Himachal Pradesh High Court
Shyam Chand vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 29 August, 2025
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Virender Singh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
.
CrMP No. : 3316 of 2025 in
Cr. Revision No. 81 of 2012
Reserved on : 20.08.2025
Decided on : 29.08.2025
Shyam Chand ...Applicant
Mani Chand
r toVersus
...Respondent
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the applicant: Mr. T.S. Chauhan, Senior Advocate,
with Mr. Surya Chauhan, Advocate.
For the respondent: Ms. Shagun Sharma, Advocate, vice
Mr. Arun Kaushal, Advocate.
Virender Singh, Judge.
Petitioner-Shaym Chand has filed the present
application, under Section 147 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as NI Act),
for compounding of the offences, on the basis of the
Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
compromise, entered into between the petitioner-applicant-
Shyam Chand and respondent-Mani Chand.
.
2. The said application has been filed in a decided
matter, as, the main petition, i.e. Criminal Revision No. 81
of 2022, filed by petitioner-applicant-Shyam Chand, has
been dismissed by this Court, vide judgment, dated 20th
December, 2022.
3. If the present application is accepted, as prayed
for, it would be nothing, but, would amount to interfering
with the judgment, passed by this Court, on 20 th
December, 2022, by virtue which, Criminal Revision No. 81
of 2022, was dismissed.
4. In other words, the acceptance of the prayer, so
made in the application, would amount to reviewing the
judgment of the same Court, by virtue of which, the main
petition has been dismissed. The said course is not legally
permissible under law, in view of the bar, created by
Section 362 CrPC.
5. Admittedly, at present, no proceedings are
pending between the parties before this Court or before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court. Although, compounding can be
done, at any stage, but, for invoking the said provisions
i.e., Section 147 of the NI Act, some proceedings must be
.
pending before any Court.
6. Pendency of the proceedings, before any Court,
is sine qua non, for exercising the powers under Section
482 CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS), as, held by a three
Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in
Ramawatar versus State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021
SCC OnLine SC 966. Relevant paragraph 13 of the
judgment, is reproduced, as under:-
"13. We, however, put a further caveat that the
powers under Article 142 or under Section 482
Cr.P.C., are exercisable in post-conviction
matters only where an appeal is pending
before one or the other Judicial forum. This is
on the premise that an order of conviction does
not attain finality till the accused has
exhausted his/her legal remedies and the
finality is sub-judice before an appellate court.
The pendency of legal proceedings, be that
may before the final Court, is sine-qua-non to
involve the superior court's plenary powers to
do complete justice. Conversely, where a
settlement has ensued post the attainment of
all legal remedies, the annulment of
proceedings on the basis of a compromise
would be impermissible. Such an embargo is
necessitated to prevent the accused from
gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a
settlement/compromise will always be loaded
with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We
have already clarified that the purpose of
these extra-ordinary powers is not to
incentivise any hollow-hearted agreements
between the accused and the victim but to do
complete justice by effecting genuine
.
settlement(s)."
(Self emphasis supplied)
7. The powers, under Section Section 528 of the
BNSS (Section 482 CrPC), are not to be used, in
contravention to the specific provisions of the Act. While
holding so, the view of this Court is being guided, by the
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of Punjab
versus Devinder Pal Singh Bhullar and others, (2011) 14
Supreme Court Cases 770. Relevant paragraphs 44 to 64
of the said judgment, are reproduced, as under:
"44. There is no power of review with the
Criminal Court after judgment has been
rendered. The High Court can alter or review
its judgment before it is signed. When an order
is passed, it cannot be reviewed. Section 362
Cr.P.C. is based on an acknowledged principle
of law that once a matter is finally disposed of
by a Court, the said Court in the absence of a
specific statutory provision becomes functus
officio and is disentitled to entertain a fresh
prayer for any relief unless the former order of
final disposal is set aside by a Court of
competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed
by law. The Court becomes functus officio the
moment the order for disposing of a case is
signed. Such an order cannot be altered except
to the extent of correcting a clerical or arithmetical
error. There is also no provision for modification of
the judgment. (See: Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan
Singh Bajwa & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 43;
and Chhanni v. State of U.P., )
45. Moreover, the prohibition contained
in Section 362 Cr.P.C. is absolute; after the
judgment is signed, even the High Court in exercise
.
of its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has
no authority or jurisdiction to alter/review the
same. (See: Moti Lal v. State of M.P., AIR 1994 SC
1544; Hari Singh Mann (supra); and State of
Kerala vs. M.M. Manikantan Nair).
