Reserved On: 01.01.2026 vs Mast Ram & Anr
2026 Latest Caselaw 965 HP

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Reserved On: 01.01.2026 vs Mast Ram & Anr on 23 February, 2026

                                                                                      2026:HHC:3554

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

                                                Cr. Appeal No. 124 of 2014
                                                Reserved on: 01.01.2026
                                                Date of Decision: 23.02.2026




                                                                                   .

    Diwan Chand                                                                    ...Petitioner





                                            Versus
    Mast Ram & Anr                                                               ...Respondents




                                                     of
    Coram
    Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
                           rt
    Whether approved for reporting?1 No
    For the Petitioner                      :    Mr G.R. Palsra, Advocate.

    For Respondent No.1                     :    Mr R.K. Sharma, Senior Advocate
                                                 with Ms Anita, Advocate.



    For Respondent No.2                     : Mr Kapil Sharma, Advocate.

    For Respondent No.3/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional




                                Advocate General.





    Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present appeal is directed against the judgment

dated 28.02.2014, passed by learned Special Judicial Magistrate

Mandi, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the complaint filed by

the appellant (complainant before learned Trial Court) was

dismissed and the respondents (accused before the learned Trial

Court) were acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act).

(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they

were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal

are that the complainant filed a complaint against the accused

before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence

of punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was alleged that the

accused had taken a contract for the preparation of plots for the rt Housing Board, Bajaura. They hired an excavator owned by the

complainant at the rate of ₹750/- per hour with effect from

12.05.2007 till 03.11.2007. They operated the excavator for 1225

hours during the aforesaid period. An amount of ₹9,18,750/- was

due to the complainant as the rent. The accused paid ₹3,19,554/-

to the complainant and issued a cheque of ₹5,00,000/- in favour

of the complainant on 25.11.2007 to discharge their legal liability.

The complainant presented the cheque to his bank, but it was

dishonoured with an endorsement 'insufficient funds'. The

complainant served a notice upon the accused, which was duly

served upon them. However, they failed to repay the amount to

the complainant. Hence, a complaint was filed against the accused

for taking action against them as per the law.

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3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of

accusation was put to them for the commission of an offence

.

punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which they pleaded

not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The complainant examined himself (CW1) to prove his

of complaint.

5. The accused, in their statements recorded under rt Section 313 of Cr. P.C. denied the complainant's case in its entirety.

They specifically denied that they had issued any cheque in the

complainant's favour to discharge their liability. They examined

Visheshwar Sharma (DW1), Assistant Director of State Forensic

Science Laboratory (SFSL), to prove their defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held that the statement of

Visheshwar Sharma (DW1) proved that the signatures of Dina Nath

taken before the Court, his admitted signatures and the signatures

on the cheque were not the same. This established the defence of

the accused that they had not issued the cheque in favour of the

complainant. Hence, the learned Trial Court dismissed the

complaint and acquitted the accused.

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7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned

Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present appeal asserting

that the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint. The

.

accused had taken the complainant's excavator on rent. The report

issued by the Director of SFSL was just an opinion and could not

have been made a basis for dismissing the complaint. The

of complainant presented the cheque twice on the assurance of the

accused, which corroborates his version that the cheque was rt signed by the accused. This aspect was ignored by the learned Trial

Court. The account of the accused is joint, and they are liable to

pay the amount to the complainant. Therefore, it was prayed that

the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the

learned Trial Court be set aside.

8. I have heard Mr G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the

petitioner, Mr R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms

Anita, learned counsel for respondent No.1, Mr Kapil Sharma,

learned counsel for respondent No.2/accused and Mr Lokender

Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent

No.3/State.

9. Mr G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the

appellant/complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court

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erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the

signatures of the accused Dina Nath did not tally with the

signatures on the cheque. The cheque was dishonoured because of

.

insufficiency of funds and not because of a difference in

signatures. The ingredients of commission of an offence

punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied, and

of the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint.

Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the rt judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set-aside.

10. Mr R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, for the

respondent No.1/accused submitted that the learned Trial Court

had rightly relied upon the statement of Dr Visheshwar Sharma

(DW1) to hold that the defence of the accused that they had not

issued any cheque in favour of the complainant was established.

Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court

should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial

Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal, even if another

view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be

dismissed.

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11. Mr Kapil Sharma, learned counsel for respondent

No.2/accused adopted the submissions of Mr R.K. Sharma, learned

Senior Advocate and prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

.

12. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate

General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the dispute is

between the private parties and the State has nothing to say in the

of present matter.

13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions rt made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

14. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of

acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of

acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of

evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no

reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the

evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page

438:

"24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider

2026:HHC:3554

material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."

15. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer

.

Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed:

"21. We may note that the present appeal is one against

acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and

of the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the rt acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the

judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581, and

Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471."

