Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 14049 HP
Judgement Date : 18 September, 2024
2024:HHC:8925
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.626 of 2022
Date of Decision: 18.09.2024
__________________________________________________________________________
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Ilyas Ali .........Petitioner
Versus
Bhag Singh .......Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner: Dr. Rajesh Kumar Parmar, Advocate.
For the Respondent: None.
__________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 397 read
with Section 401 Cr.P.C., lays challenge to judgment dated 30.07.2022,
passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nalagarh, District Solan,
Himachal Pradesh, in Regd. CIS No.98 of 2019, titled Ilyas Ali Vs. Bhag
Singh, affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
09.08.2019/02.09.2019, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Nalagarh, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, in complaint No.400/3
of 2015, whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioner-
accused (hereinafter, "accused") guilty of having committed offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short
the "Act"), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of six months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.60,000/-
to the respondent-complainant.
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2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
that respondent-complainant (hereinafter, 'complainant') instituted a
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complaint under Section 138 of the Act, in the competent Court of law,
alleging therein that accused entered into an agreement dated 26.07.2014
with him to hire the tractor bearing No.HR-06-R-7975 along with loader @
Rs.2000/- per day. He alleged that agreement was reduced into writing
duly attested by Notary Public and with a view to discharge his lawful
liability, accused issued Cheque bearing No.528607 dated 04.07.2015
amounting to Rs.50,000/- drawn on State Bank of Patiala, Branch Bhagni,
Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh,
however, on presentation of aforesaid Cheque to the Bank concerned, the
same was dishonoured with the remarks "Insufficient Funds". After receipt
of aforesaid return memo, complainant served accused with a legal notice
through registered post, however, since petitioner-accused failed to make
the payment good within the time stipulated in the legal notice,
respondent/complainant was compelled to initiate proceedings under
Section 138 of the Act in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Nalagarh, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh.
3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated
09.08.2019/02.09.2019, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having
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committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted
and sentenced him, as per the description given hereinabove.
.
4. Though, at the first instance, accused preferred an appeal in
the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nalagarh, District Solan,
Himachal Pradesh, however, same was dismissed vide judgment dated
30.07.2022. In the aforesaid background, petitioner-accused has
approached this Court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein his
acquittal after setting aside the judgments of conviction recorded by the
Courts below. r
5. Vide order dated 22.11.2022, Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
stayed the substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below,
subject to petitioner/accused depositing 50% of the compensation amount,
however, fact remains that aforesaid order was never complied with.
Though, repeatedly matter was adjourned enabling the petitioner to deposit
the amount or to settle the matter with the complainant, but in vain.
6. Since petitioner/accused was not coming forward to impart
instructions, learned counsel representing the petitioner/accused
submitted during the proceedings of the case that case at hand be decided
on its own merits.
7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material adduced on record, vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgments, this Court sees no reason to agree with Dr. Rajesh Kumar
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Parmar, learned counsel representing the petitioner that Courts below have
fallen in grave error while appreciating the evidence, rather this Court finds
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that both the Courts below have meticulously dealt with each and every
aspect of the matter and there is no scope left for interference.
8. Though, Dr. Rajesh Kumar Parmar, learned counsel
representing the petitioner, while making this Court peruse evidence
adduced on record, attempted to argue that both the Courts below failed to
appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, but such submission of his
deserves outright rejection, being contrary to the record. Admittedly in the
case at hand, there is no dispute with regard to issuance of Cheque as well
as his signatures thereupon, rather, petitioner/accused while getting his
statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has categorically admitted
factum of his having issued Cheque as well his signatures thereupon, but
attempt came to be made to prove on his behalf that no amount was
payable. Since factum with regard to issuance of Cheque as well as his
signatures thereupon never came to be disputed by the petitioner, no
illegality can be said to have been committed by both the Courts below
while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which speak about
presumption in favour of the holder of the Cheque that Cheque was issued
towards discharge of a lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is
rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption, accused either can refer to the
documents and evidence led on record by the complainant or presumption
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can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if any. However, in the instant
case, despite sufficient opportunities, petitioner-accused failed to lead any
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evidence to probabilize the defence sought to be raised by putting certain
suggestions to the complainant in his cross-examination. Similarly, he was
unable to point out from the documents as well as evidence adduced on
record by the complainant that Cheque issued by him was not towards
discharge of lawful liability.
