Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 10.9.2024 vs Satpaul Singh And Another on 25 October, 2024
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 251 of 2015
Reserved on: 10.9.2024
Date of Decision: 25.10.2024
State of H.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Satpaul Singh and another ...Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Appellant : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General.
For the Respondents : Mr. Vijender Katoch, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 15.12.2014, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Indora, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide
which the respondents (accused before the learned Trial Court)
were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 324, 325, 427 and 451 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for
convenience)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused
persons before the learned Trial Court for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 325, 324, 323, 451 and 427
read with Section 34 of IPC. It was asserted that the informant
Resham Singh (PW1) was returning to his home on 2.8.2008.
Accused Satpal Singh (Ex-Pradhan) of Gram Panchayat Meelwan
called him and started abusing him without any reason. He also
slapped him. Teja Singh and Pawan Kumar rescued the informant
from the accused. On the same day, at about 6.00 pm, Satpaul
Singh, his son and another person, whose name was not known
to the informant, came to the informant's home and gave him
beatings. On 3.8.2008, at about 5.00 pm, the informant Resham
Singh (PW1) and his son Balwinder Singh (PW2) were returning
to their home in their vehicle bearing registration No. PB-54B-
5657, when accused Satpaul Singh, his son and two unknown
persons started pelting stones on the vehicle at Meelwan Petrol
Pump. The windscreen of the vehicle was damaged. When the
vehicle was stopped, the accused Satpaul Singh and another
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person attacked the informant party. Satpaul Singh was armed
with a darat and his son was armed with a stick. Balwinder Singh
suffered injuries on his left hand and back. The informant
suffered an injury on his left hand. The injured were taken to the
hospital. An intimation was given to the police. Chattar Singh
(PW8) went to the hospital. He filed an application (Ex.PW8/A) to
seek the opinion of the Doctor regarding the fitness of the
injured to make the statement. Dr. Randhir Singh (PW4) certified
that the injured was fit to make the statement. Chattar Singh
(PW8) recorded the statement (Ex.PW1/A) of informant Resham
Singh and sent it to the police station through HHC Surjeet Singh.
FIR (Ex.PW7/A) was registered in the police station. Dr. Randhir
Singh (PW4) conducted a medical examination of Balwinder
Singh and found injuries on his person. He referred him to a
Radiologist. Dr Raman Sharma (PW9) examined the X-ray of
Balwinder Singh and found the amputation of the phalanx of the
little finger. He issued the opinion (PW9/B). Dr Randhir Singh
(PW4) issued the MLC (Ex.PW4/A) showing that Balwinder had
suffered simple and grievous injuries. Dr. Randhir Singh also
examined Resham Singh (PW2) and found that he had suffered
simple injuries which could have been caused within six hours of
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the examination. He issued MLC (Ex.PW4/C). Chattar Singh
handed over the case file to Suresh Kumar (PW10) for further
investigation. Suresh Kumar seized a blood-stained undervest
(Ex. P1), and T-shirt (Ex. P4) vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). These were
put in a parcel and the parcel was sealed with seal impression 'A'.
Suresh Kumar went to the spot and prepared the site plan
(Ex.PW10/A). Resham Singh produced a blood-stained
undervest, which was put in a parcel and the parcel was sealed
with seal impression 'A'. Photographs of the spot (Ex. PX and PY)
were taken. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their
version and after the completion of the investigations, a challan
was prepared and presented before the Court.
3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 324, 325, 427,
and 451 read with Section 34 of IPC to which they pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined ten witnesses to prove its
case. Resham Singh (PW1) is the informant. Baljinder Singh
(PW2) is the victim. Jai Mal Singh (PW3), Pritam Chand (PW5)
and Balwinder Singh (PW6) are the eyewitnesses. Dr. Randhir
Singh (PW4) conducted the medical examination of the injured.
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Shakti Prashad (PW7) signed the FIR. Chattar Singh (PW8)
conducted the initial investigation. Raman Sharma (PW9) is the
Radiologist, who issued the X-ray report. Suresh Kumar (PW10)
conducted the investigation.
5. The accused in their statements recorded under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution case in its entirety.
They examined Chain Singh (DW1) and Gian Chand (DW2) in
defence.
6. The learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses did not support the prosecution case.
There were contradictions in the testimonies of the witnesses
which would make the prosecution case highly unreliable. There
was a delay in reporting the matter to the police for which no
explanation was provided. The accused had also sustained
injuries in the incident and these were not explained. Hence, the
accused were acquitted.