46. If a judgment has been pronounced without
jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural
justice or where the order has been pronounced
without giving an opportunity of being heard to a
party affected by it or where an order was
obtained by abuse of the process of court which
would really amount to its being without
jurisdiction, inherent powers can be exercised to
recall such order for the reason that in such an
eventuality the order becomes a nullity and the
provisions of Section 362 Cr.P.C. would not
operate. In such eventuality, the judgment is
manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule
of natural justice. The power of recall is different
from the power of altering/reviewing the judgment.
However, the party seeking recall/alteration has to
establish that it was not at fault. (Vide: Chitawan
& Ors. v. Mahboob Ilahi, Deepak Thanwardas
Balwani v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. Swarth
Mahto & Anr. v. Dharmdeo Narain Singh,
Makkapati Nagaswara Sastri v. S.S.
Satyanarayan, Asit Kumar Kar v. State of West
Bengal & Ors., Vishnu Agarwal v. State of U.P. &
Anr.
47. This Court by virtue of Article 137of the
Constitution has been invested with an express
power to review any judgment in Criminal Law
and while no such power has been conferred on
the High Court, inherent power of the court cannot
be exercised for doing that which is specifically
prohibited by the Code itself. (Vide: State
Represented by D.S.P., S.B.C.I.D., Chennai v. K.V.
Rajendran & Ors.
48. In Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal & Anr., AIR
1981 SC 736, this Court held that the prohibition
in Section 362 Cr.P.C. against the Court altering or
reviewing its judgment, is subject to what is
"otherwise provided by this Code or by any other
law for the time being in force". Those words,
however, refer to those provisions only where the
Court has been expressly authorised by the
Code or other law to alter or review its judgment.
.
The inherent power of the Court is not
contemplated by the saving provision contained
in Section 362 Cr.P.C and, therefore, the attempt to
invoke that power can be of no avail.
49. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised
to the effect that the criminal justice delivery
system does not clothe the court to add or delete
any words, except to correct the clerical or
arithmetical error as specifically been provided
under the statute itself after pronouncement of the
judgment as the Judge becomes functus officio.
Any mistake or glaring omission is left to be
corrected only by the appropriate forum in
accordance with law.
IV. INHERENT POWERS UNDER SECTION
482 Cr.P.C.
50. "3......The inherent power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is intended to prevent the abuse of the
process of the Court and to secure the ends of
justice. Such power cannot be exercised to do
something which is expressly barred under
the Cr.P.C. If any consideration of the facts by way
of review is not permissible under the Cr.P.C. and
is expressly barred, it is not for the Court to
exercise its inherent power to reconsider the matter
and record a conflicting decision. If there had been
change in the circumstances of the case, it would
be in order for the High Court to exercise its
inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances
and pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of
justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the
Court. Where there are no such changed
circumstances and the decision has to be arrived
at on the facts that existed as on the date of the
earlier order, the exercise of the power to
reconsider the same materials to arrive at different
conclusion is in effect a review, which is expressly
barred under Section 362 Cr.P.C.
(emphasis supplied)
51. The inherent power of the court under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is saved only where an order has been
passed by the criminal court which is required to
be set aside to secure the ends of justice or where
the proceeding pending before a court, amounts to
abuse of the process of court. Therefore, such
powers can be exercised by the High Court in
.
relation to a matter pending before a criminal court
or where a power is exercised by the court under
the Cr.P.C. Inherent powers cannot be exercised
assuming that the statute conferred an unfettered
and arbitrary jurisdiction, nor can the High Court
act at its whim or caprice. The statutory power has
to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and
in the rarest of rare cases. (Vide: Kurukshetra
University & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Anr., AIR
1977 SC 2229; and State of W.B. & Ors. v. Sujit
Kumar Rana, (2004) 4 SCC 129).
52. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be
resorted to if there is a specific provision in
the Cr.P.C. for the redressal of the grievance of the
aggrieved party or where alternative remedy is
available. Such powers cannot be exercised as
against the express bar of the law and engrafted in
any other provision of the Cr.P.C. Such powers can
be exercised to secure the ends of justice and to
prevent the abuse of the process of court. However,
such expressions do not confer unlimited/
unfettered jurisdiction on the High Court as the
"ends of justice" and "abuse of the process of the
court" have to be dealt with in accordance with law
including the procedural law and not otherwise.
