appellant during trial, the SSFC found him guilty of the charge
and sentenced him "to be dismissed from service". The sentence was
promulgated to the appellant on 03.01.2004 itself. Feeling aggrieved of the
manner in which the proceedings were conducted against the appellant and he
was handed down the sentence of "to be dismissed from service", the
appellant filed SWP No. 706/2004 to throw challenge to the entire
proceedings conducted by the respondents as also the sentence of "dismissal
from service" imposed upon him. The matter was contested by the
respondents. In the reply affidavit filed by the respondents, it was denied by
them that any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder
were infracted in the matter, that too, to the prejudice of the appellant.
6 The Writ Court considered the rival contentions and the grounds
of challenge urged on behalf of the appellant and came to the conclusion that
the respondents had followed the due process of law and that there was no
evidence of infraction of any statutory Rule in the matter. The Writ Court
opined that dismissal from service was one of the punishments specified
under Section 48(1)(c) which could be imposed by the SSFC after conducting
the trial and, therefore, no show cause notice of proposed penalty was
contemplated. The writ petition was dismissed by the Writ Court vide order
dated 08.06.2012. It is this order of the Writ Court which is assailed before us
on multiple grounds.
7 The primary ground of challenge, that was vehemently urged by
Mrs. Kour learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, is that under
Rule 45 of the Rules of 1969, the charge against a delinquent enrolled person
like the appellant is required to be heard by the Commandant of such person
and a decision to try the delinquent enrolled person by the SSFC is also
required to be taken by the Commandant of such delinquent. Mrs. Kour
argues that, in the instant case, the Commandant of the appellant was Deputy
Inspector General, BSF, Sector Headquarter, Rawalpura and, therefore, the
hearing of charge, Recoding of Evidence and referring the appellant for trial
by the SSFC could not have been done by the Commandant 42nd Bn. BSF.
8 The Writ Court has dealt with the aforesaid issue and has, on the
reading of Rules 45, 48 and 51 of the BSF Rules, come to the conclusion that,
once the appellant was attached in the 42nd Bn BSF, it was the Commandant
of 42nd Bn. BSF who had the control over the appellant and was, thus, the
Commandant of the appellant for the purpose of Rules 45, 48 and 51 of the
Rules of 1969.
9 We have given our thoughtful consideration to the argument raised
by learned Senior Counsel, but, we could not help concurring with the view
taken by the Writ Court.
10 It is true where it is alleged that a person subject to the Act other
than an officer or subordinate officer has committed an offence punishable
thereunder, the allegation is required to be reduced into writing. This is
known as the „offence report‟. Charge against the enrolled person like the
appellant is required to be heard by the Commandant of such enrolled person.
"Who is the Commandant of the enrolled person" is not defined under the Act
or the Rules framed thereunder. However, the Administrative Head of the
Unit/Bn. subject to whose control the enrolled delinquent person is employed,
is the Commandant vis-à-vis such delinquent. In the instant case, the
appellant, at the time of committing the alleged offence of unauthorized
absence from duty, was posted in the Sector Headquarter BSF Rawalpora and
was, thus, under the overall control of DIG, BSF. However, the DIG BSF,
Sector Headquarter, in the exercise of its administrative powers, attached the
appellant in 42nd Bn. BSF, Charar-i-Sharief for conducting of disciplinary
proceedings. The moment the appellant was attached in 42nd Bn., he became
an employee of BSF subject to the control of Commandant 42nd Bn. It is the
Commandant of 42nd Bn BSF who, in terms of Rules 45, 48 and 51 of the
Rules of 1969 was the Commandant of the appellant for the purpose of
initiating disciplinary proceedings. We, therefore, reject the contention of
learned Senior Counsel that the entire disciplinary proceedings including the
proceedings by the SSFC were conducted by and at the behest of a person
who was not authorized to do so by the Act of 1968 or the Rules framed
thereunder.
11 The argument of Mrs. Kour that the punishment inflicted upon the
appellant is disproportionate to the misconduct attributed to him is also
without any substance. The appellant is an incorrigible offender and
compulsive absconder. Prior to the incident in question, he was thrice
reprimanded for either remaining unauthorizedly absent or overstaying
sanctioned leave. Despite numerous warnings administered, the appellant did
not mend his ways. Border Security Force is a disciplined Force engaged in
safeguarding the borders and frontiers of the Country. Such an Organization
cannot run on the personnel who do not have any sense of duty and have the
guts of remaining absent without permission or sanction of leave. The act of
the appellant is an example of gross indiscipline which cannot be tolerated in
any organization, more particularly in a disciplined Force like BSF. Having
regard to the nature of duty the BSF has to perform, it cannot ill afford to
show leniency to the people like the appellant who have least care for.
12 Viewed from any angle, we do not find that the penalty of
dismissal from service imposed upon the appellant is shockingly
disproportionate to the conduct attributed. The SSFC has considered the
evidence on record and has come to the conclusion that the dismissal from
service is the befitting punishment that is required to be imposed on the
appellant for the act of gross indiscipline committed by him. We, in the
exercise of writ jurisdiction, do not sit in an appeal over such decision of the
competent Authority, unless we find the decision completely vitiated by
perversity or the punishment awarded is, otherwise, strikingly
disproportionate to misconduct proved. We do not find either in the instant
case. See V. Ramana vs. A.P.S.R.T.C. & ors, (2005) 7 SCC 338, paras (11)
& (12) whereof reads thus:
"11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury's case (supra) the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.
12. To put differently unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed".
Also in (2011) 10 SCC 244 Commandant 22nd Bn. CRPF vs.
Surinder Kumar, the Apex Court has, in para (15), held as under:
"Moreover, it appears from the impugned order that the High Court has in exercise of power of judicial review interfered with the punishment of dismissal on the ground that it was disproportionate. In Union of India vs. R.K. Sharma (AIR 2001 SC 3053), this Court has taken the view that the punishment should not be merely disproportionate but should be strikingly disproportionate to warrant interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and it was only in an extreme case, where on the face of it there is perversity or irrationality that there
can be judicial review under Articles 226 or 227 or under Article 32 of the Constitution. Since this is not one of those cases where the punishment of dismissal was strikingly disproportionate or where on the face of it there was perversity or irrationality, the Division Bench of the High Court ought not to have interfered with the order of dismissal from service".
13 At the insistence of learned Senior Counsel, we have gone
through the entire record and we are satisfied that despite the fact that the
explanation tendered by the appellant was only his ipse dixit, the respondents
have followed the due process of law. They have meticulously followed the
procedure laid down in various Rules and have conducted the trial in strict
compliance with the principles of natural justice.
14 For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered opinion that
the judgment of the Writ Court is legally perfect and unimpeachable. The
appeal is found to be without merit and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
The record be returned to learned counsel for the respondents.
(PUNEET GUPTA) (SANJEEV KUMAR)
JUDGE JUDGE
Jammu
26 .05.2023
Sanjeev
Whether order is speaking:Yes
Whether order is reportable:Yes
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