Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 22.7.2025 vs Nanku Ram on 29 July, 2025
2025:HHC:24708
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 469 of 2011
Reserved on: 22.7.2025
.
Date of Decision: 29.07.2025
State of H.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Nanku Ram ...Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Appellant : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate
General.
For the Respondent : Mr. Surender Verma, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 20.5.2011, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Court No.1, Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Trial
Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned
Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the Indian
Penal Code (in short IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court
for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
.
appeal are that the police received a telephonic information on
7.2.2007 at 7.30 PM that an accident had taken place near Tail
Control. The information was reduced into writing, and SI/SHO
Prem Dass (PW8) went to the spot for verification with Constable
Dharminder. He found that motorcycle bearing registration No.
HP-33-6609 and Van bearing registration No. HP-02-0774 had
met with an accident, which were lying on the road. He found
skid marks of the tyres of the Van to the extent of 30 ft. and
concluded that the driver of the Van had hit the motorcycle at a
high speed. The motorcycle riders had sustained injuries, and the
driver of the Van had absconded. He prepared a rukka
(Ex.PW8/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR
(Ex.PW2/A) was registered. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW8/B)
and took the photographs (Ex. P1 to Ex. P3), whose negatives are
Ex.P4 to Ex.P6. He seized the Van and the motorcycle vide memo
(Ex.PW5/A). He obtained the MLCs (Ex.PX and Ex. PY). Nanku
Ram produced the documents of the Van, which were seized vide
memo (Ex.PW4/A). Yog Raj (PW7) produced the documents of
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the motorcycle, which were seized vide memo (Ex.PW7/A). HC
Devki Nandan (PW6) conducted the mechanical examination of
the Van and motorcycle and found that there was no mechanical
.
defect in the vehicle which could have led to the accident. He
issued reports (Ex.PW6/B and Ex.PW6/C). Injured Khem Lata
succumbed to her injuries. Her postmortem report (Ex.PW1/A)
was obtained. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per
their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the
challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial
Court.
3. Learned Trial Court put the notice of accusation to the
accused for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of IPC, to which the accused
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove
its case. HC Kundan Lal (PW1) obtained the postmortem report.
HC Amar Nath (PW2) signed the FIR. Amit Sharma (PW3) was
riding the motorcycle. Narpat Ram (PW4) is the witness to
recovery. Constable Dharmender (PW5) is the witness to the
recovery of the van and the motorcycle. HC Devki Nandan (PW6)
conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles. Yog Raj
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(PW7) is the brother of the deceased. Prem Dass (PW8)
conducted the investigation.
5. Accused in his statement recorded under Section 313
.
of Cr.P.C. admitted that he was driving the van at the time of the
accident. He denied that the accident occurred due to his
negligence. He stated that Amit was at fault and he (the accused)
was falsely implicated. He did not lead any defence evidence.
6.
The learned Trial Court held that no independent
witness was associated. The motorcyclist suddenly appeared on
the road from the arterial road. He was supposed to take care
before coming to the main road. He failed to do so. His
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Hence, the
learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of
IPC.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment delivered by the
learned Trial Court, the State has filed the instant appeal,
contending that the learned Trial Court evaluated the evidence in
a careless and cursory manner. The testimonies of the witnesses
were rejected without any valid reasons. Amit Kumar explicitly
stated that the van was being driven at high speed on the wrong
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side. He was not cross-examined on this point. The Investigating
Officer observed skid marks of the van extending over a distance
of 30 ft. He attempted to contact an independent witness, but
.
none were available. The learned Trial Court erred in drawing an
adverse inference against the prosecution for refusing to produce
independent witnesses. Therefore, it is prayed that this appeal be
allowed and the judgment of the learned Trial Court be set aside.
8.
I have heard Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy
Advocate General, for the appellant-State and Mr. Surender
Verma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.
9. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General,
for the appellant-State, submitted that Amit Sharma (PW3)
categorically stated that the accused was driving the van at a
high speed towards the wrong side of the road. This statement
was corroborated by the site plan and the testimony of the
Investigating Officer, who had noticed skid marks up to a
distance of 30 ft. Thus, the prosecution had proved on record that
the van was being driven at a high speed and the learned Trial
Court erred in acquitting the accused. He prayed that the present
appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial
Court be set aside.
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10. Mr. Surender Verma, learned counsel for the
respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had
rightly held that the motorcycle came to the main road from an
.
arterial road, and the motorcyclist was bound to take care that
entry of the motorcycle did not cause any danger to the traffic
moving on the road. The accident had taken place towards the
left side of the road, which shows that the van was being driven
towards its proper side. There was no negligence on the part of
the accused, and the accident occurred due to the negligence of
Amit Sharma (PW3). Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal
be dismissed. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in State
of H.P. Vs. Baldev Singh alias Kewal Singh 2025:HHC:18768 in
support of his submission.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment
of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176
that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is
patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission
to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could
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have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the
learned Trial Court. It was observed:
"11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda
.
Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC
4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a
Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the
legal position with regard to the scope of interference in
an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:
"38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles
laid down by this Court governing the scope of
interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the
State for challenging the acquittal of the accused
recorded by the trial court.
