Himachal Pradesh High Court
State Of H.P vs Jai Krishan @ Nandu & Ors on 28 July, 2025
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 4067 of 2013
.
Reserved on : 15.07.2025
Date of Decision: 28.07.2025
State of H.P. .... Petitioner
Versus
Jai Krishan @ Nandu & Ors. .... Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes
For the petitioner : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
For the complainant : Ms. Anita Kumari, Advocate.
For the respondents : Mr. N.K. Thakur, Senior
Advocate, with Mr. Divya Raj
Singh, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment
dated 11.01.2013 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at
Dharamshala (learned appellate Court) vide which the appeal filed
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
by the petitioner/State against the judgment dated 27.06.2009
passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class(I), Palampur,
.
District Kangra (learned Trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall
hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed
before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned
Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 147, 148, 323, 325 & 506 read with Section 149 of the
Indian Penal Code (in short "IPC"). It was asserted that Nand Lal
Ex-Pradhan of Gram Panchayat intimated the police on 18.04.2004
that a quarrel had taken place in village Nanahar. SI Ashok Parmar
(PW-9), HHC Surender Pal and HHC Ajit Singh were sent to verify
the correctness of the information. The informant, Santosh Kumar
(PW-1), made a statement (Ex. PW1/A) that he was repairing the
Kuhl on 16.04.2004 at 10.45 am with Dharam Chand (PW-5), when
Jai Krishan @ Nand Lal came to the spot and inquired from him
(Santosh Kumar) as to what he was doing. Santosh Kumar replied
that he was repairing the Kuhl. Jai Krishan got infuriated and tried
to remove the fence erected by the informant Santosh Kumar. Lata
Devi (PW-2) also reached the spot. Informant and Lata Devi tried
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
to prevent Jai Krishan from uprooting the fence. However, Jai
Krishan slapped Lata Devi. Kishori Lal, Ramesh Chand, Ravi
.
Kumar, Mahinder Singh, Puno Devi, Gaitri Devi, Ravi Kumar,
Mahindra Devi, Anju Devi, and Gudo Devi came to the spot armed
with sticks. They gave beatings to the informant, Lata Devi and
Dharam Chand. Partap Chand, Jagdish Chand (PW-4), and Khem
Chand came to the spot after hearing the noise. The accused also
gave beatings to Jagdish Chand and Khem Chand. The statement
was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex. PW9/A) was
registered. SI Ashok Parmar filed an application (Ex. PW9/C) for
conducting the medical examination of the injured. Dr. Nirdosh
Gupta (PW-6) conducted the medical examination of Khem Chand
and found that he had sustained injuries. X-ray was advised, and
multiple small contusion and lecirated wound were detected. The
nature of injuries sustained by Khem Chand was grievous, which
could have been caused by a blunt weapon. MLC (Ex. PW6/A) was
issued. Dr. Nirdosh Gupta examined Lata Devi and found that she
had sustained simple injuries. He issued the MLC (Ex. PW6/B). He
also examined Santosh Kumar and found that he had sustained
simple injury. He issued the MLC (Ex.PW6/C). He also examined
Dharam Chand and found that he had sustained grievous injury. He
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
issued the MLC (Ex.PW6/D). Dr. Arvind Bhan (PW-7) went through
the X-ray and issued reports (Ex. PW-7/D to Ex. PW- 7/F). SI
.
Ashok Parmar went to the spot and prepared the site plan
(Ex.PW9/E). Jai Krishan produced the sticks, which were seized
vide memo (Ex. PW1/B). Santosh Kumar produced a T-shirt
(Ex. P7), which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/C). Khem Chand
produced a shirt (Ex. P9), which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW3/A).
Lata Devi produced a shirt (Ex. P8) which was seized vide memo
(Ex.PW2/A). Jagdish Chand produced a shirt (Ex. P10), which was
seized vide memo (Ex.PW4/A). These were sealed in different
parcels with seal 'A', and the seal impression (Ex. PW9/F) was
taken on a separate piece of cloth. Statements of witnesses were
recorded as per their versions. The challan was prepared and
presented before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the
investigation.