7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal
asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the
evidence properly. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses
were discarded for unsustainable reasons. There was sufficient
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material to establish the accusation against the accused. The
prosecution version was proved by the testimonies of the
witnesses, which was duly corroborated by medical evidence.
Learned Trial Court erred in relying upon the minor
contradictions to discard the prosecution version. Therefore, it
was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment
passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
8. I have heard Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned
Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr.
Vijender Katoch, learned counsel for the respondents/accused.
9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the appellant/State submitted that the learned Trial
Court erred in acquitting the accused. The prosecution case was
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The matter was reported to the
police on the same day and the learned Trial Court erred in
holding that there was a delay in reporting the matter to the
police. The statements of prosecution witnesses were duly
corroborated and this aspect was overlooked by the learned Trial
Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed
and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
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10. Mr. Vijender Katoch, learned counsel for the
respondents/accused supported the judgment passed by
the learned Trial Court and submitted that no interference is
required with it.
11. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment
of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544: 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 130 that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the High
Court should see whether the evidence was properly appreciated
on record or not; second whether the finding of the Court is
illegal or affected by the error of law or fact and thirdly; whether
the view taken by the Trial Court was a possible view, which
could have been taken based on the material on record. The Court
will not lightly interfere with the judgment of acquittal. It was
observed:
"25. We may first discuss the position of law regarding the
scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For, that is the
foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of
criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused unless proven guilty.
The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and
finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in
acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretised
when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the
trial court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds
that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets
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strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to rebut
the same in appeal.
26. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal and
there is no quarrel about that. It is also beyond doubt that
in the exercise of appellate powers, there is no inhibition
on the High Court to reappreciate or re-visit the evidence
on record. However, the power of the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence is a qualified power, especially
when the order under challenge is of acquittal. The first
and foremost question to be asked is whether the trial
court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record and
gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence.
The second point for consideration is whether the finding
of the trial court is illegal or affected by an error of law or
fact. If not, the third consideration is whether the view
taken by the trial court is a fairly possible view. A decision
of acquittal is not meant to be reversed on a mere
difference of opinion. What is required is an illegality or
perversity.
27. It may be noted that the possibility of two views in a
criminal case is not an extraordinary phenomenon. The
"two-views theory" has been judicially recognised by the
courts and it comes into play when the appreciation of
evidence results in two equally plausible views. However,
the controversy is to be resolved in favour of the accused.
For, the very existence of an equally plausible view in
favour of the innocence of the accused is in itself a
reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover,
it reinforces the presumption of innocence. Therefore,
when two views are possible, following the one in favour
of the innocence of the accused is the safest course of
action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the view of the
trial court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is
not open for the High Court to convict the accused by
reappreciating the evidence. If such a course is
permissible, it would make it practically impossible to
settle the rights and liabilities in the eye of the law.
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28. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka [Selvaraj v. State of
Karnataka, (2015) 10 SCC 230: (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 19]: (SCC
pp. 236-37, para 13)
"13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and
on an appraisal of the evidence, in our considered view,
the view taken by the trial court was a possible one.
Thus, the High Court should not have interfered with
the judgment of acquittal. This Court in Jagan M.
Seshadri v. State of T.N. [Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N.,
(2002) 9 SCC 639: 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494] has laid down
that as the appreciation of evidence made by the trial
court while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view,
it is not permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty of
the High Court while reversing the acquittal has been
dealt with by this Court, thus : (SCC p. 643, para 9)
'9. ... We are constrained to observe that the
High Court was dealing with an appeal against
acquittal. It was required to deal with various
grounds on which acquittal had been based
and to dispel those grounds. It has not done
so. Salutary principles while dealing with
appeal against acquittal have been overlooked
by the High Court. If the appreciation of
evidence by the trial court did not suffer from
any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out
in the impugned judgment, the order of
acquittal could not have been set aside. The
view taken by the learned trial court was a
reasonable view and even if by any stretch of
imagination, it could be said that another view
was possible, that was not a ground sound
enough to set aside an order of acquittal.'"
