Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 20.8.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 26 August, 2025
2025:HHC:28729
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 1805 of 2025
Reserved on: 20.8.2025
Date of Decision: 26.8.2025.
Kapil Dev ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Hemant Kumar Thakur,
Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in FIR No. 42 of 2024, dated 12.3.2024,
registered at Police Station Dharampur, District Solan, H.P., for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21 and 29
of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short
'the ND&PS Act').
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2025:HHC:28729
2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested
in FIR No. 42 of 2024 on 12.3.2024. The story concocted by the
prosecution is false, and the petitioner is not involved in the
commission of crime. The petitioner has deep roots in society,
and there is no chance of his fleeing from justice. He would abide
by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. The
matter was listed for prosecution's evidence on 5.8.2025. The
prosecution has failed to complete the evidence within a
reasonable time, and the petitioner's right to a speedy trial is
being violated. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition,
which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 42 of 2025, and was
dismissed on 21.3.2025. Hence, the bail petition.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police party received a secret information on
12.3.2024 at about 2:04 am that two people were riding a
motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-98-1355. They were
transporting a huge quantity of heroin, which could be
recovered by their search. The information was reduced to
writing, and it was sent to the Supervisory Officer. The police
associated two independent witnesses and intercepted the
motorcycle at 2:40 am. The motorcycle riders revealed their
2025:HHC:28729
names as Abhishek and Rajat Sharma. The police searched their
motorcycle and recovered 9.29 grams of heroin. The police
seized the heroin and arrested the riders. They disclosed that
they had purchased 9.5 grams of heroin from Dishant Garg and
the present petitioner, Kapil Dev, on 11.3.2024 for ₹ 28,000/-. ₹
26,000/- were paid in cash and ₹2,000/- were paid by UPI. The
heroin was sent to FSL and was confirmed to be
Diacetylmorphine. The mobile phone was sent to FSL, and the
conversation was found with the mobile number registered in
the name of Dishant Garg. Abhishek identified the present
petitioner, Kapil Dev, who was arrested. Dishant Garg was also
arrested subsequently. Police recorded the statement of Anil
Chaudhary, who disclosed that the petitioner and Dishant were
running a big business of heroin from their hotel. Huge money
transactions were found between Rajat Sharma and Dishant
Garg. FIR No. 05 of 2024 has been registered against Kapil Dev
and Dishant Garg at Police Station Parwanoo for the commission
of offences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
FIR No. 177 of 2021, FIR No. 25 of 2023 and FIR No. 5 of 2024 are
also registered against the petitioner-Kapil Dev. The petitioner
is a drug peddler and is spoiling the future of the young
2025:HHC:28729
generation. The prosecution has cited 23 witnesses, and
witnesses at Serial Nos 1 to 3 have been examined. Witnesses at
Serial Nos 6 and 7 were summoned for 7.8.2025. Hence, the
status report.
4. I have heard Mr. Hemant Kumar Thakur, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned
Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
5. Mr. Hemant Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was
falsely implicated. The quantity of heroin stated to have been
recovered from the possession of the petitioner is intermediate,
and the rigours of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act do not apply to
the present case. The petitioner was arrested on 12.3.2024. More
than one and a half years have elapsed since his arrest. The
prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, and the learned
Trial Court has also summoned two witnesses for 29.12.2025.
The prosecution has cited 23 witnesses, and the trial is not likely
to be concluded within a reasonable time because the learned
Trial Court is summoning the witnesses in piecemeal. Therefore,
2025:HHC:28729
he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner
be released on bail.
6. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the
prosecution is making all efforts to examine the witnesses. The
petitioner was named as a drug peddler by his employee. The
petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence
in case of his release on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a
bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 42 of 2025
and was dismissed on 21.3.2025. It was held in State of
Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2
SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a
subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a
change of circumstances. It was observed:
"Once that application was rejected, there was no question
of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the
earlier decision without there being a change in the fact
situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a
2025:HHC:28729
substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier
decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of
little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was
a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during
these two days, drastic changes had taken place,
necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial
discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the
impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all
earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J.,
only a couple of days before, in the absence of any
substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is
necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that
the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an
impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either
successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure
an order which had hitherto eluded him.
9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an
earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to
consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then
consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed.
It was held:
"11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to
consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by
noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications
have been rejected and after such consideration, if the
court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then
the said court will have to give specific reasons why in
spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail
application should be granted."
2025:HHC:28729
10. The petitioner has asserted that there is an
inordinate delay in the progress of the trial. As per the
prosecution, the police had only recovered 9.29 grams of heroin
and keeping in view the principle of proportionality, the
petitioner has undergone a substantial part of the imprisonment
which may be imposed upon him after the conclusion of the
trial. This submission has to be accepted as correct. A perusal of
the certified copies of the order sheets shows that learned
Special Judge-II, Solan, took cognisance on 14.6.2024. The
charge was framed on 4.10.2024. The matter was listed on
15.1.2025, on which date statements of two witnesses were
recorded. The statement of one witness was recorded on
10.4.2025. The matter was listed on 5.8.2025 and 7.8.2025, but
no witness appeared. Learned Trial Court ordered the issuance of
summons to the witness cited at Serial Nos 4 and 5 for
29.12.2025.