3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 148, 323, 325,
and 506, read with Section 149 of IPC, to which they pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 9 witnesses to prove its case.
Santosh Kumar (PW-1) is the informant. Lata Devi (PW-2), Khem
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
Chand (PW-3), Jagdish Chand (PW-4) and Dharam Chand (PW-5)
are the eye-witnesses/victims. Nirdosh Gupta (PW-6) conducted
.
the medical examination of the injured. Arvind Bhan (PW-7) went
through the X-rays and issued a report. Ramna Devi (PW-8) is a
witness to recovery. Ashok Parmar (PW-9) conducted the
investigation.
5. The accused, in their statements recorded under
Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its entirety.
They stated that a false case was made by the complainant party
due to old enmity. The witnesses were related to the informant.
They tendered the documents in evidence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that an FIR No. 114/2004 was
registered against the informant party regarding the same
incident. Houses of many people were located near the place of
incident. No independent witness was cited by the prosecution.
House of Jagdish was located at a distance of 2 km from the place of
incident, and House of Dharam Chand was located at a distance of 7
km. Their presence at the spot was doubtful. There were various
contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses. All
these circumstances made the prosecution's case highly suspect;
therefore, the accused were acquitted of the charged offences.
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned
Trial Court, the State preferred an appeal which was decided by the
.
learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Appellate
Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings
recorded by the learned Trial Court that the statements of
prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material
particulars. The accused had also sustained injuries, and no
explanation was provided by the prosecution for those injuries. The
learned Trial Court had rightly acquitted the accused. Therefore,
the appeal was dismissed.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgments passed by learned
Courts below, the State has filed the present revision asserting that
learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the material
placed before them. The evidence was not appreciated from the
right perspective. The witnesses had sustained injuries and their
presence on the spot could not be doubted. Minor contradictions
were blown out of proportion. The prosecution was not obliged to
explain minor/superficial injuries. Therefore, it was prayed that
the present revision be allowed and the judgments passed by the
learned Courts below be set aside.
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
9. I have heard Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General for the petitioner-State, Ms. Anita Kumari,
.
learned vice counsel representing the complainant and Mr. N.K.
Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Divya Raj Singh,
learned counsel for respondents/accused.
10. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the petitioner/State, submitted that the prosecution
witnesses consistently deposed about the incident. Minor
contradictions in the statements of the witnesses were not
sufficient to discard the prosecution's case. Learned Courts below
erred in holding that the contradictions made the prosecution's
case doubtful. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be
allowed and the judgments passed by learned Courts below be set
aside.
11. Ms. Anita Kumari, learned counsel representing the
informant, adopted the submissions of Mr. Lokender Kutlehria
learned Additional Advocate General.
12. Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, for the
respondents/accused, submitted that learned Courts below had
rightly appreciated the material placed before them. They had
taken a reasonable view while deciding the matter, and this Court
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
should not interfere with the concurrent findings of the fact
recorded by the learned Courts below; therefore, he prayed that the
.
present revision be dismissed.
13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.
14. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022)
3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court
does not exercise an appellate jurisdiction and it can only rectify
the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed
at page 207: -
"10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions,
at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are
concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two
courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and
evidence brought on record. The High Court in
criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to
exercise jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the
scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow.
Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short
"CrPC") vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as
to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any
finding, sentence, or order, recorded or passed, and as
to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior
court. The object of the provision is to set right a
patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There
has to be a well-founded error which is to be
determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also
well settled that while considering the same, the
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the
facts and evidence of the case to reverse those
findings.
.