29. In Sanjeev v. State of H.P. [Sanjeev v. State of H.P., (2022)
6 SCC 294: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 522], the Hon'ble Supreme
Court analysed the relevant decisions and summarised the
approach of the appellate court while deciding an appeal
from the order of acquittal. It observed thus: (SCC p. 297,
para 7)
"7. It is well settled that:
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7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal,
the reasons which had weighed with the trial court
in acquitting the accused must be dealt with, in case
the appellate court is of the view that the acquittal
rendered by the trial court deserves to be upturned
(see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka [Vijay
Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 :
(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586] and Anwar Ali v. State of
H.P. [Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 166 :
(2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 395] ).
7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the
normal presumption of innocence in a criminal
matter gets reinforced (see Atley v. State of
U.P. [Atley v. State of U.P., 1955 SCC OnLine SC 51: AIR
1955 SC 807]).
7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence
on record, the appellate court must be extremely
slow in interfering with the appeal against
acquittal (see Sambasivan v. State of
Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5
SCC 412: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320])."
12. The present appeal has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
13. As per the prosecution case, three incidents had taken
place. The first incident took place when the informant was
returning to his home and was abused by accused Satpaul;
the second incident took place in the house of the informant
when Satpaul Singh and another person entered the informant's
house and gave him beatings. In the third incident, the informant
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Resham Singh (PW1) and Balwinder Singh (PW2) were attacked
on 3.8.2008 at about 5.00 PM at Meelwan Petrol Pump.
14. Statement (PW1/A) reads that Teja Singh and Pawan
Kumar rescued the informant from Satpaul during the first
incident. Resham Singh (PW1) stated that Pawan Kumar and Teja
Singh rescued him and sent him to his home. Pawan Kumar and
Teja Singh were not examined as witnesses before the learned
Trial Court and there is no corroboration to the testimony of the
informant regarding the first incident.
15. The prosecution examined Jaimal Singh (PW3) to
corroborate the informant's version of the first incident. He
stated that he had gone to Meelwan Bazar on 2.8.2008 at about
4.00-5:00 PM to bring medicine. Resham Singh (PW1) sent him
to bring tea where he met Satpaul. Satpal inquired about Resham
and he replied that Resham was sitting in the shop of Doctor.
Satpal asked Jai Mal to call Resham, on which he called Resham.
Both of them started talking to each other. Satpaul started
abusing Resham and gave him beatings. He (Jaimal) rescued the
informant and took him to his home.
16. The statement of this witness is quite contradictory to
the prosecution's version. As per the informant, he was returning
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from his field when he met accused Satpaul who started abusing
him without any reason. The informant nowhere stated that he
was sitting in the shop of the Doctor from where he was called by
Resham and the incident started thereafter. Jaimal Singh
admitted in his cross-examination that he is a driver of Resham
Singh. He explained that he was present at the bazaar and he
wanted to purchase the medicine. He has not given the details of
the medicine to be purchased by him or the name of the Doctor
who had prescribed the medicines. He is known to the informant
and falls within the definition of a chance witness. It was laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Yadav v. State of
U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150 that the
testimony of a chance witness is to be seen with due care and
caution. It was observed:
Chance witness
29. A chance witness is one who happens to be at the place
of occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not
as a matter of course. In other words, he is not expected to
be in the said place. A person walking on a street
witnessing the commission of an offence can be a chance
witness. Merely because a witness happens to see an
occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed
though a little more scrutiny may be required at times.
This again is an aspect which is to be looked into in a given
case by the court. We do not wish to reiterate the aforesaid
position of law which has been clearly laid down by this
Court in State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy [State of
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A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy, (2003) 12 SCC 660: 2005 SCC
(Cri) 817]: (SCC pp. 665-66, paras 12-13)
"12. Criticism was levelled against the evidence of PWs
4 and 9 who are independent witnesses by labelling
them as chance witnesses. The criticism about PWs 4
and 9 being chance witnesses is also without any
foundation. They have clearly explained as to how they
happened to be at the spot of occurrence and the trial
court and the High Court have accepted the same.
13. Coming to the plea of the accused that PWs 4 and 9
were "chance witnesses" who have not explained how
they happened to be at the alleged place of occurrence,
it has to be noted that the said witnesses were
independent witnesses. There was not even a
suggestion to the witnesses that they had any
animosity towards any of the accused. In a murder trial
by describing the independent witnesses as "chance
witnesses" it cannot be implied thereby that their
evidence is suspicious and their presence at the scene
doubtful. Murders are not committed with previous
notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder
is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the
house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in
a street, only passers-by will be witnesses. Their
evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with
suspicion on the ground that they are mere "chance
witnesses". The expression "chance witness" is
borrowed from countries where every man's home is
considered his castle and everyone must have an
explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another
man's castle. It is quite unsuitable an expression in a
country where people are less formal and more casual,
at any rate in the matter explaining their presence."
