Reserved On: 28.04.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh
2025 Latest Caselaw 444 HP

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Reserved On: 28.04.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 6 May, 2025

2025:HHC:12652

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MP(M) No. 2836 of 2024 Reserved on: 28.04.2025 Date of Decision: 06.05.2025.

    Avikash Minhas                                                               ...Petitioner
                                           Versus

    State of Himachal Pradesh                                                    ...Respondent


    Coram

Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Bhupinder Singh Ahuja, Advocate.

For the Respondent : Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for

seeking regular bail. It has been asserted that the petitioner was

arrested vide FIR No. 83 of 2023, dated 25.9.2023, registered for

the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20, 25 and

29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act (in

short "the ND&PS Act') at Police Station Panchrukhi, District

Kangra, H.P. As per the prosecution case, 1.056 kilograms of

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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contraband was recovered from the petitioner. The prosecution's

case is false. The petitioner has been in judicial custody since

25.9.2023. There is a huge difference in the quantity recovered

and the quantity received in SFSL, and the whole case has become

suspect. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions

which the Court may impose. Hence, the petition.

2. The petition is opposed by filing a status report

asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on

25.9.2023, when they received a secret information at 1.40 AM

that vehicles bearing registration No. HP-37F-7813 and HP-37G-

3170 were transporting charas. The police reduced the

information to writing and sent it to the Supervisory Officer. The

police intercepted the vehicles and associated two independent

witnesses. The police recovered a carry bag from the dashboard of

the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-37F-7813, which

contained 1.056 kilograms of charas. The police arrested the

occupants of the vehicle and seized the charas. The charas was

sent to FSL, and it was confirmed to be an extract of cannabis and

a sample of charas containing 26.46 w/w resin. The police filed a

charge sheet before the Court. Five witnesses out of nineteen

cited by the prosecution have been examined till 3.1.2025. The

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petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence

in case of his release on bail. He would influence the witnesses.

Hence, the status report.

3. I have heard Mr. Bhupinder Singh Ahuja, learned

counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned

Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State.

4. Mr. Bhupinder Singh Ahuja, learned counsel for the

petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was

falsely implicated. As per the prosecution's case, 1.056 kilograms

of charas was recovered from the dashboard of the vehicle. The

case property was produced before the learned Additional Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Palampur. Three samples of 40 grams each

were taken, and 940 grams of charas was packed in the parcel.

The result of the analysis shows that the actual weight of the

cannabis was 38.711 grams, therefore, it is highly doubtful that

the police had recovered 1.056 kilograms of charas. The benefit of

the discrepancy in the weight is to be given to the accused. The

rigours of Section 37 of ND&PS do not apply to the present case,

and the petitioner is entitled to bail.

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5. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate

General, for the respondent-State, submitted that this Court has

to see a prima facie case while deciding the bail petition. The

status report prima facie shows that the petitioner was found in

possession of a commercial quantity of charas. The rigours of

Section 37 of the ND&PS Act apply to the present case. Therefore,

it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

7. The parameters for granting bail were considered by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramratan v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC

OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as follows: -

"12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose "any condition" for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below:

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"14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC which uses the expression "any condition ... otherwise in the interest of justice", has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose "any condition" for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail." (Emphasis supplied)

13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570, this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose "any condition" on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms: --

"15. The words "any condition" used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance, effective in the pragmatic sense, and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed." (Emphasis supplied)

14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the application for bail and observed:

"4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail,

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depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial." (Emphasis supplied)

8. The present petition has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

9. The status report shows that the police intercepted a

vehicle bearing registration No. HP-37F-7813 and recovered a

carry bag containing 1.056 kilograms of charas from its

dashboard. The driver of the vehicle identified himself as Avikash

Minhas (present petitioner). The petitioner was present in the

vehicle from which the recovery was made. In Madan Lal versus

State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC

OnLineSC 874, the contraband was recovered from a vehicle, and it

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was held that all the occupants of the vehicle would be in

conscious possession of the contraband. It was observed:

"19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle.

20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit, there must be conscious possession.

21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e. conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.

22. The expression "possession" is a polymorphous term which assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52] to work out a completely logical and precise definition of "possession" uniformly applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes.

23. The word "conscious" means awareness about a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.

24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194:

1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the article in

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the case in question, while the person to whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power or control.

25. The word "possession" means the legal right to possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC 498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966 : (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)] .)

26. Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where also presumption is also available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.

27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only possession but conscious possession has been established.

It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the possession was not conscious in the logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the Act."

10. Therefore, in view of the binding precedent of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court, the petitioner has to be treated to be in

possession of the charas.

11. The weight of charas was found to be 1.056 grams on

the spot. Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate found the

weight of the charas to be 1.038 kilograms, and three samples of

40 grams were separated of the recovered contraband.

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12. It was laid down by this Court in a case titled Sohan Lal

alias Bhau and others Vs. State of H.P. and others, 2019 STPL 3203

HP, that if there is a variation in the report of analysis and the

certificate issued under Section 52-A of the ND&PS Act, the

certificate will prevail. It was observed: -

10. It would be evidently clear from the aforesaid exposition of law that the samples drawn and certified by the learned Magistrate in compliance with sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 52-A are primary evidence and, therefore, had to be taken as true and any contradiction in such certification with the final report prepared by the prosecution, the quantity mentioned in the final report obviously had to give way to the certification so made by the Court under Section 52-A of the Act ibid.