15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court
under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the
power to call for and examine records of an inferior
court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the
legality and regularities of any proceeding or order
made in a case. The object of this provision is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law
or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4
SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of
Section 397 has been considered and succinctly
explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of
jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded
error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to
scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it,
bear a token of careful consideration and appear to
be in accordance with law. If one looks into the
various judgments of this Court, it emerges that
the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the
decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous,
there is no compliance with the provisions of law,
the finding recorded is based on no evidence,
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion
is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not
exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each
case would have to be determined on its own
.
merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it
should not be against an interim or interlocutory
order. The Court has to keep in mind that the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not
lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing
with the question as to whether the charge has
been framed properly and in accordance with law
in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in
the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the
case substantially falls within the categories
aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-
advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC."
16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit
Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9
SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986]
has also laid down principles to be considered for
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly
in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed
under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : (Amit
Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9
SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri)
986], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27)
"27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction
under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and
Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of
jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate
for us to enlist the principles with reference to
which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction.
However, it is not only difficult but inherently
impossible to state such principles with precision.
At best and upon objective analysis of various
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out
some of the principles to be considered for proper
exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to
quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction
.
under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or
together, as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of
the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the
more power, the more due care and caution is to be
exercised in invoking these powers. The power of
quashing criminal proceedings, particularly the
charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code,
should be exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection, and that too in the rarest of rare
cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether
the uncontroverted allegations as made from the
record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith prima facie establish the offence or not.
If the allegations are so patently absurd and
inherently improbable that no prudent person can
ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied,
then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere.
No meticulous examination of the evidence is
needed for considering whether the case would end
in conviction or not at the stage of framing of
charge or quashing of charge.
***
27.9. Another very significant caution that the
courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the
facts, evidence and materials on record to
determine whether there is sufficient material on
the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction; the court is concerned primarily with
the allegations taken as a whole whether they will
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the
process of court leading to injustice.
***
.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the
rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence
is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more
inclined to permit continuation of prosecution
rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The
Court is not expected to marshal the records with a
view to decide admissibility and reliability of the
documents or records, but is an opinion formed
prima facie."
17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate
court and start appreciating the evidence by finding
out inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses, and
it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to
be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing
with an application for discharge.
16. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court
under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the
power to call for and examine records of an inferior
court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the
legality and regularities of any proceeding or order
made in a case. The object of this provision is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law
or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4
SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of
Section 397 has been considered and succinctly
explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
.
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of
jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded
error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to
scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it,
bear a token of careful consideration and appear to
be in accordance with law. If one looks into the
various judgments of this Court, it emerges that
the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the
decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous,
there is no compliance with the provisions of law,
the finding recorded is based on no evidence,
material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion
is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not
exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each
case would have to be determined on its own
merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it
should not be against an interim or interlocutory
order. The Court has to keep in mind that the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not
lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing
with the question as to whether the charge has
been framed properly and in accordance with law
in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in
the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the
case substantially falls within the categories
aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-
advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC."
16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit
Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9
SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986]
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
has also laid down principles to be considered for
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly
in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed
under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : (Amit
.
Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9
SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri)
986], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27)
"27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction
under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and
Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of
jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate
for us to enlist the principles with reference to
which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction.
However, it is not only difficult but inherently
impossible to state such principles with precision.
At best and upon objective analysis of various
judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out
some of the principles to be considered for proper
exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to
quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or
together, as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of
the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the
more power, the more due care and caution is to be
exercised in invoking these powers. The power of
quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the
charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code,
should be exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether
the uncontroverted allegations as made from the
record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith prima facie establish the offence or not.
If the allegations are so patently absurd and
inherently improbable that no prudent person can
ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied,
then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere.
.
No meticulous examination of the evidence is
needed for considering whether the case would end
in conviction or not at the stage of framing of
charge or quashing of charge.
***
27.9. Another very significant caution that the
courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the
facts, evidence and materials on record to
determine whether there is sufficient material on
the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction; the court is concerned primarily with
rthe allegations taken as a whole whether they will
constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the
process of court leading to injustice.
***
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the
rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence
is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more
inclined to permit continuation of prosecution
rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The
Court is not expected to marshal the records with a
view to decide admissibility and reliability of the
documents or records, but is an opinion formed
prima facie."