9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the Cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:-
"23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While
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Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to
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prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court
however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be
better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a
scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to
discharge an unduly high standard of proof". The Court
further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of
probabilities.
24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a
probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution
can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it
is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is
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not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant.
.
25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in
order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to
arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment
within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a rdishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was
lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory
presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of
this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has
been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground
to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy."
10. In the case at hand, complainant in order to prove his case
examined himself as CW-1. He filed affidavit Ex.CW1/A, reiterating therein
averments contained in the complaint. If cross-examination conducted
upon this witness is perused in its entirety, it can be safely concluded that
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accused was unable to extract something contrary to what this witness
stated in examination-in-chief. Though attempt came to be made at the
.
behest of accused to carve out a case that Cheque in question was not
issued towards discharge of lawful liability, but he was unable to dispute,
factum of his having executed agreement dated 26.07.2014, which was
allegedly executed inter se petitioner-accused and complainant for
transportation of sugarcane. As per aforesaid agreement, accused had
agreed to pay Rs.2000/- per day for transportation of sugarcane in the
tractor bearing No.HP-06-R-7975 owned by complainant. To partly
discharge the liability of rent qua tractor in question, accused issued
Cheque Ex.C1, but same on its presentation to Bank concerned came to be
dishonoured vide return memo Ex.C2 on account of insufficient funds in
the Bank account of the accused. Complainant successfully proved on
record that before initiating proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, he
had served accused with legal notice Ex.C2 calling upon him to make the
payment good within stipulated time. By placing on record postal receipts
and acknowledgment, Ex.C4 & Ex.C5, complainant successfully proved on
record that though legal notice was duly served upon accused, but he
neither paid the amount in dispute nor he replied to the same. Leaving
everything aside, accused failed to explain that in case he had no liability, if
any, towards complainant, why and under what circumstances, Cheque in
question was issued. Since factum with regard to issuance of Cheque as
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well as his signatures thereupon never came to be refuted, both the Courts
rightly held accused guilty of his having committed the offence punishable
.
under Section 138 of the Act, especially when Cheque in question issued by
him was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds.
11. Since factum of issuance of Cheque as well as his signatures
thereupon was never disputed, presumption as available under Section 118
and 139 of the Act rightly came to be invoked in the case of the petitioner
that Cheque in question was issued in discharge of lawful liability. Since no
evidence worth credence ever came to be led on record to rebut the
presumption, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the
Courts below while holding petitioner/accused of his having committed
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Though, no specific
defence ever came to be taken at the behest of the petitioner/accused that
Cheque in question was issued as a security, but even if it is presumed that
Cheque in question was issued as a security, that may not be of any help to
the accused, for the reason that by now, it is well settled that Cheque, if
any, issued as a 'security' can also be presented for encashment, if amount
taken or promised to be repaid is not paid.
12. Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State of
Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on
28.10.2021, has held as under:
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"16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every circumstance. 'Security' in its true sense is the
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state of being safe and the security given for a loan is
something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to
which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan
amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount, the cheque which is rissued as security would mature for presentation and the
drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other
provisions of N.I. Act would flow."
13. Needless to say, expression "Security cheque" is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather
same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on
record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable
Instruments Act does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a
"security cheque" to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would
not be maintainable as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the
cheque in question is issued, same would attract provision of Section 138
of the Act in case of its dishonour.
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14. Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record by the
respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients of Section
.
138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Since Cheque issued by accused
towards discharge of his lawful liability was returned on account of
insufficient funds in the bank account of accused and he despite having
received legal notice failed to make the payment good within the stipulated
time, complainant had no option but to institute proceedings under Section
138 of the Act, which subsequently rightly came to be decided by both the
Courts below on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on
record by the respective parties.
15. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C to re-appreciate the evidence, especially in view of
the concurrent findings of fact and law relied upon by the Courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex
Court in case "State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri" (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:-
"In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court
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nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own
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conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of
the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice."
16. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if
any, committed by the Courts below, while passing impugned judgments,
there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
17. True it is that the Hon'ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct
irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its
judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel
representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity
committed by the Courts below while appreciating the evidence and as
such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned
judgments passed by the Courts below.
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18. Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove as
well as law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
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reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the
Courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper
appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
19. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by
the learned trial Court, if not already served. Bail bonds of the petitioner
are cancelled and discharged accordingly. Interim direction, if any, stands
vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Sandeep Sharma), Judge September 18, 2024 (Rajeev Raturi)
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