11. The certified copies of the order sheets also show
that the learned Trial Court never summoned all the witnesses
cited by the prosecution. The witnesses were summoned in a
piecemeal manner. Firstly, witnesses at Serial No.1 to 3 were
summoned for 15.1.2025, thereafter, witnesses at Serial No.4, 5
2025:HHC:28729
and 8 were summoned for 10.4.2025 and witnesses at Serial No.
6 and 7 were summoned for 10.7.2025. Now the witnesses at
Serial Nos 4 and 5 have been summoned for 29.12.2025. This
shows the inability of the learned Trial Court to conclude the
trial expeditiously.
12. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that when the State or any prosecuting
agency including the Court concerned has no wherewithal to
provide the right to speedy trial of the accused, the bail should
not be opposed on the ground that crime committed is serious. It
was observed at page 820:
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the
court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect
the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial
as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose
the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed
is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies
irrespective of the nature of the crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of
criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be
innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside
lightly, however stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded,
2025:HHC:28729
the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be
said to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of
the Constitution.
13. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127
that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the
accused. It was observed on page 298:
"13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948, assures that:
"12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or
attacks."
14. More recently, the European Convention on Human
Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:
"6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time...."
and in its second sub-article, that:
"6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence
shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law."
15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down
the use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and
omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal
prosecution in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386
US 213 (1967)].
16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569:
1994 SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
2025:HHC:28729
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp.
638-39, paras 86-87)
"86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as
an essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution.
The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint
imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and
continues at all stages, namely, the stage of the
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that
any possible prejudice that may result from the
impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the
commission of the offence till it consummates into a
finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted
that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is
properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while
dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
has observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
'5. ... No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
"reasonable, fair or just" and it would fall
foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no
doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial
we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an
integral and essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty
enshrined in Article 21. The question which
would, however, arise is as to what would be
the consequence if a person accused of an
offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought
to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment
as a result of a long-delayed trial in violation
of his fundamental right under Article 21.
Would he be entitled to be released
2025:HHC:28729
unconditionally, freed from the charge
levelled against him on the ground that
trying him after an unduly long period of
time and convicting him after such trial
would constitute a violation of his
fundamental right under Article 21."
17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence
being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a
fortiori in departmental enquiries has been emphasised
by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution
Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC
225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] underscored that this right to
speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution
and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973; that it encompasses all stages viz.
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial;
that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and
explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a
balancing test to determine whether this right had been
denied in the particular case before it."
14. It was held in the Shaheen Welfare Association. v.
Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person
cannot be kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial
being concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
"8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to
grant some relief to those persons who have been
deprived of their personal liberty for a considerable
length of time without any prospect of the trial being
concluded in the near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of
the community and the nation needs to be safeguarded
looking to the nature of the offences these undertrials
have been charged with. But the ultimate justification for
such deprivation of liberty pending trial can only be their
being found guilty of the offences for which they have
2025:HHC:28729
been charged. If such a finding is not likely to be arrived
at within a reasonable time, some relief becomes
necessary."
15. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3
SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be
subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at
page 335:
"40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has
been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that
cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed
as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is
not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which,
regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or
the gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised
the legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To
put it differently, no accused can be subjected to
unending detention pending trial, especially when the law
presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even
where statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail,
such as in cases under the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court has expressly ruled that
after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or for any
other valid reason, such stringent provisions will melt
down, and cannot be measured over and above the right
of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
(see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A.
Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] )."
16. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right
to a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right
2025:HHC:28729
of bail is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be
concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: -
13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused
to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial
discretion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present
case), this Court has upheld them for conflating two
competing values i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy
freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and
societal interest -- as observed in Vaman Narain
Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of
Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745 :
(2008) 17 SCR 369] ("the concept of bail emerges from the
conflict between the police power to restrict liberty of a man
who is alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption
of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal...."). They are,
at the same time, upheld on the condition that the trial is
concluded expeditiously. The Constitution Bench in Kar-
tar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,
(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994) 2 SCR 375]
made observations to this effect. In Shaheen Welfare Asso-
ciation. v. Union of India [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of
India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR
1123] again, this Court expressed the same sentiment,
namely, that when stringent provisions are enacted,
curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting judicial
discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and trials
would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that
parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare
case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC
616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123], SCC p. 624,
para 17)
"17. ... a conscious decision has been taken by the
legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal
liberty of an undertrial accused for the sake of
protecting the community and the nation against
terrorist and disruptive activities or other activities
harmful to society, it is all the more necessary that
2025:HHC:28729
investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and an
adequate number of Designated Courts are set up to
bring to book persons accused of such serious crimes.