17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate
court and start appreciating the evidence by finding
out inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses, and
it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to
be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing
with an application for discharge.
17. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018)
8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018
SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in
the absence of any perversity. It was observed on page 169:
.
"12. This Court has time and again examined the
scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the ground for
exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High
Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath
Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC
(Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court
has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)
"5. ... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court
can call for and examine the record of any
proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High
Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But
the said revisional power cannot be equated with
the power of an appellate court, nor can it be
treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate
for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and
come to its conclusion on the same when the
evidence has already been appreciated by the
Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal
unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice
of the High Court which would otherwise
tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On
scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High
Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no
hesitation in concluding that the High Court
exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the
conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the
oral evidence. ..."
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to
and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray
Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao
Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123:
(2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High
.
Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall
not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it
is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-
consideration of any relevant material; the order
cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another
view is possible. The following has been laid down in
para 14: (SCC p. 135)
"14. ... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is
perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
relevant material or there is palpable misreading of
records, the Revisional Court is not justified in
setting aside the order, merely because another
view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant
to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of
the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power
in the court to do justice in accordance with the
principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional
power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC
is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless
the finding of the court,, whose decision is sought
to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable
in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly
unreasonable or where the decision is based on no
material or where the material facts are wholly
ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised
arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not
interfere with the decision in exercise of their
revisional jurisdiction."
14. In the above case, also conviction of the accused
was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray
Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013
SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by
substituting its view. This Court set aside the High
Court's order holding that the High Court exceeded its
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too
without any legal basis.
18. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
.
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC
(Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at
page 205:
"16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the
absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual
findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-
analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales &
Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels
GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design
and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well-
established principle of law that the Revisional Court
will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a
court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a
jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is,
therefore, in the negative."
19. The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
20. The statement of Santosh Kumar (Ex.PW1/A) was
recorded on 16.04.2004 at 4:15 pm at Sub-divisional
Hospital, Palampur. SI Ashok Parmar had filed an application
(Ex. PW9/C) for conducting the medical examination of
Khem Chand, Lata Devi, Santosh Kumar, Dharam Chand and
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
Jagdish Chand. Medical examinations of Khem Chand, Lata
Devi, Santosh Kumar and Dharam Chand were conducted
.
between 1:20 to 1:50 pm, and the medical examination of
Jagdish Chand was conducted on the same day at 5:30 pm.
The application for medical examination (Ex. PW9/C) reads
that Puno Devi had inflicted injuries with a stick to Khem
Chand, Nand Lal inflicted injuries to Lata Devi with kicks and
fist blows, Gurbaksh inflicted injuries to Santosh Kumar with
sticks, and Mohinder inflicted injuries to Dharam Chand with
a stick. Jagdish Chand sustained injuries from a stone. Khem
Chand sustained injuries on the rear side of the head. Lata
Devi sustained injuries on her back and both legs. Santosh
Kumar sustained injuries on the rear side of his head. Dharam
Chand sustained injuries on his face, and Jagdish Chand
sustained injuries on his right ear.
21. The statement (Ex.PW1/A) is silent regarding the
names of the persons who had inflicted injuries. The fact that
the investigating officer knew about the names of the
persons who had inflicted injuries and the part of the body
where the injuries were inflicted before 1:20 pm shows that
the information of a cognizable offence was disclosed to him
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
before recording the statement (Ex.PW1/A); therefore, the
information received by the police before filing the
.
application (Ex. PW9/C) would be the FIR and the statement
(Ex. PW1/A) would be hit by Section 162 of the Cr.P.C.