16. While dealing with the appeal against the acquittal in a

complaint filed for the commission of an offence punishable

under Section 138 of the NI Act the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in

Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat (2019) 18 SCC 106 that the

normal rules with same rigour cannot be applied to the cases

under Negotiable Instruments Act because there is a presumption

that the holder had received the cheque for discharge of legal

liability. The Appellate Court is entitled to look into the evidence

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to determine whether the accused has discharged the burden or

not. It was observed:-

12. According to the learned counsel for the appellant-

.

accused, the impugned judgment is contrary to the principles laid down by this Court in Arulvelum v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288 because the High

Court has set aside the judgment of the trial court without pointing out any perversity therein. The said case of Arulvelum v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288]

of related to the offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC. Therein, on the scope of the powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, this Court observed as follows : (SCC p. 221, para 36) rt"36. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments leads to the definite conclusion that the appellate court should be

very slow in setting aside a judgment of acquittal, particularly in a case where two views are possible. The trial court judgment cannot be set aside because the appellate court's view is more probable. The appellate

court would not be justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshalling the entire evidence on record that the

judgment of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law."

The principles aforesaid are not of much debate. In other words, ordinarily, the appellate court will not be upsetting

the judgment of acquittal, if the view taken by the trial court is one of the possible views of the matter and unless the appellate court arrives at a clear finding that the judgment of the trial court is perverse i.e. not supported by evidence on record or contrary to what is regarded as normal or reasonable; or is wholly unsustainable in law. Such general restrictions are essential to remind the appellate court that an accused is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and a judgment of acquittal further strengthens such presumption in favour of the accused. However, such restrictions need to be visualised in

2026:HHC:3554

the context of the particular matter before the appellate court and the nature of the inquiry therein. The same rule with the same rigour cannot be applied in a matter relating to the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, particularly where a presumption is drawn that the holder has received

.

the cheque for the discharge, wholly or in part, of any debt

or liability. Of course, the accused is entitled to bring on record the relevant material to rebut such presumption and

to show that preponderance of probabilities are in favour of his defence but while examining if the accused has brought about a probable defence so as to rebut the presumption, the appellate court is certainly entitled to examine the

of evidence on record in order to find if preponderance indeed leans in favour of the accused.

13. For determination of the point as to whether the High rt Court was justified in reversing the judgment and orders of the trial court and convicting the appellant for the offence

under Section 138 of the NI Act, the basic questions to be addressed are twofold: as to whether the complainant Respondent 2 had established the ingredients of Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act, so as to justify drawing of the

presumption envisaged therein; and if so, as to whether the appellant-accused had been able to displace such presumption and to establish a probable defence whereby,

the onus would again shift to the complainant?

17. The present appeal has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

18. The cheque (Ex.CW1/A) is stated to be signed by

accused Dina Nath Sharma. The accused filed an application for

comparison of his signatures, which was allowed, and the

specimen signatures, admitted signatures and the disputed

signatures were sent to SFSL. Dr. Visheshwar Sharma (DW1)

examined these signatures and issued a report (Ex.DW1/A)

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mentioning that a person who wrote the specimen and admitted

signatures did not write the disputed signatures on the cheque.

Visheshwar Sharma (DW1) had stated that he examined the

.

documents sent to him and issued the report (Ext.DW1/A). He

denied in his cross-examination that the science of handwriting

was not perfect. He admitted that there are variations in the

of signatures and handwriting of a person, but clarified that the

original characteristics of the handwriting do not change. He rt denied that he had examined the documents and had issued a

wrong report.

19. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that

he was making a false statement. He is the Assistant Director of

SFSL and has no interest in favouring the accused or in deposing

against the complainant. His testimony falsifies the complainant's

version that the accused had signed the cheque.

20. The complainant stated in his cross-examination that

he was not aware of the details of the work executed by the

accused. He could not specify the work done by the excavator. No

agreement was prepared between the parties. He had maintained

the record but had not produced it before the Court. He had taken a

room on rent for the operator of the excavator. He admitted that

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the accused Dina Nath had made a complaint regarding the fact

that he had not delivered any cheque nor had he put his signature.

He denied that the accounts were settled between the parties.

.

21. The complainant's testimony is not sufficient to

establish the plea taken by him that the accused had rented the

machine and they were liable to pay ₹9,18,750/-. He admitted that

of he had maintained the account but failed to produce any such

record before the Court. He did not examine his accountant, who rt was maintaining such a record. He also did not examine the

operator of the excavator to establish that the work was executed

for 1225 hours, as claimed by him in the complaint. He has not

produced any logbook of the excavator showing the details of the

hours or the photographs of the readings of the hours in the

machine. Thus, the complainant's testimony does not establish

the plea taken by him that the accused were liable to pay

₹9,18,750/-, out of which they had paid ₹3,19,554/- and were

liable to pay ₹5,99,196/- to him.

22. It was submitted that the cheque carries with it a

presumption that it was issued for consideration to discharge the

liability. This submission will not help the complainant. The

presumption would only be triggered when the cheque is shown to

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have been signed by a person. In the present case, the testimony of

Visheshwar Sharma (DW1) makes it doubtful that the cheque was

signed by Dina Nath. Therefore, the necessary condition for

.

triggering the presumption under Section 118(a) and 139 of the NI

Act is not satisfied.

23. No other point was urged.

of

24. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a

reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will rt not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court,

even if another view is possible.

25. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and the

same is dismissed, and so are the pending miscellaneous

applications, if any.

26. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code

of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita, 2023) the accused are directed to furnish bail bonds in the

sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to

the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks,

which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the

event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment,

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or on grant of the leave, the accused on receipt of notice thereof,

shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

27. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the

.

learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

of Judge 23rd February, 2026 (Nikita) rt