Such powers can be exercised ex debito justitiae to
do real and substantial justice as the courts have
been conferred such inherent jurisdiction, in
absence of any express provision, as inherent in
their constitution, or such powers as are necessary
to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of
administration of justice as provided in the legal
maxim "quando lex aliquid alique, concedit,
conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest".
However, the High Court has not been given nor
does it possess any inherent power to make any
order, which in the opinion of the court, could be in
the interest of justice as the statutory provision is
not intended to by-pass the procedure prescribed.
(Vide: Lalit Mohan Mondal & Ors. v. Benoyendra
Nath Chatterjee, AIR 1982 SC
785; Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of
Gujarat & Anr., AIR 2006 SC 915; Central Bureau
of Investigation v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava, IAS &
Anr., AIR 2006 SC 2872; Inder Mohan Goswami &
Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal & Ors., AIR 2008 SC
251; and Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra &
Ors., AIR 2008 SC 3077).
.
53. The High Court can always issue
appropriate direction in exercise of its power
under Article 226 of the Constitution at the behest
of an aggrieved person, if the court is convinced
that the power of investigation has been exercised
by an Investigating Officer malafide or the matter
is not investigated at all. Even in such a case, the
High Court cannot direct the police as to how the
investigation is to be conducted but can insist only
for the observance of process as provided for in
the Cr.P.C. Another remedy available to such an
aggrieved person may be to file a complaint
under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and the court concerned
will proceed as provided in Chapter XV of
the Cr.P.C. (See: Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v.
State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2004) 7 SCC 768;
and Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala &
Ors., AIR 2008 SC 1614).
54. The provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C. closely
resemble Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, (hereinafter called the 'CPC'), and, therefore,
the restrictions which are there to use the inherent
powers under Section 151 CPC are applicable in
exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and
one such restriction is that there exists no other
provision of law by which the party aggrieved
could have sought relief. (Vide: The Janata Dal v.
H.S. Chowdhary & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 892).
55. In Divisional Forest Officer & Anr. v. G.V.
Sudhakar Rao & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 328, this Court
held that High Court was not competent
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to stay the operation of
an order of confiscation under Section 44(IIA) of the
Andhra Pradesh Forest Act as it is distinct from a
trial before a court for the commission of an
offence.
56. In Popular Muthiah v. State represented by
Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 SCC 296, explaining
the scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court held :
" 48...The High Court cannot issue directions
to investigate the case from a particular angle or
by a particular agency."
(emphasis added)
Thus, in case, the High Court in exercise of its
inherent powers, issues directions contravening
the statutory provisions laying down the procedure
.
of investigation, it would be unwarranted in law.
57. In Rajan Kumar Machananda v. State of
Karnataka, 1990 (supp.) SCC 132, this Court
examined a case as to whether the bar
under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. can be circumvented
by invoking inherent jurisdiction under Section
482 Cr.P.C. by the High Court. The Court came to
the conclusion that if such a course was
permissible it would be possible that every
application facing the bar of Section 397(3) Cr.P.C.
would be labelled as one under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Thus, the statutory bar cannot be circumvented.
58. This Court has consistently emphasised
that judges must enforce laws whatever they may
be and decide the cases strictly in accordance with
the law. "The laws are not always just and the
lights are not always luminous. Nor, again, are
judicial methods always adequate to secure
justice". But the courts "are bound by the Penal
Code and Criminal Procedure Code" by the very
`oath' of the office. (See: Joseph Peter v. State of
Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR 1977 SC 1812).
59. It is evident from the above that inherent
powers can be exercised only to prevent the abuse
of the process of the court and to secure the ends
of justice. However, powers can be used provided
there is no prohibition for passing such an order
under the provisions of Cr.P.C. and there is no
provision under which the party can seek
redressal of its grievance. Under the garb of
exercising inherent powers, the Criminal Court
cannot review its judgment. Such powers are
analogous to the provisions of Section 151 CPC
and can be exercised only to do real and
substantial justice. (self emphasis supplied).
60. The rule of inherent powers has its source in
the maxim "Quadolex aliquid alicui concedit,
concedere videtur id sine quo ipsa, ess uon potest"
which means that when the law gives anything to
anyone, it gives also all those things without which
the thing itself could not exist. The order cannot be
passed by-passing the procedure prescribed by
law. The court in exercise of its power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot direct a
particular agency to investigate the matter or to
investigate a case from a particular angle or by a
procedure not prescribed in Cr.P.C. Such powers
.
should be exercised very sparingly to prevent
abuse of process of any court. Courts must be
careful to see that its decision in exercise of this
power is based on sound principles.