22. It was laid down by this Court in Lachhman v.
State, 1972 SCC OnLine HP 55: 1973 Cri LJ 1658, that where the
police had received the information of a cognisable offence,
which was not reduced into writing, any subsequent
information disclosed on the spot would be hit by section 162
of CrPC and cannot be treated as an FIR. It was observed at
page 1660:
"6. The first point agitated by the learned counsel for
the appellants is that the statement Exhibit P.A.
recorded by the police at the spot was not the first
information report. The same was hit by the
provisions of Section 162 Cr. P.C. The F.I.R. in this case
was that which was given by P.Ws 8 and 10, who
immediately, on seeing the occurrence, went to the
police station and informed the police about the
commission of the offence. The answer of the learned
Advocate-General to this contention of the appellants'
learned counsel is that the information given by these
two persons was quite vague and indefinite, and it was
not reduced to writing and the F.I.R. was the one
which was recorded by the S.H.O. when he went to the
spot and found that a cognizable offence had been
committed. It was therefore. Exhibit P.A., which was
the F.I.R. and it was not hit by the provisions of
Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and he
has placed reliance on some authorities. The
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
contention of the learned Advocate-General does not
appear to be correct, since the two persons, i.e. P.Ws 8
and 10, had seen that rape was committed, as is
evident from their statements on the record. P.W. 8
.
has stated that he saw the accused Lachhman
committing rape on the girl, and then he brought the
bearer. Sukh Ram (P.W. 10) and he also saw the
accused committing rape, and then they both went to
the police post. Solan and informed the police of the
occurrence. P.W. 10 stated that when he was awakened
by P.W. 8, he also went and peeped in the verandah
through the glass pane and saw the accused
Lachhman, who had put the legs of the girl on his
shoulders and had put a part of the quilt over her
mouth. The girl was trying to get rid of the man by
shaking her legs and herself, but the accused was not
letting her free. The thekedar (P.W. 8) asked him that
in case the girl died, even he and the witness will be in
trouble and that the matter should be reported to the
police. and they accordingly rushed to the police post,
Solan and reported the matter to the Munshi present
there. He telephoned to the S.H.O., who arrived in the
police post along with two constables, and they came
to the hotel. Hence the only conclusion that can be
deduced from the testimony of these two witnesses is
that there was no vagueness in the information about
the commission of a cognizable offence by the two
persons staying there in that hotel along with the girl
and this information, as it appears, was conveyed to
the incharge of the police post and therefore, this, in
my opinion, was the first information in point of time
about the commission of a cognizable case. The police
proceeded to the spot in pursuance of the information
imparted by the two witnesses, and therefore,
investigation had already started the moment the
investigating machinery was set in motion. It is a
different thing that the police did not record the
information which had been given to them, but it was
their duty to reduce the same into writing, when it was
brought to their notice that a cognizable offence had
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
taken place. Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab ((1970) 2
SCC 113: AIR 1970 SC 1566) is an authority relied upon
by the learned Advocate-General to show that
anonymous telephone message at police station that
.
firing had taken place at a taxi stand although is
information which is first in point of time will not by
itself clothe it with character of first information
report in the aforesaid case the person, giving the
information on telephone, did not disclose his
identity, nor did he give any further particulars and
what he stated was that fire had taken place at a taxi
stand, Ludhiana. This was recorded in the daily diary
of the police station by the police officer responding to
the telephone call, and it was in view of these facts
that it was held that, prima facie this cryptic and
anonymous oral message, which did not in terms
dearly specify a cognizable offence, cannot be treated
as a first information report. This authority, therefore,
has got no application, because it was definitely a
vague message that fire had taken place at the taxi
stand without mentioning whether any cognizable
offence had been committed. But in the instant case, it
was quite explicit that rape had been committed on a
girl. Vinayak Datt Durbhatkar v. State (AIR 1970 Goa 96)
is also another authority relied on by him. In this case,
the oral statement was made by the assaulted person
at the police station, and then he was removed to the
hospital where another Head Constable recorded his
statement, and that statement was challenged by the
defence on the ground that the same was hit by
Section 162. It was held in that case that the latter
statement, being the dying declaration made to a
police officer during the course of investigation, is
taken out of the purview of Section 162(1). In other
words, the limitations imposed by Sec. 162(1) are not
applicable to a dying declaration and that the oral
statement made to the Head Constable earlier was not
complete in itself. Therefore, this authority also has
got no application to the facts of the present case,
where everything was complete except about the
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
verification of the name of the girl and about the
names of the accused, which the police could ascertain
on going at the spot. Therefore, in my opinion, the
first information report was the one which had been
.
