Himachal Pradesh High Court

Reserved On: 12.9.2024 vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 21 October, 2024

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MMO No. 890 of 2022 Reserved on: 12.9.2024 Date of Decision: 21.10.2024.

Surjeet Singh and another ...Petitioners

Versus

Central Bureau of Investigation ...Respondent

Coram Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Vinod Thakur, Advocate.

For the Respondent : Mr. Rajinder Thakur, Central Government Counsel.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner have filed the present petition for

quashing of FIR No. RC0962016A0005, dated 28.6.2016,

registered by CBI, Shimla and the proceedings in Criminal Case

No. 358 of 2021, titled Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) Vs.

Surjeet Singh, pending before learned Special Judicial

Magistrate, CBI, Shimla, H.P. for the commission of offences

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 465, 468 and 471 of IPC

and summoning order dated 24.11.2021, arising out of the FIR.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petition are that CBI received an intimation from reliable

sources that Om Gauri Dutt Sharma committed gross

misconduct by unauthorized dealing and processing proposals

of the alleged distributors seeking permission for telecast of

Hindi feature films, telefilms and Hindi films songs from

Doordarshan Kendra, Shimla w.e.f. 2007 till 2012. He also made

unauthorized payments to the distributors. A joint surprise

check was conducted at Doordarshan Kendra, Shimla on

10.6.2016 and the documents related to the telecast of Hindi

feature films, telefilms and Hindi film songs from 2007 to 2012

were collected. It was found from the scrutiny of the record that

any distributor could submit a proposal to Doordarshan for

the telecast of Hindi films upon his registration with

Doordarshan and depositing a non-refundable fee of ₹15,000/-.

Surjeet Singh distributor of M/s Expert Pictures and

Smt. Pushpinder Kaur distributor of M/s Amba Shree Films

(India) submitted the proposals which were approved by Om Gauri

Dutt Sharma; however, they were not registered with Doordarshan

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and they had not deposited the non-refundable fees of

₹15,000/-. Om Gauri Dutt Sharma allowed Hindi film songs and

telefilms of M/s Expert Pictures and M/s Amba Shree Films

(India) to be telecasted without proper agreement and complete

documents. A copy of the link agreement duly notarized on

stamp paper, a notarized copy of censor certificate, synopsis,

DVD/VCD/VHS software for preview, indemnity bond, affidavit,

publicity material, award certificate/jubilee certificate,

newspaper clippings of press review and photocopy of PAN Card

were required to be submitted with the proposal. The documents

submitted by M/s Expert Pictures and M/s Amba Shree Films

(India) were incomplete. The link agreement with the original

producers was for theatrical rights only. Om Gauri Dutt Sharma

allowed Hindi Feature Films, telefilms and Hindi songs to be

telecast based on unauthorized agreements. The proposal for

the telecast of Hindi Feature Film was to be accompanied by

a non-refundable processing fee of ₹10,000/- per film by way of

a bank draft in favour of Prasar Bharti. Verification revealed that

no such payment was made by the distributors and no bank

details were furnished with any of the proposals. The payments

were released without completing the formalities. Om Gauri

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Dutt Sharma was aware of the revised guidelines for Hindi

Feature Film framed in the year 2007. The guidelines bearing

the signatures of Om Gauri Dutt Sharma were taken in

possession. As per the guidelines, approval for the telecast of

a Hindi feature film was to be obtained from New Delhi whereas

Om Gauri Dutt Sharma himself accepted, processed and granted

permission for the telecast of Hindi films without bringing it to

the knowledge of authorized officers of Doordarshan, New Delhi

for approval. The proposals submitted by other distributors

seemed to be prepared and submitted by the alleged distributors

as the same mistakes were found in various documents. Om

Gauri Dutt Sharma showed undue favours to M/s Expert Pictures

and M/s Amba Shree Films by violating the conditions. He

caused significant pecuniary benefit to the distributors and

pecuniary loss to the producers of the films. The distributors, in

conspiracy with Om Gauri Dutt Sharma, cheated Doordarshan.