30. The principle was reiterated by this Court in Jarnail
Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107]: (SCC p. 725, paras
21-23)
"21. In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. [Sachchey
Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) 11 SCC 410: 2004 SCC
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(Cri) Supp 105] this Court while considering the
evidentiary value of the chance witness in a case of
murder which had taken place in a street and a
passer-by had deposed that he had witnessed the
incident, observed as under:
If the offence is committed in a street only a
passer-by will be the witness. His evidence
cannot be brushed aside lightly or viewed with
suspicion on the ground that he was a mere
chance witness. However, there must be an
explanation for his presence there.
The Court further explained that the expression
"chance witness" is borrowed from countries where
every man's home is considered his castle and
everyone must have an explanation for his presence
elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite
unsuitable an expression in a country like India
where people are less formal and more casual, at any
rate in the matter of explaining their presence.
22. The evidence of a chance witness requires a very
cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness
must adequately explain his presence at the place of
occurrence (Satbir v. Surat Singh [Satbir v. Surat
Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 192: 1997 SCC (Cri) 538], Harjinder
Singh v. State of Punjab [Harjinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2004) 11 SCC 253: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp
28], Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of
Kerala [Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of
Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 241]
and Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh [Sarvesh
Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 :
(2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 188] ). Deposition of a chance
witness whose presence at the place of incident
remains doubtful should be discarded
(vide Shankarlal v. State of
Rajasthan [Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10
SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579] ).
23. Conduct of the chance witness, subsequent to the
incident may also be taken into consideration
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particularly as to whether he has informed anyone
else in the village about the incident
(vide Thangaiya v. State of T.N. [Thangaiya v. State of
T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 650: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1284]).
Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) met the informant
Darshan Singh (PW 4) before lodging the FIR and
the fact of conspiracy was not disclosed by
Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) and Darshan Singh (PW 4).
The fact of conspiracy has not been mentioned in
the FIR. Hakam Singh, the other witness on this
issue has not been examined by the prosecution.
Thus, the High Court was justified in discarding the
part of the prosecution case relating to conspiracy.
However, in the fact situation of the present case,
the acquittal of the said two co-accused has no
bearing, so far as the present appeal is concerned."
17. In the present case, the name of Jaimal Singh was not
mentioned by the informant before the police or the Court,
therefore, his presence on the spot is highly suspect. He has
given an entirely different version regarding the incident; hence,
it is difficult to rely upon his testimony to hold that he had
witnessed the incident and his testimony regarding the first
incident has to be discarded.
18. Statement (Ex.PW1/A) also shows that the accused,
his son and another person came to the house of the informant
Resham Singh and gave him beatings. The name of the third
person was not mentioned in the complaint. The informant
stated on oath that he was beaten by Satpaul, his son and two
persons. He was rescued by Pritam Chand and Jaimal Singh.
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Significantly, the names of Pritam Chand and Jaimal Singh were
not mentioned by him before the police and their presence on the
spot has to be viewed with suspicion.
19. Jaimal Singh (PW3) stated that at about 6.00 PM,
Satpaul and his son visited the informant's house and gave him
beatings. He tried to rescue the informant but was unsuccessful.
Pritam Chand and Pawan Kumar also reached the spot and
rescued the informant from the accused.
20. Pritam Chand (PW5) stated that he was going towards
his field on 2.8.2008 at about 6.00 PM. He heard the noise from
the house of informant Resham Singh. He went inside and saw
that the accused were beating Resham Singh. Resham was lying
in the verandah and the accused were beating him. The driver of
Resham was trying to rescue him. Pradhan Pawan also reached
the spot with Teja who took the accused to their home.
21. The testimonies of these witnesses are not
satisfactory. As per the informant, accused Satpaul, his son and
one unknown person visited his home and gave him beatings.
Jaimal and Pritam Chand, on the other hand, only mentioned
the accused Satpaul and his son. They omitted the presence of the
unknown person. Further Jaimal and Pritam Chand stated about
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the arrival of Pawan and Teja whose names were not mentioned
by the informant either in the statement on oath or in the initial
statement made to the police. Therefore, it is difficult to rely
upon the testimonies of Jaimal and Pritam Chand regarding the
second incident.