This is the only way in which society can be protected
against harmful activities. This would also ensure that
persons ultimately found innocent are not
unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods."
17. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial
detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page
178:
"23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that
laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of
bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials
are not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the
individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and
their living conditions, more often than not, are
appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry's
response to Parliament, the National Crime Records
Bureau had recorded that as on 31-12-2021, over 5,54,034
prisoners were lodged in jails against a total capacity of
4,25,069 prisoners in the country [ National Crime
Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India
<https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI-2021/Executi
ve_ncrb_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these, 1,22,852 were
convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials.
24. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates
are at risk of "prisonisation" a term described by the
Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict
Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242]
as "a radical transformation" whereby the prisoner: (SCC
OnLine Ker para 13)
"13. ... loses his identity. He is known by a number. He
loses personal possessions. He has no personal
relationships. Psychological problems result from loss
of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy
2025:HHC:28729
of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out
to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by
ordinary standards. Self-perception changes."
25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to
crime, "as crime not only turns admirable, but the more
professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal" [
Working Papers - Group on Prisons & Borstals - 1966
U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer's "The Prison Community"
published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison
Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is
referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, "Donald Clemmer's
Concept of Prisonisation", available
at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/
Sobecki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ).
Incarceration has further deleterious effects, where the
accused belongs to the weakest economic strata:
immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases,
scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and
alienation from society. The courts, therefore, have to be
sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an
acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and
ensure that trials--especially in cases where special laws
enact stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded
speedily."
18. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
recently in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to
speedy trial of the offenders facing criminal charges is an
important facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and
inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial entitles the
accused to grant of bail, it was observed at page 817: -
"10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC
81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the
2025:HHC:28729
right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges
is "implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as
interpreted by this Court". Remarking that a valid
procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a
procedure that is "reasonable, fair and just", it was held
that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
"5. ... Now obviously procedure prescribed by law
for depriving a person of liberty cannot be
"reasonable, fair or just" unless that procedure
ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of
such person. No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as "reasonable,
fair or just" and it would fall foul of Article 21. There
can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by
speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is
an integral and essential part of the fundamental right
to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question
which would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is
denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of
his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-
delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21."
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time
and again, in several judgments, such as Kadra
Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar,
(1981) 3 SCC 671: 1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,
(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court
re-emphasised the right to a speedy trial and further held
that an accused, facing a prolonged trial, has no option:
(Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269,
para 84)
"84. ... The State or complainant prosecutes him. It
is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant,
as the case may be, to proceed with the case with
reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country,
2025:HHC:28729
where the large majority of accused come from poorer
and weaker sections of society, not versed in the ways
of law, where they do not often get competent legal
advice, the application of the said rule is wholly
inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused
demands a speedy trial and yet he is not given one, it
may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot
disentitle an accused from complaining of
infringement of his right to a speedy trial on the
ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy
trial."
19. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v.
State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was
observed:
7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried
trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to
prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an
accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in
"The Ballad of Reading Gaol", wrote the following
poignant lines while being incarcerated:
"I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;
All that we know who be in jail
Is that the wall is strong;
And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long."
20. It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents and he is not entitled to bail on this consideration.
This submission will not help the State. It was laid down by the
2025:HHC:28729
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3763: 2024: INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents
may not be a reason to deny bail to the accused in case of long
incarceration. It was observed:
"10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is
only one of the several considerations for deciding the
prayer for bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused
makes out a strong prima facie case, depending upon the
fact situation and period of incarceration, the presence of
antecedents may not be a ground to deny bail. There may
be a case where a Court can grant bail only on the grounds
of long incarceration. The presence of antecedents may
not be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court
may grant default bail. Again, the antecedents of the
accused are irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending
upon the peculiar facts, the Court can grant bail
notwithstanding the existence of the antecedents."
21. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,
and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail in the sum of
₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the
satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the
petitioner will abide by the following terms and conditions: -
(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses,
nor will he influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever;
(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and
every hearing and will not seek unnecessary
adjournments;
2025:HHC:28729
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for
a continuous period of seven days without
furnishing the address of the intended visit to the
SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and
the Trial Court;
(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to
the Court; and
(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from
the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social
Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile
number or social media accounts, the same will be
intimated to the Police/Court within five days from
the date of the change.
22. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to
file a petition for cancellation of the bail.
23. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy
of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, District Jail,
Solan, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
24. The observations made hereinabove are regarding
the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the case's merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
26th August 2025
(Chander)
CHANDER CHANDER SHEKHAR
SHEKHAR Date: 2025.08.26
15:43:58 +0530
