Himachal Pradesh High Court

Bimla Devi And Anr vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Anr on 7 July, 2025

Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21397 )

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MMO No. 559 of 2025

                                                         Reserved on: 01.07.2025





                                                         Date of Decision: 07.07.2025





Bimla Devi and anr.                                                                ...Petitioners

                                              Versus





State of Himachal Pradesh & anr.                                               ...Respondents

Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.


Whether approved for reporting?1 No

For the Petitioners                      :      Mr. Anshul Attri, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1                     :       Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate


                                                General.
For Respondent No.2                     :       Ms. Akriti Rana, Advocate.




Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing

of F.I.R. No. 123/2023, dated 26.09.2023, registered at Police Station

Palampur, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of offences

punishable under Sections 353 and 332 read with Section 34 of the Indian

Penal Code (IPC) and consequential proceedings arising therefrom.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are

that the informant made a complaint to the police stating that he was

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21397 )

posted as a Patwari. Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Palampur

directed him to auction Khasra No. 159/72. He went to the spot to execute

the order on 26.09.2023. Bimla Devi, joint owner of the land, misbehaved

with the informant. She caught hold of the informant and told him that

she had seen many patwaries like him. She pushed him. Her son,

Rajinder Kumar, also threatened the informant. The family members of

Bimla Devi also pushed him. They obstructed the informant in the

discharge of his official duties and tried to snatch the documents from

him. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation.

3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioners

have filed the present petition seeking its quashing based on the

compromise effected between the parties. It was asserted that the matter

has been compromised between the parties voluntarily, without any

influence from any person. No fruitful purpose would be served by

continuing the criminal proceeding; hence, the petition.

4. Mr. Anshul Attri, learned counsel for the petitioner,

submitted that the parties have entered into a compromise voluntarily

and the FIR be ordered to be quashed as per the compromise effected

between the parties.

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5. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the

respondent/State, submitted that the informant was discharging his

official duties pursuant to an order passed by the Court. The offence was

not private but affected the administration of justice; therefore, he

prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

6. I have given considerable thought to the submission made at

the bar and have gone through the record carefully.

7. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh

v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 that the

jurisdiction to quash the proceedings under Section 482 based on the

compromise is different from the jurisdiction of compounding under

Section 320 of CrPC. It was observed:

"57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of

settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of the offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding

offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

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58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not

.

compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of

criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the

ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effects on the public and consist of wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim

have settled the dispute amicably or the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences

of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under

special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which

overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of a civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony,

particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim

have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash

the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts, and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.

59. B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10

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SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and

.

Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court

under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)

858], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist a distinction between compounding

an offence under Section 320 and quashing a criminal case by the High Court in the exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different, although the ultimate consequence may be the same, viz., acquittal of the accused or

dismissal of the indictment.

60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327], Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 Cri LJ 1049], Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076:

AIR 1999 SC 2554], Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153], Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] and Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321]. The principle

propounded in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to

override express bar provided in law is by now well settled.

In Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 Cri LJ 1049],

the Court observed the same thing that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. A similar statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: AIR 1999 SC 2554]. In Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153] the accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC was not compoundable offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In Rumi

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Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] although the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery

Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for the

commission of the offences under Sections 120-B/420/467/468/471 IPC along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not quash a case involving a crime against society when a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing the

charge. Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was again a case where the accused persons were charged of having committed the offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and the allegations were that the accused secured the credit facilities by

submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilised

such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing

the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil

Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] and Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and it was held

that B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] and Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] dealt with different factual situation as the dispute involved had overtures of

a civil dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] supports the view that criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing.

61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section

Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21397 )

320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation, but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power, viz., (i) to secure the ends of

justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what

cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each

case, and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be

fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the

offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption

Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc., cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour

stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from a commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the

offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in

nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the

offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case

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is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.

8. It was held in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688:

(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 320 that the jurisdiction

conferred under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the non-

compoundable offences can be exercised when the dispute is having the

overwhelmingly and predominantly a civil character. However, this

jurisdiction cannot be exercised when the offences have a serious impact

on society. It was observed:

"15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-

compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be

exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial

transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire

dispute amongst themselves;

15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.

15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely

Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21397 )

on the basis of a compromise between the victim and the offender;

15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc.

would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences

and therefore are to be treated as crimes against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC

and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However,

the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is

there for the sake of it or if the prosecution has collected

sufficient evidence, which, if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of the injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the

vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after

investigation, the chargesheet is filed/the charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible

when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of

this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non- compoundable offences, which are private and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused,

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namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc."

9. In the present case, the informant was acting as a public

servant. He was executing an order of the Court when he was obstructed

and beaten. Therefore, FIR does not disclose a private dispute but a

dispute which affects the public at large. It concerns the Administration

of Justice, in which the public has a vital interest, and if such offences are

allowed to be compounded, it will encourage the people to breach the

Rule of Law and shake the very edifice on which the civil society exists.

Therefore, the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised

to quash such an offence.

10. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is