22. The prosecution also relied upon the statement of
Baljinder to whom the incident was narrated by his father
Resham, however, the said statement is hearsay and does not fall
within the purview of Section 156 of the Indian Evidence Act as
there is nothing to show that the statement was made at or
around the time when the incident had taken place. Therefore,
the statement of Baljinder Singh cannot be relied upon to
corroborate the testimony of Resham Singh.
23. Resham Singh (PW1) stated that he and his son were
returning to their home in the vehicle bearing registration No.
PB-54B-5657. Satpaul pelted stones on the windscreen. When
the informant and his son got out of the vehicle, Satpaul, his son
and two other people attacked him and his son. Baljinder was
injured by the blow of Darat. Resham tried to run away but his
thumb was amputated. Satpaul had darati with him.
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24. Baljinder Singh (PW2) stated that when they reached
near Petrol Pump, the accused pelted stones on the car and
damaged the windscreen at about 4.00 PM. When the informant
party got down, the accused gave them beatings. They had darati
and sticks. Baljinder sustained injuries on his hand, waist and
back. Pawan Kumar and Balwinder rescued him.
25. Balwinder Singh (PW6) stated that when he reached
Meelwan Patrol Pump at 4.00 PM, he saw that a scuffle was going
on. Satpaul and his son were beating Resham Singh. Many people
gathered to rescue the informant party and sent them to their
respective homes.
26. Significantly, this witness has not stated anything
about the use of the sickle/darati. He has only stated that Satpaul
and his son were beating Resham Singh. He stated in his cross-
examination that Satpaul was armed with an iron rod and his son
was armed with the kirpan, which is entirely different from the
version of the informant and his son that Satpaul has
darat/darathi and his son has a stick. He has also not deposed
about the presence of two unknown persons or beatings being
given to Baljinder son of Satpaul.
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27. Suresh Kumar (PW0) visited the spot and prepared
the site plan (Ex.PW10/A). The site plan nowhere mentions that
any broken pieces of glass were found by him on the spot to
corroborate the prosecution version that the accused had pelted
stones at the car of the informant due to which the windscreen
was shattered. Even the photographs (Ex. PX and Ex. PY) do not
show any shattered pieces of windscreen. Even though some
coloured pieces of glass probably of the indicator are visible in
the photographs. It is nobody's version that the indicator was
damaged, therefore, these photographs do not corroborate the
prosecution's version.
28. Chain Singh (DW1) proved the FIR (Ex.DA lodged at
the instance of Satpaul Singh, in which it was mentioned that at
4.00 PM, on 3.8.2008 Resham Singh, his son Baljinder and other
persons had given beatings to Satpaul Singh. Rajinder and
Baljinder were armed with gandasi and other persons were
armed with sticks. They attacked the accused. The accused
sustained injuries. Bachan Lal, the owner of the dhaba, tried to
rescue and he also suffered injuries in the incident. Thus, as per
the defence version, the incident had taken place near the dhaba
of Bachan at 4.00 PM. Balwinder Singh also stated that
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the incident had occurred at about 4.00 PM, which corroborates
the defence version regarding the incident having taken place at
4.00 PM and not the prosecution version that the incident had
taken place at 5.00 PM.
29. Baljinder Singh (PW2) admitted in his cross-
examination that the incident had taken place at Milwan Bus
Stand which is quite distinct from Milwan Petrol Pump because
the site plan (Ex.PW10/A) does not show any bus stand near the
petrol pump.
30. Dr Randhir Singh (PW4) conducted the medical
examination of Satpaul Singh and found 11 injuries on his person
which could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon. The
informant and his son denied that they had attacked the accused
but they have not provided any explanation about the injuries
sustained by the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Parshuram v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1416 that failure to explain the injuries caused by the sharp-
edged weapon sustained by the accused is an important
circumstance. It was observed: -
"31. We do not find the said observation of the trial court
correct. The injuries sustained by Ramrup @ Roopa are by
a sharp weapon. It will be trite to refer to the following
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observations of this Court in the case of Lakshmi
Singh v. State of Bihar (1976) 4 SCC 394:
"12. ....... It seems to us that in a murder case, the non-
explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at
about the time of the occurrence or in the course of
the altercation is a very important circumstance from
which the court can draw the following inferences:
"(1) that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis
and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not
presented the true version;
(2) that the witnesses who have denied the presence
of the injuries on the person of the accused are lying
on the most material point and therefore their
evidence is unreliable;
(3) that in case there is a defence version which
explains the injuries on the person of the accused it
is rendered probable so as to throw doubt on the
prosecution case."