given by the two persons to the in-charge of the police
post, and this document Exhibit P.A., recorded during
the course of investigation, is definitely hit by the
provisions of Sec. 162. In this behalf. I may also refer
to State v. Jagdeo (AIR 1955 NUC (All) 1516), wherein it
was held that it is not essential to mention in the
information when exactly the offence was committed,
nor is it essential to mention by whom it was
committed or in what circumstances. The object
behind the investigation itself is to ascertain these
matters; it is for the station officer to find out by
investigation whether the offence was committed at
all and if it was by whom and in what circumstances.
The informer may aid him by stating in the
information by whom and in what circumstances the
offences were committed, but the law does not impose
upon him any obligation to do so. Nor there is any
provision in the Code for any preliminary inquiry prior
to investigation or prior to the lodging of the
information within the meaning of Section 154. The
question whether information given under Section 154
is complete or not is not relevant. So long as it is an
information about the commission of a cognizable
offence it is all the information that is required to be
given under Section 154 and, there cannot arise any
question of its being incomplete and the failure of the
station officer to reduce the first information to
writing does not mean that the information was not
an information contemplated by Section 154. In the
face of this, the argument of the learned Advocate-
General has got no force, that the document Exhibit
P.A. was the F.I.R. and that it was not hit by Section
162. The result, therefore, is that the argument
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants
carries weight. However, this point was not raised by
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
the appellants in the trial Court and, therefore. I do
not attach much importance to this argument.
23. This position was reiterated in Vijai Singh v. State
.
of Himachal Pradesh, 1994 SCC OnLine HP 67: 1995 Cri LJ 881:
(1994) 2 Ch LR 504, wherein it was observed at page 882:
"3. Before dealing with the other points raised by the
learned counsel for the accused appellants, it is
necessary to state that the First Information Report in
this case is the report lodged by Nand Lal (Ex. PQ). It is
the First Information Report disclosing the
commission of a cognizable offence by the accused
against the deceased. It cannot be held to be cryptic
and vague. It was not, in these circumstances,
appropriate for the police to record the statement of
Smt. Veena Devi under Section 154 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and register the First Information
Report on that basis. Section 154 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is clear about the recording of the
First Information Report. It does not envisage holding
of any kind of inquiry by the Police before registering
the First Information Report, unless the report is
cryptic and vague (See: (1970) 2 SCC 113: AIR 1970 SC
1566 : (1970 Cri LJ 1415), Tapinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, 1977 Cri LJ 107, Raberi Karsan Cova v. State of
Gujarat, 1976 Cri LJ 132, Jagdish B. Rao v. Govt. of the
Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR 1959 Cal
342 : (1959 Cri LJ 694), Kamal Kanto Das v. the State,
1989 Cri LJ 1350, Tehal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1980
Cri LJ 1397, Randhir Singh v. the State, and 1994 (1) JT SC
33, Dhananjoy Chatterjee @ Dhana v. State of West
Bengal).
4. In 1972 SLJ 276 (HP): (1973 Cri LJ
1658), Lachhman v. State, it has been held that (at page
1661 of Cri LJ):
".....Nor there is any provision in the Code for any
preliminary inquiry prior to investigation or prior
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
to the lodging of the information within the
meaning of Section 154. The question whether
information given under Section 154 is complete or
not is not relevant. So long as it is an information
.
about the commission of a cognizable offence it is
all the information that is required to be given
under Section 154 and, there cannot arise any
question of its being incomplete and the failure of
the station officer to reduce the first information to
writing does not mean that the information was
not an information contemplated by Section 154."
5. Thus, the view taken by this Court in this decision is
quite apt and in tune with the tenor and spirit of
Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unless,
as already recorded above, the information is vague or
cryptic or does not disclose the commission of a
cognizable case. This question need not detain us any
further when the learned counsel for the parties did
not assail the findings of the trial court on this
question.
24. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sunil Kumar v. State of M.P., (1997) 10 SCC 570: 1997 SCC (Cri)
879 that definite information about the commission of a
cognizable offence will constitute an FIR. It was observed at
page 577:
"20. While on this point, we wish to mention,
however, that the High Court erred in not treating the
telephonic information that PW 3 gave to the police
station as the FIR. It is not disputed that PW 3 did give
information to the police station, wherein he stated
that one person had been killed and another person
had been dismembered, and it was recorded
accordingly in the daily diary book (Ext. P-17). The
same entry discloses, notwithstanding the absence of
the names of the assailants therein, a cognizable
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
offence, and indeed it is on the basis thereof that PW 6
initially started the investigation. Ext. P-17 will
therefore be the FIR, and the statement of Ramesh
(Ext. P-2), which was recorded by him in the course of
.
the investigation, is to be treated as one recorded
under Section 161 CrPC.....:
25. A similar view was taken in Hem Raj v. State of
Punjab, (2003) 12 SCC 241: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 979, wherein it
was observed at page 247:
"21....The High Court, after noticing the evidence on
record and the submissions advanced by the parties,
firstly considered the correctness of the finding of the
trial court as to whether the statement Ext. PC, made
by PW 2, was the first information report; whether the
report earlier made by Vicky, PW 3 to PW 6, in front of
Society Cinema, must be treated to be the first
information report. The High Court observed that the
first information as to the manner in which the
occurrence had taken place was given by PW 2 and not
by Vicky, PW 3, and, therefore, the trial court was not
justified in holding that the first information report
was really the report made earlier by PW 3 to PW 6 as
nothing had come on record to show that Vicky, PW 3,
had told PW 6 about the manner in which the
occurrence had taken place. In our view, since it is not
clear from the record as to what was the nature of
information given by PW 3 to PW 6, since the same
was not recorded, it is not possible to hold
categorically that the information given by PW 3 must
be treated as the first information report. However, we
must observe that the reasoning of the High Court in
this regard cannot be accepted as correct, namely, that
unless the manner in which the occurrence took place
is stated in the report, the same cannot be treated as a
first information report. The law is very clear and well
settled that a report which discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence must be treated as the first
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
information report under Section 154 CrPC. It does not
matter whether the person lodging the report had
witnessed the commission of the offence or not, nor is it
necessary that all details should be mentioned in the
.
report about the manner of occurrence, the participants in
the crime, the time and place of occurrence, etc. The
requirement of Section 154 CrPC is only this that the
report must disclose the commission of a cognizable
offence, and that is sufficient to set the investigating
machinery into action. In this case, since the report to
PW 6 made by PW 3 was not recorded, and the
endorsement made by PW 6 indicates that PW 3 had
told him that a quarrel had taken place a little earlier
and that Toni, the injured, had been taken to C.M.C.
Hospital, it is not possible to say in the absence of
evidence on record, as to whether the report related
facts disclosing the commission of a cognizable
offence. We, however, do not attach much significance
to this aspect of the case, and we shall proceed on the
basis that the report made by Parshotam Lal, PW 2, is
the first information report." (emphasis supplied)
26. Santosh Kumar (PW-1), Lata Devi (PW-2), Khem
Chand (PW-3), and Jagdish Chand (PW-4) denied in their
cross-examination that accused Jai Krishan, Bichho Devi,
and Puno Devi were harvesting the wheat crop. Ramna Devi
(PW-8), on the other hand, stated in her cross-examination
that Jai Krishan, his wife and Gurmukh were harvesting
wheat crop on 16.04.2004. She was put forward as a witness
of truth by the prosecution, and her statement would be
binding upon the prosecution. Her statement falsifies the
testimonies of Santosh Kumar, Lata Devi, Khem Chand and
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
Jagdish Chand, and makes the genesis of the incident
doubtful.
.