Payments of ₹50.00 lacs were made to M/s Expert Pictures and

M/s Amba Shree Films (India) between 2007 and 2012 without

following the guidelines and based on false and incomplete

documents. CBI registered the FIR and conducted the

investigation. It was found after the investigation that the

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proposals did not annex the document showing that M/s Expert

Pictures, M/s Amba Shree Films (India) Ltd. and M/s Tridev

Media had telecast rights from the original producer of the film

or that they were the sole distributor or

sub-distributor/territorial distributor of the films. Indemnity

bonds signed by Surjeet Singh-petitioner, Pushpinder Kaur-

petitioner were not signed by the witnesses. Indemnity bond and

affidavit produced by M/s Expert Pictures, M/s Amba Shree

Films India and M/s Tridev Media had no date leaving space for

manipulation by Doordarshan Kendra officials. It was the joint

responsibility of the Programme Executive and Director to check

whether the indemnity bonds were duly signed and dated by the

parties and the witnesses. Letters sent to the General Secretary,

NIMPA were altered and forged copies were submitted to

Doordarshan Kendra Shimla along with the proposal. The forged

letter was attested by Mr Jaideep Kohli and in one case by Mr.

Avtar Singh. Government Examiner of Questioned Documents

(GEQD) Shimla gave a positive opinion about the forgery of the

documents. He opined that altered photocopies of the original

letters/documents were submitted to Doordarshan Kendra,

Shimla for claiming fake TV rights of the movies. The changes

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made in the letters addressed to the General Secretary, NIMPA

were similar, indicating that changes were made by a single

person namely Surjeet Singh. There was a striking resemblance

in all cases like changing the name of the General Secretary,

NIMPA to the concerned party and the addition of 16 mm

Doordarshan rights. Surjeet Singh had received a total amount

of ₹9,60,000/- after deducting 10% tax. He had taken

₹8,64,000/- for telecasting the movies. Om Gauri Dutt Sharma

failed to verify whether the persons submitting the proposal for

the telecast of movies had rights or not. The concerned

Programme Executive should have checked the documents

before processing the movie on file for the telecast. There was

documentary evidence to show that the proposal for the telecast

of the film was approved in the proposal register after

the telecast of the movie. Two movies were telecast without any

processing. Surjeet Singh altered the documents to give the

impression that the party from whom he had purchased

Doordarshan rights had those rights. He was handling the work

of two firms namely M/s Amba Shree and M/s Tridev Media

which were opened in the name of Pushpinder Kaur and Jagjeet

Kaur. The distributors who claimed to have sold the territorial

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rights did not have those rights. The favour was shown to

private persons in the telecast of Hindi films. The matter

regarding the telecast of Hindi films was being examined by the

Vigilance Wing of Doordarshan and the case was required to be

kept open. Offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code

(IPC0 and Prevention of Corruption Act were made out against

Gauri Dutt Sharma, V.K. Mahindru and Dhara Saraswati but the

competent authority declined to grant sanction for prosecution.

Hence, the charge sheet was filed against nine accused for the

commission of various offences under the Indian Penal Code

(IPC) and Prevention of Corruption Act.

3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the FIR and

filing of the charge sheet, the petitioners have filed the present

petition for quashing of the FIR and the consequent

proceedings. It was asserted that the allegations levelled against

the petitioners are manifestly attended with mala fide and

proceedings were maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive

for wreaking vengeance on the petitioners. The allegations are

vague. Sweeping statements were made without any foundation.

The concerned officer namely Anuj Kumar, who had processed

the movies, was not made an accused. Devinder Kumar,

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the Programme Executive, who verified the documents was also

not arrayed as an accused. This shows that the documents were

correct. Om Gauri Dutt Sharma was also not arrayed an accused.

The petitioners were made scapegoats and a false case was made

against them. The distributors admitted in their statements

under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. that they had supplied the

registration letter along with the agreement executed between

the distributors and the producers to the petitioners. There is no

proof of any forgery. The forgery, if any, was committed by the

distributor who had supplied the documents to the petitioners.

Many other persons had supplied movies to be telecast at

Doordarshan Kendra, Shimla. They were not arrayed as accused

even though they had followed the same procedure as was

followed by the petitioners. The distributors were running

cinema halls at Jallandhar and the petitioners were under the

impression that they had copyright of the films. The petitioners

were wrongly arrayed as accused before the Court in connivance

with the CBI. Petitioners applied for registration after fulfilling

all the terms and conditions. ₹15,000/- per month was released

to the petitioner out of which they paid ₹13,000/- to the

distributors. Allegations made in the FIR, even if they are taken

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to be correct at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do

not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. The

continuation of the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in

futility and no fruitful purpose would be served by the same. The

FIR was registered after nine years. Therefore, it was prayed that

the FIR be quashed.

