Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 13.08.2025 vs State Of H.P on 21 August, 2025
2025:HHC:28285
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1699 of 2025.
Reserved on: 13.08.2025.
Date of Decision: 21.08.2025.
Kamaldeep alias Timmi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr. Vijender Katoch, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General for the respondent.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking
regular bail, in FIR No. 20 of 2024, dated 01.02.2024, registered at
Police Station Damtaal, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 21 & 29 of the Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (ND&PS Act).
2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. HP38B-3835
on 01.02.2024, at Toll Tax Barrier, Bhadroya, at about 12:30 am,
and recovered 7.20 grams of heroin from it during its search. The
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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driver revealed his name as Kamaljeet alias Timmi (present
petitioner), and the other person sitting beside him identified
himself as Pawan Kumar. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail
petition before this Court, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No.
1334 of 2024, and the same was dismissed by this Court on
17.09.2024. The petitioner has completed one year and four
months in custody. The prosecution has failed to complete the
evidence. Six FIRs have been registered against the petitioner. The
petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court
may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on 31.01.2024.
They were checking the vehicles. A vehicle bearing registration No.
HP-38B-3835 came from Bhadroya Chowk at about 12:30 am. The
police signaled the driver to stop the vehicle. The driver slowed his
vehicle and thereafter sped away. The vehicle hit the barricade. The
police followed the vehicle and found that the vehicle was hanging
on a tree towards the downside of the road. The police checked the
registration number and found it to be HP-38B-3835. Two people
were sitting inside the vehicle, who were taken out. Balwinder
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Singh and Jagbhushan were associated as independent witnesses.
The driver revealed his name as Kamaldeep (the present
petitioner), and the other person revealed his name as Pawan
Kumar. The police searched the vehicle in the presence of the
occupants and independent witnesses. They recovered a tobacco
packet containing 7.20 grams of heroin. The police seized the
heroin and arrested the occupants of the vehicle. The police
searched the house of Pawan Kumar and recovered 450 grams of
cannabis. The occupants revealed on inquiry that they had
purchased the heroin from Dayapal. The police also arrested him.
As per the report of analysis, the Exhibit stated as charas was an
extract of cannabis, and the exhibit stated as heroin was a sample
of Diacetylmorphine. Six FIRs have been registered against the
petitioner, out of which four FIRs have been registered for the
commission of offences punishable under various provisions of the
NDPS Act. The petitioner would intimidate the witnesses and
indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of his release
on bail. The police filed the charge-sheet before the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Nurpur, on 30.03.2024. The prosecution
has cited 24 witnesses, out of whom six have been examined. The
matter was listed on 01.08.2025, before the learned Additional
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Sessions Judge, Nurpur. Hence, it was prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
4. I have heard Mr. Vijender Katoch, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
5. Mr. Vijender Katoch, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of 7.20
grams of heroin, which is slightly more than the small quantity.
The petitioner has already spent one year and four months in
custody, and keeping in view the principle of proportionality in
imposing sentence, the petitioner has undergone a substantial part
of the imprisonment. The prosecution has failed to complete the
evidence, and the right to a speedy trial of the petitioner is being
violated. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed
and the petitioner be released on bail.
6. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was
involved in the commission of similar offences in the past. He
would indulge in the commission of similar offences in case of his
release on bail. The consumption of heroin is adversely affecting
the young generation, and such offences should not be lightly
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viewed. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had filed a bail
petition earlier, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1334 of 2024
and was dismissed on 17.09.2024. It was held in State of
Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC
605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent
bail application can only be considered if there is a change of
circumstances. It was observed:
"Once that application was rejected, there was no question of
granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier
decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And
when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which
has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely
cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence.
'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and
it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes
had taken place, necessitating the release of the respondent on
bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that
the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all
earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a
couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change
in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with
restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is
not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain
ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one
judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto
eluded him.
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9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh
Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail
application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the
rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the
subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held:
"11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to
consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by
noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have
been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of
the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court
will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier
rejection the subsequent bail application should be
granted."
10. Therefore, the present petition can be considered when
there is a change in the circumstances.
11. It was submitted that the prosecution has failed to
complete the evidence despite the lapse of one year and four
months, which is violative of the right to a speedy trial. This
submission has to be accepted as correct. The status report shows
that the prosecution has cited 24 witnesses, out of whom six
witnesses have been examined, and 18 witnesses are yet to be
examined. The petitioner was found in possession of 7.20 grams of
heroin, and applying the principle of proportionality, he has
undergone the substantial part of imprisonment, which can be
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awarded to him after the conclusion of the trial. Thus, the
grievance of the petitioner that his right to a speedy trial is being
violated has to be accepted as correct.
12. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127 that
the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused. It
was observed at page 298:
"13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
1948, assures that:
"12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks."
14. More recently, the European Convention on Human
Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:
"6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
a reasonable time...."
and in its second sub-article, that:
"6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall
be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
law."
15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the
use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and
omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution
in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386 US 213 (1967)].
16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994
SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
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fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp.
638-39, paras 86-87)
"86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right
to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by
arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of the investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may
result from the impermissible and avoidable delay from the
time of the commission of the offence till it consummates
into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted
that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is properly
reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing
with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has
observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
'5. ... No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
"reasonable, fair or just" and it would fall foul of
Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that
a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life
and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question
which would, however, arise is as to what would
be the consequence if a person accused of an
offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to
be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a
result of a long-delayed trial in violation of his
fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be
entitled to be released unconditionally, freed
from the charge levelled against him on the
ground that trying him after an unduly long
period of time and convicting him after such
trial would constitute a violation of his
fundamental right under Article 21."
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17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being
present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in
departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court
on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri)
93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit in
Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected in Section
309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; that it
encompasses all stages viz. investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden lies on the
prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court
must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this
right had been denied in the particular case before it."
13. It was held in the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of
India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot be
kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial being concluded
expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
"8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant
some relief to those persons who have been deprived of their
personal liberty for a considerable length of time without
any prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future.
Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and the nation
needs to be safeguarded looking to the nature of the offences
these undertrials have been charged with. But the ultimate
justification for such deprivation of liberty pending trial can
only be their being found guilty of the offences for which
they have been charged. If such a finding is not likely to be
arrived at within a reasonable time, some relief becomes
necessary."
14. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3
SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be
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subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at
page 335:
"40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has been
urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that cancellation
of bail by this Court is likely to be construed as an indefinite
foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is not necessary to
dwell upon the wealth of case law which, regardless of the
stringent provisions in a penal law or the gravity of the
offence, has time and again recognised the legitimacy of
seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it differently, no
accused can be subjected to unending detention pending
trial, especially when the law presumes him to be innocent
until proven guilty. Even where statutory provisions
expressly bar the grant of bail, such as in cases under the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court has
expressly ruled that after a reasonably long period of
incarceration, or for any other valid reason, such stringent
provisions will melt down, and cannot be measured over and
above the right of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution (see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of
India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] )."
15. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a speedy
trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail is
curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded
expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: -
13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to
secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discretion
(like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case), this
Court has upheld them for conflating two competing values
i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy freedom, based on the
presumption of innocence, and societal interest -- as
observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [Vaman
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Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281: (2009) 1
SCC (Cri) 745: (2008) 17 SCR 369] ("the concept of bail emerges
from the conflict between the police power to restrict liberty of a
man who is alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption
of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal...."). They are, at
the same time, upheld on the condition that the trial is
concluded expeditiously. The Constitution Bench in Kartar
Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994)
3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994) 2 SCR 375] made
observations to this effect. In Shaheen Welfare Associa-
tion. v. Union of India [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India,
(1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123] again,
this Court expressed the same sentiment, namely, that when
stringent provisions are enacted, curtailing the provisions of
bail, and restricting judicial discretion, it is on the basis that
investigation and trials would be concluded swiftly. The
Court said that parliamentary intervention is based on: (Sha-
heen Welfare case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India,
(1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123], SCC p.
624, para 17)
"17. ... a conscious decision has been taken by the
legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal liberty
of an undertrial accused for the sake of protecting the
community and the nation against terrorist and
disruptive activities or other activities harmful to society,
it is all the more necessary that investigation of such
crimes is done efficiently and an adequate number of
Designated Courts are set up to bring to book persons
accused of such serious crimes. This is the only way in
which society can be protected against harmful activities.
This would also ensure that persons ultimately found
innocent are not unnecessarily kept in jail for long
periods."
16. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial detention
and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page 178:
"23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that
laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of bail
may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials are not
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concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the individual is
immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and their living
conditions, more often than not, are appalling. According to
the Union Home Ministry's response to Parliament, the
National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31-
12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against
a total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country
[ National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India
<https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI-2021/Executive
_ncrb_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these, 1,22,852 were
convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials.
24. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are
at risk of "prisonisation" a term described by the Kerala
High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict Pris-
oner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242] as "a
radical transformation" whereby the prisoner: (SCC OnLine
Ker para 13)
"13. ... loses his identity. He is known by a number. He
loses personal possessions. He has no personal
relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of
freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of
personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be
dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary
standards. Self-perception changes."
25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to
crime, "as crime not only turns admirable, but the more
professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal"
[ Working Papers - Group on Prisons & Borstals - 1966 U.K.]
(also see Donald Clemmer's "The Prison Community"
published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison
Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is
referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, "Donald Clemmer's Concept
of Prisonisation", available
at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/Sob
ecki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ). Incarceration
has further deleterious effects, where the accused belongs to
the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood,
and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of
family bonds and alienation from society. The courts,
therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in
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the event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is
irreparable), and ensure that trials--especially in cases
where special laws enact stringent provisions- are taken up
and concluded speedily."
17. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court recently
in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that the right to speedy trial of the
offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India and inordinate delay in the conclusion
of the trial entitles the accused to grant of bail, it was observed at
page 817: -
"10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81:
1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the right to
speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is "implicit
in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by
this Court". Remarking that a valid procedure under Article
21 is one which contains a procedure that is "reasonable, fair
and just", it was held that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
"5. ... Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of liberty cannot be "reasonable, fair
or just" unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for
determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure
which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be
regarded as "reasonable, fair or just" and it would fall
foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article
21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what
would be the consequence if a person accused of an
offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be
deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a
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long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21."
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and
again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya v. State
of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671:
1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225:
1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court re-emphasised the
right to a speedy trial and further held that an accused,
facing a prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul Rehman
Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC
225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para 84)
"84. ... The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is,
thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as
the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable
promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large
majority of accused come from poorer and weaker
sections of society, not versed in the ways of law, where
they do not often get competent legal advice, the
application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of
course, in a given case, if an accused demands a speedy
trial and yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant
factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused
from complaining of infringement of his right to a speedy
trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a
speedy trial."
18. It was further held that if the State or any prosecuting
agency, including the Court concerned, has no wherewithal to
provide the right of speedy trial to the accused, then the bail should
not be opposed on the ground that the crime is serious. It was
observed at page 820:
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the court
concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect the
fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State
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or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea
for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious.
Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the
nature of the crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of criminal
jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent
until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, however
stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded, the
right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said to
have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the
Constitution.
19. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v. State
of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was observed:
7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried
trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to
prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an accused
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in "The
Ballad of Reading Gaol", wrote the following poignant lines
while being incarcerated:
"I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;
All that we know who be in jail
Is that the wall is strong;
And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long."
20. It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents and he is not entitled to bail on this consideration. This
submission will not help the State. It was laid down by the Hon'ble
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Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 3763: 2024: INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents may not be a
reason to deny bail to the accused in case of long incarceration. It
was observed:
"10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only one of
the several considerations for deciding the prayer for bail made by
him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a strong prima
facie case, depending upon the fact situation and period of
incarceration, the presence of antecedents may not be a ground to
deny bail. There may be a case where a Court can grant bail only on
the grounds of long incarceration. The presence of antecedents
may not be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may
grant default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused are
irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending upon the peculiar facts,
the Court can grant bail notwithstanding the existence of the
antecedents."
21. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and the
petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his furnishing
bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like
amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail,
the petitioner will abide by the following terms and conditions: -
(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will
he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.
(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every
hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing the
address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the
Police Station concerned and the Trial Court.
(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the
Court; and
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(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social
media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide
by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court
through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of
any change in the mobile number or social media
accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court
within five days from the date of the change.
22. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any
of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a
petition for cancellation of the bail.
23. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent of Nurpur, District
Kangra, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
24. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on
the case's merits.
25. A downloaded copy of this order shall be accepted by the
learned Trial Court while accepting the bail bonds from the
petitioner, and in case said Court intends to ascertain the veracity
of the downloaded copy of the order presented to it, the same may
be ascertained from the official website of this Court.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
21 August, 2025
(Pramod)
KARAN Digitally signed by
KARAN SINGH
Date: 2025.08.21
SINGH 13:59:30 +0530