61. To inhere means that it forms a necessary
part and belongs as an attribute in the nature of
things. The High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is
crowned with a statutory power to exercise control
over the administration of justice in criminal
proceedings within its territorial jurisdiction. This is
to ensure that proceedings undertaken under
the Cr.P.C. are executed to secure the ends of
justice. For this, the Legislature has empowered
the High Court with an inherent authority which is
repository under the Statute. The Legislature
therefore clearly intended the existence of such
power in the High Court to control proceedings
initiated under the Cr.P.C. Conferment of such
inherent power might be necessary to prevent the
miscarriage of justice and to prevent any form of
injustice. However, it is to be understood that it is
neither divine nor limitless. It is not to generate
unnecessary indulgence. The power is to protect
the system of justice from being polluted during the
administration of justice under the Code.
62. The High Court can intervene where it finds
the abuse of the process of any court which means,
that wherever an attempt to secure something by
abusing the process is located, the same can be
rectified by invoking such power. There has to be
a nexus and a direct co-relation to any existing
proceeding, not foreclosed by any other form
under the Code, to the subject matter for which
such power is to be exercised.
63. Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. lies
before the High Court against an order passed by
the court subordinate to it in a pending
case/proceedings. Generally, such powers are
used for quashing criminal proceedings in
appropriate cases. Such an application does not lie
to initiate criminal proceedings or set the criminal
law in motion. Inherent jurisdiction can be
exercised if the order of the Subordinate Court
results in the abuse of the "process" of the court
and/or calls for interference to secure the ends of
justice. The use of word `process' implies that the
proceedings are pending before the Subordinate
.
Court. When reference is made to the phrase "to
secure the ends of justice", it is in fact in relation to
the order passed by the Subordinate Court and it
cannot be understood in a general connotation of
the phrase. More so, while entertaining such
application the proceedings should be pending in
the Subordinate Court. In case it attained finality,
the inherent powers cannot be exercised. Party
aggrieved may approach the appellate/revisional
forum. Inherent jurisdiction can be exercised if
injustice done to a party, e.g., a clear mandatory
provision of law is overlooked or where different
accused in the same case are being treated
differently by the Subordinate Court.
64. An inherent power is not an omnibus for
opening a pandorabox, that too for issues that are
foreign to the main context. The invoking of the
power has to be for a purpose that is connected to
a proceeding and not for sprouting an altogether
new issue. A power cannot exceed its own
authority beyond its own creation. It is not that a
person is remediless. On the contrary, the
constitutional remedy of writs are available. Here,
the High Court enjoys wide powers of prerogative
writs as compared to that under Section
482 Cr.P.C. To secure the corpus of an individual,
remedy by way of habeas corpus is available. For
that the High Court should not resort to inherent
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as the
Legislature has conferred separate powers for the
same. Needless to mention that Section 97 Cr.P.C.
empowers Magistrates to order the search of a
person wrongfully confined. It is something
different that the same court exercising authority
can, in relation to the same subject matter, invoke
its writ jurisdiction as well. Nevertheless, the
inherent powers are not to provide universal
remedies. The power cannot be and should not be
used to belittle its own existence. One cannot
concede anarchy to an inherent power for that was
never the wisdom of the Legislature. To confer un-
briddled inherent power would itself be trenching
upon the authority of the Legislature."
(Self emphasis supplied)
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Damodar S.
.
Prabhu versus Sayed BabaLal, (2015) 5 Supreme
Court Cases 663, has elaborately discussed the provisions
of Sections 138 and 147 of the NI Act and laid down
certain guidelines. Relevant para-21 of the judgment, is
reproduced, as under:
" With regard to the progression of litigation in
cheque bouncing cases, the learned Attorney
General has urged this Court to frame
guidelines for a graded scheme of imposing
costs on parties who unduly delay
compounding of the offence. It was submitted
that the requirement of deposit of the costs will
act as a deterrent for delayed composition,
since at present, free and easy compounding of
offences at any stage, however belated, gives
an incentive to the drawer of the cheque to
delay settling the cases for years. An
application for compounding made after several
years not only results in the system being
burdened but the complainant is also deprived
of effective justice. In view of this submission,
we direct that the following guidelines be
followed:-
THE GUIDELINES
(i) In the circumstances, it is proposed as
follows:
(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of
Summons be suitably modified making it clear
to the accused that he could make an
application for compounding of the offences at
the first or second hearing of the case and that
if such an application is made, compounding
may be allowed by the court without imposing
any costs on the accused.