4. I have heard Mr Sanjeev Bhushan, learned Senior

Advocate, instructed by Mr Vinod Thakur, learned counsel for

the petitioners/accused and Mr Rajinder Thakur, learned Central

Government Counsel for the respondent/CBI.

5. Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, learned Senior Advocate for the

petitioners submitted that the petitioners were arrayed as

accused as scapegoats. The officials of the Doordarshan were not

charge-sheeted before the Court. There was no cheating because

the petitioners had not made any representation but had relied

upon the representation made by Doordarshan Kendra inviting

the tenders for the telecast of the films. There is no proof of

forgery and the forgery, if any, was committed by the

distributors who were not arrayed as parties. Therefore, he

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prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be

quashed.

6. Mr. Rajinder Thakur, learned Central Government

Counsel for the respondent/CBI submitted that there is

sufficient material on record to show that forgery was

committed by the petitioners in connivance with the officials of

Doordarshan. Simply because the permission was not granted by

the competent authority to prosecute the Doordarshan officials

is no reason to discharge the petitioners. The material on record

clearly shows that the petitioner had forged the documents. This

fact has been verified by the report of GEQD. Therefore, he

prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

8. The parameters for exercising jurisdiction under

Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339, wherein it

was observed: -

"9. The law with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to quash complaints and criminal proceedings has been succinctly summarized by

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this Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited (2006) 6 SCC 736: 2006 INSC 452 after considering the earlier precedents. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in the said case, which read thus:

"12. The principles relating to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few-- Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194: 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045], State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164: 1996 SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259: 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269: 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645: 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122: 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:

(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused.

For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or

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genuineness of the allegations in the complaint is warranted while examining prayer for quashing a complaint.

(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.

(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.

(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are necessary for making out the offence. (v.) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not."

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9. Similar is the judgment in Maneesha Yadav v. State of

U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held: -

"12. We may gainfully refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1990 INSC 363:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence

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collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and

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that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."

10. The allegations against the petitioners are that they

had forged the documents and submitted them to Doordarshan

Kendra showing that they had the right to telecast the film,

whereas they had no such right. The alteration was also verified

by the report of GEQD. A copy of the report of the Central

Forensic Science Laboratory has also been filed which shows

that the signatures are superimposed on the signatures in the

enclosed portion, which is not possible in the case of two freely

written genuine signatures executed in normal course with

neuro muscular action. This clearly shows that the signatures

were not put on the documents but they were superimposed.

This report prima facie shows that the documents bearing the

signatures did not bear the signatures of the persons who were

stated to have put them but they were put by the process of

superimposition. Hence, prima facie, the documents are shown

to be forged.

11. The statement of Amitabh Nalin Kumar Gupta was

recorded by the Central Bureau of Investigation in which he

stated that only theatrical rights of three movies were given to

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M/s A.J. Films, Jallandhar by Mr. J.P. Dutta. Similarly, the

terrestrial rights of the movie 'Hum' were not given to any other

party. Mr. J.P. Dutta, the producer of the movies stated that he

had not been given any rights to telecast the movies produced by

him through Doordarshan Kendra, Shimla. Mr. Anil Dabra stated

that he had not issued any letter to Sunny Movie. Bonnie Kapoor,

another producer stated that terrestrial rights of the movies

produced by him were assigned to M/s C.A. Corporation, M/s

Option-I and M/s S.K. Film Enterprises. K. Ananda Shankar

stated that the terrestrial rights of one movie were assigned to

M/s Mima Cinevision. These statements prima facie show that

Doordarshan rights were not assigned to any person and a false

representation was made to Doordarshan Kendra by the

petitioners that they had a right to telecast the movies on

Doordarshan. Doordarshan Kendra Shimla also acted on the

representation and allowed the movies to be telecast on its

network. Doordarshan Kendra Shimla would not have done so

but for the representation made by the petitioners. Thus, a prima

facie case of cheating is made out against the petitioners.

12. It was submitted that the film producers had not filed

a complaint and the CBI was not competent to initiate

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proceedings without their complaint. This submission is not

acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Ratanlal v. Prahlad Jat, (2017) 9 SCC 340: (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 729:

2017 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that the concept of locus standi is alien to

criminal law and anybody can set the criminal law in motion. It

was observed at page 345:

"9. However, criminal trial is conducted largely by following the procedure laid down in CrPC. Locus standi of the complaint is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. Anyone can set the criminal law in motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. This general principle is founded on a policy that an offence, that is an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force, is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against the society. Therefore, in respect of such offences which are treated against the society, it becomes the duty of the State to punish the offender. In A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak [A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500: 1984 SCC (Cri) 277], a Constitution Bench of this Court has considered this aspect as under: (SCC pp. 508-09, para 6) "6. ... In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force [see Section 2(n) CrPC] is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is

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interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for the larger good of society, the right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a straitjacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception."