13. Therefore, as per the judgment, the certificate issued

by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate stating that

the quantity of charas was found to be 1.038 kilograms, which is a

commercial quantity, has to be accepted as correct. Hence, the

rigours of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act will apply to it.

14. Section 37 of the ND&PS Act provides that in an

offence involving commercial quantity, the court should be

satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an

offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as follows:

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"37. Offences are to be cognisable and non-bailable. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)--

(a) Every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognisable.

(b) No person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19, section 24, or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or his bond unless-

(i) the Public Prosecutor has been allowed to oppose the application for such release, and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail."

15. This section was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC

738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the

accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit

an offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was

observed:

"7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions about the grant of bail in respect of certain offences enumerated under the said Section. They are:

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(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence punishable under Section 19, (2) Under Section 24, (3) Under Section 27A and (4) offences involving a commercial quantity.

8. The accusation in the present case is about the fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case the court proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other enactment.

(1) The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty of such an offence;

(2) that person is not likely to commit any offence while on bail."

16. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus

Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:

"19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be followed while considering the bail application moved by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429, it has been elaborated as under: -

"7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the accused murders one or two persons, while those persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death on a number of innocent young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly

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impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs Chief Secy., Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:

24. With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section of the public, particularly the adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and deadly impact on society as a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine.

8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be released on bail during trial unless the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37, namely,

(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence; and

(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail is satisfied. The High Court has

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not given any justifiable reason for not abiding by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the respondent accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic consequences and health hazards which would accompany trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the court should implement the law in the spirit with which Parliament, after due deliberation, has amended."

20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form, prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of the commission of an offence under the Act unless two conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application, and the second is that the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail operates.

21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for."

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17. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.

Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC

OnLine SC 1237 wherein it was observed at page 110:

"21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27- A and also for offences involving a commercial quantity are:

(i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail; and

(ii) There must exist "reasonable grounds to believe" that (a) the person is not guilty of such an offence, and (b) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is "reasonable ground to believe" that the person is not guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of "reasonable grounds to believe", a two-judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505], held that : (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11) "7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is "reasonable grounds". The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief contemplated, in turn, points to the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged.

8. The word "reasonable" has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable".

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'7. ... Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word "reasonable". Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy.' [See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532]] ***

10. The word "reasonable" signifies "in accordance with reason". In the ultimate analysis, it is a question of fact whether a particular act is reasonable or not, depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]

11. The court, while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose, essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail, that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty."

(emphasis supplied)

23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High Court and this Court are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that

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the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail. Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed."

18. It was held in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023

SCC OnLine SC 346, that the bail cannot be granted without

complying with the requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It

was observed:

4. This apart, it is noticed that the High Court, in passing the impugned order of bail, had lost sight of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which, inter alia, provides that no person accused of an offence involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail unless the twin conditions laid down therein are satisfied, namely, (i) the public prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the bail application;

and (ii) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any such offence while on bail.

15. For the sake of convenience Section 37(1) is reproduced hereinbelow:--

"37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable.-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)-

(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognisable;

(b) No person accused of an offence punishable for 2[offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity] shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-

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(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail."

16. In view of the above provisions, it is implicit that no person accused of an offence involving trade in a commercial quantity of narcotics is liable to be released on bail unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

19. It was held in State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo,

2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751, that the grant of bail without

considering Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. It was

observed:

"5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that in cases involving the commercial quantity of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, while considering the application of bail, the Court is bound to ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads thus:--

"37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail."

6. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing the said enactment after repealing the then existing laws

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relating to Narcotic drugs. The object and reasons given in the acts itself reads thus:--

"An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters connected therewith."

In the decision in Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549, the three- judge bench of this Court considered the provisions under Section 37(1)(b) as also 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, with regard to the expression "reasonable grounds" used therein. This Court held that it means something more than the prima facie grounds and that it contemplates substantial and probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore, it was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the provision would require the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence.

As relates to the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)

(ii) of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and, secondly, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail it was held therein that they are cumulative and not alternative. Satisfaction of the existence of those twin conditions had to be based on the 'reasonable grounds', as referred to above.

7. In the decision in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC 122, after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by this Court to be followed while considering a bail application moved by an accused involved in offences

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under the NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that the scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal that the exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37(1)(b)

(ii), NDPS Act. Further, it was held that in case one of the two conditions thereunder is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail would operate.

8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra reveal the consistent view of this Court that while considering the bail application made by an accused involved in an offence under NDPS Act a liberal approach ignoring the mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is a sine qua non for granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act, cannot be avoided while passing orders on such applications.".

20. There is sufficient material on record to show the

involvement of the petitioner in the commission of a crime.

21. It was submitted that there is delay in the progress of

the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the ground of

delay. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in

Rajesh Kumar v. State of H.P. 2024:HHC:8406 in support of this

submission. Certified copies of the order sheets have not been

filed to show that the delay is not attributable to the petitioner.

Further, the status report shows that the statements of five

witnesses have been recorded. In Rajesh Kumar (supra), the

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matter was listed after six months, and not a single witness was

examined. Therefore, the Court granted bail to the petitioner.

This was held to be a violation of the right to a speedy trial of the

accused. In the present case, it has not been shown that the

matter was listed after a prolonged time. Therefore, the cited

judgment does not apply to the present case.

22. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to

bail; hence, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed.

However, the petitioner is at liberty to approach the Court in case

the trial is not concluded within a reasonable time.

23. The observation made herein before shall remain

confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no

bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 6th May, 2025 (Chander)