27. Santosh Kumar (PW-1) was declared hostile by
the learned APP, and he was permitted to be cross-examined,
which means that the prosecution does not consider him
worthy of reliance, and the learned Trial Court was justified
in doubting his testimony.
28. Santosh Kumar (PW-1) stated in his cross-
examination that houses of Nand Lal, Jahar Singh, Om
Parkash, Prem Singh, Shri Ram, etc., are located near his
house. Lata Devi (PW-2) stated in her cross-examination
that the house of Jagdish is located at a distance of 2 km,
house of Khem Chand is located at a distance of 3 km, house
of Dharam Chand is located at a distance of 7 km, and the
house of Pardhan is located at a distance of 20 feet from her
house. Statements of these witnesses show that the houses of
independent persons, including Pardhan, are located near the
place of incident, whereas, the houses of the witnesses cited
by the prosecution are located at a considerable distance.
Therefore, learned courts below were justified in doubting
the prosecution's case because of non-examination of any
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
person from the vicinity and relying upon the statements of
Jagdish, Dharma Chand and Khem Chand.
.
29. Khem Chand (PW-3) stated that Jagdish Chand
and Partap were sitting inside the house of Santosh Kumar
when they heard some noise and came out.
30. Jagdish Chand (PW-4) stated that he was going to
Kandbari and went to the house of Santosh Kumar, where
Khem Chand, Partap and Dharam Chand were sitting.
Dharam Chand, Partap Singh and Santosh Kumar were
repairing the Kuhl. He was inside the house when he heard
some noise.
31. It is apparent from his testimony that he has
given two versions- one that Partap and Dharam Chand were
sitting inside the house, and the second that Partap, Dharam
Chand and Santosh were repairing the Kuhl, and both these
versions cannot be correct.
32. The reason assigned by these witnesses for their
presence is also not satisfactory. When Santosh was repairing
the Kuhal, there was no justification for Khem Chand, Partap
and Jagdish Chand to be present in his house. If they had gone
to meet him, either Santosh should have been in the house, or
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
they should have been present with Santosh at the Kuhl,
where the repair work was being carried out. This shows that
.
they are not making correct statements regarding their
presence.
33. Santosh Kumar admitted in his cross-
examination that Kishori Lal, son of Jai Krishan, is a witness
against him in a case of theft. He admitted that Jagdish and
Lata are accused in that case. He admitted that earlier a case
was filed against Sansar Chand, Puni Devi, etc., in which
Jagdish and Lata Devi were cited as witnesses. He admitted
that Khem Chand and Lata Devi have filed a private complaint
against accused Jagdish Chand, Partap, and Lata Devi. Savitri
Devi, Himam Chand, and Dharam Chand are the witnesses.
He admitted that Savitri Devi is his sister-in-law, whereas
Dharam Chand and Himam Chand are his brothers-in-law.
These admissions show that Dharam Chand, Partap, and
Jagdish Chand are the convenient witnesses, who are shown
to be present in every complaint instituted against the
accused and learned Courts below were justified in discarding
their testimonies.
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
34. The cross-examination of the witnesses shows
that litigations are pending between the parties; therefore,
.
learned Courts below were justified in holding that the
enmity would make it necessary to seek corroboration of
their testimonies.
35. It is an admitted case that the accused had
registered a complaint against the informant party, and the
police had filed the charge-sheet. It is also not disputed that
the accused had sustained injuries in the incident. However,
no explanation was provided for those injuries. These
circumstances will also make the prosecution's case suspect.
36. Therefore, the evidence on record was insufficient
to prove the prosecution's case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hence, the learned Trial Court was justified in recording the
acquittal, and the learned Appellate Court was justified in
upholding the judgment of the learned Trial Court. No
interference is required with the judgments passed by the
learned Courts below.
37. In view of the above, the present revision fails,
and the same is dismissed.
( 2025:HHC:24436 )
38. Registry is directed to sent down the records of
the case to the learned Courts below.
.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
28th July, 2025
(Ritu)
r to