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh
Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC
(Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the
field after considering various earlier judgments and
held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)
"29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this
Court culled out the following general principles
regarding the powers of the appellate court while
dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal
in the following words: (Chandrappa
case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC
415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42)
'42. From the above decisions, in our considered
view, the following general principles regarding
the powers of the appellate court while dealing
with an appeal against an order of acquittal
emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on the
exercise of such power and an appellate court,
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on the evidence before it, may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and law.
(3) Various expressions, such as "substantial
and compelling reasons", "good and
sufficient grounds", "very strong
.
circumstances", "distorted conclusions",
"glaring mistakes", etc., are not intended to
curtail the extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of
"flourishes of language" to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere
with an acquittal than to curtail the power of
the court to review the evidence and to come
to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in
mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,
the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person shall
be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of
law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible
on the basis of the evidence on record, the
appellate court should not disturb the finding
of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D.
Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3
SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles
governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while
dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section
378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)
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"8. ... 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further
strengthens the presumption of innocence.
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal
against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral
and documentary evidence.
.
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence,
is required to consider whether the view taken by
the trial court is a possible view which could have
been taken on the basis of the evidence on record.
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate
court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the
ground that another view was also possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order
of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other
conclusion was possible."
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of
interference by an appellate court for reversing the
judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in
favour of the accused has to be exercised within the
four corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity.
41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission
to consider material evidence on record; and
41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is
possible from the evidence available on record."
12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position
that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded
by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High
Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity; that the same is based on a
misreading/omission to consider material evidence on
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record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is
possible from the evidence available on record."
13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the
.
parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
14. The site plan (Ex.PW8/B) shows that the accident had
taken place near the bridge over the canal. Amit Sharma (PW3)
stated in his cross-examination that he entered the National
Highway through the control bridge. Site plan shows the control
bridge towards the left side of the National Highway. Thus, it is
apparent from the combined reading of the site plan and the
statement of Amit Sharma (PW3) that the motorcycle was
approaching the National Highway from the control bridge. Rule
8 of the Rules of the Road Regulation provides that the driver of
the motor vehicle shall slow down while approaching a road
intersection, a road junction, a pedestrian crossing or a road
corner and shall not enter any such intersection, junction or
crossing until he has become aware that he may do so without
endangering the safety of the persons. Rule 9 provides that the
driver of a motorcycle shall, on entering a road intersection, give
way to the vehicles proceeding along that road. The combined
effect of both these rules is that a person approaching the road
intersection is not supposed to enter the same unless he is sure
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that the safety of any person would not be endangered by his
entry, and when he has entered the road intersection, he will give
way to the traffic proceeding on the road.
.
15. In the present case, Amit Sharma (PW3) was entering
the main road; therefore, he was supposed to give way to the
already moving vehicles on the road. It appears that he had failed
to do so. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly concluded
that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of Amit
Kumar (PW3) and not due to the negligence of the accused.
16. It was submitted that the accused was driving the van
at a high speed and towards the wrong side of the road.
Therefore, the proximate cause of the accident was the high
speed of the van. This submission cannot be accepted. Amit
Sharma (PW3) has not given the proximate speed of the van. It
was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs.
State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term 'high
speed' by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from
the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was
observed:
"Further, no attempt was made to find out what this
witness understood by high speed. To one man, speed of
even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while
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to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may
appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this
case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was
driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that
he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The
.
evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to
stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was
struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the
bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways
near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he
carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus
and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result
that he received the injuries that resulted in his death."
17. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs.
Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, wherein it was held:
"Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high
speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or
"rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by
the prosecution could give any indication, even
approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed".
"High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution
to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant
by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case.
In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything
essential to the establishment of the charge against an
accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until
the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed,
subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is
no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In
the absence of any material on the record, no presumption
of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking
the maxim "res ipsa loquitur."
18. This Court also held in the State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal
Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging
rashness or negligence. It was observed: -
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"It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to
decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The
deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the
accident occurs."
19. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs.
.
Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: -
"Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be
proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot
be automatically presumed even on the basis of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a
high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that
negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting
in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion
to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a
vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its
ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in
the instant case."
20. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable based on the
statement of a witness that he was driving the vehicle at a high
speed, and the prosecution has to establish specific negligence of
the accused.
21. It was submitted that the accused was driving the van
towards the wrong side of the road. This submission is not
acceptable. The photographs (Ex. P1 to Ex. P3) show the Van
towards the left side of the road. The site plan shows that the Van
was towards the left side of the road. Hence, the statement of
Amit Sharma (PW3) that the Van was being driven towards the
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wrong side of the road is incorrect, and the accused cannot be
convicted based on the said statement.
22. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the
.
Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule
2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as
close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall
allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction
to pass on his right side. Therefore, the driver of the Van was
driving towards the left side of the road as per Rule 2, and there
was no negligence on his part.
23. There is no other evidence showing the negligence of
the accused. Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable
view based on the evidence led before it, and no interference is
required with it while deciding an appeal against acquittal.
24. Consequently, the present appeal fails, and the same
is dismissed.
25. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail
bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like
amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four
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weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation
that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this
judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on
.
receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court.
26. Records be sent back forthwith along with a copy of
the judgment. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed
of.
r to (Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
29th July, 2025
(Chander)