10. In Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand [Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand, (2001) 5 SCC 407: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1322], this Court has held that the doctrine of locus standi is totally foreign to criminal jurisprudence. To punish an offender in the event of commission of an offence is to subserve a social need. Society cannot afford to have a criminal escape his liability since that would bring about a state of social pollution which is neither desired nor warranted and this is irrespective of the concept of locus.

11. In Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham [Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham, (1979) 2 SCC 297: 1979 SCC (Cri) 454], this Court has considered the competence of a private party, as distinguished from the State to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution against a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. It was held that appellate power vested in the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution is not to be confused with ordinary appellate power exercised by appellate courts and Appellate Tribunals under specific statutes. Article 136 of the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with a plenitude of plenary, appellate power over all courts and tribunals in India. The power is plenary in the

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sense that there are no words in Article 136 itself qualifying that power. But, the very nature of the power has led the Court to set limits to itself within which it has to exercise such power. The power is vested in the Supreme Court but the right to invoke the Court's jurisdiction is vested in no one. The exercise of the power of the Supreme Court is not circumscribed by any limitation as to who may invoke it. The Court found that the judgment of acquittal by the High Court has led to a serious miscarriage of justice. Therefore, it was held that the Supreme Court cannot refrain from doing its duty and abstain from interfering on the ground that a private party and not the State has invoked the Court's jurisdiction.

13. Therefore, there was no necessity for the producers

to make a complaint before the Court and the FIR cannot be

quashed on the ground that no complaint was filed by the

producers of the film.

14. It was submitted that the petitioners were cheated by

M/s Sunny Movies and other persons who claimed that they had

a right to broadcast the movies over the Doordarshan network.

This is a matter of trial. Prima facie it is established on record

that the movies were telecast without any rights and these

movies were supplied by the petitioners; hence, the petitioners

are prima facie liable.

15. Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioners wanted this Court to analyze the evidence to

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determine the correctness of the allegations made in the FIR.

This exercise cannot be undertaken by the Court under Section

482 of Cr.P.C. The Court exercising jurisdiction under Section

482 of Cr.P.C. is only concerned with the prima facie case and the

truthfulness or otherwise of its contents is a matter of trial to be

determined by the learned Trial Court. It was laid down by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Jaiswal vs. State of Jharkhand,

2024 SCC OnLine SC 685 that the Court exercises extra-ordinary

jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and cannot conduct a

mini-trial or enter into an appreciation of an evidence of a

particular case. It was observed:-

"13. We say so for reasons more than one. This Court in catena of Judgments has consistently held that at the time of examining the prayer for quashing of the criminal proceedings, the court exercising extra- ordinary jurisdiction can neither undertake to conduct a mini-trial nor enter into appreciation of evidence of a particular case. The correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint cannot be examined on the touchstone of the probable defence that the accused may raise to stave off the prosecution and any such misadventure by the Courts resulting in proceedings being quashed would be set aside. This Court in the case of Akhil Sharda 2022 SCC OnLine SC 820 held to the following effect:

"28. Having gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court by which the High Court has set aside the criminal proceedings in the

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exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., it appears that the High Court has virtually conducted a mini-trial, which as such is not permissible at this stage and while deciding the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions no mini-trial can be conducted by the High Court in the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. jurisdiction and at the stage of deciding the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the High Court cannot get into appreciation of evidence of the particular case being considered."

16. A similar view was taken in Maneesha Yadav's case

(supra), wherein it was held: -

"13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home(2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:

"14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of

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FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) "16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not."

17. It was submitted that Doordarshan officials were not

arrayed as parties and the proceedings against the petitioners

are not maintainable. This submission cannot be accepted. The

offence committed by the petitioners will not be obliterated

merely because Doordarshan officials were not arrayed as

parties. They had committed the offences under the Prevention

of Corruption Act and Section 120-B of the IPC. The conspiracy

stands even if all the conspirators are not brought before the

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Court. Therefore, the present petition cannot be allowed because

the officials of Doordarshan Shimla were not arrayed as parties.

18. No other point was urged.