The omission on the part of the prosecution to explain
the injuries on the person of the accused assumes much
greater importance where the evidence consists of
interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence
gives a version which competes in probability with that
of the prosecution one. In the instant case, when it is
held, as it must be, that the appellant Dasrath Singh
received serious injuries which have not been explained
by the prosecution, then it will be difficult for the court
to rely on the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 and 6, more
particularly, when some of these witnesses have lied by
stating that they did not see any injuries on the person
of the accused. Thus, neither the Sessions Judge nor the
High Court appears to have given due consideration to
this important lacuna or infirmity appearing in the
prosecution case. We must hasten to add that as held by
this Court in State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima [(1975) 2 SCC
7: 1975 SCC (Cri) 384] there may be cases where the
non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may
not affect the prosecution case. This principle would
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obviously apply to cases where the injuries sustained by
the accused are minor and superficial or where the
evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and
disinterested, so probable, consistent and
creditworthy, that it far outweighs the effect of the
omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the
injuries. The present, however, is certainly not such a
case, and the High Court was, therefore, in error in
brushing aside this serious infirmity in the prosecution
case on unconvincing premises."
32. A similar view with regard to non-explanation of
injuries has been taken by this Court in the cases of State of
Rajasthan v. Madho 1991 Supp (2) SCC 396, State of
M.P. v. Mishrilal (Dead) (2003) 9 SCC
426, Nagarathinam v. State Represented by Inspector of
Police (2006) 9 SCC 57 and recently in the case of Nand Lal
v. State of Chhattisgarh 2023 SCC OnLine SC 262
33. Undisputedly, in the present case also, the witnesses
are interested witnesses. The injuries sustained by three
accused persons are not at all explained. The trial court
and the High Court have not considered this aspect of the
matter.
34. Non-explanation of injuries on the persons of the
accused would create doubt, as to, whether, the
prosecution has brought on record the real genesis of the
incident or not. Undisputedly, as observed hereinabove, a
cross-case was also registered against the complainant
party for the injuries sustained by the accused persons."
31. In the present case, the failure to provide any
explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused, the absence
of the pieces of the windscreen and the difference in time and the
place would make it difficult to rely upon the prosecution's
version that the third incident had taken place in the manner
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suggested by the informant and not in the manner suggested by
the defence.
32. The weapon of offence was not recovered in the
present case. Therefore, there is no corroboration to the
testimony of the informant and his son that the injuries noticed
by the Medical Officer could have been caused using the
darat/darati or the stick.
33. The first and second incidents took place on 2.8.2008.
The matter was reported to the police on the next day. No
explanation was provided for the delay in reporting the matter to
the police and the learned Trial Court was justifying in holding
that the non-explanation of the delay will make the prosecution
case suspect. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P.
(1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to
embellishments, concoction and fabrication and therefore the
court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and
caution in case of delay. It was observed:
"FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is
a vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of
appreciating the evidence led at the trial. The object of
insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the
earliest information regarding the circumstance in which
the crime was committed, including the names of the
actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons,
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if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any.
Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment,
which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the
delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of
spontaneity, but danger also creeps in the introduction of
a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to
determine whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is
alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for
certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of
the copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder
case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by
the Magistrate late it can give rise to an inference that the
FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been
recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a
satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or
receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The
prosecution has led no evidence at all in this behalf. The
second external check equally important is the sending of
a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its
reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest,
prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a
statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution
case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements
recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the
report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact
that the prosecution story was still in an embryo state and
had not been given any shape and that the FIR came to be
recorded later on after due deliberations and consultations
and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a
promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the
infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and
authenticity and it appears to us that the same has been
ante-timed and had not been recorded till the inquest
proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8."
34. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs. State of
Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: -
"12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the
prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first
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information report because of the possibility of a
concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the
delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the
matter on merits without giving much importance to such
delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the
explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts
and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned
if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any
motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren
Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1]."
35. Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable
view which could have been taken based on the material placed
before it. Such a view cannot be interfered with while hearing an
appeal against the acquittal and no interference is required with
the judgment of the learned Trial Court.
36. No other point was urged.
37. Consequently, the present appeal fails and the same is
dismissed.
38. Registry is directed to send down the records of the
case to the learned Trial Court forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
25th October, 2024
(Chander)