(b) If the accused does not make an application
for compounding as aforesaid, then if an
application for compounding is made before the
.
Magistrate at a subsequent stage,
compounding can be allowed subject to the
condition that the accused will be required to
pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited
as a condition for compounding with the Legal
Services Authority, or such authority as the
Court deems fit.
(c) Similarly, if the application for compounding
is made before the Sessions Court or a High
Court in revision or appeal, such compounding
may be allowed on the condition that the
accused pays 15% of the cheque amount by
way of costs.
(d) Finally, if the application for compounding is
made before the Supreme Court, the figure
would increase to 20% of the cheque amount."
(Self emphasis supplied)
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a recent
decision, in M/s. New Win Export & Anr. versus A.
Subramaniam, Neutral Citation No. 2024 INSC 535, has
held that in case, compounding is done, after conviction,
the same can only be done with the leave of the court,
where appeal against such conviction is pending. Relevant
para-4 of the judgment, is reproduced as under:
"4. Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 makes all offences under NI Act
compoundable offences. In our opinion, this
settlement agreement can be treated to be
compounding of the offence. All the same,
Section 320 (5) of CrPC provides that if
compounding has to be done after conviction,
then it can only be done with the leave of the
Court, where, appeal against such conviction
.
is pending." (self emphasis supplied)
10. Admittedly, in the present case, nothing has
been done by the petitioner-applicant, when, the lis was
pending before the learned trial Court, Court of Sessions,
as well as, before this Court.
11.
If the contentions of the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner-applicant are accepted, then,
instead of filing the present application, before this Court,
the application for compounding should have been filed,
before the learned trial Court.
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while issuing
directions in Damodar S. Prabhu's (supra) has
categorically fixed the amount of compounding fee at
different levels. Before the learned trial Court, there is no
requirement of paying the compounding fee, if the
compounding is done at first or second hearing of the case,
whereas, 10% of the cheque amount is held to be payable,
as compounding fee, where, the compounding is done, at
the subsequent stage. If the proceedings are pending
before the Court of Sessions or before the High Court, the
compounding fee is held to be 15%. If the proceedings are
pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Hon'ble
.
Supreme Court has increased the figure, as, 20% of the
cheque amount.
13. Merely, on the basis of the said guidelines, the
arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner-
applicant, qua the fact that compounding can be done, at
any stage, do not hold water.
14. Even, as per those guidelines, in Damodar S
Prabhu's case (supra), an inference can be drawn that sine
qua non, for moving the application, for compounding, is
pendency of proceedings. Non-filing of the appeal before
the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the dismissal of the
Revision Petition, by this Court, resulted into finality of the
judgment of conviction.
15. If the present application is allowed, it would
amount to re-opening the matter, which is not permissible.
16. Even otherwise, if the prayer is accepted, it
would amount to give premium to the accused, for his act
of omission, in not preferring the appeal before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, against the dismissal of his Criminal
Revision, by this Court.
.
17. Considering the fact that no appeal has been
preferred, against the dismissal of the Criminal Revision,
by this Court, this Court is of the view that the petitioner-
applicant could not bring his case within the purview of
the exceptions, as, carved out, by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in para 46 of the judgment in Devinder Pal Singh
Bhullar's case (supra).
18. In view of the directions, issued by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, in Damodar S. Prabhu's case (supra),
compounding is permissible, at any stage of the
proceedings, but, pendency of the proceedings is sine qua
non for the same, whereas, in this case, no proceedings, in
any Court, are pending, as such, a line has to be drawn,
where, the compounding of the offence, could be permitted.
19. If the prayer of the petitioner-applicant, at this
stage, is accepted, then, there would be no end to the
litigation, as, after challenging the judgment of conviction
and order of sentence unsuccessfully, which has attained
finality, by way of all the legal remedies, available,
thereafter, the person, like the petitioner, would approach
this Court, time and again, to get rid of the judgment of
.
conviction and order of sentence, under the garb of
compromise.
20. Considering all these facts, the present
application is held to be not maintainable and the same is
accordingly dismissed.
( Virender Singh )
r Judge
August 29, 2025
( rajni )
